Daily Papers

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Evaluating the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) has traditionally relied on static benchmark datasets, human assessments, or model-based evaluations - methods that often suffer from overfitting, high costs, and biases. ZeroSumEval is a novel competition-based evaluation protocol that leverages zero-sum games to assess LLMs with dynamic benchmarks that resist saturation. ZeroSumEval encompasses a diverse suite of games, including security challenges (PyJail), classic games (Chess, Liar's Dice, Poker), knowledge tests (MathQuiz), and persuasion challenges (Gandalf, Debate). These games are designed to evaluate a range of AI capabilities such as strategic reasoning, planning, knowledge application, and creativity. Building upon recent studies that highlight the effectiveness of game-based evaluations for LLMs, ZeroSumEval enhances these approaches by providing a standardized and extensible framework. To demonstrate this, we conduct extensive experiments with >7000 simulations across 7 games and 13 models. Our results show that while frontier models from the GPT and Claude families can play common games and answer questions, they struggle to play games that require creating novel and challenging questions. We also observe that models cannot reliably jailbreak each other and fail generally at tasks requiring creativity. We release our code at https://github.com/facebookresearch/ZeroSumEval.

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.

Compositional reinforcement learning is a promising approach for training policies to perform complex long-horizon tasks. Typically, a high-level task is decomposed into a sequence of subtasks and a separate policy is trained to perform each subtask. In this paper, we focus on the problem of training subtask policies in a way that they can be used to perform any task; here, a task is given by a sequence of subtasks. We aim to maximize the worst-case performance over all tasks as opposed to the average-case performance. We formulate the problem as a two agent zero-sum game in which the adversary picks the sequence of subtasks. We propose two RL algorithms to solve this game: one is an adaptation of existing multi-agent RL algorithms to our setting and the other is an asynchronous version which enables parallel training of subtask policies. We evaluate our approach on two multi-task environments with continuous states and actions and demonstrate that our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art baselines.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning have shown that language models can develop sophisticated reasoning through training on tasks with verifiable rewards, but these approaches depend on human-curated problem-answer pairs and domain-specific reward engineering. We introduce SPIRAL, a self-play framework where models learn by playing multi-turn, zero-sum games against continuously improving versions of themselves, eliminating the need for human supervision. Through self-play, SPIRAL generates an infinite curriculum of progressively challenging problems as models must constantly adapt to stronger opponents. To enable this self-play training at scale, We implement a fully online, multi-turn, multi-agent reinforcement learning system for LLMs and propose role-conditioned advantage estimation (RAE) to stabilize multi-agent training. Using SPIRAL, self-play on zero-sum games produces reasoning capabilities that transfer broadly. Training Qwen3-4B-Base on Kuhn Poker alone achieves 8.6% improvement on math and 8.4% on general reasoning, outperforming SFT on 25,000 expert game trajectories. Analysis reveals that this transfer occurs through three cognitive patterns: systematic decomposition, expected value calculation, and case-by-case analysis. Multi-game training (TicTacToe, Kuhn Poker, Simple Negotiation) further enhances performance as each game develops distinct reasoning strengths. Applying SPIRAL to a strong reasoning model (DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B) can still lead to 2.0% average improvement. These results demonstrate that zero-sum games naturally develop transferable reasoning capabilities, highlighting a promising direction for autonomous reasoning development.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Claim verification is critical for enhancing digital literacy. However, the state-of-the-art single-LLM methods struggle with complex claim verification that involves multi-faceted evidences. Inspired by real-world fact-checking practices, we propose DebateCV, the first claim verification framework that adopts a debate-driven methodology using multiple LLM agents. In our framework, two Debaters take opposing stances on a claim and engage in multi-round argumentation, while a Moderator evaluates the arguments and renders a verdict with justifications. To further improve the performance of the Moderator, we introduce a novel post-training strategy that leverages synthetic debate data generated by the zero-shot DebateCV, effectively addressing the scarcity of real-world debate-driven claim verification data. Experimental results show that our method outperforms existing claim verification methods under varying levels of evidence quality. Our code and dataset are publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DebateCV-6781.

Competitive debate is a complex task of computational argumentation. Large Language Models (LLMs) suffer from hallucinations and lack competitiveness in this field. To address these challenges, we introduce Agent for Debate (Agent4Debate), a dynamic multi-agent framework based on LLMs designed to enhance their capabilities in competitive debate. Drawing inspiration from human behavior in debate preparation and execution, Agent4Debate employs a collaborative architecture where four specialized agents, involving Searcher, Analyzer, Writer, and Reviewer, dynamically interact and cooperate. These agents work throughout the debate process, covering multiple stages from initial research and argument formulation to rebuttal and summary. To comprehensively evaluate framework performance, we construct the Competitive Debate Arena, comprising 66 carefully selected Chinese debate motions. We recruit ten experienced human debaters and collect records of 200 debates involving Agent4Debate, baseline models, and humans. The evaluation employs the Debatrix automatic scoring system and professional human reviewers based on the established Debatrix-Elo and Human-Elo ranking. Experimental results indicate that the state-of-the-art Agent4Debate exhibits capabilities comparable to those of humans. Furthermore, ablation studies demonstrate the effectiveness of each component in the agent structure.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We test the robustness of debate as a method of scalable oversight by training models to debate with data generated via self-play. In a long-context reading comprehension task, we find that language model based evaluators answer questions more accurately when judging models optimized to win debates. By contrast, we find no such relationship for consultancy models trained to persuade a judge without an opposing debater present. In quantitative and qualitative comparisons between our debate models and novel consultancy baselines, we find evidence that debate training encourages stronger and more informative arguments, showing promise that it can help provide high-quality supervision for tasks that are difficult to directly evaluate.

Modern large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have shown remarkable performance on general language tasks but still struggle on complex reasoning tasks, which drives the research on cognitive behaviors of LLMs to explore human-like problem-solving strategies. Along this direction, one representative strategy is self-reflection, which asks an LLM to refine the solution with the feedback generated by itself iteratively. However, our study shows that such reflection-style methods suffer from the Degeneration-of-Thought (DoT) problem: once the LLM has established confidence in its solutions, it is unable to generate novel thoughts later through reflection even if its initial stance is incorrect. To address the DoT problem, we propose a Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) framework, in which multiple agents express their arguments in the state of "tit for tat" and a judge manages the debate process to obtain a final solution. Clearly, our MAD framework encourages divergent thinking in LLMs which would be helpful for tasks that require deep levels of contemplation. Experiment results on two challenging datasets, commonsense machine translation and counter-intuitive arithmetic reasoning, demonstrate the effectiveness of our MAD framework. Extensive analyses suggest that the adaptive break of debate and the modest level of "tit for tat" state are required for MAD to obtain good performance. Moreover, we find that LLMs might not be a fair judge if different LLMs are used for agents. Codes: https://github.com/Skytliang/Multi-Agents-Debate

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

This paper presents a pilot study aimed at introducing multi-agent debate into multimodal reasoning. The study addresses two key challenges: the trivialization of opinions resulting from excessive summarization and the diversion of focus caused by distractor concepts introduced from images. These challenges stem from the inductive (bottom-up) nature of existing debating schemes. To address the issue, we propose a deductive (top-down) debating approach called Blueprint Debate on Graphs (BDoG). In BDoG, debates are confined to a blueprint graph to prevent opinion trivialization through world-level summarization. Moreover, by storing evidence in branches within the graph, BDoG mitigates distractions caused by frequent but irrelevant concepts. Extensive experiments validate that BDoG is able to achieve state-of-the-art results in ScienceQA and MMBench with significant improvements over previous methods. The source code can be accessed at https://github.com/thecharm/BDoG.

