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The present invention relates to telecommunications, digital communications, arti cial intelligence
governance, trusted computing, cryptographic enforcement, and execution-time authorization
architectures for next-generation network environments, including 5G, AI-native 6G, IMT-2030,
Open RAN, AI-RAN, cloud-to-RAN control, satellite communications, and non-terrestrial
networks.
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More particularly, the invention relates to systems and methods for preventing unauthorized
inbound communications, spam calls, robocalls, automated messages, fraudulent signalling, proxyrouted contact attempts, machine-generated communication abuse, and unauthorized protocol-layer
delivery through a Capability-Validated Inbound Descriptor (CVID) module. Unlike signaturebased caller authentication frameworks, including STIR/SHAKEN, spam-scoring systems,
reputation lters, virtual-number masking systems, caller-ID attestation mechanisms, or applicationlayer access policies, which may identify, attest, label, score, or mask a communication without
structurally preventing protocol-layer delivery, the CVID architecture withholds the cryptographic
capability required for delivery or effectuation unless session-bound authority, caller or sender
identity, declared purpose, temporal validity, revocation state, recipient permission, permitted
communication context, channel scope, usage quota, nonce freshness, jurisdictional condition, and
any required runtime governance predicate are veri ed inside a protected enforcement domain.
The CVID module provides consumable, cryptographically bound, non-bearer execution authority
that is validated before signalling, routing, ringing, delivery, session establishment, packet-core
actuation, RAN effectuation, inference release, content rendering, satellite relay, cross-border
transmission, settlement, or other irreversible communication or network effect becomes
operationally effective.
In preferred embodiments, the invention is applicable to voice calling, VoIP, SIP-based
communications, messaging, email, AI-assisted communications, multi-agent communication
systems, autonomous machine communications, distributed inference outputs, agentic RAN
management decisions, digital-twin-governed network actions, packet-core actions, OS-embedded
enterprise connectivity, Network-as-Code environments, physical AI platform communication, and
digitally mediated reachability systems in which identity, authority, purpose, duration, jurisdiction,
behavioural logic, and usage scope must remain cryptographically inseparable at the point of
execution-time enforcement.
The same hardware-rooted, fail-closed execution-time nality architecture may also be extended to
satellite communications, non-terrestrial network relay, cross-border data export control, restricted
content delivery, Central Bank Digital Currency systems, of ine or online digital settlement
systems, and other infrastructure contexts where unauthorized transmission, inference release,
content rendering, relay, actuation, or settlement must be denied before irreversible effectuation
Background
Problems Existing in the Prior Art
Problem 1 — Existing revocation-based token approaches do not control communication nality
Certain prior approaches, including CN110855672A, focus on token validity, token revocation, or
token-management logic. Such architectures may improve whether a token is regarded as current,
expired, or revoked within a software system, but they do not solve the telecom problem of predelivery communication nality. They do not transform inbound calling, signaling, or
communication reachability into a bounded authority object whose use is consumed at the protocol
path itself. Nor do they ensure that signaling, ringing, routing, message acceptance, or comparable
communication effects cannot occur unless a protected enforcement boundary releases a valid,
context-scoped communication capability.
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A revoked token and a non-consumable identi er are not equivalent design objects. In a
conventional revocation architecture, permission remains conceptually persistent until