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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Appeal No. 92 of 1953. Appeal under section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code from the Judgment and Decree dated the 8th November 1949 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 195 of 1947 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated 20th December 1946 of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur in Special Suit No. 78 of 1945. C.K.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Daphtary, Solicitor General of India (R. A. Govind, with him) for the appellants. J.B. Dadachanji, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for respondents. October 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. This appeal is from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for the possession of certain immovable properties which was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur. The value of the properties has been found to be over Rs.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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10.000. The original decree was on 20 12 1946. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was on 8 11 1949. The defendants applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950. The High Court directed the trial court to find the value of the property which was the subject matter of the suit at the time of the suit and on the date of the passing of the decree in appeal. On 22 1 1951 the lower court ascertained the value as stated above.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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'The High Court thereafter granted leave to appeal on 1 10 1951, overruling the objections raised by the plaintiff to the grant of such leave. The maintainability of this appeal has been questioned before us by Mr. Dadachanji, learned counsel for the respondents, in a somewhat lengthy argument. His main contention was that article 133 of the 874 Constitution applies to the case, and as the value is below Rs. 20,000, no appeal can be entertained. It is the correctness of this argument that we have to consider. On the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, as the properties were of the requisite value, and on 6 1 1950 they sought a certificate of leave to appeal, which was bound to be granted.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The Constitution establishing the Supreme Court as the final appellate authority for India came into force on 26 1 1950. Did the vested right become extinguished with the abolition of the Federal Court? If the court to which an appeal lies is altogether abolished without any forum substituted in its place for the disposal of pending matters or for the lodgment of appeals, the vested right perishes no doubt. We have therefore. to examine whether the Constitution which brought the Supreme Court into being makes any provision for an appeal from a reversing decree of the High Court prior to the date of the Constitution respecting properties of the value of Rs. 10,000 and more being entertained and heard by the Supreme Court.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Article 135 is in these terms: "Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to which the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do not apply if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing law". Article 133 runs as follows: "(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies (a) that the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or 875 (b)that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or (c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; and, where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub clause (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law... " It is reasonably clear that article 133 does not apply to this "matter". The language is prospective, and the judgment, decree or final order from which the appeal is to be taken is that of a High Court in the territory of India that is a High Court established under the Constitution. The territory of India comprises the territory of the States. Article 214 says that there shall be a High Court for each State, and clause (2) thereof provides that "the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to any Province immediately before the commencement of this Consti tution shall be deemed to be the High Court for the corresponding State". We can compendiously speak of the High Court prior to the Constitution and the High Court after the Constitution as the Provincial High Court and the State High Court.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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A High Court in the territory of India means a State High Court, and article 133 provides for appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of such High Court. Though article 133 does not apply, we have still to see whether it is a matter as regards which jurisdiction and powers were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the earlier enactments defining the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, and the Government of India Act, 1935 establishing the Federal Court and conferring a limited jurisdiction on the same. It is sufficient to point out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals 111 876 from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The aggrieved party had a: right to go before it, without any special leave being granted.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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It was a matter over which jurisdiction was "exercisable" by the Federal Court. The construction that it was "exercisable" only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is too narrow, and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word "exercisable" in the article. Pending matters are dealt with under article 374(2), and we must give some meaning to the provisions of article 135. As soon as the decree of the High Court came into existence, the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to bear an appeal from that decree became exercisable, provided certain conditions as to security and deposit were complied with, which are not material for our present purpose. Reference may be made here to paragraph 20 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, as amended in 1951, which provides "Nothing in this Order shall affect the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under, any existing law or any right, privilege, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred under any such law.. " By this Order section 110, Civil Procedure Code was adapted to the new situation but the requirement as to value Was raised from 10,000 to 20,000. What is provided is that this adaptation will not affect the right of appeal already accrued.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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If we accede to the argument urged by the respondents, we shall be shutting out altogether a large number of appeals, where the parties had an automatic right to go before the Federal Court before the Constitution and which we must hold was taken away from them for no fault of their own, merely because the Supreme Court came into existence in place of the Federal Court. An interpretation or 877 construction of the provisions of the Constitution which would lead to such a result should be avoided, unless inevitable. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Gundapuneedi Veeranna and three others vs Gundapuneedi China Venkanna and seven others(1) was a case where the decree of the High Court and the application for leave to appeal were both after the Constitution came into force. Whether in all matters where there was a right of appeal under section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code it continues in respect of all suits filed prior to the Constitution is a question that does not arise for decision now. On the merits, the appeal is unassailable. The family whose genealogical tree is given in the opening portion of the judgment of the trial Judge owned what may be compendiously described as Sangam properties and Peta Velapur Mahal properties, and all of them were of the nature of watan.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The Sangam lands were held by the eldest branch represented by Yeshwant Rao (son of Panduranga Rao) by right of lineal primogeniture. When Yeshwant Rao and his widow Tarabai died in November 1924, these properties went to the plaintiff Shankar Rao 's branch as the next senior in line. The Peta Velapur Mahal properties were held in three shares by Narsinga Rao, Vithal Rao and Krishna Rao, the fourth brother Shyama Rao having no right as he was insane. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 represent Krishna Rao 's branch. After Yeshwant Rao 's death, Lakshman Rao, the grandfather of defendants I and 2, filed a suit No. 1064 of 1925 for a declaration that he was the nearest heir to the Sangam properties, the Peta Velapur Mahal properties and the cash income appertaining to the inamdar 's right in Sangam.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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He got a declaratory decree that he was the nearest heir of the deceased Yeshwant Rao, and had a right in such capacity to take possession of ill the properties, excluding the inam income and the Sangam lands specified in Schedule B of the decree and a small item of property situated in the same village and specified in Schedule G. As regards the excluded items, Shankar (1) I.L.R. 878 Rao, the first defendant, (plaintiff in the present suit) was held to be the heir. On appeal to the High Court, the decree of the Subordinate Judge was confirmed, except as regards the cash allowance of three villages Nevare, Tambure and Limbagaon, which was also declared to belong to Shankar Rao. As the decree was only a declaratory decree, a fresh suit had to be filed by Narayana Rao, son of Lakshman Rao, to recover possession of the Peta Velapur Mahal properties at Mahalung, Lavang and Wafegaon. This was Civil Suit No. 2148 of 1936.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Recovery was also sought of some cash and the value of some ornaments and clothes, etc. The claim was resisted by Shankar Rao, and his main plea was that in lieu of the properties claimed, a large number of lands at Sangam had originally been given to the plaintiff 's branch, and that unless those properties were given back, the plaintiff could not claim to recover the Velapur Mahal properties. The suit ended in a compromise decree. Shankar Rao was to deliver actual possession of the lands to the plaintiff as owner together with costs and mesne profits and the plain tiff was to abandon the rest of the claim. The decree states, "The defendant has given up all the contentions in his written statement". After possession was taken of the Velapur Mahal properties under the decree, the plaintiff, Shankar Rao, brought this suit to recover from defendants I and 2 the Sangam lands to which he referred in his earlier written statement alleging that they were given to their grandfather in lieu of maintenance.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The defendants have made the answer that the items of Sangam lands claimed by the plaintiff were given to their ancestor, Krishna Rao absolutely under the deed of 1867, and that since then they had been in the enjoyment as owners thereof. The Civil Judge dismissed the plaintiff 's suit finding that the case of the plaintiff to the effect that the lands were given to Krishna Rao for maintenance under the deed of 1867 was unfounded. But on appeal by Shankar Rao (the plaintiff), the High Court reversed this decree construing the deed of 1867 as a deed under which absolute owner 879 ship was not transferred to Krishna Rao and that the specified items of Sangam lands were given to him provisionally and conditionally till Krishna Rao obtained possession of the Peta Velapur Mahal lands which were then under a mortgage. We have examined the deed closely and do not find any warrant for the view taken by the learned Judges on appeal. The deed is Exhibit No. 35, and it is printed at page 63 of the Paper Book.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The correctness of the translation is admitted. It was executed by Narsinga Rao of the first branch in favour of Krishna Rao of the last branch, predecessor in title of defendants 1 to 3. After reciting that Krishna Rao was entitled to a one third share in the income appertaining to the Deshmuki rent of the family at Peta Velapur Mahal, it proceeds to say, ".. In lieu of the land of that Mahal and in respect of the cash allowance of the Haqdari rights we have given to you for a 1/3 share of land of this Mahal the following lands from the village of Sangam which is continued with us by Vadilki right (the right of primogeniture)". The deed proceeds to set out the items by areas, assessment, and boundaries, and then goes on: "In all 6 numbers have been given by us to you in lieu of your entire income from the said Mahal. Now, five and half Pavs out of the said land are in your Vahiwat ' at present and the remaining land was to have been given over to your vahiwat, but we having formerly mortgaged the said village to Ramchandra Pandurang Deshpande, 5 'Pavs ' of land is not in your Vahiwat this day.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Hence on the expiry of 6 years, the period of the mortgage, you may carry on the entire Vahiwat of the land passed in your favour in writing as aforesaid without any hindrance. We have no claim of inheritance left on the aforesaid land". The deed concludes with a provision made for the residence of the donee in an open space in the same villagers It further states: ". There are four shops and a wada at the Kasba of Velapur, and a one third share thereof has been allotted to your share over which we have no 880 claim of inheritance left". It is obvious from this document that the one third share of Krishna Rao 's branch in the Peta Velapur Mahal properties was retained by Narasinga Rao and that in lieu thereof Krishna Rao was given six items of the Sangam properties, the whole of which could not then and there be given over into his possession and management as there was a usufructuary mortgage over a portion of the lands which was to expire after the lapse of six years from that date. The lands referred to as mortgaged are the Sangam lands and not the Peta Velapur Mahal lands as wrongly assumed by the High Court.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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There is absolutely nothing said about the properties being given for maintenance to ]Krishna Rao. On the other hand, in two places we find that any right to inheritance was given up. In fact, this case of the plaintiff was given up before the trial Judge. It is true that there was an exchange of properties, but there is nothing to warrant the view of the learned Judges that it was provisional or conditional, and that the Sangam lands were to be returned when the Velapur Mahal properties went into the possession and management of Krishna Rao 's branch. To say that such an arrangement was implied is to ignore the plain terms of the deed. The properties now in dispute are the items covered by the deed.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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They did not form the subject matter of the two previous litigations. Since 1867, the date of Exhibit No. 35 they have always been in the possession of the defendants ' branch as owners. It must also be remembered that the earlier suits of 1925 and 1936 proceeded on the basis that the defendants ' branch was the heir to the properties left by the deceased, Yeshwant Rao. There is no other question which arises for discussion or decision. It follows that, the trial Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff 's claim to recover possession of the suit properties covered by the deed of 1867 was entirely baseless.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The decree of the High Court is reversed and that of the trial Judge is restored with costs throughout payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.
