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What is the summary of this judgment?	section 320(1) in terms creates a statutory bar against illegal encroachment on any portion of a public street. It provides that "No person shall, except with the permission of the Commissioner granted in this behalf, erect or set up any booth or other structure whether fixed or movable or whether of a permanent or temporary nature, or any fixture in or upon any street etc". Having regard to this express provision, the High Court failed to see that the respondent Gurnam kaur had no legally enforceable right to the grant of a writ or direction in the nature of mandamus. The High Court could not obviously issue any such direction which would be tantamount to a breach of the law. Furthermore the High Court could not also make the impugned direction in view of the provision contained in section 322(a) of the Act, which expressly confers power on the Commissioner to cause the removal of any structure which constitutes an encroachment on a public place like a street which is meant for the use of the pedestrains. It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 'sdecision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das 'case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which PG NO 938 was acceptable by all the parties concerned.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The Court no doubt made incidental observation to the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in article 38(2) of the Constitution and said: "Article 38(2) of the Constitution mandates the State to strive to minimise, amongst others, the inequalities in facilities and opportunities amongst individuals. One who tries to survive by one 's own labour has to be encouraged because for want of opportunity destitution may disturb the conscience of the society. Here are persons carrying on some paltry trade in an open space in the scorching heat of Delhi sun freezing cold or torrential rain. They are being denied continuance at that place under the specious plea that they constitute an obstruction to easy access to hospitals. A little more space in the access to the hospital may be welcomed but not at the cost of someone being deprived of his very source of livelihood so as to swell the rank of the fast growing unemployed. As far as possible this should be avoided which we propose to do by this short order. "	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	This indeed was a very noble sentiment but incapable of being implemented in a fast growing city like the metropolitan City of Delhi where public streets are overcrowded and the pavement squatters create a hazard to the vehicular traffic and cause obstruction to the pedestrians on the pavement. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavement or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	So far as the order shows, no argument was addressed to the Court on the question or not whether any direction could properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation to construct a stall at the pitching site of a PG NO 939 pavement squatter. Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of the Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th edn. explains the concept of sub silentio at p. 153 in these words: "A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. The Court may consciously decide in favour of one party because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B in his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by the court.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	In such circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and although the case had a specific outcome, the decision is not an authority on point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio. In Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (k)., [1936] 2 All E.R. 905 (C.A. ), the only point argued was on the question of priority of the claimant 's debt, and, on this argument being heard, the Court granted the order.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	No consideration was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an account standing in the name of the liquidator. When, therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith, Ltd., the Court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., said that he could not help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. We went on to say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could make the order which it did; nevertheless, since it was decided "without argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule, and without any citation of authority", it was not binding and would not be followed. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule has ever since been followed.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority. PG NO 940 At the end of the day, we must make a mention that Shri Verghese, learned counsel for the respondent made a valiant effort to bring into play the principles laid down by this Court in Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; We are afraid, we cannot permit the question to be raised for two reasons. In the first place, no such point was taken in the writ petition nor any contention advanced before the High Court that the removal of the illegal encroachment by the Municipal Corporation constitutes a threat to life and liberty guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution or that the right to life includes a right to livelihood. Secondly, the rights of the parties now stand crystallized by the aforementioned judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in the suit brought by the respondent, and the rights have to be worked out in terms of the decree passed by him which has since become final. Besides, the decision in Olga Tellis is of little avail. Chandrachud, CJ. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed that the word 'life ' in article 21 included livelihood, but upheld the validity of sections 313(1) and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which provided that the Commissioner may 'without notice, cause to be removed ' obstructions as an encroachment on footpaths could not be regarded as unreasonable, unfair or unjust.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The learned Chief Justice however said that the section conferred a discretionary power which like all power must be exercised reasonably and in conformity with the provisions of our Constitution. In Bombay Hawkers ' Union, Chandrachud, CJ. speaking for himself and one of us (Sen, J.) held that the impugned provision was in the nature of a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public, on the exercise of the right of hawkers to carry on their trade or business. The learned Chief Justice added: "No one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance, annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public. Public streets are meant for the use of the general public and cannot be used to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business. "	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	These cases undoubtedly raise a human problem and both the Delhi Development Authority as well as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi should seek to evolve an innovative plan to rehabilitate the unfortunate persons who by force of circumstances are forced to ply their trade by squatting in the open on the pavements. At the same time, these pavement squatters create a serious problem to the civic administration as it creates congestion on the public streets and obstructs free flow of traffic. As Chandrachud, PG NO 941 CJ. rightly observed in Bombay Hawkers ' Union: "No one has a right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance, annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public", and further that "All public streets are meant for the use of the general public and cannot be used to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business". We feel that the Municipal Corporation authorities in consultation with the Delhi Development Authority should endeavour to find a solution on the lines as suggested in Bombay Hawkers ' Union i.e. by creating Hawking and Non Hawking Zones and shifting the pavement squatters to areas other than Non Howking Zones.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The authorities in devising a scheme must endeavour to achieve a twin object viz., to preserve and maintain the beauty and the grandeur of this great historic city of Delhi from an aesthetic point of view, by reducing congestion on the public streets and removing all encroachments which cause obstruction to the free flow of traffic, and rehabilitate those unfortunate persons who by force of circumstances, are made to ply their trade or business on pavements or public streets. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed. We direct however that the appellant Municipal Corporation of Delhi shall act in conformity with the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, II Class, Delhi in the aforementioned suits, which, not having been appealed from, has since become final inter partes. No costs.	Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. These persons filed suits in the Court of Subordinate Judge praying for perpetual injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with their business and/or removing or demolishing any temporary structures put up by them for plying their trade. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the plaintiffs ' main claim seeking a declaration that the Municipal Corporation had no right or authority to remove the stalls built up by them. He however held that by virtue of the Tehbazari licence granted in their favour the plaintiffs had acquired the right to occupy and carry on business at the suit sites till their licence was not terminated by the Corporation according to the procedure laid down in proviso (a)(ii) of Sub Section of Section 430 of the Act. Two of the squatters namely Jamuna Das and his brother filed writ petitions in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable site on pavement in front of the main gate of the hospital. (Jamna Das & Anr. vs PG NO 929 PG NO 930 Delhi Administration & Ors., Writ Petition Nos. 981 982 of 1984.) This Court directed that the petitioners be rehabilitated by the Municipal Corporation by construction of stalls according to the sketch plan filed by the Corporation with a further direction that each of them would be put in possession of one of the stalls. The Court made it clear that this was a consent order and that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. The respondent, who was one of the plaintiffs who had filed suits in the court of Subordinate Judge, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ and direction restraining the Corporation from evicting her without the due process of law. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the judgment of the Learned Subordinate Judge which was a judgment inter partes had become final not having been appealed from and therefore the respondent could not be removed from pitching her stall on the pavement outside the hospital where she was squatting. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jamuna Das ' case the High Court gave an option to the Corporation either to construct the stall similar to the one they have constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamuna Das ' case or in the alternative furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build her own stall accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by this Judgment of the High Court, the Municipal Corporation filed this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD: The Learned Judges of the High Court failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das ' case made a direction with the consent of parties and with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section 320 of the Act as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court could not have made the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in sections 320 and 322 of the Act. [937A C It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law ' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge 's decision PG NO 931 binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das ' case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the Court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. [937F H; 938A] Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das ' case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. [938F G ] A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. [938G H] Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fitzgerald, 12th Ed.; Gerard vs Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. vs Bremith Ltd.,, referred to. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule 'has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedents is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement. having the weight of authority. [939G H] PG NO 932 Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ; and Bombay Hawkers ' Union & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., ;, referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	il Appeal No. 3 107 of 1991. From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8. 