Large language models (LLMs) excel in natural language generation but often confidently produce incorrect responses, especially in tasks like mathematical reasoning. Chain-of-thought prompting, self-verification, and multi-agent debate are among the strategies proposed to improve the reasoning and factual accuracy of LLMs. Building on Du et al.'s multi-agent debate framework, we find that multi-agent debate helps at any model scale, and that diversity of thought elicits stronger reasoning in debating LLMs. Across various model sizes, performance on mathematical reasoning tasks benefits most when diverse trained models are used. Remarkably, after 4 rounds of debate, a diverse set of medium-capacity models (Gemini-Pro, Mixtral 7BX8, and PaLM 2-M) outperforms GPT-4 on the GSM-8K benchmark, scoring 91% accuracy. By comparison, when 3 instances of Gemini-Pro are used, performance only reaches 82%. Finally, this diverse set of medium-capacity models sets a new state-of-the-art performance on the ASDiv benchmark (94%). These results underscore the idea that the future of AI is agentic, with diverse cooperating agents yielding emergent capabilities beyond even the most powerful individual models.

Large language models (LLMs) have improved significantly in their reasoning through extensive training on massive datasets. However, relying solely on additional data for improvement is becoming increasingly impractical, highlighting the need for models to autonomously enhance their reasoning without external supervision. In this paper, we propose Debate, Train, Evolve (DTE), a novel ground truth-free training framework that uses multi-agent debate traces to evolve a single language model. We also introduce a new prompting strategy Reflect-Critique-Refine, to improve debate quality by explicitly instructing agents to critique and refine their reasoning. Extensive evaluations on five reasoning benchmarks with six open-weight models show that our DTE framework achieve substantial improvements, with an average accuracy gain of 8.92% on the challenging GSM-PLUS dataset. Furthermore, we observe strong cross-domain generalization, with an average accuracy gain of 5.8% on all other benchmarks, suggesting that our method captures general reasoning capabilities.

Recent work within the Argument Mining community has shown the applicability of Natural Language Processing systems for solving problems found within competitive debate. One of the most important tasks within competitive debate is for debaters to create high quality debate cases. We show that effective debate cases can be constructed using constrained shortest path traversals on Argumentative Semantic Knowledge Graphs. We study this potential in the context of a type of American Competitive Debate, called Policy Debate, which already has a large scale dataset targeting it called DebateSum. We significantly improve upon DebateSum by introducing 53180 new examples, as well as further useful metadata for every example, to the dataset. We leverage the txtai semantic search and knowledge graph toolchain to produce and contribute 9 semantic knowledge graphs built on this dataset. We create a unique method for evaluating which knowledge graphs are better in the context of producing policy debate cases. A demo which automatically generates debate cases, along with all other code and the Knowledge Graphs, are open-sourced and made available to the public here: https://github.com/Hellisotherpeople/DebateKG

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

As frontier language models increasingly saturate standard QA benchmarks, concerns about data contamination, memorization, and escalating dataset creation costs persist. We propose a debate-driven evaluation paradigm that transforms any existing QA dataset into structured adversarial debates--where one model is given the official answer to defend, and another constructs and defends an alternative answer--adjudicated by a judge model blind to the correct solution. By forcing multi-round argumentation, this approach substantially increases difficulty while penalizing shallow memorization, yet reuses QA items to reduce curation overhead. We make two main contributions: (1) an evaluation pipeline to systematically convert QA tasks into debate-based assessments, and (2) a public benchmark that demonstrates our paradigm's effectiveness on a subset of MMLU-Pro questions, complete with standardized protocols and reference models. Empirical results validate the robustness of the method and its effectiveness against data contamination--a Llama 3.1 model fine-tuned on test questions showed dramatic accuracy improvements (50% -> 82%) but performed worse in debates. Results also show that even weaker judges can reliably differentiate stronger debaters, highlighting how debate-based evaluation can scale to future, more capable systems while maintaining a fraction of the cost of creating new benchmarks. Overall, our framework underscores that "pretraining on the test set is no longer all you need," offering a sustainable path for measuring the genuine reasoning ability of advanced language models.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has shown promise in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models by learning directly from outcome-based rewards. Recent RLVR works that operate under the zero setting avoid supervision in labeling the reasoning process, but still depend on manually curated collections of questions and answers for training. The scarcity of high-quality, human-produced examples raises concerns about the long-term scalability of relying on human supervision, a challenge already evident in the domain of language model pretraining. Furthermore, in a hypothetical future where AI surpasses human intelligence, tasks provided by humans may offer limited learning potential for a superintelligent system. To address these concerns, we propose a new RLVR paradigm called Absolute Zero, in which a single model learns to propose tasks that maximize its own learning progress and improves reasoning by solving them, without relying on any external data. Under this paradigm, we introduce the Absolute Zero Reasoner (AZR), a system that self-evolves its training curriculum and reasoning ability by using a code executor to both validate proposed code reasoning tasks and verify answers, serving as an unified source of verifiable reward to guide open-ended yet grounded learning. Despite being trained entirely without external data, AZR achieves overall SOTA performance on coding and mathematical reasoning tasks, outperforming existing zero-setting models that rely on tens of thousands of in-domain human-curated examples. Furthermore, we demonstrate that AZR can be effectively applied across different model scales and is compatible with various model classes.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently demonstrated strong potential in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Particularly, the "Zero" reinforcement learning introduced by Deepseek-R1-Zero, enables direct RL training of base LLMs without relying on an intermediate supervised fine-tuning stage. Despite these advancements, current works for LLM reasoning mainly focus on mathematical and coding domains, largely due to data abundance and the ease of answer verification. This limits the applicability and generalization of such models to broader domains, where questions often have diverse answer representations, and data is more scarce. In this paper, we propose General-Reasoner, a novel training paradigm designed to enhance LLM reasoning capabilities across diverse domains. Our key contributions include: (1) constructing a large-scale, high-quality dataset of questions with verifiable answers curated by web crawling, covering a wide range of disciplines; and (2) developing a generative model-based answer verifier, which replaces traditional rule-based verification with the capability of chain-of-thought and context-awareness. We train a series of models and evaluate them on a wide range of datasets covering wide domains like physics, chemistry, finance, electronics etc. Our comprehensive evaluation across these 12 benchmarks (e.g. MMLU-Pro, GPQA, SuperGPQA, TheoremQA, BBEH and MATH AMC) demonstrates that General-Reasoner outperforms existing baseline methods, achieving robust and generalizable reasoning performance while maintaining superior effectiveness in mathematical reasoning tasks.

Despite the great empirical success of deep reinforcement learning, its theoretical foundation is less well understood. In this work, we make the first attempt to theoretically understand the deep Q-network (DQN) algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015) from both algorithmic and statistical perspectives. In specific, we focus on a slight simplification of DQN that fully captures its key features. Under mild assumptions, we establish the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence for the action-value functions of the iterative policy sequence obtained by DQN. In particular, the statistical error characterizes the bias and variance that arise from approximating the action-value function using deep neural network, while the algorithmic error converges to zero at a geometric rate. As a byproduct, our analysis provides justifications for the techniques of experience replay and target network, which are crucial to the empirical success of DQN. Furthermore, as a simple extension of DQN, we propose the Minimax-DQN algorithm for zero-sum Markov game with two players. Borrowing the analysis of DQN, we also quantify the difference between the policies obtained by Minimax-DQN and the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game in terms of both the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

Large language models frequently encounter conflicts between their parametric knowledge and contextual input, often resulting in factual inconsistencies or hallucinations. We propose Self-Reflective Debate for Contextual Reliability (SR-DCR), a lightweight framework that integrates token-level self-confidence with an asymmetric multi-agent debate to adjudicate such conflicts. A critic, deprived of context, challenges a defender who argues from the given passage; a judge model evaluates the debate and determines the context's reliability. The final answer is selected by combining the verdict with model confidence. Experiments on the ClashEval benchmark demonstrate that SR-DCR consistently enhances robustness to misleading context while maintaining accuracy on trustworthy inputs, outperforming both classical debate and confidence-only baselines with minimal computational overhead. The code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/Self-Reflective-Debates.