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This appeal to the Supreme Court was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain immovable properties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20 12 1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff 's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949. The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6 1 1950 which was granted on 1 10 1951. One of the questions for determination was whether article 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court. Held, that article 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the "territory of India". Held further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6 1 1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted. Held also that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court 's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000. The construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under article 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is 873 too narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable ' in the Article.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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ivil Appeal No. 3388 of 1984. From the Judgment and Order dated 4.4.1989 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 1450 of 1981. A.K.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Sen, C. Sitaramiah, P.A. Chaudhary, K. Jagannatha Rao, P.R. Ramachandra Murthy, Mrs. Anjani, K. Ram Kumar, Y.P. Rao, P.S.R. Murhty, B. Kanta Rao, N.D.B. Raju, R.N.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Keshwani, R.F. Nariman, Raj Kumar Gupta, P.C. Kapur, Rajen dra Chaudhary, A. Subba Rao, K.R. Nagaraja, P.K. Rao, A.T.M. Sampath, P.N.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Ramalingam, R. Venkatramani, G. Narasimhulu, G.N. Rao and S.K. Sucharita for the Appellants. K. Parasaran, T.V.S.N. Chari, Mrs. B. Sunita Rao, Ms. Manjula Gupta and V. Sekhar for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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This is a group of matters comprising Civil Appeal No. 3388 of 1984 in this Court and other cases which have been placed before us for hearing along with this appeal. We propose to deal first with Civil Appeal No. 3388 of 1984. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 1450 of 1981.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The question involved in the appeal before the High Court from which this appeal arises was whether land which has been agreed to be sold by the owner under an agreement of sale and possession of which was delivered in part performance of the agreement.for sale but pursuant to which no conveyance had been executed till the relevant date, could be included both in the holding of the owner vendor as 223 well as the purchaser or whether it was liable to be includ ed only in the holding of the purchaser for the purposes of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act '). There are a number of connected matters where the same question is involved and which have been placed for hearing before us. In some of these cases, a part of the considera tion has been paid and in a few others, the entire consider ation has been paid. It has also been alleged that the possession of the land was transferred to the purchaser pursuant to the agreements of sale referred to. In some of these cases, lands belonging to the owners have been given on lease to tenants who are in possession thereof as les sees. In order to appreciate the controversy arising before us, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the said Act.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Before the said Act was enacted, there was in force in Andhra Pradesh an Act entitled Andhra Pradesh (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1961 which provided for the imposition of a ceiling on holdings of agricultural land. After that Act had been in force for some time, the Central Committee on Land Reforms made certain recommenda tions regarding the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and in line with this proposed policy, the said Act was enacted in 1973 to bring about comprehensive legislation for the imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings in the State of Andhra Pradesh and with a view to replace the aforesaid Act of 1961 as well as Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of Alienation Act, 1972). The object of the legislation was to take over the lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed and to distribute the same among landless and other deserving persons to subserve the common good. The said Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitu tion at Item 67 by the Constitution 34th (Amendment) Act and was protected under Article 31 A. The object of the said Act was agrarian reform. Under sub section (c) of section 3 of the said Act 'ceiling area ' is defined as under: "3(c): 'ceiling area ' means the extent of land specified in section 4 or section 4 A to be ceiling area. "
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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It may be mentioned here that the agricultural land was classified into wet land, dry land and so on and appropriate areas were fixed as ceiling in respect of such lands taking into account the nature and yield capacity of the lands in question. Section 3(i) runs as follows: 224 "3(i): 'holding ' means the entire land held by a person (i) as an owner; (ii) as a limited owner; (iii) as an usufructuary mortgagee; (iv) as a tenant; (v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by condi tional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise; or in one or more of such capacities; and the expression 'to hold land ' shall be construed accordingly; Explanation: Where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity, such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. " Section 3(m) provides that "notified date" means the date notified under sub section (3) of section 1 on which the said Act came into force. It may be mentioned that the notified date in respect of the said Act is 1.1.1975. Very briefly stated, under section 4, the ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members was prescribed as one standard holding. Where the family consisted of more than five members, there was, broadly speaking, a proportionate increase in the ceiling area.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Under section 5, the standard holding is fixed taking into account the classification of the land according to the nature of the land. Sub section (1) of section 7 runs as follows: "7(1). Special provision in respect of certain transfers, etc. already made: Where on or after the 24th January, 1971 but before the notified date, any person has transferred whether by way of sale, gift, usufructuary mortgage, exchange, settlement, surrender or in any other manner whatsoever, any land held by him or created a trust of any land held by him, then the burden of proving that such transfer or creation of trust has not been effected in anticipation of, and with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any law relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings, shall be on 225 such person, and where he has not so proved, such transfer or creation of trust, shall be disregarded for the purpose of the computation of the ceiling area of such person. " Very briefly stated, sub section (2) of section 7 pro vides inter alia that any alienation made. by way of sale, lease for a period exceeding six years, gift, exchange, usufructuary mortgage or otherwise as set out in the said sub section on or after 2nd May, 1972 and before the noti fied date in contravention of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultur al Land (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 shall be null and void.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The other sub sections also provide that in the various other circumstances set out therein alienations made will be disregarded for purposes of fixation of ceiling. Section 8 provides, in brief, that every person whose holding on the notified date together with any land trans ferred by him on or after 24th January, 1971 exceeds the specified limits, shall within 30 days from the notified date, namely 1.1. 1975 or such extended period as the Gov ernment may notify in that behalf furnish a declaration in respect of his holding to the competent Tribunal. Section 9 deals with determination of the ceiling area by the Tribunal constituted under Section 6. Section 10 deals with the surrender of lands in certain cases. Sub section (5) of the said section provides that it shall be open to the Tribunal to refuse to accept the surrender of any land as contemplated under sub section (1) or deemed surrender of land as contemplated under sub section (4) of the said section in the circumstances set out in sub section (5).
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Section 11 deals with the vesting of surrendered lands. Section 12 deals with revision and vesting of lands surrendered. The opening part of that section provides that where any land is surrendered or deemed to have been surren dered under the said Act by any usufructuary mortgagee or a tenant, the possession of such land shall, subject to such rules, as may be prescribed, revert to the owner. Sub sec tion (4) of section 12 provides that where any land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under the said Act by any person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through a part performance of con tract for sale or otherwise the possession of such land shall subject to such rules as may be prescribed, revert to the owner. Sub section (5 A) make an analogous provision in connection with lands surrendered by limited owners and provides that such surrendered lands shall revert to the person having a vested interest in the remainder. 226 Section 13 makes special provision for the exclusion from the holding of the owner of land belonging to him held by a protected tenant where such land or part thereof stands transferred to the protected tenant under Section 38A of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Before going into the merits of the contentions urged and considering the proper interpretation to be given to the relevant sections of the said Act, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the said Act is a piece of agrarian legisla tion enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distri bution of lands for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Con stitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation and not with a view to defeat the same in a strict and constricted manner in which a taxing law, for instance, might be interpreted. The main submission of learned counsel for the appel lants is that the expression 'holding ' has been defined in sub section (i) of Section 3 of the said Act, the definition section set out earlier, as meaning the entire land held by a person (emphasis supplied) and that the use of the said word "held" in the definition indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land, must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land; and hence where, in part performance of an agreement for sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the said land and it cannot be said that the said land is held by him. It was submitted by learned counsel that in view of this context although the Explanation to sub section (i) of section 3 is very widely worded, its meaning cannot be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land is no longer in possession of the land and has parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. We find it difficult to accept this contention. Clauses (i) to (v) of subsection (i) of section 3 set out the various capacities in which a person can be said to "hold" land for the purposes of the said Act and among these capacities are "as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale".