1990 of the Gauhati High Court in Civil Rule No. 407 of 1985. H.N.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Salve. K.S. Parihar and H.S. Parihar for the Appellant. P.K. Goswami, Kailash Vasdev and M.J. Paul for the Respondents.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J. Special Ieave granted. Counsel heard. 462 This is an appeal filed by the Reserve Bank of India, by special leave. The contesting respondent, being respondent No. 1, is an association of its officers at its Gauhati unit.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	The respondent association (referred to hereinafter as "the respondent") represents the interests of 45 officers belonging to Grades A to C employed in the appellant bank at its unit at Gauhati. It appears from the affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant that there was difficulty in per suading officers of the appellant posted outside the North Eastern region to accept transfers to the unit of the appel lant in the North Eastern part of the country which unit was located at Gauhati in Assam. It also emerges from the record that the Gauhati station was regarded as a hardship station by the officers who were transferred to the Gauhati unit from other regions of the country. The Government of India found a similar difficulty in persuading its officers to accept postings in the NorthEastern region and they were given substantial incentives to accept transfers to the North Eastern region. We are not here concerned directly with the actual benefits granted by the Government of India but what is material is that such benefits had to be given by the Government of India. By a letter dated December 9, 1983, certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its officers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern regions.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Those allowances were gener ally known as special duty allowances. We are not much concerned with the details as to how the special duty allow ances were calculated but the main special duty allowance basically comprised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. These allowances were also known as special compensatory allowances or remote locality allow ances. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an adhoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the adhoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The re spondent demanded the extension of the said benefit to the local officers by its letter dated May 10, 1985. We may mention here that the local officers who were posted at the Gauhati did get an extra allowance in addition to their salaries but it was considerably smaller than the main compensatory allowance paid to the officers from outside the NorthEastern region who were transferred to Gauhati.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Certain other benefits were also allowed to non local officers transferred to Gauhati but there is no need to refer to them in detail. The appellant declined to allow the same allow ances to local officers posted at Gauhati as were given to the officers from other regions transferred to Gauhati as stated earlier. It is this decision which gave rise to the writ petition from the decision in which this appeal arises. 463 It was the contention of the respondent before the Gauhati High Court that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allow ance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gauhati. In the coun ter filed in the High Court by the appellant bank, the Deputy Chief Officer of the appellant bank averted that the hardships faced by the non local officers are greater than those faced by the local officers. The scheme of adhoc incentives was introduced to tide 'over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experi enced by them on transfer to Gauhati. It was clarified that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecu lier circumstances prevailing at the moment in the North Eastern region which was regarded as a difficult region. It was accepted that considerable difficulties would have to be suffered by the officers posted there who hailed from places outside the NorthEastern region. The contention of the appellant bank failed to find favour with the High Court which took the view that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and it pointed out that, for example, even officers from outside from Tripura who were posted at Gauhati would suffer almost the same degree of hardship as officers transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern regions although Tripu ra was in the North Eastern region. The High Court took the view that the local officers of the appellant bank, Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers trans ferred to Gauhati. It is the correctness of the view taken by the High Court which is sought to be impugned before us in this appeal.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	We are of the opinion that the High Court was, with respect, in error in taking the view that officers from the North Eastern region who were posted at Gauhati. either on transfer or otherwise, sufferred the same hardships as officers from other regions transferred to Gauhati. The hardship and inconvenience sufferred by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region, would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gau hati. His mother tongue might completely be different in speech and, even as far as the script is concerned, from the 464 language used by the local people at Gauhati. He and his family members would, therefore. find it very difficult to communicate freely with the local people.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	His children might find it difficult to get admission to a school and pursue their education at Gauhati. They would be unfamiliar with the surroundings and the customs of the people. The hard ships faced by an officer say from the Western or Southern regions of India or North India posted at Gauhati would be qualitatively as well as quantitatively greater than the hardships faced by the local officers posted at Gauhati. It may be that some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardships when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allow ance, exclusively to officers transferred from distant regions discriminatory and bad in law. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in coming to the conclusion that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati sufferred from the same degree of hardship. A person trans ferred from outside the North Eastern region to Gauhati would normally have to face more severe difficulties than an officer from the North Eastern region posted in Gauhati or, at the least, the appellant bank could reasonably take that view.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Moreover, as pointed out by the appellant bank in the counter that they were finding it difficult to persuade their officers from outside to accept transfers to Gauhati and it is common knowledge that an office of a large bank cannot be run efficiently by officers a large number of whom have been posted there by transfers against their will and under the threat of disciplinary action. The work done by them could hardly be expected to be satisfactory. After all, the appellant, the Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institution and if in the interest of efficiency and proper working it bona fide took the decision, in the circumstances set out earlier, to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to main tain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, in our opin ion, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The writ petition filed by respond ent No. 1 is dismissed.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	There will be no order as to costs throughout. V.P.R. Appeal allowed.	By a letter dated December 9, 1983 certain incentives and allowances were provided by the appellant to its offi cers posted at Gauhati who were not from the North Eastern region. Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances and the main special duty allowance com prised 25% of basic pay, subject to a maximum of Rs.400 per month. By a Memorandum issued by the appellant on April 11, 1985, an ad hoc increase in salary was effected for non local officers and an option was given to them either to choose the ad hoc increase or the special duty allowances for the period during which they were posted at Gauhati. The respondent demanded the extension of the said bene fits to the local officers by their letter dated May 10, 1985. When the appellant bank declined to allow the benefits to the local officers, the respondent association challenged the Memorandum dated April 11, 1985 in a writ petition in the High Court, contending that all the officers of the appellant bank posted at Gauhati, whether they were from the North Eastern region or outside had to live in the same conditions and suffer from the same hardships, and hence, if any allowance was given to the officers transferred from outside to the Gauhati Office, the very same allowance should also be given to the local officers posted at Gau hati. The appellant bank averred in its counter that the scheme of ad hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Gauhati office; that the non local officers experienced difficulties in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on, and some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Gauhati; that the said incentives were temporary and because of the pecul iar circumstances 461 prevailing at the moment in. the North Eastern region, which was regarded as a difficult region. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that all officers at Gauhati suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the local officers of the appellant bank at Gauhati were discriminated against and directed that they must be given the same benefits as the non local officers transferred to Gauhati. Allowing the appeal by special leave filed by the.bank, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The hardship and inconveniences suffered by an officer of the appellant bank who was transferred to Gauhati from regions other than the North Eastern region would certainly be more acute than those suffered by local officers posted at Gauhati. [463G H] 1.02. Some of the officers coming from the North Eastern region may also face considerable hardship when posted at Gauhati but the fact that there might be a few such officers would not render the payment of special allowance, exclu sively to officers transferred from distant regions discrim inatory and bad in law. [464B C] 1.03. The Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institu tion and if in the interest of efficiency and proper work ing, it bona fide took the decision to grant some extra benefits to the non local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination. [464E F]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Appeal No. 235 of 1954. On Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th day of February 1953 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 120 of 1952 arising out of the Order dated the II the day of September, 1952 of the said High Court in its Ordinary Original Jurisdiction in Misc. Application No. 216 of 1952.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India (B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant. Sri Narain Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the respondent. 20 1956. January 17.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAMJ. By an order dated 12th May 1952, hereinafter referred to as the impugned order the Government of the State of Bombay requisitioned under section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act, the premises specified therein. The impugned order, so far as it is relevant to the present appeal, stated, "Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) the Government of Bombay is pleased to requisition the said part of the building for a public purpose, namely, for housing an Officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service". The respondent filed a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court and the application was beard by Tendolkar, J. who set aside the impugned order. Against his decision the appellant appealed and a Division Bench of the said Court affirmed the decision of Tendolkar, J. The present appeal is by special leave against the decision of the High Court.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The principal ground upon which the impugned order was set aside was that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been validly made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On behalf of the appellant, the Attorney General has urged that in the circumstances of the present case, the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court. In support of his submission he relied upon certain provisions of the (LXIV of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Hamabai Framjee Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council(1) and the decisions of this Court in (1) [1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44. 