We propose a general two-stage algorithm that enjoys a provable scaling law for the test-time compute of large language models (LLMs). Given an input problem, the proposed algorithm first generates N candidate solutions, and then chooses the best one via a multiple-round knockout tournament where each pair of candidates are compared for K times and only the winners move on to the next round. In a minimalistic implementation, both stages can be executed with a black-box LLM alone and nothing else (e.g., no external verifier or reward model), and a total of N times (K + 1) highly parallelizable LLM calls are needed for solving an input problem. Assuming that a generated candidate solution is correct with probability p_{gen} > 0 and a comparison between a pair of correct and incorrect solutions identifies the right winner with probability p_{comp} > 0.5 (i.e., better than a random guess), we prove theoretically that the failure probability of the proposed algorithm decays to zero exponentially with respect to N and K: $P(final output is incorrect) le (1 - p_{gen})^N + lceil log_2 N rceil e^{-2 K (p_{comp} - 0.5)^2}.$ Our empirical results with the challenging MMLU-Pro benchmark validate the technical assumptions, as well as the efficacy of the proposed algorithm and the gains from scaling up its test-time compute.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks that require complex reasoning. Most benchmarks focus on final outcomes but overlook the intermediate reasoning steps - such as planning, revision, and decision making under resource constraints. We argue that measuring these internal processes is essential for understanding model behavior and improving reliability. We propose using strategic games as a natural evaluation environment: closed, rule-based systems with clear states, limited resources, and automatic feedback. We introduce a framework that evaluates LLMs along three core dimensions: planning, revision, and resource-constrained decision making. To operationalize this, we define metrics beyond win rate, including overcorrection risk rate, correction success rate, improvement slope, and over-budget ratio. In 4320 adversarial rounds across 12 leading models, ChatGPT-o3-mini achieves the top composite score, with a win rate of 74.7 percent, a correction success rate of 78.6 percent, and an improvement slope of 0.041. By contrast, Qwen-Plus, despite an overcorrection risk rate of 81.6 percent, wins only 25.6 percent of its matches - primarily due to excessive resource use. We also observe a negative correlation between overcorrection risk rate and correction success rate (Pearson r = -0.51, p = 0.093), suggesting that more frequent edits do not always improve outcomes. Our findings highlight the value of assessing not only what LLMs decide but how they arrive at those decisions

Making LLMs speak for different, especially minority groups of people, and generate statements supporting their diverse or even controversial perspectives is critical to creating an inclusive environment. However, existing LLMs lack sufficient controllability to the stance of their generated content, which often contains inconsistent, neutral, or biased statements. In this paper, we improve the controllability of LLMs in generating statements supporting an argument the user defined in the prompt. We find that multi-round debates between two LLMs with opposite stances generate higher-quality and more salient statements for each, which are important training data to improve the controllability of LLMs. Motivated by this, we develop a novel debate & tuning (DEBATUNE) pipeline finetuning LLMs to generate the statements obtained via debate. To examine DEBATUNE, we curate the largest dataset of debate topics so far, which covers 710 controversial topics and corresponding arguments for each topic. Evaluations by the GPT-4 judge with a novel controversy controllability metric show that LLMs' capability of generating diverse perspectives is significantly improved by DEBATUNE. Moreover, such controllability can be generalized to unseen topics, generating high-quality statements supporting controversial arguments.

Game theory is a powerful framework for reasoning about strategic interactions, with applications in domains ranging from day-to-day life to international politics. However, applying formal reasoning tools in such contexts is challenging, as these scenarios are often expressed in natural language. To address this, we introduce a framework for the autoformalization of game-theoretic scenarios, which translates natural language descriptions into formal logic representations suitable for formal solvers. Our approach utilizes one-shot prompting and a solver that provides feedback on syntactic correctness to allow LLMs to refine the code. We evaluate the framework using GPT-4o and a dataset of natural language problem descriptions, achieving 98% syntactic correctness and 88% semantic correctness. These results show the potential of LLMs to bridge the gap between real-life strategic interactions and formal reasoning.

We introduce Open-Reasoner-Zero, the first open source implementation of large-scale reasoning-oriented RL training focusing on scalability, simplicity and accessibility. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that a minimalist approach, vanilla PPO with GAE (lambda=1, gamma=1) and straightforward rule-based rewards, without any KL regularization, is sufficient to scale up both response length and benchmark performance, similar to the phenomenon observed in DeepSeek-R1-Zero. Using the same base model as DeepSeek-R1-Zero-Qwen-32B, our implementation achieves superior performance on AIME2024, MATH500, and the GPQA Diamond benchmark while demonstrating remarkable efficiency -- requiring only a tenth of the training steps, compared to DeepSeek-R1-Zero pipeline. In the spirit of open source, we release our source code, parameter settings, training data, and model weights across various sizes.

Implementing quantum game theory on real hardware is challenging due to noise, decoherence, and limited qubit connectivity, yet such demonstrations are essential to validate theoretical predictions. We present one of the first full experimental realizations of the Battle of the Sexes game under the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) framework on IBM Quantum's ibm sherbrooke superconducting processor. Four quantum strategies (I, H, R(pi/4), R(pi)) were evaluated across 31 entanglement values gamma in [0, pi] using 2048 shots per configuration, enabling a direct comparison between analytical predictions and hardware execution. To mitigate noise and variability, we introduce a Guided Circuit Mapping (GCM) method that dynamically selects qubit pairs and optimizes routing based on real-time topology and calibration data. The analytical model forecasts up to 108% payoff improvement over the classical equilibrium, and despite hardware-induced deviations, experimental results with GCM preserve the expected payoff trends within 3.5%-12% relative error. These findings show that quantum advantages in strategic coordination can persist under realistic NISQ conditions, providing a pathway toward practical applications of quantum game theory in multi-agent, economic, and distributed decision-making systems.

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning about group polarization using logical systems. In this work we consider the modal logic PNL that captures the notion of agents agreeing or disagreeing on a given topic. Our contribution involves enhancing PNL with advanced formal reasoning techniques, instead of relying on axiomatic systems for analyzing group polarization. To achieve this, we introduce a semantic game tailored for (hybrid) extensions of PNL. This game fosters dynamic reasoning about concrete network models, aligning with our goal of strengthening PNL's effectiveness in studying group polarization. We show how this semantic game leads to a provability game by systemically exploring the truth in all models. This leads to the first cut-free sequent systems for some variants of PNL. Using polarization of formulas, the proposed calculi can be modularly adapted to consider different frame properties of the underlying model.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

We give a quantum algorithm for computing an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game in a m times n payoff matrix with bounded entries. Given a standard quantum oracle for accessing the payoff matrix our algorithm runs in time O(m + ncdot epsilon^{-2.5} + epsilon^{-3}) and outputs a classical representation of the epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium. This improves upon the best prior quantum runtime of O(m + n cdot epsilon^{-3}) obtained by [vAG19] and the classic O((m + n) cdot epsilon^{-2}) runtime due to [GK95] whenever epsilon = Omega((m +n)^{-1}). We obtain this result by designing new quantum data structures for efficiently sampling from a slowly-changing Gibbs distribution.