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The very language of sub section (i) of section 3 indicates that land can be held as contemplated in the said sub section by persons in a number of capacities. The Explanation in plain language states that the same land can be held by 227 one person in one capacity and by another person in a dif ferent capacity and provides that such land shall be includ ed in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be held as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. On a plain reading of the language used in the Explanation, we find it that it is not possible to accept the submission that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. Apart from what we have pointed out earlier we find that the question which arises before us in this appeal is al ready covered by the decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; The facts of the case were that out of the total holding of his land the respondent transferred some land to another person under two unregistered sale deeds pursuant to an agreement for sale and gifted.away some land to his son.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In the return submitted by him under the said Act the respondent did not include in his holding the area transferred under the unreg istered sale deeds or the land gifted by him which was in the possession of the purchaser and donee respectively. The Land Reforms Tribunal ignoring the two transfers computed his holding at 1.7692 standard holding and called upon him to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding. In revision, the High Court held that the land transferred under the two sale deeds could not be included in the hold ing of the respondent for ascertaining the ceiling area. In coming to this conclusion, the High Court gave the benefit of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to the person in possession of the plot pursuant to the contract for sale and treated the land as a part of his holding. On appeal to this court, a Division Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court reversed the decision of the High Court and held that the High Court was in error in holding that the land in the possession of the transferee cannot be taken to be a part of the holding of the respondent. It was held by this Court that the expression "held" connotes both owner ship as well as possession.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In the context of the definition it is not possible to interpret the term "holding" only in the sense of possession. The Explanation to the definition of the term "holding" clearly contemplates that the same land can be the holding of two different persons holding the land in different capacities, (See page 486). The Court went on to state that: "It is by now well settled that a person in possession pursuant to a contract for sale does not get title to the land 228 unless there is a valid document of title in his favour. In the instant case it has already been pointed out that the transferee came into possession in pursuance of an agreement for sale but no valid deed of title was executed in his favour. Therefore, the ownership remained with the respond ent transferor. But even in the absence of a valid deed of title the possession pursuant to an agreement of transfer cannot be said to be illegal and the transferee is entitled to remain in possession" The Court went on to observe that: "There may conceivably be cases where the same land is included in holding of two persons in different capacities and serious prejudice might be caused to one or both of them if they were asked to surrender the excess area.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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To safe guard the interest of the owners in such a case the legisla ture has made a provision in section 12(4) and (5) of the Act. Even so there might be cases where some prejudice might be caused to some tenure holders. " The Court further observed that: "But if the definition of the term 'holding ' is couched in clear and unambiguous language the court has to accept it as it stands. So construed the same land can be a part of the holding of various persons holding it in different capaci ties. When the terms of the definition are clear and unam biguous there is no question of taking extraneous aid for construing it. " The correctness of this decision has been upheld by this court in Begulla Bapi Raju etc.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. etc., 1 at p. 7 17. In that case one of the contentions urged on behalf of the petition ers was that land transferred by the petitioners under various transfer deeds to the outsiders and who came in possession also could not be included in the holding of the petitioners. This argument was negatived by a Bench compris ing three learned Judges of this Court, which followed the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin 's case (supra), and did not accept the plea that the decision in that case required reconsideration. The question raised for our determination in this appeal is 229 directly covered against the appellant by the decisions of this Court in two cases just referred to by us.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In these circumstances, even assuming that there is another equally plausible view regarding the construction and the legal effect of section 3(i) of the said Act read with Explana tion, that would not necessarily justify our reconsidering the question which has already been decided by this Court, although the decision was rendered by a Bench comprising only three learned Judges of this Court. In our opinion, unless we find that the decisions in the aforesaid cases are erroneous, it would not be proper on our part to reconsider the same. Apart from this, as we have pointed out earlier, in our view, considering the clear language of section 3(i) of the said Act read with Explanation to that section, the view taken in Mohd. Ashrafuddin 's case (supra) is, with respect, the correct view, and we are inclined to take the same view on the construction and legal effect of that provision. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to place reli ance on the decision of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawa da vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In that case a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that, if the owner of the land has put the transferee in possession of the land in part performance of a contract for sale, such land can be included only in the holding of the transferee and cannot simultaneously be computed in the holding of the transferor as well, for that land is not "held" by him as an "owner". It could be included in the holding of the transferor only as and when the transferee surrenders that land and that land reverts to the transferor as provided under section 12 of the said Act. The Division Bench also took the view that the expression "holding" and the expression "held by a person" occurring in section 3(i) of the said Act must be construed as taking in the idea of actual possession and not merely any right, title or interest in the land devoid of actual possession. In our view, this decision cannot be regarded as laying d,own good law and must be treated as overruled by the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Ashrafud din 's case (supra) and Begulla Bapi Raju 's case (supra). We cannot lose sight of the fact that the said Act is a piece of agrarian reform legislation passed with a view to effec tively fix a ceiling on agricultural holdings and to achieve equitable distribution of surplus land among the landless and the other deserving persons.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The plain language of section 3(i) read with Explanation supports the view taken by this Court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin 's case (supra). 1t is true that the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid judgment has given certain examples 230 where the interpretation which has been given in Mohd. Ashrafuddin 's case (supra), might lead to some hardship. That, however, in our opinion, cannot justify restricting the effect of the plain language of the relevant provisions in the manner done by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the said Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition of surplus land and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and the other deserving persons.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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It is a notorious fact that there were a large number of cases where agreements for sale or documents for lease in respect of excess lands were executed by owners of lands in excess Of the ceiling area with a view to defeat the provisions of the said Act. In fact, a perusal of the facts in the cases before us generally lends support to the existence of such a situation. In these circum stances, if the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which, on a plain reading, shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well as the owner or the lessee and the owner, we see no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision, merely because that it might possibly result in hardship in few cases. Moreover we find that, to some ex tent, the legislature has tried to mitigate this hardship by providing that, if the purchaser under the agreement of sale or the lessee has in his holding land in excess of the ceiling area, such excess would revert to the owner of the land. If the interpretation sought to be put by learned counsel for the appellants, which finds support from the aforementioned decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, were correct, we fail to see why such a provision as afore stated for reversion of excess land to the owner should have been made. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellants that if the construction placed on the said provisions by the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid judgment was accepted, it is not as if the object of the said legislation would be defeated because where an agreement for sale or agreement of lease cannot be shown to be bona fide, the land would be included in the holding of the owner.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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This circumstance. however. is of a little avail. Where such agreements for sale or of lease are executed in writing and possession is handed over to the purchaser or the lessee, it would be very difficult to show that the transaction was not bona fide although the agreement might well have been executed really with a 231 view to defeat the provisions of the said Act. We cannot lose sight of the fact that section 3(i) and the Explanation only deals with cases where the transfer of ownership is not complete and the owner does not part completely with his legal interest in the land, so that on the termination of the agreement for sale or agreement of lease without any document being registered, the land would fully revert to the owner. Moreover, in many cases, it was found that the owner of the land himself continued to cultivate the land claiming that he was doing so on behalf of his son who was the lessee or the purchaser under an agreement.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In these circumstances, we fail to see any reason to cut down the plain meaning of the provisions of section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the definition of the word 'holding ' contained in sub section (i) of section 3 was an exhaustive definition and that definition contained in the main section could not be interpreted in the light of the Explanation thereto. It was submitted by him that the meaning of the term 'holding ' and 'held ' in sub section (i) of section 3 could not be governed by the Explanation. In support of the contention, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer and Others, at pp. 914 917.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In our opinion, this decision is hardly of any assistance in the matter before us. It is well settled that the provisions in an Act have to be read harmoniously and in the light of the context in which they occur. In our opin ion, there can be no quarrel with the reliance being placed on the Explanation in order to understand the meaning of the term "holding" and "held" used in sub section (i) of section 3 of the said Act. Although some other decisions have been referred to us, we do not think any useful purpose would be served by discussing the same in view of what we have ob served earlier, nor would it serve any purpose to refer to the various examples of ownership set out in the American Jurisprudence to which our attention was drawn. In the result, in our opinion, there is no merit in the appeal and the same must fail and is dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we, however, direct that there will be no order as to costs of the appeal.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The other connected Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions have all been directed to be tagged with the aforesaid Civil Appeal disposed of by us as they involve the same points as raised in the said 232 Civil Appeal. Following our decision, the said Civil Appeals and the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed but with no order as to costs. In view of the dismissal of all the Appeals and Special Leave Petitions, the Civil Miscellaneous Petitions therein do not survive and all are dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. Appeals and P.S. S Petitions dismissed.