21 The State of Bombay vs Bhanji Munji and Another(1) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan (Civil Appeal No.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	229 of 1953) decided on the 4th of October 1955(2). On the other hand, Mr. Andley, on behalf of the respondent, contended that to requisition the premises to house an employee of the State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, could not be regarded as a public purpose because that was a matter in which the general interest of the community was not directly and vitally concerned. He urged that although their Lordships of the Privy Council rightly approved the observations of Batchelor, J. concerning the expression 'public purpose ', they erred in their decision in Hamabai 's case. In any event, Hamabai 's case could be distinguished as in that case there was a scheme for constructing houses for Government servants generally and not procuring residential accommodation for one particular individual. The validity of the impugned order was also questioned by him on the ground that nothing had been established to prove that by housing an officer of the Corporation in the requisitioned premises the needs or the purposes of the Corporation would be served or that it would contribute to the efficiency of the officer concerned. Before Tendolkar, J. two points bad been raised (1) that no enquiry, as required by section 5 of the Requisition Act, was held and (2) that the impugned order was invalid as the requisition was not for a public purpose.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The former question was decided against the respondent while the latter was decided in his favour. In appeal, the first point does not appear to have been put forward as there is no reference to it in the judgments of the learned Judges of the Division Bench. In this Court the only point argued was as to whether the requisition was for a public purpose or not. Before proceeding to consider that question it is necessary to make some reference to the purpose for which the Corporation is established, its compo. sition, the extent of control exercised by the State Government over it and its activities. (1) (2) ; 22 It was not disputed before us that the Corporation is a public utility concern and is governed by the provisions of the Act.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The purpose for which the Corporation was created may be gathered from the provisions of section 3 of the Act which enables a State Government to establish a Road Transport Corporation having regard to the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of road transport, the desirability of coordinating any form of road transport with any other form of transport and the desirability of extending and improving the facilities for road transport in any area and of providing an efficient and economical system of road transport service. The Corporation consists of a Chairman and members appointed by the State Government who are removable by that authority. Where capital is subscribed by the issue of shares under section 23 of the Act provision is made for the representation of the share holders in the Corporation and the manner in which they are to be elected in accordance with rules to be framed under the Act. Its Chief Executive Officer or General Manager and its Chief Accounts Officer are to be appointed by the State Government. The other officers and servants are to be appointed by the Corporation but the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay shall be determined by regulations made under the Act subject to the provisions of section 34, which authorises the State Government to issue directions and general instructions to the Corporation and these instructions may include directions relating to the recruitment and conditions of service. The Corporation is under the effective control of the State Government.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	In addition to what has already been mentioned when referring to the composition of the Corporation, the capital of the Corporation may be provided by the Central and State Governments in such proportion as is agreed between them. When no such capital is provided, the Corporation may raise capital, as is authorised by the State Government, by issue of shares. These shares are guaran 23 teed by that Government. The budget of the Corporation has to be submitted to the State Government for approval and its accounts are to be audited by an auditor appointed by that Government. The balance of the net profits, after providing for various matters mentioned in section 30 of the Act, is to be made over to the State Government for the purpose of road development. The Corporation can be superseded by the State Government or that Government may, after an enquiry under section 36, authorize a person by notification in the official Gazette to take over the Corporation and administer its affairs during the period the notification is in force.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The activities of the Corporation are manifold in pursuit of which there is a statutory duty to so exercise its powers as to provide, secure or promote the provision of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated system of road transport in the State or part of it and in any extended area (vide section 18 of the Act). The powers of the Corporation are stated in section 19 of the Act. These powers, although not exhaustive, cover a wide field. Particular reference need be made only to some of them. Section 19(1) provides: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Corporation shall have power: (a).... (b).... (c)to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including fair wages, establishment of provident fund, living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities". Section 19(2) excluding the explanation to clause (a) and some clauses with which we are not immediately concerned, states, "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the powers conferred by subsection (1) shall include power: (a) to manufacture, purchase, maintain and repair rolling stock, vehicles, appliances, plant, equipment or any other thing required for the purpose of any of the activities of the Corporation referred to in sub section (1).	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	24 (b) to acquire and hold such property, both movable and immovable, as the Corporation may deem necessary for the purpose of any of the said activities and to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any property held by it. (d) to purchase by agreement or to take on lease or under any form of tenancy any land and to erect thereon such buildings as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying on its undertaking. " The provisions of the Act read as a whole lead us to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose. Indeed the learned Judges of the High Court were of this opinion and Mr. Andley did not contend to the contrary. According to him, in this case., the requisition was not for the Corporation but for an employee of the Corporation and for his convenience which could not be a public purpose. The expression 'public purpose ' has been considered in many cases and it is unnecessary to refer to them except the three cases cited by the Attorney General.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	In Hamabai 's case(1) the observation of Batchelor, J. to the effect "General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purposes ' in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned" received the approval of the Privy Council. Their Lordships, however, rejected the contention that there cannot be a 'public purpose ' in taking land if that land when taken is no it in some way or other made available to the public at large. This contention had been raised because the Government had resumed lands, which had been the subject of a lease and a sana, the terms of which permitted the Government to resume the lands for any public purpose, with a view to erect (1) [1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44. 25 thereon dwelling houses for the use of Government officials as their private residence on adequate rent.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The concluding portion of the judgment of the Privy Council is important and needs to be quoted. It stated, "But here, so far from holding them to be wrong, the whole of the learned judges, who are thorough conversant with the conditions of Indian life, say that they are satisfied that the scheme is one which will redound to public benefit by helping the Government to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From such a conclusion their Lordships would be slow to differ, and upon its own statement it commends itself to their judgment". In Bhanji Munji 's case(1) the requisition was for housing a person having no housing accommodation. After considering the affidavits, the facts and the circumstances of the case, Bose, J. observed "The Constitution authorizes requisition for a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for the homeless.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	If, therefore, a vacancy is allotted to a person who is in fact homeless, the purpose is fulfilled". In Ali Gulshan 's case(2) the requisition was for the purpose of housing a member of the staff of a foreign Consulate. This Court held that the requisition was for a State purpose, which it is needless to say must be regarded as a public purpose. An examination of these and other cases leads us to the conclusion that it is impossible to precisely define the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined in order to determine whether a 'public purpose ' has been established Prima facie the Government is the best judge as to whether 'public purpose ' is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the sole judge. The courts have the jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter whenever a question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a 'Public purpose '.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The cases of Hamabai, Bbanji Munji and Ali Gulshan are merely illustrative. In each of them primarily the person directly and vitally concerned would be the person to whom the residential accommodation would be (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777. (2) ;, 4 26 allotted with which prima facie the general interest of the community would not be directly concerned at all. We must regard Hamabai 's case as a decision to the,effect that the general interest of the community was directly and vitallyconcerned with the efficiency of the Government servants because it would be to its benefit to have such servants and, therefore, providing living accommodation for them was a public purpose. The decision in Bhan Munji 's case must be read as one in which the general interest of the community was directly and vitally concerned with pre vention of lawlessness and disease and to house the homeless in order to avoid such a contingency was a public purpose.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	In Ali Gulshan 's case a State purpose was served because the State Government was interested in its own trade or commerce and in the efficient discharge of his duties by a foreign Consul who would be concerned with such trade or commerce. In the present case it is possible to construe the impugned order as a requisition on behalf of the Corporation as it does not name any individual for whom the requisition is being made. In other words the requisitioned premises were at the disposal of the Corporation to house one of its officers to be named later on. Apart from that, there is a statutory power in the Corporation under section 19 (1) (c) of the Act to provide living accommodation for its employees and under section 14 the Corporation appoints such number of its officers and servants as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Corporation appoints only such officers as are needed for the efficient discharge of its functions and that the State Government was requested to requisition some premises as living accommodation for one of them whose posting at Bombay was necessary. Indeed the affidavit of Mr. Nadkarni, Accommodation Officer of the Government of Bombay, states that the official of the Corporation has to perform his duties in Bombay.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	Having regard to the provisions of section 19 (2) (a) and (b) of the Act, the power in the Corporation 27 to provide living accommodation for its employees must be regarded, as one of its statutory activities undersection 19(1). Theword 'acquire ' may include the power to purchase by agreement but is wide enough to enable the Corporation to request the State Government to acquire property under the Land Acquisition Act (I of ] 894) in order to provide living accommodation for its employees. The activities of the Corporation under section 19 (1) are so interlinked with its successful functioning as a Road Transport Corporation that requisitioning or acquisition of property to advance and ensure those activities must be regarded as for a public purpose. It would not be sufficient to merely establish the Corporation. It has to have an adequate and efficient staff, living accommodation forwhom would be an absolute need of the Corporation. Its officers have to be efficient in the discharge oftheir duties, for upon them depends the successful working of the road transport system upon which the public must rely and thus it would be directly and vitally concerned with the efficiency of 'the employees of the Corporation.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	It was suggested that a line must be drawn somewhere, otherwise there was no guarantee to what lengths the powers of requisition might be exercised by the Government. It is sufficient to say that each case would have to be decided upon the facts and the circumstances ap pearing therein. Here the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the community is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and its undertaking. A breakdown in the Organisation of the Corporation, leading to dislocation of the road transport system would create a chaotic condition to the detriment of the interest of the community. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the road transport system and it must, therefore, be held that the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. In the result the appeal is allowed and the decision 28 of the High Court is set aside.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	Costs in the appeal in this Court shall be paid by the appellant to the respondent as directed by the order granting Special Leave. Each party, however, will bear his own costs in the High Court.	In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under section 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose ' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose '. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide section 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee. Petit vs Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay vs Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.