We introduce OpenDebateEvidence, a comprehensive dataset for argument mining and summarization sourced from the American Competitive Debate community. This dataset includes over 3.5 million documents with rich metadata, making it one of the most extensive collections of debate evidence. OpenDebateEvidence captures the complexity of arguments in high school and college debates, providing valuable resources for training and evaluation. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the efficacy of fine-tuning state-of-the-art large language models for argumentative abstractive summarization across various methods, models, and datasets. By providing this comprehensive resource, we aim to advance computational argumentation and support practical applications for debaters, educators, and researchers. OpenDebateEvidence is publicly available to support further research and innovation in computational argumentation. Access it here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/Yusuf5/OpenCaselist

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are integrated into critical real-world applications, their strategic and logical reasoning abilities are increasingly crucial. This paper evaluates LLMs' reasoning abilities in competitive environments through game-theoretic tasks, e.g., board and card games that require pure logic and strategic reasoning to compete with opponents. We first propose GTBench, a language-driven environment composing 10 widely-recognized tasks, across a comprehensive game taxonomy: complete versus incomplete information, dynamic versus static, and probabilistic versus deterministic scenarios. Then, we investigate two key problems: (1) Characterizing game-theoretic reasoning of LLMs; (2) LLM-vs-LLM competitions as reasoning evaluation. We observe that (1) LLMs have distinct behaviors regarding various gaming scenarios; for example, LLMs fail in complete and deterministic games yet they are competitive in probabilistic gaming scenarios; (2) Open-source LLMs, e.g., CodeLlama-34b-Instruct, are less competitive than commercial LLMs, e.g., GPT-4, in complex games. In addition, code-pretraining greatly benefits strategic reasoning, while advanced reasoning methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) do not always help. Detailed error profiles are also provided for a better understanding of LLMs' behavior.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

We study the problem of adversarial language games, in which multiple agents with conflicting goals compete with each other via natural language interactions. While adversarial language games are ubiquitous in human activities, little attention has been devoted to this field in natural language processing. In this work, we propose a challenging adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo as an example, in which an attacker and a defender compete around a target word. The attacker is tasked with inducing the defender to utter the target word invisible to the defender, while the defender is tasked with detecting the target word before being induced by the attacker. In Adversarial Taboo, a successful attacker must hide its intention and subtly induce the defender, while a competitive defender must be cautious with its utterances and infer the intention of the attacker. Such language abilities can facilitate many important downstream NLP tasks. To instantiate the game, we create a game environment and a competition platform. Comprehensive experiments and empirical studies on several baseline attack and defense strategies show promising and interesting results. Based on the analysis on the game and experiments, we discuss multiple promising directions for future research.

Debate is the process of exchanging viewpoints or convincing others on a particular issue. Recent research has provided empirical evidence that the persuasiveness of an argument is determined not only by language usage but also by communicator characteristics. Researchers have paid much attention to aspects of languages, such as linguistic features and discourse structures, but combining argument persuasiveness and impact with the social personae of the audience has not been explored due to the difficulty and complexity. We have observed the impressive simulation and personification capability of ChatGPT, indicating a giant pre-trained language model may function as an individual to provide personae and exert unique influences based on diverse background knowledge. Therefore, we propose a persona knowledge-aligned framework for argument quality assessment tasks from the audience side. This is the first work that leverages the emergence of ChatGPT and injects such audience personae knowledge into smaller language models via prompt tuning. The performance of our pipeline demonstrates significant and consistent improvement compared to competitive architectures.

We explore the self-play training procedure of large language models (LLMs) in a two-player adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo. In this game, an attacker and a defender communicate around a target word only visible to the attacker. The attacker aims to induce the defender to speak the target word unconsciously, while the defender tries to infer the target word from the attacker's utterances. To win the game, both players should have sufficient knowledge about the target word and high-level reasoning ability to infer and express in this information-reserved conversation. Hence, we are curious about whether LLMs' reasoning ability can be further enhanced by self-play in this adversarial language game (SPAG). With this goal, we select several open-source LLMs and let each act as the attacker and play with a copy of itself as the defender on an extensive range of target words. Through reinforcement learning on the game outcomes, we observe that the LLMs' performances uniformly improve on a broad range of reasoning benchmarks. Furthermore, iteratively adopting this self-play process can continuously promote LLMs' reasoning abilities. The code is at https://github.com/Linear95/SPAG.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities across a broad range of tasks including Olympiad-level mathematical problems, indicating evidence of their complex reasoning abilities. While many reasoning benchmarks focus on the STEM domain, the ability of LRMs to reason correctly in broader task domains remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce TTT-Bench, a new benchmark that is designed to evaluate basic strategic, spatial, and logical reasoning abilities in LRMs through a suite of four two-player Tic-Tac-Toe-style games that humans can effortlessly solve from a young age. We propose a simple yet scalable programmatic approach for generating verifiable two-player game problems for TTT-Bench. Although these games are trivial for humans, they require reasoning about the intentions of the opponent, as well as the game board's spatial configurations, to ensure a win. We evaluate a diverse set of state-of-the-art LRMs, and discover that the models that excel at hard math problems frequently fail at these simple reasoning games. Further testing reveals that our evaluated reasoning models score on average downarrow 41\% \& downarrow 5\% lower on TTT-Bench compared to MATH 500 \& AIME 2024 respectively, with larger models achieving higher performance using shorter reasoning traces, where most of the models struggle on long-term strategic reasoning situations on simple and new TTT-Bench tasks.

Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Open-ended evaluation systems, where candidate models are compared on user-submitted prompts, have emerged as a popular solution. Despite their many advantages, we show that the current Elo-based rating systems can be susceptible to and even reinforce biases in data, intentional or accidental, due to their sensitivity to redundancies. To address this issue, we propose evaluation as a 3-player game, and introduce novel game-theoretic solution concepts to ensure robustness to redundancy. We show that our method leads to intuitive ratings and provide insights into the competitive landscape of LLM development.

As AI systems are used to answer more difficult questions and potentially help create new knowledge, judging the truthfulness of their outputs becomes more difficult and more important. How can we supervise unreliable experts, which have access to the truth but may not accurately report it, to give answers that are systematically true and don't just superficially seem true, when the supervisor can't tell the difference between the two on their own? In this work, we show that debate between two unreliable experts can help a non-expert judge more reliably identify the truth. We collect a dataset of human-written debates on hard reading comprehension questions where the judge has not read the source passage, only ever seeing expert arguments and short quotes selectively revealed by 'expert' debaters who have access to the passage. In our debates, one expert argues for the correct answer, and the other for an incorrect answer. Comparing debate to a baseline we call consultancy, where a single expert argues for only one answer which is correct half of the time, we find that debate performs significantly better, with 84% judge accuracy compared to consultancy's 74%. Debates are also more efficient, being 68% of the length of consultancies. By comparing human to AI debaters, we find evidence that with more skilled (in this case, human) debaters, the performance of debate goes up but the performance of consultancy goes down. Our error analysis also supports this trend, with 46% of errors in human debate attributable to mistakes by the honest debater (which should go away with increased skill); whereas 52% of errors in human consultancy are due to debaters obfuscating the relevant evidence from the judge (which should become worse with increased skill). Overall, these results show that debate is a promising approach for supervising increasingly capable but potentially unreliable AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Planning for goal-oriented dialogue often requires simulating future dialogue interactions and estimating task progress. Many approaches thus consider training neural networks to perform look-ahead search algorithms such as A* search and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). However, this training often requires abundant annotated data, which creates challenges when faced with noisy annotations or low-resource settings. We introduce GDP-Zero, an approach using Open-Loop MCTS to perform goal-oriented dialogue policy planning without any model training. GDP-Zero prompts a large language model to act as a policy prior, value function, user simulator, and system model during the tree search. We evaluate GDP-Zero on the goal-oriented task PersuasionForGood, and find that its responses are preferred over ChatGPT up to 59.32% of the time, and are rated more persuasive than ChatGPT during interactive evaluations.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, reward-based methods built on the Bradley-Terry assumption struggle to capture the non-transitive and heterogeneous nature of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO with strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, creating a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. In this work, we introduce Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an n-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. Our framework establishes well-defined Nash equilibria in multiplayer settings and extends the concept of duality gap to quantify approximation quality. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation, we show that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

The recently released ChatGPT model demonstrates unprecedented capabilities in zero-shot question-answering. In this work, we probe ChatGPT for its conversational understanding and introduce a conversational framework (protocol) that can be adopted in future studies. The Pok\'emon universe serves as an ideal testing ground for auditing ChatGPT's reasoning capabilities due to its closed world assumption. After bringing ChatGPT's background knowledge (on the Pok\'emon universe) to light, we test its reasoning process when using these concepts in battle scenarios. We then evaluate its ability to acquire new knowledge and include it in its reasoning process. Our ultimate goal is to assess ChatGPT's ability to generalize, combine features, and to acquire and reason over newly introduced knowledge from human feedback. We find that ChatGPT has prior knowledge of the Pokemon universe, which can reason upon in battle scenarios to a great extent, even when new information is introduced. The model performs better with collaborative feedback and if there is an initial phase of information retrieval, but also hallucinates occasionally and is susceptible to adversarial attacks.