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Sub section (i) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land could be excluded from the holding of the owner vendor within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants as well. In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by them it was contended that use of the word 'held ' in the definition in section 3(i) indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in possession of the said land and hence where, in part per formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the Court, HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good and with a view to subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the object of the legislation. [226B C] 2.1 The very language of sub s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a person can 'hold ' land for the purposes of the Act as an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language states that the same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub section (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part performance of an agreement to sell. It cannot,,therefore, be said that only where the land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded as held by him. 1226G 227B] 2.2 The Explanation to section 3(i) was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per sons. If the legislature has used language in section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C D] 222 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Mohd. Ashrafuddin, ; applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. vs State of Andhra Pradesh etc. ;, referred to. Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. vs The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.,, distinguished. The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada vs Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over ruled.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Civil Appeal No. 668(N) of 1971, From the Judgment and order dated 14.1.1970 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 789 of 1969. E.C. Agarwala, Vijay Pandita and Atul Sharma for the Appellant.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J. This is an appeal by Special Leave against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. The facts necessary for the disposal of the Appeal can be shortly stated. The Respondent before us, who was the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, is the owner of three agricultural lands described in the judgment appealed against, situated at Talkhed, Taluk Malkapur, District Buldana in the Vidarbha area of Maharashtra. Originally, these fields belonged to one Hiralal who died in 1916. Hiralal started the construction of a dharamshala and a temple in 1912 in the said lands which construction was completed by the Respondent 's mother during the minority of the Respondent.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The Respondent 's mother also constructed another dharamshala on a separate piece of land. The facts on record show that Umaji, the father of the Appellant, was appointed a Pujari by the then landlord to worship the idols in the aforesaid temple and to look after the management of the dharamshalas on behalf of the landlord. Under an agreement with the landlord, the aforesaid three agricultural lands were cultivated by Umaji but instead of being paid in cash for the services rendered by him to the landlord in the form of looking after the management of the property and worshipping in the temple, Umaji was allowed to cultivate the said fields and to take the crops. The Appellant is the son of Umaji and records show that, after the death of Umaji, he was given the same work as Umaji on the same terms and conditions. On 674 February 12, 1963, the Appellant was served with a notice calling upon him to hand over the belongings of the temple as well as the immovable property to the Respondent. The Respondent then filed a suit for possession of the aforesaid lands in which the Appellant took a defence that he was a tenant of these lands and protected under the relevant legislation against eviction.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The issue whether the Appellant was the tenant of the said lands was framed and referred to the Tahsildar for decision. The aforesaid issue was decided in the first instance by the Naib Tahsildar. Before him the Appellant contended that he was a deemed tenant as understood under Section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Vidarbha Tenancy Act '). It was contended by the Appellant that he was in lawful cultivation of the said agricultural lands and should be declared to be a tenant. The Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated his claim that the Appellant was not a tenant. The Naib Tahsildar passed an order on November 30, 1965 holding that the Appellant was the tenant in respect of the said lands because he was lawfully cultivating the said lands which belonged to the Respondent.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Against this order the Respondent herein filed an appeal. The Sub Divisional officer, who decided the appeal, set aside the order of Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter for fresh inquiry on several issues including the issue as to how the Appellant herein came to be in possession of the said lands. The Appellant then filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal against this decision. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored the order of the Naib Tahsildar. The Tribunal took notice. Of the admission of the Respondent that the Appellant herein was cultivating the said lands lawfully and on this basis came to the conclusion that the Appellant herein was the tenant of the said lands.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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This conclusion of the Tribunal was challenged by the Respondent herein before the Bombay High Court. The learned Judge, who disposed of the Special Civil Application or writ petition noted that it was not in dispute that the Appellant was cultivating the said lands but he was doing so and appropriating the crop in lieu of payment of services which he rendered to the landlord as the Pujari worshipping the Gods in the said temple and looking after the management of the dharamshalas. Instead of being paid in cash for these services, the Appellant was allowed to cultivate the fields and take the crops thereof. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that, on these facts, the lawful cultivation of the fields by 675 the Appellant was referable to a particular contract which alone must govern the relationship between the parties. That contract constituted or created a relationship of employer and employee. It was held that the Appellant herein was an employee of the Respondent in his capacity as a Pujari and person looking after the management of the dharamshalas.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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On these facts, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Appellant herein was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and held that the decision to the contrary arrived at by the Tribunal was erroneous and liable to be set aside. The learned Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the order made by the Tribunal and the Revenue Authorities and held that the Appellant had failed to prove that he was a tenant of the said agricultural lands. It is this conclusion of the learned Judge which is challenged in this appeal. The contention of Mr. Aggarwala, learned counsel for the Appellant, is that his client was admittedly in lawful possession of the lands in question and was cultivating the same at the relevant time. In view of this, it must he held that he was a deemed tenant of the said lands under the provisions of Section 6 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and the Respondent was not entitled to evict him. It was submitted by him that the learned Judge of the High Court who disposed of the Special Leave Application was in error when he proceeded on the footing that the Appellant was not the tenant of the said lands as the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the produce was given to him and his father earlier as the Pujari of the aforesaid temple and for looking after the management of the dharamshalas and the said lands.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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It was urged by him that even if the Appellant could be said to be a servant of the Respondent, he was admittedly in lawful personal cultivation of the said lands and was not paid in cash or kind but by way of a crop share, the crop share being equivalent to the entire crop. The Respondent has not chosen to appear before us. In order to examine the correctness of the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Aggarwala, we may, at this stage, take note of the relevant provisions of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. The term 'tenant ' is defined in sub section (32) of Section 2 of that Act as follows: "(32)`tenant ' means a person who holds land on lease and includes (a) person who is deemed to be a tenant under Sections 6, 7 or 8, 676 (b) a person who is a protected lessee or occupancy tenant and the word 'landlord ' shall be cons trued accordingly". Under sub section ( 17) of Section 2, land, inter alia, means, land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes and 13 includes the sites of farm building appurtenant to such land. Subsection (1) of Section 6 which is the material provision before us runs as follows: "6.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Persons deemed to be tenants. (1) A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not (a) a member of the owner 's family, or (b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owner 's family, or (c) a mortgage in possession. " Section 41 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act deals with the right of a tenant to purchase land held by him as a tenant. Under the provisions of that Act, a tenant other than an occupancy tenant shall be entitled to purchase from the landlord the land held by him as a tenant and cultivated by him personally except whether the landlord belongs to any category specified in sub section (2). Section 46 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, inter alia, provides that with effect on and from the first day of April, 1961, the ownership of all lands held by tenants which they are entitled to purchase from their landlords under the provisions of Chapter III of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act shall stand transferred to ( i and vested in such tenants. As far as the case before us is concerned as we have already pointed out that the Appellant was admittedly cultivating the lands in question and was not a member of the landlord 's family nor was he a hired labourer.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in sub section (2) of Section 41. The aforesaid cultivation was 677 clearly lawful because the Respondent to whom the lands belonged had permitted him to do so. It is true that the record shows that this right to cultivate the land and appropriate the produce was given to the Appellant because of the services he was performing as a Pujari of the aforesaid temple of the Respondent and as he was looking after the dharamshalas. By reason of these facts, it might be said that he was cultivating the said lands as a servant of the Respondent, but he was not being paid any wages in cash or kind but by way of a crop share, the share being the entire crop. In these circumstances, he must be held to be a deemed tenant of the said lands under the provisions of Section 6 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. The fact of his cultivating the land as a servant of the Respondent would make no difference because he was being paid for his services by way of a crop share and hence was not covered by the provisions of clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section 6.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The learned Judge of the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that, merely because the Appellant was a servant of the Respondent, he could not be held to be a tenant in respect of the said lands. The learned Judge altogether failed to notice that although the appellant was a servant, he was not given wages payable either in cash or kind but by way of a crop share and hence not covered by the exception carved out by clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section 6. From the observations made by the learned Judge, it appears that he proceeded on the wrong footing that in order to be a deemed tenant, a person must show that his lawful cultivation owes its origin to some sort of tenancy. In fact, the whole aim of Section 6 is to confer deemed tenancy upon persons who are not already tenants of the land in question. We may point out that this conclusion finds some support from the decision of this Court in Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim, [ 1963] 3 S.C.R. l at pp 6 7 decided by a Bench of five learned Judges of this Court.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In that case the provision which came up for consideration was Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948, the material portion of which runs as follows. "A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not. It was held that this Act encompassed with its beneficent provisions not only tenants who held land for purpose of cultivation under contracts from the land owners but persons who are deemed to be the tenants. 678 In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the order of Naib Tahsildar, confirmed by Revenue Tribunal, is restored. There will be no order as to the costs of the Appeal.