What is the summary of this judgment?	N: Criminal Appeal No. 260 of 1972. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 22.3.1972 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 1971. R.L. Kohli, Ramesh Kohli, Naresh K. Sharma and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	M. N. Phadke, H. R. Khanna and R. N. Poddar for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. After hearing counsel for the parties, by virtue of our Order dated October 4, 1983, we had allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused appellant. We now proceed to give the reasons for the said Order. The appellant was convicted by the High Court under section 408 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code in respect of criminal breach of 799 trust with regard to several items which have been detailed in the judgment of the High Court. The appellant was also convicted under sections 471 and 467 read with section 109 of the I.P.C.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Under the first count (section 408) the appellant was sentenced to two years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1000, in default of payment of fine, further six months R.I. Under the second count (section 471) he was sentenced to imprisonment for one year. The High Court further convicted the appellant under s.409 I.P.C. for having committed breach of trust in respect of certain oil engines and sentenced him to 3 years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1000, in default of payment of fine, imprisonment for six months.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Thus, the sum total of the sentences under various sections mentioned above comes to five years but as the sentences have been made to run concurrently, the total sentences would be three years apart from the fine. The learned Sessions Judge had acquitted the appellant holding that the charges framed against him were not proved but the High Court in an appeal by the State of Gujarat reversed the decision of the Sessions Judge and set aside the appellant 's acquittal and convicted him as aforementioned. The facts of the case have been detailed in the judgments of the High Court and the Sessions Judge with clarity and lucidity and need not be repeated all over again except so far as they are relevant for the purpose of deciding the appeal. There was an organisation known as 'Jasdan Taluka Sahkari Kharid Vechan Sangh Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Sangh ') which was like an autonomous cooperative society directly within the control and supervision of the Government. The appellant was the chairman of the Sangh and the other members of the Sangh consisted of two categories, viz., members nominated by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and those elected by the Sangh itself. The managing Committee of the Sangh consisted of 8 members out of whom the appellant was the Chairman and A 2 was the Manager while the Tehsildar was the ex officio Member of the Sangh.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Having received a number of complaints against the Sangh, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies ordered one V. B. Shah to act as special auditor and examine and audit the accounts of the Sangh for the year 1965 66. On the basis of the audit report, the Managing Committee was superseded and an administrator was appointed. Meanwhile the Sangh moved the High Court to obtain a stay order against the appointment of the 800 administrator as a result of which the appointment of the administrator was stayed for some time and the stay was vacated in July 1966. Subsequently, one M. K. Parikh was appointed an administrator. The police after usual investigation submitted chargesheet under section 120B, IPC against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. So far as the appellant is concerned he was never charged under the sections mentioned earlier.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	The charge of conspiracy failed and the Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused except A 3 who was convicted under s.408 to R.I. for two years and a fine of Rs.1000. In the instant case, we are only concerned with the appellant who was Chairman of the Managing Committee. Mr. Phadke, learned counsel for the respondent, has very fairly conceded that excepting 3 items he would not press the case of the prosecution against the appellant. These items are mentioned at page 154 of the paper book and may be extracted as follows: (1) Item about purchase of the truck; (2) Item about purchase of fertilisers; (3) Items of the amounts of Rs. 600 and 1100 received by accused No. 3 after the audit was done; (4) non finding of five oil engines by the administrator when he took over charge.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	So far as item No. (1) is concerned, the High Court itself found that there was absolutely no legal evidence to connect the appellant with the purchase of the truck and so far as misappropriation by the appellant in regard to this item is concerned that stands disproved. Coming to the other three items, viz., purchase of fertilisers, the amounts of Rs. 600 and Rs. 1100 and the missing of five oil engines, these formed the basis of the conviction of the appellant by the High Court. Mr. Phadke conceded that he would not press the case with respect to item No.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	(1) but would try to show that so far as items (2) to (4) are concerned the case has been fully proved against the appellant. 801 Having gone through the judgment of the High Court we find ourselves unable to accept the argument of Mr. Phadke. The counsel for the appellant rightly argued with great force and vehemence that taking the findings of the High Court ex facie no case of defalcation of Items (2) to (4) has been made out. In our opinion, the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. With due respect what the High Court seems to have missed is that in a case like this where there was serious defalcation of the properties of the Sangh, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the dual charges particularly against the appellant (A 1)The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappears. The only ground on the basis of which the High Court.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	has convicted him is that as he was the chairman of the Managing Committee, he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. The High Court, however, has not referred to the concept of vicarious liability but the findings of the High Court seem to indicate that this was the central idea in the mind of the High Court for convicting the appellant. in a criminal case of such a serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded and once the charge of conspiracy failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to items 2, 3 and 4. It is conceded by Mr Phadke that no such direct evidence is forthcoming and he tried to argue that as the appellant was chairman of the Sangh and used to sign papers and approve various tenders, even as a matter of routine he should have acted with care and caution and his negligence would be a positive proof of his intention to commit the offence. We are however unable to agree with this somewhat broad statement of the law. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him criminally liable in a vicarious sense for items 2 to 4.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. Similar is the case with the other two items. Indeed, if the chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz, Tehsildar and other nominated members, would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberations of the meetings of the Committee, a conclusion 802 which has not even been suggested by the prosecution. As chairman of the Sangh the appellant had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details of every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. in fact, the hero of the entire show seems to be A 3 who had so stage managed the drama as to shield his guilt and bring the appellant in the forefront. But they by itself would not be conclusive evidence against the appellant.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	There is nothing to show that A 3 had either directly or indirectly informed the appellant regarding the illegal purchase of fertilisers or the missing of the five oil engines which came to light much later during the course of the audit. Far from proving the intention the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant had any knowledge of defalcation of items 2 to 4, In fact, so far as item 3 is concerned, even Mr. Phadke conceded that there is no direct evidence to connect the appellant. In these circumstances, we do not find any justification for the High Court to have interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge in favour of the appellant and having considered the fact and circumstances of the case, we are clearly of the opinion that the case against the appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. Even putting the prosecution case at the highest it cannot be said that two views are not reasonably possible, For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences imposed by the High Court and acquit the appellant of the charges framed against him. The appellant will now be discharged from his bail bonds and need not surrender. N.V.K.	The appellant was the Chairman of an autonomous cooperative society under the control and supervision of the State Government. On receipt of complaints about the financial management of the Society, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed a special auditor to audit the Society 's accounts. On the basis of the audit report a charge sheet was filed against all the accused for entering into a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust. The conspiracy charge having failed, all the accused except one were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the appellant in respect of three items, namely, purchase of fertilisers involving two transactions and missing of certain oil engines, on the ground that as Chairman of the Managing Committee he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that no case of defalcation had been made out against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the appellant 's acquittal. The case against the appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802 D E] 798 2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the properties, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the charges against the appellant. The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappeared. [801 B C] 3. In a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E] 4. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him liable in a vicarious sense. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. If the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and other nominated members would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberation of the meetings of the Committee. The appellant as Chairman of the Sangh, had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details or every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G H; 802 A B]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Case No. 275 of 1951. Appeal under article 132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated April 11, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Das Gupta and Mookerjee JJ.) in Criminal Revision Case No. 1028 of 1950 arising out of the Order dated November 23, 1950, of the Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta, in P. R. Case No. 2107 of 1950.