We consider the problem of how a trusted, but computationally bounded agent (a 'verifier') can learn to interact with one or more powerful but untrusted agents ('provers') in order to solve a given task. More specifically, we study the case in which agents are represented using neural networks and refer to solutions of this problem as neural interactive proofs. First we introduce a unifying framework based on prover-verifier games, which generalises previously proposed interaction protocols. We then describe several new protocols for generating neural interactive proofs, and provide a theoretical comparison of both new and existing approaches. Finally, we support this theory with experiments in two domains: a toy graph isomorphism problem that illustrates the key ideas, and a code validation task using large language models. In so doing, we aim to create a foundation for future work on neural interactive proofs and their application in building safer AI systems.

Bias in LLMs can harm user experience and societal outcomes. However, current bias mitigation methods often require intensive human feedback, lack transferability to other topics or yield overconfident and random outputs. We find that involving LLMs in role-playing scenario boosts their ability to recognize and mitigate biases. Based on this, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Multi-role Debates as Feedback (RLDF), a novel approach for bias mitigation replacing human feedback in traditional RLHF. We utilize LLMs in multi-role debates to create a dataset that includes both high-bias and low-bias instances for training the reward model in reinforcement learning. Our approach comprises two modes: (1) self-reflection, where the same LLM participates in multi-role debates, and (2) teacher-student, where a more advanced LLM like GPT-3.5-turbo guides the LLM to perform this task. Experimental results across different LLMs on BBQ and our datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in bias mitigation. Our source code and datasets are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/RLDF-E344.

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

The Shapley value is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, which has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. The meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley values, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contributions. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

Social deduction games like Werewolf combine language, reasoning, and strategy, providing a testbed for studying natural language and social intelligence. However, most studies reduce the game to LLM-based self-play, yielding templated utterances and anecdotal cases that overlook the richness of social gameplay. Evaluation further relies on coarse metrics such as survival time or subjective scoring due to the lack of quality reference data. To address these gaps, we curate a high-quality, human-verified multimodal Werewolf dataset containing over 100 hours of video, 32.4M utterance tokens, and 15 rule variants. Based on this dataset, we propose a novel strategy-alignment evaluation that leverages the winning faction's strategies as ground truth in two stages: 1) Speech evaluation, formulated as multiple-choice-style tasks that assess whether the model can adopt appropriate stances across five dimensions of social ability; and 2) Decision evaluation, which assesses the model's voting choices and opponent-role inferences. This framework enables a fine-grained evaluation of models' linguistic and reasoning capabilities, while capturing their ability to generate strategically coherent gameplay. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs show diverse performance, with roughly half remain below 0.50, revealing clear gaps in deception and counterfactual reasoning. We hope our dataset further inspires research on language, reasoning, and strategy in multi-agent interaction.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

The remarkable growth in large language model (LLM) capabilities has spurred exploration into multi-agent systems, with debate frameworks emerging as a promising avenue for enhanced problem-solving. These multi-agent debate (MAD) approaches, where agents collaboratively present, critique, and refine arguments, potentially offer improved reasoning, robustness, and diverse perspectives over monolithic models. Despite prior studies leveraging MAD, a systematic understanding of its effectiveness compared to self-agent methods, particularly under varying conditions, remains elusive. This paper seeks to fill this gap by conceptualizing MAD as a test-time computational scaling technique, distinguished by collaborative refinement and diverse exploration capabilities. We conduct a comprehensive empirical investigation comparing MAD with strong self-agent test-time scaling baselines on mathematical reasoning and safety-related tasks. Our study systematically examines the influence of task difficulty, model scale, and agent diversity on MAD's performance. Key findings reveal that, for mathematical reasoning, MAD offers limited advantages over self-agent scaling but becomes more effective with increased problem difficulty and decreased model capability, while agent diversity shows little benefit. Conversely, for safety tasks, MAD's collaborative refinement can increase vulnerability, but incorporating diverse agent configurations facilitates a gradual reduction in attack success through the collaborative refinement process. We believe our findings provide critical guidance for the future development of more effective and strategically deployed MAD systems.

DeepSeek-R1 has shown that long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can naturally emerge through a simple reinforcement learning (RL) framework with rule-based rewards, where the training may directly start from the base models-a paradigm referred to as zero RL training. Most recent efforts to reproduce zero RL training have primarily focused on the Qwen2.5 model series, which may not be representative as we find the base models already exhibit strong instruction-following and self-reflection abilities. In this work, we investigate zero RL training across 10 diverse base models, spanning different families and sizes including LLama3-8B, Mistral-7B/24B, DeepSeek-Math-7B, Qwen2.5-math-7B, and all Qwen2.5 models from 0.5B to 32B. Leveraging several key design strategies-such as adjusting format reward and controlling query difficulty-we achieve substantial improvements in both reasoning accuracy and response length across most settings. However, by carefully monitoring the training dynamics, we observe that different base models exhibit distinct patterns during training. For instance, the increased response length does not always correlate with the emergence of certain cognitive behaviors such as verification (i.e., the "aha moment"). Notably, we observe the "aha moment" for the first time in small models not from the Qwen family. We share the key designs that enable successful zero RL training, along with our findings and practices. To facilitate further research, we open-source the code, models, and analysis tools.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

Contemporary progress in large language models (LLMs) has revealed notable inferential capacities via reinforcement learning (RL) employing verifiable reward, facilitating the development of O1 and R1-like reasoning models. Directly training from base models with RL is called zero-RL. However, previous works rely upon activating LLMs' inherent capacities through fixed prompt templates. This strategy introduces substantial sampling inefficiencies for weak LLMs, as the majority of problems generate invalid outputs during accuracy-driven filtration in reasoning tasks, which causes a waste of samples. To solve this issue, we propose Cog-Rethinker, a novel hierarchical metacognitive RL framework for LLM reasoning. Our Cog-Rethinker mainly focuses on the rollout procedure in RL training. After the direct rollout, our Cog-Rethinker improves sample utilization in a hierarchical metacognitive two-stage framework. By leveraging human cognition during solving problems, firstly, it prompts policy to decompose zero-accuracy problems into subproblems to produce final reasoning results. Secondly, with zero-accuracy problems in previous rollout stage, it further prompts policy to refine these answers by referencing previous wrong solutions. Moreover, to enable cold-start of the two new reasoning patterns and maintain train-test consistency across prompt templates, our Cog-Rethinker applies supervised fine-tuning on the policy using correct samples of the two stages with direct rollout template. Experimental results demonstrate Cog-Rethinker's superior performance on various mathematical reasoning benchmarks, we also analyzed its improved sample efficiency that accelerates convergence compared to baseline methods.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Decision-making, a complicated task requiring various types of abilities, presents an excellent framework for assessing Large Language Models (LLMs). Our research investigates LLMs' decision-making capabilities through the lens of a well-established field, Game Theory. We focus specifically on games that support the participation of more than two agents simultaneously. Subsequently, we introduce our framework, GAMA-Bench, including eight classical multi-agent games. We design a scoring scheme to assess a model's performance in these games quantitatively. Through GAMA-Bench, we investigate LLMs' robustness, generalizability, and enhancement strategies. Results reveal that while GPT-3.5 shows satisfying robustness, its generalizability is relatively limited. However, its performance can be improved through approaches such as Chain-of-Thought. Additionally, we conduct evaluations across various LLMs and find that GPT-4 outperforms other models on GAMA-Bench, achieving a score of 60.5. Moreover, Gemini-1.0-Pro and GPT-3.5 (0613, 1106, 0125) demonstrate similar intelligence on GAMA-Bench. The code and experimental results are made publicly available via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/GAMABench.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

We introduce an approach to evaluate language model (LM) agency using negotiation games. This approach better reflects real-world use cases and addresses some of the shortcomings of alternative LM benchmarks. Negotiation games enable us to study multi-turn, and cross-model interactions, modulate complexity, and side-step accidental evaluation data leakage. We use our approach to test six widely used and publicly accessible LMs, evaluating performance and alignment in both self-play and cross-play settings. Noteworthy findings include: (i) only closed-source models tested here were able to complete these tasks; (ii) cooperative bargaining games proved to be most challenging to the models; and (iii) even the most powerful models sometimes "lose" to weaker opponents

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

While state-of-the-art language models have achieved impressive results, they remain susceptible to inference-time adversarial attacks, such as adversarial prompts generated by red teams arXiv:2209.07858. One approach proposed to improve the general quality of language model generations is multi-agent debate, where language models self-evaluate through discussion and feedback arXiv:2305.14325. We implement multi-agent debate between current state-of-the-art language models and evaluate models' susceptibility to red team attacks in both single- and multi-agent settings. We find that multi-agent debate can reduce model toxicity when jailbroken or less capable models are forced to debate with non-jailbroken or more capable models. We also find marginal improvements through the general usage of multi-agent interactions. We further perform adversarial prompt content classification via embedding clustering, and analyze the susceptibility of different models to different types of attack topics.