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% Under an agreement with the respondent landlord, the appellant had been appointed to do worshipping in a temple as pujari to look after the management of two dharamshalas and to cultivate three agricultural, lands, and for all these services, he had been allowed to take crop share the whole crop from the lands cultivated by him, instead of his being paid any wages in cash. The respondent filed a suit for possession of the agricultural lands. The appellant 's defence was that he was a deemed tenant as understood under section 6 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and was in lawful cultivation of the lands. The Naib Tahsildar, who decided the suit, passed an order, holding the appellant to be a tenant. The Sub Divisional officer, in appeal by the respondent, set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar and remanded the matter. Against the order of the Sub Divisional officer, the appellant appealed in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Sub Divisional officer and restored that of the Naib Tahsildar. The respondent moved the High Court. The High Court decided that the appellant was not entitled to claim the rights of a deemed tenant, and quashed the orders of the authorities below holding the contrary view. The appellant appealed to this Court by Special Leave against the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The appellant was lawfully cultivating the lands, having been permitted to do so by the landlord. He was not a member of the landlord 's family, nor was he his hired labourer. The landlord did not belong to any of the classes specified in Sub Section (2) of section 41. The appellant was rendering service as pujari and the service of looking after the dharamshalas, and for these services, he had been given the right to cultivate the lands and appropriate the crop share the entire 673 crop instead of being paid any wages in cash. The appellant was not hit by the provisions of clause (b) of Sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act, and he must be held to be a deemed tenant under the provisions of section 6. [676G H;677B C] Dahya Lal and others vs Rasul Mohammad Abdul Rahim, ; at 6, 7, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Appeal No. 324 of 1962. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 8, 1960 of the Kerala High Court, in O. P. No. 97 of 1953. G.B. Pai, J.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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B. Dadachanji, O. C. mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. S.V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor General of India, R. Ganapathy lyer, P. D. Menon and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. April 9. The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAjENDRAGADKAR J. The short question which arises in this appeal is whether the factory run by the appellant, the Associated Industries (P) Ltd., Qulion, falls within section 1 (3) of the employees ' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (No.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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19 of 1952) (hereinafter called 'the Act '). The appellant is a Company which runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. The tile factory began its career in July, 1943, and the engineering works in 907 September, 1950. It is common ground that these two industries are separate and distinct and that they are carried on by the same Company and on the same premises. It is also common ground that a licence issued under the, has been issued to the appellant for the entire premises and it is under this licence that the said premises arc allowed to be used as one factory under the said Act and the rules framed thereunder. It appears that the respondent, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Vanchiyoor, Trivandrum, intimated to the appellant on March 10, 1953, that the Act as well as the scheme framed under it were applicable to the appellant 's factory, and so, the appellant was called upon to deposit in the SubOffice of the Imperial Bank of India the contribu tions and administrative charges as required by section 6 of the Act.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The same requisition was repeated on March 25, 1953 and April 24, 1953. The appellant disputed the correctness of the view taken by the respondent that the appellant 's factory fell under the purview of the Act, and so, it refused to comply with the respondent 's requisition. Thereupon, the respondent wrote to the appellant on June 16, 1953 informing it that appropriate action would be taken to compel the appellant to make the necessary deposit and submit returns as required by the Act in case it failed to comply with the notices issued in that behalf. At this stage, the appellant moved the High Court of Kerala by a writ petition (O. P. No. 97/1953) in which it claimed a writ of certiorari quashing the notices issued by the respondent against it, and restraining the respondent from proceeding further in the matter and for other incidental reliefs. The main contention raised by the appellant before the High Court was that the appellant 's factory was not an establishment to which section 1 (3) of the Act applied.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The High Court 908 has rejected this contention. Then it was urged before the High Court on behalf of the appellant that the effect of the notices served on the appellant by the respondent was retrospective in character and it was urged that the said notices were illegal. This argument was also rejected by the High Court. 'I he appellant further contended before the High Court that since for the relevant period the employees had not made their contributions, it would be inequitable to enforce the notices against the appellant. The High Court noticed the fact that it had been conceded by the respondent that he did not propose to collect the employees ' share of the contribution to the fund for the relevant period from the appellant, and it held that the concession so made was proper and fair and so, there was no substance in the grievance made by the appellant that giving effect to the notices served on it by the respondent would be inequitable and unjust. On these findings, the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed with costs, It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court with a certificate granted by the High Court.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The principal point which is sought to be raised by Mr. Pai on behalf of the appellant in this appeal is concluded by a recent decision of this Court in The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs (1) Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co., Bhandra, and (2) Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. (1). It would be noticed that the relevant sections which fell to be construed in dealing with the appellant 's contention are section 1 (3), section 2 (g) and (i) and section 6 of the Act. Section 1 (3) (a) provides, inter alia, that subject to the provisions contained in section 16, the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in, which 50 or more persons are employed; the numerical requirement of 50 has been reduced to 20 by an Amending Act of 1960. Section (2) (g) (1) A.1,R. 909 defines a 'factory ' as meaning any premises, including the precincts thereof, in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on, whether with the aid of power or without the aid of power; and section 2 (i) defines an 'industry ' as meaning any industry specified in Schedule I, and includes any other industry added to the Schedule by notification under section 4. Section 6 prescribes for the levy of contributions and deals with other matters which may be provided for in Schemes; and in accordance with the provisions of this section, the Employees ' Provident Fund Scheme of 1952 has been framed.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In the case of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay, (1) this Court has held that section 1 (3) (a) does not lend itself to the construction that it is confined to factories exclusively engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I. It was observed in that connection that when the legislature has described factories as factories engaged in any industry, it did not intend that the said factories should be exclusively engaged in the industry specified in Sch. I. Consistently with this view, this Court further observed that the word 'factory ' used in section 1 (3) (a) has a comprehensive meaning and it includes premises in which any manufacturing process is being carried on as described in the definition, and so the factory engaged in any industry specified in Sch. I does not necessarily mean a factory exclusively engaged in the particular industry specified in the said Schedule. in construing the scope of section 1 (3) (a) this Court held that composite factories came within its purview and that the fact that a factory is engaged in industrial activities some of which fall under the Schedule and some do not, will take the factory out of the purview of section 1 (3) (a) having dealt with this aspect of the matter, this Court proceeded to consider the question as to (1) A I. R. 910 whether numerical requirement of the employment of 50 persons, as the section then stood, applied to the factory or to the industry, and it held that the said test applied not to the industry but to the factory.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Thus, the conclusion was that in order that a factory should fall under section 1 (3) (a), it must be shown that it is engaged in any such industry as is specified in Sch. I and the number of its employees should not be less than 50. This decision makes it clear that section 1 (3) (a) is not confined only to factories which are exclusively engaged in industrial work to which Sch. I applies,but it also takes in composite factories which run industries some of which fall under Sch. I and some do not. In order to make the position clear let us state the true legal position in respect of the scope of the application of section 1 (3) (a) in categorical terms.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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If the factory carries on one industry which falls under Sch. I and satisfies the requirement as to the number of employees prescribed by the section, it clearly falls under section 1 (3) (a). If the factory carries on more than one industry all of which fell under Sch. 1 and its numerical strengh satisfies the test prescribed in that behalf, it is an establishment under section 1 (3) (a). If a factory runs more industries than one, one of which is the primary and the dominant industry and the others are its feeders and can be regarded as subsidiary, minor, or incidental industries in that sense, then the character of the dominant and primary industry will determine the question as to whether the factory is an establishment under section 1 (3) (a) or not. If the dominant and primary industry falls under Sch.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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I, the fact that the subsidiary industries do not fall under Sch. I will not help to exclude the application of section 1 (3) (a). If the dominant and primary industry does not fall under Sch. 1, but one or more subsidiary, incidental, minor and feeding industries fall under Sch. I, then section 1 (3) (a) will not apply. If the factory runs more 911 industries than one all of which are independent of each other and constitute separate and distinct industries, section 1 (3) (a) will apply to the factory even if one or more., but not all, of the industries run by the factory fall under Sch.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The question about the subsidiary, minor, or feeding industries can legitimately arise only where it is shown that the factory is really started for the purpose of running one primary industry and has undertaken other subsidiary industries only for the purpose of subserving and feeding the purposes and objects of the primary industry ; in such a case, these minor industries merely serve as departments of the primary industry; otherwise if the industries run by a factory are independent, or are not so integrated as to be treated as part of the same industry, the question about the principal and the dominant character of one industry as against the minor or subsidiary character of another industry does not fall to be considered. It is in the light of this position that we may revert to the actual decision in The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay (1). In that case, this Court was dealing with the cases of Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co., and Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. The Metal Company carried on four different kinds of activities and it was held that its industrial activity which fell under Sch. I was neither minor, nor subsidiary, nor incidental to the other activities. In other words, the industry which the company ran and which fell under Sch.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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I was independent of the other industries conducted by the Company, and so, it was held that the question about one industry being subsidiary, minor, or incidental did not arise. In the result, the Company 's factory was found to fall under section 1 (3) (a). On the other hand, the case of the Oudh Sugar Mills stood on a different basis. The primary activity (1) A. I. R. 912 of the mills was the manufacture of hydrogenated vegetable oil named 'Vanasada ' and its by products, such as soap, oil cakes, etc. It appeared that a department of the Mills manufactured containers and this part of the industrial activity of the Mills fell under Sch. I.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Evidence, however, showed that the fabrication of the containers had been undertaken by the Mills only as a feeder activity which was integrally connected with its primary business of producing and marketing vegetable oil, and since the primary business was. outside Sch. 1, the factory as a whole was held to be outside section 1 (3) (a). It is true that since this Court dealt with the two respective cases of the Company and the, Mills in one judgment, the test as to the principal character of the industrial activity of one industry in relation to the character of the minor industry came to be considered ; but the application of the said test became necessary essentially because of the case of the Oudh Sugar Mills. In the case of the Company, however, the several activities were not minor or subsidiary, but were independent, and it was held that the factory of the company fell under section 1 (3) (a). Therefore, in our opinion, there is no scope for the argument in the present case that the engineering industry which the appellant runs is not the primary or dominant industry but the manufacture of tiles is.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Mr. Pai attempted to argue that though engineering industry run by the appellant 's factory falls under Sch. I,it employs only 24 workers whereas the tiles industry employs more than 50. He also relied on that fact that the tiles factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950, and his argument was that judged in the light of the fact that the tiles industry was started first, as well as considered by the application of the test of the strength of the employees working in the two industries,tiles industry should be treated to be the main, dominant and primary industry of the factory, and so, the factory, as a 913 whole, should be held to be outside section 1 (3) (a). In our opinion, this argument is plainly untenable. If the tiles industry and the engineering industry are independent of each other, then no question arises as to which is principal and which is subsidiary. As soon as it is shown that the factory is carrying on two industries independent of each other one of which falls under Sch.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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I, it becomes a composite factory to which section 1 (3) (a) applies. When section 1 (3) (a) requires that the factory should be engaged in any industry specified in Sch. I, considerations as to whether the industrial activity is major or minor can arise only where some activities are dominant and others are of the nature of feeding activities, but not otherwise. Where the industrial activities are independent and the factory is running separate industries within the same premises and as part of the same establishment and under same licence, it is difficult to accept the argument that in dealing with such a factory, enquiry would be relevant as to which of the industries is dominant and primary, and which is not. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was plainly right in rejecting the appellant 's case that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act. Mr. Pai wanted to contend that if the appellant 's factory is treated as falling under section 1 (3) (a), complications may arise by reason of the fact that the rate of contribution initially prescribed by section 6 has been amended in 1962 by the Amending Act No.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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48 of 1962. Section 6 of the unamended Act provides, inter alia, that the contribution to be paid by the employer to the fund shall be 6 1/4% of the basic wages, dearness allowance and retaining allowance, if any, for the time being payable to each of the employees, and the employees ' contribution shall be equal to the contribution payable by the employer in respect of him. This section further provided that the employee was competent to 914 make a higher contribution not exceeding 8 and one third per cent of his emoluments specified in the said section. By the amendment made in 1962, this rate has been enhanced to 8% in respect of any establishment or class of establishments which the Central Government, after making such enquiry as it deems fit, may by notification in the official Gazette specify. We were told that in regard to the engineering industry., this amended sub section has been extended by a notification, and Mr. Pai 's apprehension is that if the factory of the appellant is held to be an establishment to which section 1 (3) (a) applies on the ground that it is a composite factory Which runs several industries one of which falls under Sch. I, it is likely that the increased rate may be made applicable to the factory as a whole.