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	N.C. Chakravarti for the appellant. B.Sen for the respondent. M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India (P. A. Mehta, with him), for the intervener. December 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	This is an appeal under article 132 (1) of the Constitution. Leave to appeal was granted by the High Court at Calcutta. 84 646 The appellant was convicted under section 7 (1) of essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946 for an offence said to have been committed on the 24th of October, 1950 The conviction was on At two counts: (1) for selling cloth above the controlled rate and (2) for not issuing a cash memo. The sentence was rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs. 200 with another three months in default. The trial was before the 8th Presidency Magistrate at Calcutta who adopted a summary procedure.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	There was an application for revision before the High Court but it was dismissed. An application for leave to appeal to this Court was then filed. It was granted on a ground which was not taken either in the original court or in the revision before the High Court, namely that the Essential Supplies Act of 1946 under which the appellant was convicted was not in force on the 24th of October, 1950, and so there could be no conviction under it. The validity of this Act was challenged in Joylal Agarwala vs The State(1) but this Court he Id that the Act was valid up to the 31st of March, 1950, that being the life of the Act at the date relevant to that case. It is necessary to explain that the Act is a temporary Act and that its life has been extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry for a year at a time. The latest extension at the date of the previous case was up to the 31st of March, 1950.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	We therefore start with the position that the Act was a good Act up till that date. The Act was further extended up till the 31st of March, 1951, by a resolution dated the 20th of December, 1949. This is the extension with which we are concerned and which is now challenged, the argument being that there was no legislative body in existence on that date competent to extend the life of the Act for another year. The Gazette notification setting out the resolution is in the following terms (1) ; 647 `` New Delhi, the 22nd December, 1949. No. F. 7 WL (1) 47.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The following resolution which wag passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at its meeting held on the 20th of December, 1949, is hereby published for general information : In pursuance of the proviso to section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, this Assembly hereby approves the extension of the period mentioned in sections 2 and 3 of the said Act for a further period of twelve months commencing on the first day of April, 1950. " It has to be seen whether the body which passed that resolution had the power to extend the Act. It can be accepted, because of the decision in Joylal Agarwala vs The State(1), that the Constituent Assembly had authority on 25th of February, 1948, and again on 23rd of March, 1949, to make two successive extensions of the Essential Supplies Act of a year each. The only question, therefore, is whether any body continued to have that power on the dates material here. The extensions jug t referred to were brought about as follows. The Constituent Assembly derived its authority to pass the above resolution from section 4 A of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act of 1946.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	This was an Act of the British Parliament which originally conferred on the British Houses of Parliament the power of approving by resolution the extension of the period fixed by section 4. Later, the Indian Independence Act of 1947 was passed by the British Parliament and in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 9 and 19 of that Act the Governor General by an Adaptation Order substituted the words " Dominion Legislature " for the words " Houses of Parliament " and thus enabled the Dominion Legislature to exercise the powers of Parliament in this behalf. At the same time, the (1) ; 131. 648 Governor General introduced section4 A into the British Act of 1946, the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, by way of adaptation and conferred on the Constituent Assembly the, powers of the Dominion Legislature. Thus the Constituent Assembly became empowered to extend the period fixed in section 4 by the passing of a resolution and that in its turn had the effect of extending the life of the Essential Supplies Act of 1946, because section 1 (3) of that Act says that it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act of 1946. Now section 4 A provides that the Constituent Assembly shall have the powers of the Dominion Legislature under the British Act " until other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly under sub section (1) of section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. "	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	Turning to sub section (1) of section 8 we find that the British Parliament invested the Constituent Assembly with all the powers of the Dominion Legislature " for the purpose of making provision as to the constitution of the Dominion. " That power it exercised and drew up the Indian Constitution, but in doing so it decided to bring the constitution into being in two instalments and it did that by enacting article 394 and enacting in it that that article and certain others, including article 379, should come into force " at once " at once being the 26th of November, 1949 while the remaining articles were to come into force on the 26th of January, 1950. Now article 379 (1) provides that `` Until both Houses of Parliament have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the body functioning as the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall be the Provisional 649 Parliament and shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on Parliament. " It was argued on behalf the appellant that because of this article the Constituent Assembly disappeared as a law making body on and after the 26th of November, 1949, and that its place was taken by the Provisional Parliament referred to by that article, and as the resolution of the 20th December, 1949, purports to be a resolution of the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) and not of the Provisional Parliament, it is a resolution of a body which no longer had authority to enact laws or pass a resolution of this kind affecting the laws of the land. The learned Attorney General argues, on the other hand, that the Constituent Assembly continued to function as such and to retain its right to exercise its dual functions of constitution making and law making right up to the last stroke of midnight on the 25th of January, 1950. The very next second, when a new day ushered in a new era for this country, it ceased to exist as a Constituent Assembly and its place was taken by the Provisional Parliament of India.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	We need not decide this point, for even if the Provisional Parliament was intended to function on the 26th of November, 1949, and not from the 26th of January, 1950, it is clear that the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till " the commencement of the Constitution" which, by article 394, is the 26th of January, 1950. Consequently, the power conferred on it as a designated body, by the English statute, as adapted by the Governor General, could be validly exercised on the 20th of December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed,the resolution of that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the English statute as that was not one of "the powers conferred by this Constitution on Parliament," nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th of November, 1949 650 ( assuming that to be the case) be regarded as other provision" made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 A of the English Act. It follows the Constituent Assembly was not deprived of these specially designated powers on the date of the resolution. The next question is whether the Constituent Assembly had the power to extend the life of this particular piece of legislation beyond the 26th of January, 1950. The question was posed in this way.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	It was conceded that the Essential Supplies Act was validly extended up to the 31st of March, 1950. The resolution which extended its life for another year beyond this was passed on the 20th of December, 1949, but it was argued that it could not take effect till after the expiry of the previous extension, that is, not until the 1st of April, 1950. But by that time the Constitution had come into being and so neither the Constituent Assembly nor the Provisional Parliament could have extended the life of the temporary Act after its expiration on the 31st of March, 1950, because of Explanation III to article 372. It follows that the Constituent Assembly which purported to effect the extension ahead of time could not do, in anticipation, what the Constitution says cannot be done after its commencement. There is nothing in this contention. The resolution of the 20th December, 1949, took immediate effect and its effect was to alter the date fixed for the expiration of the period mentioned in section 4 of the English statute from the 31st of March, 1950, to the 31st of March, 1951.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The Essential Supplies Act fixed the date for its own expiration as the date flied for the expiration of the period mentioned in section 4 above. Accordingly, it was an Act which was alive immediately before the 26th of January, 1950, and which was due, at that time, to expire of its own force, not on the 31st of March, 1950, but on the 31st of March, 1951, and as this was a law in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution 651 it continued in force, because of article 372(1) and Explanation III, until it was due to expire. That exhausts the constitutional points. We bold that there was a body in existence. at all material times competent to extend the life of the Act up till the 31st of March, 1951, and that it did so extend its life on the 20th of December, 1949. The Act continued in force until after the Constitution and therefore was a living Act at the date of the offences, namely the 24th of October, 1950.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	Counsel then sought to attack the conviction on other grounds but a,,; the leave to appeal was confined to the constitutional points be cannot so far as that is concerned, be permitted to travel further. Of course, it would have been competent for him to file a separate petition for special leave to appeal on the other points but had be done so it would have followed the usual course and he would have been obliged to obtain special leave in the usual way. We therefore treated this part of the argument as one asking for special leave to appeal. We heard him fully and are of opinion that these remaining points are not ones on which special leave to appeal should be granted. We therefore reject this irregular petition for special leave to appeal on its merits. The appeal filed under article 132 (1) is also dismissed.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	Appeal dismissed. Agent for the intervener: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.	The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of, the provisions of article 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to extend the duration of the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950 645 Held, that, even assuming that under article 379 (1) the Provi sional Parliament was intended to function from the 26th November, 1949, and not from the 26th. January, 1950, as the Constituent Assembly was to continue in existence till the 26th January 1950, the power conferred on it as a designated body by the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, of the British Parliament as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, could be validly exercised on the 20th December, 1949, and was so exercised when it passed the resolution on that date. The Provisional Parliament was not a body authorised to exercise the special power of approving the extension of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India Act of 1946 as that was not one of the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Provisional Parliament, nor can bringing the Provisional Parliament into existence on the 26th November, 1949, assuming that to be the case, be regarded as " other provision " made by the Constituent Assembly within the meaning of section 4 of the India Act of 1946. Held further, that the resolution extending the life of the Act beyond the 26th of January, 1950, was not invalid, as it came into immediate effect and not on the 1st of April, 1950, when the previous extension expired. Accordingly the Act with its duration extended by virtue of the resolution was an Act immediately in force before the commencement of the Constitution anti so was saved by article 372 (1) and Explanation III.