With the exponential growth of research facilitated by modern technology and improved accessibility, scientific discoveries have become increasingly fragmented within and across fields. This makes it challenging to assess the significance, novelty, incremental findings, and equivalent ideas between related works, particularly those from different research communities. Large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong quantitative and qualitative reasoning abilities, and multi-agent LLM debates have shown promise in handling complex reasoning tasks by exploring diverse perspectives and reasoning paths. Inspired by this, we introduce Tree-of-Debate (ToD), a framework which converts scientific papers into LLM personas that debate their respective novelties. To emphasize structured, critical reasoning rather than focusing solely on outcomes, ToD dynamically constructs a debate tree, enabling fine-grained analysis of independent novelty arguments within scholarly articles. Through experiments on scientific literature across various domains, evaluated by expert researchers, we demonstrate that ToD generates informative arguments, effectively contrasts papers, and supports researchers in their literature review.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

The rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have presented challenges in evaluating those models. Existing evaluation methods are either reference-based or preference based, which inevitably need human intervention or introduce test bias caused by evaluator models. In this paper, we propose GameEval, a novel approach to evaluating LLMs through goal-driven conversational games, overcoming the limitations of previous methods. GameEval treats LLMs as game players and assigns them distinct roles with specific goals achieved by launching conversations of various forms, including discussion, question answering, and voting. We design three unique games with cooperative or adversarial objectives, accompanied by corresponding evaluation metrics, to show how this new paradigm comprehensively evaluates model performance.Through extensive experiments, we show that GameEval can effectively differentiate the capabilities of various LLMs, providing a comprehensive assessment of their integrated abilities to solve complex problems. Our public anonymous code is available at https://github.com/GameEval/GameEval.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with complex reasoning tasks. Motivated by the society of minds (Minsky, 1988), we propose ReConcile, a multi-model multi-agent framework designed as a round table conference among diverse LLM agents to foster diverse thoughts and discussion for improved consensus. ReConcile enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs by holding multiple rounds of discussion, learning to convince other agents to improve their answers, and employing a confidence-weighted voting mechanism. In each round, ReConcile initiates discussion between agents via a 'discussion prompt' that consists of (a) grouped answers and explanations generated by each agent in the previous round, (b) their uncertainties, and (c) demonstrations of answer-rectifying human explanations, used for convincing other agents. This discussion prompt enables each agent to revise their responses in light of insights from other agents. Once a consensus is reached and the discussion ends, ReConcile determines the final answer by leveraging the confidence of each agent in a weighted voting scheme. We implement ReConcile with ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude2 as the three agents. Our experimental results on various benchmarks demonstrate that ReConcile significantly enhances the reasoning performance of the agents (both individually and as a team), surpassing prior single-agent and multi-agent baselines by 7.7% and also outperforming GPT-4 on some of these datasets. We also experiment with GPT-4 itself as one of the agents in ReConcile and demonstrate that its initial performance also improves by absolute 10.0% through discussion and feedback from other agents. Finally, we also analyze the accuracy after every round and observe that ReConcile achieves better and faster consensus between agents, compared to a multi-agent debate baseline. Our code is available at: https://github.com/dinobby/ReConcile

Distilling knowledge from a large teacher model to a lightweight one is a widely successful approach for generating compact, powerful models in the semi-supervised learning setting where a limited amount of labeled data is available. In large-scale applications, however, the teacher tends to provide a large number of incorrect soft-labels that impairs student performance. The sheer size of the teacher additionally constrains the number of soft-labels that can be queried due to prohibitive computational and/or financial costs. The difficulty in achieving simultaneous efficiency (i.e., minimizing soft-label queries) and robustness (i.e., avoiding student inaccuracies due to incorrect labels) hurts the widespread application of knowledge distillation to many modern tasks. In this paper, we present a parameter-free approach with provable guarantees to query the soft-labels of points that are simultaneously informative and correctly labeled by the teacher. At the core of our work lies a game-theoretic formulation that explicitly considers the inherent trade-off between the informativeness and correctness of input instances. We establish bounds on the expected performance of our approach that hold even in worst-case distillation instances. We present empirical evaluations on popular benchmarks that demonstrate the improved distillation performance enabled by our work relative to that of state-of-the-art active learning and active distillation methods.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Large language models (LLMs), while promising, face criticisms for biases, hallucinations, and a lack of reasoning capability. This paper introduces SocraSynth, a multi-LLM agent reasoning platform developed to mitigate these issues. SocraSynth utilizes conditional statistics and systematic context enhancement through continuous arguments, alongside adjustable debate contentiousness levels. The platform typically involves a human moderator and two LLM agents representing opposing viewpoints on a given subject. SocraSynth operates in two main phases: knowledge generation and reasoning evaluation. In the knowledge generation phase, the moderator defines the debate topic and contentiousness level, prompting the agents to formulate supporting arguments for their respective stances. The reasoning evaluation phase then employs Socratic reasoning and formal logic principles to appraise the quality of the arguments presented. The dialogue concludes with the moderator adjusting the contentiousness from confrontational to collaborative, gathering final, conciliatory remarks to aid in human reasoning and decision-making. Through case studies in three distinct application domains, this paper showcases SocraSynth's effectiveness in fostering rigorous research, dynamic reasoning, comprehensive assessment, and enhanced collaboration. This underscores the value of multi-agent interactions in leveraging LLMs for advanced knowledge extraction and decision-making support.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

Poker, also known as Texas Hold'em, has always been a typical research target within imperfect information games (IIGs). IIGs have long served as a measure of artificial intelligence (AI) development. Representative prior works, such as DeepStack and Libratus heavily rely on counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) to tackle heads-up no-limit Poker. However, it is challenging for subsequent researchers to learn CFR from previous models and apply it to other real-world applications due to the expensive computational cost of CFR iterations. Additionally, CFR is difficult to apply to multi-player games due to the exponential growth of the game tree size. In this work, we introduce PokerGPT, an end-to-end solver for playing Texas Hold'em with arbitrary number of players and gaining high win rates, established on a lightweight large language model (LLM). PokerGPT only requires simple textual information of Poker games for generating decision-making advice, thus guaranteeing the convenient interaction between AI and humans. We mainly transform a set of textual records acquired from real games into prompts, and use them to fine-tune a lightweight pre-trained LLM using reinforcement learning human feedback technique. To improve fine-tuning performance, we conduct prompt engineering on raw data, including filtering useful information, selecting behaviors of players with high win rates, and further processing them into textual instruction using multiple prompt engineering techniques. Through the experiments, we demonstrate that PokerGPT outperforms previous approaches in terms of win rate, model size, training time, and response speed, indicating the great potential of LLMs in solving IIGs.