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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We ought to add that Mr. Pai conceded that subsequent to the decision of the appellant 's writ petition in the High Court, the tiles industry has also been included in Sch. I. but the revised rate has been made applicable to it. Mr. Pai contends that if the factory is treated as falling under section 1 (3) (1), a distinction should be made in the different industries run by the factory for the purpose of calculating the contribution of the employer to the Provident Fund. We do not propose to deal with this contention in the present appeal. That is a matter which may well have to be decided by the respondent, and it is not open to Mr. Pai to request this Court to decide such a hypothetical question in the present proceedings. The result is,, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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The appellant runs a tile factory and an engineering works at Quilon. These two industries are indepedent of each other, but they arc carried on by the same company and on the same premises. The tile factory was started in 1943 and the engineering works in 1950. The engineering industry was included in Schedule I of the Act and it employed only 24 workers, whereas the tile industry employed more than 50. The license issued to the appellant under the, was for the entire premises. The appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court in which he alleged that its factory did not attract the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) of the Employees ' Provident Funds Act 1952. The 'writ petition was dismissed with costs. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court. Held (i) that a factory is an "establishment" within the meaning of section 1 (3) (a) of the Act if it satisfies the requirements of the section, namely, (1) that its one or all industries fall under Schedule I of the Act, (2) that it satisfies the numerical strength as prescribed under the section. (ii)that the character of the dominant or primary industry will determine the question of the application of section I (3) (a) if a factory carries on both the dominant and subsidiary industries. (iii)That if the factory runs more industries than one an of 'which are independent of each other, section I (3) (a) will 906 apply to the factory even if one or more, but not all, of the industries run by it fall under Shedule I. (iv)that neither the tile industry was dominant nor the engineering industry was subsidiary; rather both the industries were independent of each other. (v)that the factory of the appellant will be deemed to be a composite factory and the provisions of section 1 (3) (a) will be attracted as one of its industries i. e. engineering industry, falls under Schedule I. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay vs Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara [1962] Supp.3 section C. R. 815, approved.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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ivil Appeal No. 2041 of 1972. From the Judgment and Decree dated 5.11.1971 of the Gujarat High Court in First Appeal No. 693 of 1964. Harish N. Salve, S.A. Shroff, S.S. Shardul and R. Sasi prabhu for the Appellant. S.T.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Desai and M.N. Shroff for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. This appeal on certificate brought from the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat dated July 3, 1972 raises a question whether the High Court was justi fied in reversing the decision of the District Judge, Suren dranagar dated March 19, 1964 and restoring the order of the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, State of Gujarat dated February 1, 1962 upholding that of the Deputy Charity Com missioner, Ahmedabad holding that the two temples of Sri Dwarkadhishji and Sri Trikamrayji at Patadi were temples as defined in section 2(17) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and therefore they fell within the purview of the expression 'public trust ' within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Act. The facts giving rise to the appeal may be shortly stated. The appellant is a former ruler of the semi juris dictional State of Patadi, one of the 17 States which en tered into a covenant for the formation of the United State of Kathiawad which on the reorganisation of the States became part of the former State of Bombay and now forms part of the State of Gujarat.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region including the area that formed part of the erstwhile State of Patadi in the year 1952. In Patadi, which was the seat of the former Ruler, there exist two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir or Haveli which is the main temple and adjacent to it there is the smaller temple known as Sri Trikamrayji Mandir. Both these temples were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respectively by the then ruler of Patadi and the cost of construction was met from the Patadi State Treasury. The temples are situated on the main road in Patadi and do not form part of the Darbargadh or the palace wherein the ruler and the members of the royal family used to reside, although there exists a passage leading to the public road presumably meant for the use of the ladies of the royal family. In the Gram Panchayat records Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir or Haveli stands in the name of the deities and the appellant is merely shown as a Vahivatdar. Similarly, Sri Trikamrayji Mandir is shown as the property of the deities and the appellant as a Vahivatdar.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The two temples were exempted from payment of municipal as well as other taxes including the land revenue presumably because they were public tem ples. This is one of the decisive factors in determining whether a temple is a private or a public one. It appears that the management of the temples remained throughout with the successive ruler of Patadi but that circumstance would not afford an indicia of ownership of the temples being vested in the rulers. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the temples were throughout treated as places of public religious worship and the public in general and members of the Vaishnava sect in particular were regu larly worshipping in the temples as a matter of right ever since the installation of the deities and also taking part in the ceremonial festivals like 'Hindola ' and 'Annakut ' and making cash offerings of bhends, gifts of ornaments etc. The evidence also discloses that nobody was required to take permission from the darbar before entering into the temples for darshan and worship, nor was there any obstruction made at any point of time except after the initiation of the proceedings from the appellant or the manager and/or his servants to the use of the temples by the public as of right. The cash offerings or 914 bhents, gifts or ornaments etc.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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made by the general public and members of the Vaishnava sect were kept in a golak at Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir under the exclusive control of the Vaishnava sect and remittances were made to Goswami Maharaj, Acharya of the Vaishnava sect at Ahmedabad. Even after the Act was extended to the erstwhile State of Patadi, the public in general and the members of the Vaishnava sect in particular had unrestricted right of worship at the temples. Sometime in the year 1958 the inhab itants of Patadi made a complaint to the Charity Commission er that there were several items of public religious and charitable endowments under the possession and control of the appellant and he was appropriating the income and prof its thereof. Thereupon the Deputy Charity Commissioner suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the Act and issued show cause notice to the appellant. In answer to the show cause notice the appellant filed a reply admitting the existence of some public trusts and agreed to get them registered as such under section 18 of the Act and thereafter made an application. He however pleaded that the two temples in question and the properties appurtenant thereto as well as a public library were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family and were not public trusts.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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During the inquiry, several wit nesses were examined on behalf of the public as well as by the appellant. The appellant however did not enter the witness box but examined his chief darbari NatwarIal Ranch hodlal. The Deputy Charity Commissioner by his order dated January 29, 1960 on the totality of the evidence came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were therefore temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and these temples togeth er with the properties appurtenant thereto have constituted public religious trusts within the meaning of section 2(13). The appellant being dissatisfied carried an appeal to the Chari ty Commissioner who by his order dated February 1, 1962 upheld the finding reached by the Deputy Charity Commission er. Aggrieved, the appellant made an application under section 72 of the Act before the District Judge, Surendranagar for setting aside the order of the Charity Commissioner. The learned District Judge disagreed with the finding reached by the Charity Commissioner and held that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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He held that the question as to whether the temples in question were dedicated to the public depends upon inferences which could legitimately be drawn from facts not in 915 dispute and observed that a dedication to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and descendants. However, it was abundantly clear that the temples which undoubtedly have been constructed by the then ruler of Patadi adjacent to the Darbargadh were meant for the worship of the family deities of the founder and his family. The temples were constructed by the then ruler of Patadi, the management of which exclusively remained with the ruler for the time being, and there was nothing to show that they were intended for the use of the public at large for an indeterminate though restricted class of the Hindu community in general. According to the learned District Judge, the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowments and that the Department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. Thereupon, the Deputy Charity Commissioner preferred an appeal under section 72(4) of the Act to the High Court. Disa greeing with the learned District Judge the High Court has come to the conclusion following the decision of this Court in Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; that the two temples were places of public religious worship used as of right by the Vaishnavas and observed: "The circumstance that the public or a section thereof have been regularly worshipping in the temples as a matter of course and they could take part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in that temple as appears from the record, apparently as a matter of right, is a strong piece of evidence to establish the public character of the temple. "
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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** ** ** "There is nothing on record to indicate that in the long past in Patadi, any ruler had put any restriction on the use of the temples for Darshan over a fairly long period during which the members of the public have visited the temples as if they were their temples and this establishes their right. Such a consistent and unobstructed user must be taken as of right. It is well known that those who go for 'Dar shan ' and/or 'Puja ' do not and generally have no occasion to assert their right. It is not shown that the right was ever obstructed. " ** ** ** "Although there was a sort of private passage running from 916 the Darbargadh leading to the public road, presumably meant for the use of the 'Pardana shin ' ladies of the royal family, this would not indicate that the temples were attached to the Darbargadh or were reserved for the exclu sive use of the ruler and the members of the royal family. " The High Court on a consideration of the evidence brought out two circumstances, namely, (1) The general public and particularly the members of the Vaishnava sect had unre stricted right of worship at the temples as a matter of course and participated in the festivals of 'Hindola ' and 'Annakut ' functions and sewa at Sri Dwarkadhishji Temple and daily darshan and worship at the other temple which, by itself, was a strong piece of evidence to establish the public character of the temples.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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And (2) The cash offerings or bhents, gifts of ornaments etc. On consideration of the evidence in the case, particularly the two circumstances adverted to read in conjunction with the evidence as to the way in which the temple endowments had been dealt with and the evidence as to the public user of the temples, the High Court came to the conclusion that they were temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act which clearly fell within the ambit of the expression 'public trust' under section 2(13) It repelled the contention of the appellant that the temples were the pri vate temples of the ruler and members of the royal family, observing: "These two relevant circumstances go to show that the two temples which were places of public religious worship were used as of right by the Vaishnavas.(supra). There is no evidence on record to show that the temples were treated as private property and that the income from the offerings made at the temples was merged with the State funds, much less treated as the private income of respondent No. 1 (ex Ruler). There is also no evidence to show that the temples were at any time closed down on any occasion so as to exclude the public from worship when the members of the Ruler 's family visited the temple or temples on any other family occasion." 917 "The mere management of the temples being with the successive rulers of Patadi would not afford an indicia to show the ownership of temples as having been vested in the Rulers.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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It is well known that in the princely regimes, a citizen would not ordinarily interfere with the management of such properties being made by the then Ruler. His evidence that the darbar if it thinks fit can obstruct any person from entering into the temples introduced in the examination in chief is not dependable. He has in his cross examination admitted that prior to the enquiry proceed ings, nobody was required to take permission before entering the 'Haveli ' and the Mandir for 'Darshan ' and worship. This would go to show that there was no obstruction made at any point of time by the Darbar and his manager and/or his servants to the use of the temples by the public as of right. " ** ** ** "Even if it be assumed that the temples had originated as private temples, although the case as urged by Mr. Chhaya is that the origin is unknown or lost in antiquity, there is good evidence to show that the temples were being used as public temples. Taking an inte grated view of the circumstances aforesaid, as appear from the relevant evidence on record, in our opinion, it must be held that the Vaishnavas were regularly worshipping in the temples as a matter of course and they took part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in the temples and outside apparently as a matter of right."