What is the summary of this judgment?	N: Criminal Appeal No. 539 of 1984 From the judgment and order dated 17.11.82 of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 268/82. 466 D K Sen, G.D. Gupta and R.N. Poddar for the Appellant. D.B.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Vohra for the Respondent. The following Judgments were delivered VARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is by the Delhi Administration and directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissing Criminal Revision No. 268 of 1982 in limine. That criminal revision was filed against the acquittal of the respondent by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi in Case No. 11 of 1982, in which the respondent was tried for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ').	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	The Food Inspector, P.W. 4 took a sample of lal mirchi powder from the grocery shop of the respondent. On analysis by the Public Analyst it was found in exhibit PW 1/C that the sample contained nine living meal worms. There was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated. It was contended before the learned Magistrate that the evidence by way of the Public Analyst 's report does not satisfy the requirement of the definition of 'adulterated article ' of food contained in section 2 (1) (f) of the Act. The learned Magistrate accepted this contention and found that the prosecution has failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and he accordingly acquitted the respondent.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	The Calcutta High Court in M/s Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta(1) has observed: ". Clause (f) of Section 2 defines the word 'adulterated ' and an article of food is said to be adulterated if it is insect infested. By physical examination the Public Analyst found blackish worms and the sample there is at best worm infested. Is the word worm synonymous with 'insect ' ? Did the legislature intend to condemn wheat products due to presence of seasonal worms ? The word 'insect ' is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as "small invertebrate segmented animal having head, thorax, abdomen, and three pairs of thoracic legs, usually with one or two pairs of thoracic (1) 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	467 wings. "The word "worm" in the same dictionary is defined as "kinds of invertebrate limbless or apparently limbless creeping animal, such as are segmented in rings or are parasite in the intestines or tissues. " There is, therefore, a good deal of difference between worms and insects and a sample of food becomes adulterated only when it is insect infested. In the present sample, however, worms were found to be present and that in our view, does not satisfy the requirements of the definition "adulterated" under Section 2 of the Act. " According to the Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 edition), 'worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm". According to Webster 's New World Dictionary 'infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or bother some swarm in or about."	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	According to that dictionary an 'insect ' means any "of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranous wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 'worm means "a slender, creeping, naked, limbless animal usually brown or reddish with a soft body divided into a series of segments; an earthworm." According to that dictionary an 'insect ' means "a small invertebrate animal, usually having a body divided into segments, and several pairs of legs, and often winged." Therefore it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. Even if worms and insects are the same the appellant is not out of difficulty in this case.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	As already stated the Public Analyst has found in the sample only nine living meal worms and he has neither stated that it is insect infested nor that it is unfit for human consumption on account of the presence of the meal worms nor that it is otherwise unfit for human consumption. According to Webster 's Illustrated Contemporary Dictionary (Encyclopedic Edition), 'infest ' means "to overrun or spread in large numbers so as to be unpleasant or unsafe". 468 In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, (1) the Public Analyst had reported: " Date of Analysis: 10 1 1969, Insect infested pieces of Kajus: 21.9% and I am of the opinion that the same is adulterated due to insect infested pieces of Kajus to the extent of 21.9%" Sarkaria, J. speaking for himself and Gupta, J. has observed in that case: " In view of the construction that the expression 'insect infested ', includes infestation even by dead insects, the further point to be considered is, whether mere insect infestation, without more, would be sufficient to hold the article to be 'adulterated ' within the meaning of sub clause (f) of clause (I) of section 2 of the Act. The point sought to be made out is that in this case, the prosecution, the defence and the High Court all felt that the report of the Public Analyst was vague, inadequate and deficient, and in the absence of clear proof of the sample being unfit for human consumption, it could not constitute a valid basis for holding the article to be adulterated within the meaning of sec. 2(1)(f). As against the above, Mr. F.S.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Nariman, the learned; Counsel for the appellant Corporation submits that in the case of food articles for which no minimum standard or purity is prescribed, the moment it is proved that a proportion of percentage of the article not being a proportion or percentage as would be covered by the rule, de minimis non curat lex is putrid, filthy, disgusting, decomposed or insect infested, it would be deemed to be unfit for human consumption and therefore adulterated within the contemplation of section 2(1)(f). In any case, proceeds the argument, it is implicit in the report of the Public Analyst that the article in question was found unfit for human consumption. This implication according to the learned Counsel flows ' from the Analyst 's conclusion that the article was "adulterated". Counsel has criticised the view taken by the Bench in Dhanraj 's case that if for an article of food, no (1) ; 469 standard of quality or purity has been prescribed or no limits have been prescribed for the validity or its constituents, then sub clause (I) of clause (f) of sec. 2 will not apply and that the Public Analyst is not competent to say as to what extent of insect infestation would make the article "adulterated ' The relevant part of Section 2 reads as under: "(1) "adulterated" an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated (a) to (e)... (f) If the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption". The phrase "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" can be read conjunctively as well as disjunctively.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	If it is read conjunctively, that is, in association with what precedes it, sub clause (f) with slight consequent rearrangement and parenthesis would read like this: "If the article, is unfit for human consumption on account of (a) its consisting wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable sub stance or being insect infested, (b) or on account of any other cause '. In this view of the sub clause, proof of unfitness of the article for human consumption is a must for bringing the case within its purview. F If the phrase is to be read disjunctively the mere proof of whole or any part of the article being "filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten. or insect infested" would be conclusive to bring the case within the mischief of this sub clause, and it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article was unfit for human consumption. We would prefer the first construction as it comports best with reason, common sense, realities, the tenor of this provision and the main purpose and scheme of the Act. The adjectives "filthy", "putrid ', "disgusting", "decomposed", 470 "rotten".	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	"insect infested" refer to the quality of the article and furnish the indicia for presuming the article to be unfit for human consumption. But the presumption may not be conclusive in a cases, irrespective of the character of the article, and the nature and extent of the vice afflicting it.." In Dhanraj 's case (I.L.R. 1970 Delhi 681) the High Court construed this sub clause (f) thus: "The word 'otherwise ' in sub clause (f) of cl. (I) of sec. 2 does suggest that all the adjectives used earlier refer to the quality of the article being unfit for human consumption. To fall under that sub clause an article of food must be unfit for human consumption because it consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or because it is insect infested or on account of any other cause".	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	On the basis of that decision it is stated as follows in the, published by the Eastern Book Company, seventh edition, with reference to section 2 (1) (f) of that Act thus: " The phrase "or otherwise unfit for human consumption" should be read conjunctively and not disjunctively, that is, in association with what precedes it. This sub clause would read like this: If the article is unfit for human consumption on account of (a) its consisting wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or being insect infested, (b) or on account of any other cause. In this view of the sub clause proof of the unfitness of the article for human consumption is a must for bringing the case within its purview. Municipal Corporation, Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal(l) (1) [1976] 2 S.C.R. I 471 All the adjectives used in this sub clause are presumptive and not an absolute test of the quality of the article being unfit for human consumption. To be more precise, in the case of an article in respect of which the Rules do not prescribe any minimum standard of purity or any minimum proportion of insect infestation that would exclude in from the definition of "adulterated article" it will be a mixed question of law and fact whether the insect infestation is of such a nature, degree and extent as renders the article unfit for human consumption.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	The opinion of the public analyst who examines and analyses the sample would constitute legal evidence. As an expert in the science he is competent to opine and testify about this fact. Municipal Corporation, Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal[(1976) 2 SCR 1]". An equally strong ' Bench of this Court l has taken a different view in regard to section 2(1)(f) of the Act in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia(l), where A.P. Sen, J. speaking for himself and Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. has observed: " In Dhanraj 's case (supra) the High Court construed sub cl. (f) thus: "The word 'otherwise ' in sub clause (f) of cl.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	(l) of sec. 2 does suggest that all the adjectives used earlier refer to the quality of the article being unfit for human consumption. To fall under that sub clause an article of food must be unfit for human consumption because it consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or because it is insect infested or on account of any other cause," We are of the opinion that the High Court was clearly wrong in its inter pretation of section 2(1)(f). On the plain language of the definition section it is quite apparent that the words 'or is otherwise unfit for human consumption ' are disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them. It relates to a distinct and separate cclass altogether, It seems to us (1) [1980] I S.C.R., 910 472 that the last clause 'or is otherwise unfit for human consumption ' is residuary provision which would apply to a case not covered by or falling squarely within the clauses preceding it. If the phrase is to be read disjunctively the mere proof of the article of food being 'filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Or insect infested ' would be per se sufficient to bring the case within the purview of the word 'adulterated ' as defined in sub cl. (f) and it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption. It is, however, pointed out that the construction placed by the High Court in Dhanraj 's case upon section 2(1)(f) of the Act has been received with approval by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal [(1976) 2 S.C.R.1] where it is observed that 'the construction placed by the High Court in Dhanraj 's case is the correct exposition of the law embodied in section 2(1)(f) '. It is added for the sake of elucidation that the adjectives which precede the phrase 'or is otherwise unfit for human consumption ' indicate presumptive but not absolute criteria as to the quality of the article of food. If we may say so with respect, we have reservations about the correctness of this decision, but it is not necessary to refer the case to a larger Bench. In Kacheroo Mal 's case it is observed: "The phrase "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" can be read conjunctively as well as disjunctively.