Automated reasoning with unstructured natural text is a key requirement for many potential applications of NLP and for developing robust AI systems. Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated complex reasoning capacities even without any finetuning. However, existing evaluation for automated reasoning assumes access to a consistent and coherent set of information over which models reason. When reasoning in the real-world, the available information is frequently inconsistent or contradictory, and therefore models need to be equipped with a strategy to resolve such conflicts when they arise. One widely-applicable way of resolving conflicts is to impose preferences over information sources (e.g., based on source credibility or information recency) and adopt the source with higher preference. In this paper, we formulate the problem of reasoning with contradictory information guided by preferences over sources as the classical problem of defeasible reasoning, and develop a dataset called BoardgameQA for measuring the reasoning capacity of LMs in this setting. BoardgameQA also incorporates reasoning with implicit background knowledge, to better reflect reasoning problems in downstream applications. We benchmark various LMs on BoardgameQA and the results reveal a significant gap in the reasoning capacity of state-of-the-art LMs on this problem, showing that reasoning with conflicting information does not surface out-of-the-box in LMs. While performance can be improved with finetuning, it nevertheless remains poor.

Pretrained large language models (LLMs) are widely used in many sub-fields of natural language processing (NLP) and generally known as excellent few-shot learners with task-specific exemplars. Notably, chain of thought (CoT) prompting, a recent technique for eliciting complex multi-step reasoning through step-by-step answer examples, achieved the state-of-the-art performances in arithmetics and symbolic reasoning, difficult system-2 tasks that do not follow the standard scaling laws for LLMs. While these successes are often attributed to LLMs' ability for few-shot learning, we show that LLMs are decent zero-shot reasoners by simply adding "Let's think step by step" before each answer. Experimental results demonstrate that our Zero-shot-CoT, using the same single prompt template, significantly outperforms zero-shot LLM performances on diverse benchmark reasoning tasks including arithmetics (MultiArith, GSM8K, AQUA-RAT, SVAMP), symbolic reasoning (Last Letter, Coin Flip), and other logical reasoning tasks (Date Understanding, Tracking Shuffled Objects), without any hand-crafted few-shot examples, e.g. increasing the accuracy on MultiArith from 17.7% to 78.7% and GSM8K from 10.4% to 40.7% with large InstructGPT model (text-davinci-002), as well as similar magnitudes of improvements with another off-the-shelf large model, 540B parameter PaLM. The versatility of this single prompt across very diverse reasoning tasks hints at untapped and understudied fundamental zero-shot capabilities of LLMs, suggesting high-level, multi-task broad cognitive capabilities may be extracted by simple prompting. We hope our work not only serves as the minimal strongest zero-shot baseline for the challenging reasoning benchmarks, but also highlights the importance of carefully exploring and analyzing the enormous zero-shot knowledge hidden inside LLMs before crafting finetuning datasets or few-shot exemplars.

We generalize gradient descent with momentum for optimization in differentiable games to have complex-valued momentum. We give theoretical motivation for our method by proving convergence on bilinear zero-sum games for simultaneous and alternating updates. Our method gives real-valued parameter updates, making it a drop-in replacement for standard optimizers. We empirically demonstrate that complex-valued momentum can improve convergence in realistic adversarial games - like generative adversarial networks - by showing we can find better solutions with an almost identical computational cost. We also show a practical generalization to a complex-valued Adam variant, which we use to train BigGAN to better inception scores on CIFAR-10.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing competence in solving mathematical reasoning problems. However, many open-source LLMs still struggle with errors in calculation and semantic understanding during intermediate reasoning steps. In this work, we introduce Prove, a simple yet effective framework that leverages translated programs derived from natural language solutions as a verification mechanism to filter out potentially incorrect reasoning paths before aggregating final answers. Unlike vanilla majority voting, our approach filters out solutions whose corresponding program output is inconsistent with the generated solution, aggregating only those that pass verification. We conducted extensive experiments using 13 open-source LLMs from various model families and sizes, ranging from 0.5B to 13B parameters, across eight mathematical benchmarks. Our results show that Prove consistently outperforms vanilla majority voting as a heuristic for solving mathematical reasoning tasks across all model sizes and datasets, achieving improvements of up to 18% on GSM8K and 8% on MATH-500. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/prove.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Communication games, which we refer to as incomplete information games that heavily depend on natural language communication, hold significant research value in fields such as economics, social science, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we explore the problem of how to engage large language models (LLMs) in communication games, and in response, propose a tuning-free framework. Our approach keeps LLMs frozen, and relies on the retrieval and reflection on past communications and experiences for improvement. An empirical study on the representative and widely-studied communication game, ``Werewolf'', demonstrates that our framework can effectively play Werewolf game without tuning the parameters of the LLMs. More importantly, strategic behaviors begin to emerge in our experiments, suggesting that it will be a fruitful journey to engage LLMs in communication games and associated domains.

Scaling up test-time compute, by generating multiple independent solutions and selecting or aggregating among them, has become a central paradigm for improving large language models (LLMs) on challenging reasoning tasks. While most prior work relies on simple majority voting or reward model ranking to aggregate solutions, these approaches may only yield limited benefits. In this work, we propose to learn aggregation as an explicit reasoning skill: given a set of candidate solutions, we train an aggregator model to review, reconcile, and synthesize a final, correct answer using reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards. A key ingredient is careful balancing of easy and hard training examples, allowing the model to learn both to recover minority-but-correct answers as well as easy majority-correct answers. Empirically, we find our method, AggLM, outperforms both strong rule-based and reward-model baselines, across multiple benchmarks. Furthermore, it generalizes effectively to solutions from differing models, including stronger ones than contained in the training data, all while requiring substantially fewer tokens than majority voting with larger numbers of solutions.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks, their performance in dynamic, interactive, and competitive scenarios - such as business strategy and stock market analysis - remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we formally explore the dynamic reasoning capabilities of LLMs for decision-making in rapidly evolving environments. We introduce two game theory-based pilot challenges that mirror the complexities of real-world dynamic decision-making. These challenges are well-defined, enabling clear, controllable, and precise evaluation of LLMs' dynamic reasoning abilities. Through extensive experiments, we find that existing reasoning methods tend to falter in dynamic settings that require k-level thinking - a key concept not tackled by previous works. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning approach for LLMs, named "K-Level Reasoning". This approach adopts the perspective of rivals to recursively employ k-level thinking based on available historical information, which significantly improves the prediction accuracy of rivals' subsequent moves and informs more strategic decision-making. This research not only sets a robust quantitative benchmark for the assessment of dynamic reasoning but also markedly enhances the proficiency of LLMs in dynamic contexts.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

The recent progress in large language models (LLMs), especially the invention of chain-of-thoughts (CoT) prompting, makes it possible to solve reasoning problems. However, even the strongest LLMs are still struggling with more complicated problems that require non-linear thinking and multi-step reasoning. In this work, we explore whether LLMs have the ability to recognize their own errors, without resorting to external resources. In particular, we investigate whether they can be used to identify individual errors within a step-by-step reasoning. To this end, we propose a zero-shot verification scheme to recognize such errors. We then use this verification scheme to improve question-answering performance, by using it to perform weighted voting on different generated answers. We test the method on three math datasets-GSM8K, MathQA, and MATH-and find that it successfully recognizes errors and, in turn, increases final predictive performance.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Auxiliary learning is an effective method for enhancing the generalization capabilities of trained models, particularly when dealing with small datasets. However, this approach may present several difficulties: (i) optimizing multiple objectives can be more challenging, and (ii) how to balance the auxiliary tasks to best assist the main task is unclear. In this work, we propose a novel approach, named AuxiNash, for balancing tasks in auxiliary learning by formalizing the problem as generalized bargaining game with asymmetric task bargaining power. Furthermore, we describe an efficient procedure for learning the bargaining power of tasks based on their contribution to the performance of the main task and derive theoretical guarantees for its convergence. Finally, we evaluate AuxiNash on multiple multi-task benchmarks and find that it consistently outperforms competing methods.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Can large language models improve without external data -- by generating their own questions and answers? We hypothesize that a pre-trained language model can improve its reasoning skills given only a single prompt specifying the topic (e.g., algebra word problems) and asking the model to generate its own questions. To do this, we propose Self-Questioning Language Models (SQLM): an asymmetric self-play framework where a proposer is given the topic and generates a question for a solver, who tries to answer it. Both the proposer and solver are trained via reinforcement learning. The proposer receives a reward if the problem is not too easy or too difficult, and the solver receives a reward based on majority voting, a proxy for correctness in the absence of ground-truth answers. For coding, the proposer can instead generate unit tests which are used for verification. We study this asymmetric self-play framework on three benchmarks: three-digit multiplication, algebra problems from the OMEGA benchmark, and programming problems from Codeforces. By continually generating more interesting problems and attempting to solve them, language models can improve on downstream benchmarks without access to any curated training datasets.