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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** ** ** "The mere fact that the successive Darbars of the rulers were the managers of the temples would not go to show that the temples were private trust properties. The circumstances aforesaid lead to a reasonable inference that although the origin of the temples was at the instance of 918 then Ruler of the Patadi State, the funds which went for the construction of the temples were the funds of the State and, at least gradually in course of time, there was dedica tion of the temples for the benefit of the Vaishnav community as places of public wor ship. " We thought that on the overwhelming evidence on record both oral and dOcumentary no other conclusion than the one reached by the High Court was possible. The question whether the temples had been dedicated to the public or were the private property of the appellant was essentially a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record and the findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner were clearly unassailable. Where in a case like the present, the creation of the trust is not lost in antiquity or shrouded in obscurity, the temples having admittedly been constructed by the appellant 's ancestor must, in the absence of a formal document of endowment, be regarded as the private temples of the founder and the members of the royal family, from the fact that the appel lant and his predecessors have throughout been in management of the same. The findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner that the temples were places of public religious worship and were temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and fell within the purview of the expression 'public trust ' as defined in section 2(13), are therefore vitiated due to misplac ing of that burden.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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(3) The High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples merely because of the circumstance that there was proof of long user of the temples by the public particularly by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance or the fact that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat the temples were recorded in the names of 919 the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. According to the learned counsel, these circum stances were non sequitur. He relied upon Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn., paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, and Radhakanta Deb & Anr.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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As to the first, there is very strong and clear evidence to establish that there was dedi cation of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use or benefit of the public. "Endowment" is dedication of property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of every kind and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system. Under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a `juristic entity ', vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. The Hindu law recognises dedica tions for the establishment of the image of a deity and for maintenance and worship thereof. The property so dedicated to a pious purpose is placed extra commercium and is enti tled to special protection at the hands of the Sovereign whose duty it is to intervene to prevent fraud and waste in dealing with religious endowments.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. It would be a legitimate inference to draw that the founder of the temple had dedicated it to the public if it is found that he had held out the temple to be a public one: Pujari Lakshmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44. In view ' of this, the contention that there is no evi dence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit or use of the public or a section thereof, cannot therefore prevail. On the contrary, the evidence discloses that although the temples had been constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, the cost of their construction was met from out of the public 920 exchequer and that the income from the offerings made by the worshippers at the shrine in the form of bhents and gifts of ornaments etc. That evidence clearly establishes that the temples were intended and meant by the founder for the benefit and use of the public. As to the second, undoubtedly the burden was on the Charity Commis sioner to establish the existence of a public endowment and that burden the Charity Commissioner has discharged by unimpeachable evidence of long and uninterrupted user of the temples by the general public and particularly by members of the Vaishnava sect.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner that the temples were places of public religious worship within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Act is not vitiated by displacing of that burden but the finding reached by them is based on a proper appreciation of the evidence. As to the third conten tion, we would presently deal with the circumstances brought out in the evidence which lead to no other conclusion than the one arrived at by the Charity Commissioner and the High Court, that the temples constructed 'by the appellant 's ancestor were for the benefit of the community at large and the members of the Vaishnava sect in particular and that they had an unrestricted right of worship. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endowment made by a private individual is a public endow ment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the appli cation of legal concepts of a public and private endowment to the facts found in each particular case. Facts and cir cumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedication of a temple as a public temple, must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship therein, etc. In the present case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public exchequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription and therefore the High Court and the Charity Commissioner rightly inferred existence of a public endow ment.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Such an inference was strengthened by the fact of user of the temples by the public or a section thereof, as of right for over a century. The general effect of the evidence is that the appellant as well as his predecessors although in management, had throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. 921 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The dis tinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. The distinction is succinctly brought out in Mula 's Hindu Law in para 424 at pp. 544 545 in these words: "Religious endowments are either public or private.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In a public endowment the dedication is for the use or benefit of the public. The essential distinction between a public and a private endowment is that in the former the beneficial interest is vested in an uncertain and a fluctuating body of persons, either the public at large or some considerable portion of it answering a particular description; in a private endowment the beneficiaries are defi nite and ascertained individuals or who within a definite time can be definitely ascertained. The fact that the fluctuating and uncertain body of persons is a section of the public following a particular religious faith or is only a sect of persons of a certain religious persuasion would not make it a private endow ment. The essence of a public endowment con sists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. Besides user by the public, conduct of the founder and his descendants is also relevant, and if they in fact held out the temple to be a public one a very strong pre sumption of dedication would arise. " It therefore follows that the principles are well settled.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family i.e. an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large of a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. We do not think that it would serve any purpose to refer to all the 922 well known decisions except a few. In Pujari Lakshmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar (supra), the temple was not an ancient one and there was no deed of endowment. The question was whether the temple was a public temple or a private temple.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Although the temple was a private temple, the evi dence disclosed that the Pujari Lakshmana Goundan, the founder of the temple had held out and represented to the Hindu public in general that the temple was a public temple at which all Hindus might worship. Sir John Edge, in deliv ering the judgment of the Privy Council held that on that evidence the Judicial Committee had no hesitation in drawing the inference that the founder had dedicated the temple to the public, as it was found that he had held out the temple as a public temple. Another Privy Council decision to which we need refer is that of Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1 where the grant was made to one Daryao Gir and his heirs in perpetuity and the evidence showed that the temple and the properties attached thereto had throughout been treated by the members of the family as their private property appropriating to themselves the rents and profits thereof. Sir George Rankin, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council held that the fact that the grant was made to an individual and his heirs in perpetuity was not reconcila ble with the view that the grantor was in effect making a wakf for a Hindu religious purpose. That very distinguished Judge referred to the earlier decisions in Pujari Lakshar nana Goundan 's case, and observed: "Their Lordships do not consider that the case before them is in general outline the same as the case of the Madras temple,, in which it was held that the founder who had enlarged the house in which the idol had been installed by him, constructed circular roads for processions, built a rest house in the village for worshippers, and so forth, had held out and represented to the Hindu public that it was a public temple." The true test as laid down by this Court speaking through Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; in determining whether a temple is a private or a public temple, depends on whether the public at large or a section thereof, 'had an unrestricted right of worship ' and observed: "When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of worshippers, the 923 question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified indi viduals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof." The learned Judge distinguished the decision of the Privy Council in Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, (supra) on the ground that properties in that case were granted not in favour of an idol or temple but in favour of the founder who was maintaining the temple and to his heirs in perpetuity, and said: "But, in the present case. the endowment was in favour of the idol itself, and the point for decision is whether it was private or public endowment. And in such circumstances, proof of user by the public without interfer ence would be cogent evidence that the dedica tion was in favour of the public. " It was also observed while distinguishing the Privy Council decision in Babu Bhagwan Din 's case that it was unusual for rulers to make grant to a family idol. In Deoki Nandan 's case the Court referred to several factors as an indicia of the temple being a public one viz.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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the fact that the idol is installed not within the precincts of residential quarters but in a separate building constructed for that purpose on a vacant site, the installation of the idols within the temple precincts, the performance of pooja by an archaka appointed from time to time for the purpose, the construction of the temple by public contribution, user of the temple by the public without interference, etc. The next important decision is that of Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561 where a Constitution Bench of this Court had to consider whether the famous Nathdwara Temple which is held in great reverence by the Hindus in general and members of the Vaishnava followers of the Vallabha Sampradaya in par ticular was a public temple. It was held that neither the tenets nor the religious practice at the Vallabha School necessarily postulate that the followers of the denomination must worship in a private temple. The Court observed that the question whether a Hindu temple is private or public must necessarily be considered in the light of the relevant facts relating to it as well as the accepted principles laid down by several judicial decisions, and it was said: 924 "A temple belonging to a family which is a private temple is not unknown to Hindu law. In the case of a private temple it is also not unlikely that the religious reputation of the founder may be of such a high order that the private temple rounded by him may attract devotees in large number and the mere fact that a large number of devotees are allowed to worship in the temple would not necessarily make the private temple a public temple. On the other hand, a public temple can be built by subscriptions raised by the public and a deity installed to enable all the members of the public to offer worship.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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In such a case, the temple would clearly be a public temple." "Where evidence in regard to the foundation of the temple is not clearly avail able, sometimes, judicial decisions rely on certain other facts which are treated as relevant. Is the temple built in such an imposing manner that it may prima facie appear to be a public temple? The appearance of the temple of course cannot be a decisive factor; at best it may be a relevant factor. Are the members of the public entitled to an entry in the temple? Are they entitled to take part in offering service and taking Darshan in the temple?