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	If it is read conjunctively, that is, in association with what precedes it, sub clause (f) with slight consequent rearrangement and parenthesis would read like this; "If the article is unfit for human consumption on account of (a) its consisting wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or being insect infested, (b) or on account of any other cause ' In this view of the sub clause, proof of 'unfitness of the article for human consumption ' is a must for bringing the case within its purview. If the phrase is to be read disjunctively, the more proof of the whole or any part of the article being "filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten.. or insect infested" would be conclu 473 sive to bring the case within the mischief of this sub clause, and it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article was unfit for human consumption. We would prefer the first construction as it comports best with reason, common sense, realities, the tenor of this provision and the main purpose and scheme of the Act. The adjectives "filthy", "putrid", "disgusting", "decomposed", "rotten". "insect infested" refer to the quality of the article and furnish the indicia for presuming the article to be unfit for human consumption. But the presumption may not be conclusive in all cases, irrespective of the character of the article, and the nature and extent of the vice afflicting it.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	This is particularly so, where an article is found to be "insect infested. " With utmost respect, we are not able to share this view and would hold that the observations made in the Judgment should be confined to the particular facts of that case. The decision in Kacheroo Mal 's case (supra) was largely based on the circumstances that the standard of quality and purity was not prescribed in respect of cashew nuts. Now that r. 48 B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules; 1955 has been framed, the decision in Kacheroo Mal 's case (Supra) is rendered inapplicable. " We also constitute a Bench of equal strength. Therefore, I refrain from expressing any opinion as to which of the two aforesaid views is correct.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Nor is it necessary for me to do so having regard to the facts of this case. Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst ha not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm. infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. 'Therefore, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of section 2(1)(f) of the Act. Consequently, no interference is called for with the judgment of the 474 High Court which, as stated above, has dismissed the criminal revision in limine. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	In my opinion, the true meaning of Section 2(ia) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia (supra) and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. I agree with my learned brother that the evidence led by the prosecution is inadequate to warrant interference with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trying Magistrate and upheld by the High Court. I, therefore, agree that the appeal has to be dismissed.	Section 2(1) (f) of the Provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The prosecution case was that a sample of lal mirchi powder was taken from the grocery shop of the respondent. On an analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained nine living meal worms. Thor was no other evidence in support of the case of the prosecution that the lal mirch powder was adulterated. The learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated and acquitted the respondent. The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant State in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the State, ^ HELD: (I) The words 'worm ', 'infest ' and 'insect ' are defined in Webster 's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition). 'Worm ' means "any of many long, slender, soft bodied Creeping animals, some segmented, that live by burrowing underground or as parasites, as the earth worm, tapeworm," 'Infest ' means "to overrun or inhabit in large numbers, usually so as to be harmful or 465 bothersome, swarm in or about. 'Insect ' means "any of a large group of small invertebrate animals characterized, in the adult state, by division of the body into head, thorax, and abdomen, three pairs of membranes wings: beetles, bees, flies, wasps, mosquitoes, etc. are insects. " The same meaning is given of the above three words in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that a worm and an insect are the same. [467C E] M/S Narkeklange Roller Flour Mills and another vs The Corporation of Calcutta 1973 (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases) 257, referred to. (2) Even if the nine worms found by the Public Analyst in the sample are considered to be insects, the certificate of the Public Analyst does not support the case of the prosecution that the lal mirchi powder was adulterated, for the Public Analyst has not expressed his opinion that the lal mirchi powder was either worm infested or insect infested or that on account of the presence of the meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. Therefore, the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of Section 2(1) (f) of the Act. Consequently no interference is called for with the Judgement of the High Court. [473G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal ;, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia ;, held inapplicable. Per Varadarajan J. No opinion is expressed as to which of the two views expressed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Kacheroo Mal, ;, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia [1980] I S.C.R.910 is correct, Since this Bench also is of equal strength. Moreover, it is not necessary to do so having regard to the facts of the present case. [473F ] Per Ranganath Misra 1. (concurring in the conclusion) The true meaning of section 2(1) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Tek Chand Bhatia, 11980] I SCR 910 and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption ' is a correct statement of the law. In the instant case, the prosecution evidence is inadequate to warrant interference. [474B C]
What is the summary of this judgment?	Appeal No. 212 of 1961. From the judgment and decree dated December 11, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 640 of 1957. G. section pathak, N. D. Karkhanis, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, N.S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar for P. D. Menon, for the respondents. February 8. The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. The short question which this appeal raises for our decision is whether the appellant Shankar Narayan Ranade has established his title to the running water of the river Valdevi which runs through his Inam village Vadner.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The said village had been granted to the ancestors of 887 the appellant by the Peswa Government in 1773 A.D. This grant was continued by the British Government when the British Government came in power. The river Valdevi has its origin in the hills of Trimbak and from those hills it flows to Vadner and then to Chehedi where it joins the river Darna and thus loses its individuality. The total length of this river is about 25 miles, while its length within the limits of Vadner village is about 2 miles 82 furlongs. The Darna river after its conjunction with Valdevi proceeds towards Sangvi and there is merged with Godavari river : The appellant is one of the sharers in the Inam village of adner and he brought the present suit No. 12/1950 in the Court of the Civil judge (Senior Division) at Nasik, claiming reliefs against the Union of India and the State of Bombay, respon dents 1 & 2 respectively, on the basis of his title to the running water of the said river.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	It appears that in 1942, during the period of the 11 Would War, the Military authorities constructed barracks and other residential quarters for the army personnel within and outside the limits of Vadner. They also built a dam across the river Valdevi within the limits of Vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river. This well was fed with water carried by two channels drawn from the river. When the water reached the well, it was pumped from the well and duly stored in four reservoirs where it was filtered and then it was carried by means of pipes to the residential area occupied by the military personnel. The appellant then approached the military authorities and also the Government of Bombay and claimed compensation for the use of the water and the lands by the military authorities. Since his request for adequate compensation was not met, he filed the present suit on March 11, 1950, in a representative character under O.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	1 r. 8 C. P. C. 888 In this suit, the appellant speaking for himself and for the other sharers in the Inam village of Vadner alleged that the jagirdars of the village were, full owners of the entire area of that village, including the land, the stream and the water flowing through the stream within the limits of the village. According to the plaint, the acts of diversion of water committed by the military authorities had deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gains and thus, had caused injury and damage to them. As compensation for this damage, the appellant claimed Rs. 1,11,250/ from the respondents. The appellant further made a claim for Rs. 750/ as compensation for the use of his land by the military authorities.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1949. Some other incidential reliefs were also claimed by the appellant. Respondent No. 2 contested the appellant 's claim. It urged that the Inamdars were not the grantees of the soil, but were the grantees of the royal share of the revenue only; and it was urged that in any case, they had no ownership over the flowing water of the Valdevi river. Respondent No.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	1 adopted the written statement of respondent No. 2 and filed the Purshis in that behalf. According to the respondents, the river Valdevi had become a notified canal by virtue of a notification issued on February 17, 1913 under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, and in consequence, the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river and respondent No. 2 had the absolute right of the use of the said water. A plea of limitation was also made by both the respondents. The learned trial judge made findings in favour of the appellant on all the issues.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	He held that the Inamdars were the grantees of the soil, that the 889 river Valdevi and its flowing water belonged to them, that the notification on which reliance was placed by the respondents was invalid, that the acts of the military authorities were unauthorised and that the appellant was consequently entitled to the compensation for the use, by the military authorities, of the water of the river and his lands and also for the loss of his income from the river bed. According to the trial Court, the appellant was entitled to this compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. Accordingly, it passed a decree in favour of the appellant for an amount of Rs. 26,788/1/as compensation for the use of water up to December 31, 1949, directed that the compensation for the use of water for the period subsequent to January 1, 1950 should be ascertained in execution. proceedings, and awarded compensation @ Rs. 100/ per annum for the use of the land, and Rs.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	50/ per annum for the loss of income from the river bed during the period that the act of the military authorities continued. This decree was challenged both by the appellant and the respondents by cross appeals Nos. 634/1954 and 640/1953 respectively. 'The appellant claimed a larger amount of compensation, whereas, according to the respondents, no compensation was payable in respect of the alleged diversion of the running water of the river Valdevi. It appears that before the High Court, the respondents did not dispute the finding of the trial Court that the Inamdars were the grantees of the soil and conceded that the rights of the Inamdars such as they were to the waters of the river Valdevi had not been extinguished by the notification issued under the Bombay Irrigation Act. It was, however, urged that the Valdevi river being a notified canal, the military authorities could have used its water by making appropriate applications under 890 sections 17 and 27 of the said Irrigation Act; but since there was no evidence to show that any such applications had been made, the said point did not survive.