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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Are the members of the public entitled to take part in the festivals and ceremonies arranged in the temple? Are their offerings accepted as a matter of right?" It was then laid down that the participation of the members of the public in the Darshan in the temple and in the daily acts of worship or in the celebrations of festival occasions would be a very strong factor in determining the character of the temple. Another significant decision is that of Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors. (supra) where the question arose whether the Haveli of Nadiad where the idol of Sri Gokulnathji was installed which is wor shipped by the Vaishnava devotees of the Vallabha cult is a private or public temple on the ground of dedication, and it was laid down: "In brief the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of gifts received by it, rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship therein, the consciousness of the manager and the consciousness of the devotees themselves as to the public 925 character of the temple are factors that go to establish whether a temple is a public temple or a private temple. " See also: Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, 18 and Radhakanta Deb & Anr.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj ofBaroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, [1986] 4 SCC.162 and Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Maha raj, Junagad vs Collector of Junagad District & Ors., ; We have carefully gone through the evidence of the witnesses examined by the Deputy Charity Commissioner as also the finding reached by him as well as by the Charity Commissioner which finding has been upheld by the High Court while reversing the decision of the learned District Judge. We find no substance in the contention advanced. There are overwhelming circumstances brought out in the order of the Charity Commissioner as well as in the judgment of the High Court and no other conclusion is possible than the one reached by them that the temples in question were public religious trusts within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Act. The learned District Judge in interfering with the order was largely influenced by the fact that the management of the temples throughout remained with the ruler for the time being and while adverting to the other circumstances held that there was no evidence that the temples were dedicated to the public at large or to a sec tion thereof and that the other circumstances brought out in the evidence viz. public user for the past over 100 years without any let or hinderance, the fact that the members of the Hindu community in general and members of the Vaishnava sect in particular were allowed to visit the temples for worship and make their offerings, or that the temples stand recorded in the names of the deities in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat with appellant shown as a Vahivatdar, were not sufficient to draw an inference that the temples were places of public religious worship. In coming to that conclusion he relied upon the decision 926 of the Privy Council in Babu Bhagwan Din 's case (supra) as also of this Court in Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji 's case.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The underlying fallacy in the judgment of the learned District Judge is that he proceeds on the assumption that there was no dedication of the temples express or implied by the founder for the benefit or use of the pub lic. Several circumstances are brought out by the Charity Commissioner and the High Court showing that the temples were public temples, namely: (1) Although the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor way back in 1872 and 1875, there was positive evidence showing that the entire cost of construction was met from the public exchequer i.e. Patadi State Treasury. (2) The general public and particu larly the members of the Vaishnava sect had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples and participated in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in the temples right from the very inception, as it appears from the record, apparent ly as a matter of right without any let or hinderance on the part of the appellant or his predecessors. (3) The Hindu worshippers at the temples in general and members of the Vaishnava sect in particular made cash offerings of bhents into the golak kept at Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir or Haveli which was under the exclusive control of the members of the Vaishnava sect and the remittances of it used to be made to Goswami Maharaj, Acharya of Vaishnava sect at Ahmedabad. (4) The public records showed that the temples stand recorded in the names of the deities, the appellant and his predecessors shown as mere Vahivatdars.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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It was an undisputed fact that separate accounts being maintained in respect of the income and expenditure of the temples i.e. the cash offerings, gifts of ornaments etc.were not intermingled with the monies belonging to the appellant or the members of the royal family and the incomes from the temples were utilised for their upkeep and maintenance and also for acquisition of properties attached to the temples (5) The State used to keep apart a share of vaje i.e. Darbar 's share of the crops grown by the cultivators and also used to impose and collect tola, a cess from the cultivators for the upkeep and mainte nance of the temples. That evidence shows that the public at large and members of the Vaishnava sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by the contributions made by the public particularly by the devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. In course of time the tem 927 ples particularly Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir or HaveIi at tracted a large number of worshippers and they used to participate in the religious festivals and ceremonies per formed there. The evidence of the witnesses also shows that the deities were taken out in a palanquin by members of the Vaishnava sect and it was joined by the general public.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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The temples though adjacent to the Darbargadh were not in the precincts of the palace but were constructed facing a public road allowing access to the general public. All these cir cumstances clearly support the finding reached by the Chari ty Commissioner and the High Court that the temples were public temples and therefore public religious trusts within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and the temples with the properties attached thereto were not the private properties of the appellant or the members of his family. The only factor relied upon by the learned District Judge was that the management of the temples remained with the ruler for the time being but then the Court has to come a conclusion not on one single factor alone but on a conspectus of all the relevant factors i.e.1 upon an appreciation of all the facts and circumstances appearing. In the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. N.P.V. Appeal dis missed.
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At Patadi in the erstwhile State of Patadi in the Sau rashtra region of Gujarat State there were two temples known as Sri Dwarkadhishji Mandir and Sri Trikamrayji Mandir, which were constructed in the years 1872 and 1875 respec tively by the then ruler with funds from the State Treasury. In the Gram Panchayat records the temples stood in the name of the deities, and the appellant, the former ruler of the State, was shown as a Vahivatdar. The temples were exempted from payment of municipal and other taxes including land revenue. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was extended to the Saurashtra region of Gujarat State in the year 1952. The Deputy Charity Commissioner, sometime in 1958, suo motu initiated proceedings under section 19 of the above named Act, and issued show cause notice to the appellant, who was Vahivatdar of the temples. The appellant pleaded that the temples and the properties appurtenant thereto were private properties of the ruler and the members of the royal family, and were not public trusts. After examining witnesses, the Deputy Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the shrines had been dedicated as places of public religious worship and were, therefore, temples within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act, and that the temples together with the properties appurtenant thereto constituted public religious trust within the meaning of section 2(13). These findings were upheld by the Charity Commissioner. On an application under section 72 of the Act, the District Judge held 910 that there was no clear, cogent or satisfactory evidence of the existence of a public endowment, that the question whether the temples were dedicated to the public may be inferred from a long course of conduct of the founders and the descendants, and that the mere fact that the public was allowed access to the temples was not conclusive as to the nature of the endowment and that the department had failed to discharge the burden of showing that they were public endowments. The department appealed to the High Court which held that the temples fell within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act and were, therefore, within the ambit of the expression "public trust" under section 2(13). In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that there was no evidence to establish that there was dedication of the temples by the appellant 's ancestor for the use and benefit of the public, that the findings reached by the High Court and the Charity Commissioner were vitiated due to misplacing of the burden to establish the existence of public endowment, and that the High Court was in error in holding that the temples were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor for the benefit of the community at large and that the general public or a particular section thereof, had an unrestricted right of worship at the temples, merely because there was proof of long user by the members of the Vaishnava sect without any let or hinderance, that in the revenue records and the register of the gram panchayat, the temples were recorded in the names of the deities with the appellant shown as a mere Vahivatdar, and that separate accounts were kept in respect of the temples. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The findings arrived at by the High Court as well as the Charity Commissioner that the temples were 'public temples ' and, therefore, 'public religious trusts ' within the meaning of section 2(17) read with section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and not the private proper ties of the appellant or the members of his family are unassailable. [927C] 1.2 The question whether the temples had been dedicated or were the private property of the appellant was essential ly a matter of inference to be drawn from the other facts on record. There is clear, consistent, reliable and unimpeacha ble evidence to establish that although the temples in question were constructed by the appellant 's ancestor, he had intended and meant that they were for the use and bene fit of the 911 public, that the public at large and members of the Vaishna va sect had been worshipping at the temples as of right for the last over 100 years and that the temples had all along been primarily maintained by contributions made by the public particularly devotees belonging to the Vaishnava sect. [918C, 926G H] 2.1 The essence of a public endowment consists in its being dedicated to the public; and in the absence of any document creating the endowment, long user is the material factor from which an inference of dedication may arise. The distinction between a private and public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi viduals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. [921A B] 2.2 When property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the members who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be members of the family. But where the beneficiaries are not the members of a family or specified individuals but the public at large or a specified portion thereof, then the endowment can only be regarded as public intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. [921G] 2.3 Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. In the absence of a written grant, the question whether an endow ment made by a private individual is a public endowment or a private one is a mixed question of fact and law and the scope of dedication must be determined on the application of legal concepts of public and private endowment. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as proof of dedica tion must be considered in their historical setting viz. the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received, the rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship there in, etc. [919F, 920E F] In the instant case, the temples were constructed at public expenditure by meeting the cost of construction from the public ex chequer and the upkeep and maintenance of the temples was met by public subscription. The High Court and the Charity Commissioner therefore, rightly inferred exist ence of a public endowment. Such an inference was strength ened by the fact of user by the public as of right for over a century. The appellant as well as his predecessors al though in management, have throughout treated the temples as public temples of which they were mere Vahivatdars. The finding reached by the High Court and the Charity Commis sioner is based on a proper appreciation of the 912 evidence. All the circumstances clearly support the finding. [920G H, C, 927B] Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs Rannchhoddas Kalidas & Ors., ; ; Nar Hari Sastri & Ors. vs Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, ; ; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, ; Radhakanta Deb & Anr. vs Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, ; ; Pujari Lakashmana Goundan vs Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44; Babu Bhagwan Din vs Gir Har Saroop, LR 1939 67 IA 1; Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar, ; ; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa, owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs The Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay, ; ; Hari Bhanu Maharaj of Baroda vs Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ; Heir of deceased Maharaj Purshottamlalji Mahara], Junagad vs Collec tor of Junagad District & Ors., ; and Mulla 's Hindu Law, 15th edn., para 424 at pp. 544 545, Mukherjea 's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts, 5th edn. paras 4.36 to 4.40 at pp. 185 190, referred to.
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What is the summary of this judgment?
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N: Criminal Appeal No. 105 of 1978 with W.P. No. 833 of 1978. (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dt. 27.9.77 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Spl.
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The appellant was detained under the in September, 1974 but was released in December, 1974. In February, 1977 he was detained under section 3(1) of the, on the ground that he was "likely to engage in transporting smuggled goods". One of the grounds of.detention stated: "you were an associate of a notorious smuggler, that you were engaged in piloting smuggled goods loaded in trucks from the place of landing. " In support of the above, two instances were mentioned: one relating to an incident on 6th August, 1974 and another on 25th August, 1974. In the appellant 's writ petition the High Court observed (1) that although some of the activities attributed to the detenu related to August 1974, the fact that the detenu was in illegal employment of a notorious smuggler under detention clearly indicated that there was connection between him and the smuggler and (2) that a reasonable nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention could not be said to have been snapped by the time lag rendering the impugned order of detention as one without genuine satisfaction of the detaining authoritY. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the order of detention was bad, in that it disclosed that the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was mechanical and without application of his mind. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: (1) It is clear from the record that the instances alleged do not relate to any incident after 1974 but only relate to the activities of the detenu in 1973 and 1974. Even though information about the activities of the detenu during the year 1974 came to light in october and November, 1976, a fresh order of detention under the Act was not passed till February, 1977. If the authorities were in possession of any activities of the detenu after his release in December, 1974 action would have been taken. it is only the statements that.were recorded in october and November 1976 which led the authorities to pass a fresh order of detention in February, 1977. From the statements recorded in october and November, 1976 no incidents are shown to have taken place after 1974. [262B; 263C D] 258 (2) Whether the time lag between August 1974 and February 1977 is enough to snap the reasonable nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention would depend upon the facts of the case. If the detaining authority had come to the conclusion, taking into account the past activities of the detenu, that he was likely to continue to indulge in his unlawful activities in future there would be no justification for this Court to interfere. It is quite likely that persons who are totally involved in such activities as smuggling can cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority that they are likely to continue in their unlawful activities. But in the instant case the detaining authority passing the order has not stated that he was satisfied that the detenu was likely to engage in transporting smuggled goods. What he has stated was that the detenu "engages" or is "likely to engage" in transporting smuggled goods. There was no material before the detaining authority for coming to the conclusion that the detenu was "engaging" himself in unlawful activities. [263F; 264A C]
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