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	The main argument urged by the respondents in their appeal was that the appellant was not the owner of the running water of the stream and so, he had no right to claim any compensation for the alleged diversion of the said water by the military Authorities. The High Court has substantially accepted this contention. It has held that as owners of the lands in the village situated on both banks of the river the Inamdars were entitled to the use of the water of the river as riparian owners and what belonged to them was water which they took out from the river and appropriated to their use; they were, however, not entitled to claim title over the flowing water of the river and so, the diversion of the flowing water of the river cannot sustain their claim for compensation. The decree passed by the trial Court in respect of compensation for the wrongful use of the lands was not challenged by the respondents. In the result, the High Court modified the decree passed by the trial Court by setting aside that part of it which related to, the compensation for the use of the water of the Valdevi river by the military authorities and confirmed the rest of the directions issued by the decree. It is against this decree that the appellant has come to this Court with a certificate issued by the High Court ; and the main point which has been urged before us by Mr. Pathak on behalf of the appellant is that the high Court was in error in rejecting the appellant 's claim that the Inamdars of the village were the owners of the running water of the river Valdevi during its course within the limits of the Inam village of Vadner.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	In support of the appellant 's case, Mr. Pathak has urged that in construing the Sanad on which the appellant 's title is founded, it would be necessary to 891 bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the flowing water of a river constitutes property which can belong to a citizen either by grant or otherwise and assistance is sought for this argument from the provisions of section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue; Code (Act V of 187(9). Section 37 (1) provides, inter alia, that all public roads, lanes and paths which are not the property of individuals, belong to the Crown, and amongst the items of property specified in this clause are included rivers, streams, nallas, lakes, tanks and all canals and watercourses, and all standing and flowing water The argument is that this sub section Postulates that the items of property specified by it can belong to private individuals, and it provides that if they are not shown to belong to private individuals, they would vest in the State. Therefore, in construing the Sanad, We ought to remember that the river and its flowing water constitute property which can be granted by the Ruler to a citizen. The other consideration on which Mr. Pathak has relied is that tinder the provisions of section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, it should be assumed that unless a different intention is expressly or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property, and in the legal incidents thereof. Mr. Pathak contends that assuming that prior to the grant, the Peshwa Government as the ruling power of the day was the owner of the river and its flowing water,, when the said Government made a grant to the appellant 's predecessors, the principle enunciated by section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act should be applied and the grant should be construed to include all rights, title and interest of the grantor, unless there is a contrary provision either expressly made, or implied by necessary implications.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	892 Bearing those two considerations in mind, let us consider the terms of the Sanad itself. The Sanad is drawn in terms which are consistent with the pattern prevailing in that behalf in those days and contains the usual familiar recitals. The relevant portion of the Sanad reads as follows : " 'Seeing the respectable Erahsins, performing Snan Sandhya (bath and prayer) leading ascetic life, devoted to the performance of their duties as laid down in Shrities and Smrities, the Government has constructed houses there and given to (them). Thinking that if the same are given to them, it would be beneficial to the Swami and to the Kingdom of Swami, the village of mouje Vadner, Pargana aforesaid in (a) (b) Swarajya as well as Moglai Dutarfa (on both sides) has been given to them as Nutan (New) (c) (d) Inam together with Sardeshmukhi, Inam Tizai, (e) (f) (g) Kulbab Kulkanu, Hali Patti, and Pestr Patti excluding (the rights of) Hakkadar and Inamdar and together with water, trees, grass, wood stones and hidden treasures, for maintenance of their families." The Sanad then defines the shares in the current revenue of the said village amongst the respective shares. In the concluding portion, it makes certain other provisions with which we are not concerned in the present appeal.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	This Sanad was executed in 1773 A. D. During the British rule, this Sanad was confirmed in 1858 A. D. It is common ground that the material terms which have been construed for the purpose of determining the title of the appellant are contained in the earlier sanad. It would be noticed that the Sanad refers to the rights in water, trees, grass, wood, stones and hidden 893 treasures. It is well settled that the word "water (jal)" refers to water in tanks or wells and does not refer to the flowing water of the river. Indeed, if a grant of the river including its flowing water is intended to be made, the Sanad would have definitely used the word " 'river (nadi)", because it is wellknown that when rivers, drains or culverts are intended to be gifted, the Sanads usually use the words "nadi and nalla". Therefore, on a plain construction of the relevant words used in the Sanad, there can be no doubt that what is conveyed to the grantee by the Sanad is stationary or static water in the ponds or wells and not the flowing water of the river. The specific reference to water meaning water of the well or the pond serves two purposes ; it defines the kind of water which is conveyed, and by necessary implication, excludes the grant of flowing water of the river.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	Sanads containing words like these have frequently been considered by the Bombay High Court in the past and it has been consistently held that the word "water" means only water in the ponds or wells and does not refer to the flowing water of the river, vide Annapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1). Therefore, the two considerations on which Mr. Pathak strongly relied in support of his construction of the Sanad do not really assist him. The language of the Sanad precisely defines the nature of the water that is conveyed and in doing so, by necessary implication, excludes the flowing water of the river. Mr. Pathak, however, suggests that it is not disputed by the respondents that the Sanad in question grants title to the soil of the village and is not confined to the royal share of the revenue only ; and he, argues that the grant of the soil necessarily means the grant of the bed of the river while it flows within the limits of the Inam village. If the bed of the river has been granted to the appellant 's predecessors by the Sanad, why does it not follow that the water flowing (1), 894 on the said bed during the said limits belongs to the appellant ? The title to the running water of the river must, Mr. Pathak says, go with the title to the bed of the river.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	There are two difficulties in accepting this contention. The first difficulty is that the use of the word "water (jal)" in the Sanad, as we have already held, excludes the running water of the river. Besides, it is by no means clear that the title to the flowing water of the river necessarily goes with the title to the bed of the river. As was observed by Lord Selborne in Lyon vs Fish mongers ' Company. " 'The title to the soil constituting the bed of a river does not carry with it only exclusive right of property in the running water of the stream, which can only be appropriated by severance, and which may be lawfully so appropriated by every one having a right of access to it. Therefore, the argument that the grant of the soil of the village including the bed of the river must necessarily include the grant of the title to the flowing water of the river can not be accepted.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the river Valdevi flows through the village only for the distance of 2 miles & 2 furlongs. It is not a case where the whole of the stream of the river from its origin to its merging in another river runs entirely through this village. If a river takes its origin within the limits of an Inam village and its course is terminated within the limits of the same village, that would be another matter. In the present case, if the appellant 's right to the following water of the river is conceded, it would mean that the Inamdars would be able to divert the water completely and destroy the rights of the other riparian owners whose lands are situated outside the village. They may be able to pollute the water or do anything with it to the prejudice of the said riparian owners. Such rights cannot be claimed by the appellant unless the Sanad in his favour makes the grant 895 of,the running water in terms.	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.
What is the summary of this judgment?	As we have already seen, the Sanad not only does not make any such grant, but by necessary implication also excludes the running water from the purview of the grant. Mr. Pathak then attempted to argue that the diversion of the water of the river Valdevi during the relevant period affected the appellant 's right as the riparian owner and that, according to him, would furnish him with a cause of action for claiming damages against the respondents. In this connection, Mr. Pathak invited our attention to the observations of Parke, B. in Embrey vs Owen. (1). "Flowing water," said Parke, B., "is public juris in this sense only that all may reasonably use it who have a right of access to it, and that none can have any property in the water itself, except in the particular portion which he may choose to abstract from the stream and take into his possession, and that during the time of his possession only. The right to have a stream of water flow in its natural state, without diminution or alteration, is an incident to the property in the land through which it passes ; but this is not an absolute and exclusive right to the flow of all the water, but only subject to the right of other riparian proprietors to the reasonable enjoyment of it; and consequently it is only for an unreasonable and unauthorised use of this common benefit that any action will lie."	The appellant was one of the sharers in the Inam village of vadner and brought a suit against respondents claiming relief on the basis of his title to the running water of river valdevi. During World War 11, the military authorities constructed residential quarters within and outside the limits of vadner. They built a dam across the river within the limits of vadner and dug a well near the bank of the river which was fed by the river water and the water was carried to the residential areas. The diversion of water and the use of land continued from 1942 to 1959, which deprived the appellant and the other Inamdars of their right to utilise that water for their own gain and of others ; this had caused injury and damage to them, for which, the appellant claimed compensation from the respondents. According to the respondents, by virtue of a notification under section 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879, the river had become a notified canal and consequently the Inamdars had lost their rights, if any, in the waters of the said river. They also took a plea of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the appellant was entitled to the compensation only for two years before the date of the suit and the rest of his claim was barred by time. The decree was challenged both by the 886 appellant and the respondents by cross appeals in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal with modifications. Then followed an appeal to this court on certificate. Held, that the use of the word "water " in the sanad, pro perly construed, excludes the running water of the river and it could not be said that title to the flowing water of the river went with the title to the bed of the river. If the sanad made no grant of the running water in terms, the appellant could not claim the same as the riparian owner. Anapurnabai Gopal vs Government of Bombay (1931) 47 Bom. L. R. 839 and Lyen vs Fish Mongers ' Company [1876] 1 App. Cas. 662, referred to. Held, further, that the appellant could not be allowed to make an alternative case on the ground of his rights as a riparian owner as there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence on the record to that effect.

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