The recent paradigm shift towards training large language models (LLMs) using DeepSeek-R1-Zero-style reinforcement learning (RL) on verifiable rewards has led to impressive advancements in code and mathematical reasoning. However, this methodology is limited to tasks where rule-based answer verification is possible and does not naturally extend to real-world domains such as chemistry, healthcare, engineering, law, biology, business, and economics. Current practical workarounds use an additional LLM as a model-based verifier; however, this introduces issues such as reliance on a strong verifier LLM, susceptibility to reward hacking, and the practical burden of maintaining the verifier model in memory during training. To address this and extend DeepSeek-R1-Zero-style training to general reasoning domains, we propose a verifier-free method (VeriFree) that bypasses answer verification and instead uses RL to directly maximize the probability of generating the reference answer. We compare VeriFree with verifier-based methods and demonstrate that, in addition to its significant practical benefits and reduced compute requirements, VeriFree matches and even surpasses verifier-based methods on extensive evaluations across MMLU-Pro, GPQA, SuperGPQA, and math-related benchmarks. Moreover, we provide insights into this method from multiple perspectives: as an elegant integration of training both the policy and implicit verifier in a unified model, and as a variational optimization approach. Code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/VeriFree.

LLMs have demonstrated strong mathematical reasoning abilities by leveraging reinforcement learning with long chain-of-thought, yet they continue to struggle with theorem proving due to the lack of clear supervision signals when solely using natural language. Dedicated domain-specific languages like Lean provide clear supervision via formal verification of proofs, enabling effective training through reinforcement learning. In this work, we propose Seed-Prover, a lemma-style whole-proof reasoning model. Seed-Prover can iteratively refine its proof based on Lean feedback, proved lemmas, and self-summarization. To solve IMO-level contest problems, we design three test-time inference strategies that enable both deep and broad reasoning. Seed-Prover proves 78.1% of formalized past IMO problems, saturates MiniF2F, and achieves over 50\% on PutnamBench, outperforming the previous state-of-the-art by a large margin. To address the lack of geometry support in Lean, we introduce a geometry reasoning engine Seed-Geometry, which outperforms previous formal geometry engines. We use these two systems to participate in IMO 2025 and fully prove 5 out of 6 problems. This work represents a significant advancement in automated mathematical reasoning, demonstrating the effectiveness of formal verification with long chain-of-thought reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across diverse tasks and exhibited impressive reasoning abilities by applying zero-shot Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, due to the evolving nature of sentence prefixes during the pre-training phase, existing zero-shot CoT prompting methods that employ identical CoT prompting across all task instances may not be optimal. In this paper, we introduce a novel zero-shot prompting method that leverages evolutionary algorithms to generate diverse promptings for LLMs dynamically. Our approach involves initializing two CoT promptings, performing evolutionary operations based on LLMs to create a varied set, and utilizing the LLMs to select a suitable CoT prompting for a given problem. Additionally, a rewriting operation, guided by the selected CoT prompting, enhances the understanding of the LLMs about the problem. Extensive experiments conducted across ten reasoning datasets demonstrate the superior performance of our proposed method compared to current zero-shot CoT prompting methods on GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4. Moreover, in-depth analytical experiments underscore the adaptability and effectiveness of our method in various reasoning tasks.

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works are limited as they either rely on training with large amounts of human demonstrations or lack the ability to generate natural and useful communication strategies. In this work, we train language models to have productive discussions about their environment in natural language without any human demonstrations. We decompose the communication problem into listening and speaking. Our key idea is to leverage the agent's goal to predict useful information about the world as a dense reward signal that guides communication. Specifically, we improve a model's listening skills by training them to predict information about the environment based on discussions, and we simultaneously improve a model's speaking skills with multi-agent reinforcement learning by rewarding messages based on their influence on other agents. To investigate the role and necessity of communication in complex social settings, we study an embodied social deduction game based on Among Us, where the key question to answer is the identity of an adversarial imposter. We analyze emergent behaviors due to our technique, such as accusing suspects and providing evidence, and find that it enables strong discussions, doubling the win rates compared to standard RL. We release our code and models at https://socialdeductionllm.github.io/

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is a powerful framework for improving the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, current methods such as GRPO rely only on problems where the model responses to the same input differ in correctness, while ignoring those where all responses receive the same reward - so-called zero-variance prompts. In this work, we argue that such prompts are not useless but can, in fact, provide meaningful feedback for policy optimization. To this end, we introduce RL with Zero-Variance Prompts (RL-ZVP), a novel algorithm that extract learning signals from zero-variance prompts. RL-ZVP directly rewards correctness and penalizes errors even without contrasting responses, modulating feedback with token-level characteristics to preserve informative, nuanced signals. Across six math reasoning benchmarks, RL-ZVP achieves significant improvements of up to 8.61 points in accuracy and 7.77 points in pass rate over GRPO, while consistently outperforming other baselines that filter out zero-variance prompts. These results highlight the untapped potential of learning from zero-variance prompts in RLVR.

This paper presents a simple, effective, and cost-efficient strategy to improve LLM performance by scaling test-time compute. Our strategy builds upon the repeated-sampling-then-voting framework, with a novel twist: incorporating multiple models, even weaker ones, to leverage their complementary strengths that potentially arise from diverse training data and paradigms. By using consistency as a signal, our strategy dynamically switches between models. Theoretical analysis highlights the efficiency and performance advantages of our strategy. Extensive experiments on six datasets demonstrate that our strategy not only outperforms self-consistency and state-of-the-art multi-agent debate approaches, but also significantly reduces inference costs. Additionally, ModelSwitch requires only a few comparable LLMs to achieve optimal performance and can be extended with verification methods, demonstrating the potential of leveraging multiple LLMs in the generation-verification paradigm.

Progress in fields of machine learning and adversarial planning has benefited significantly from benchmark domains, from checkers and the classic UCI data sets to Go and Diplomacy. In sequential decision-making, agent evaluation has largely been restricted to few interactions against experts, with the aim to reach some desired level of performance (e.g. beating a human professional player). We propose a benchmark for multiagent learning based on repeated play of the simple game Rock, Paper, Scissors along with a population of forty-three tournament entries, some of which are intentionally sub-optimal. We describe metrics to measure the quality of agents based both on average returns and exploitability. We then show that several RL, online learning, and language model approaches can learn good counter-strategies and generalize well, but ultimately lose to the top-performing bots, creating an opportunity for research in multiagent learning.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

We introduce a method to improve the zero-shot reasoning abilities of large language models on general language understanding tasks. Specifically, we build an autonomous agent to instruct the reasoning process of large language models. We show this approach further unleashes the zero-shot reasoning abilities of large language models to more tasks. We study the performance of our method on a wide set of datasets spanning generation, classification, and reasoning. We show that our method generalizes to most tasks and obtains state-of-the-art zero-shot performance on 20 of the 29 datasets that we evaluate. For instance, our method boosts the performance of state-of-the-art large language models by a large margin, including Vicuna-13b (13.3%), Llama-2-70b-chat (23.2%), and GPT-3.5 Turbo (17.0%). Compared to zero-shot chain of thought, our improvement in reasoning is striking, with an average increase of 10.5%. With our method, Llama-2-70b-chat outperforms zero-shot GPT-3.5 Turbo by 10.2%.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

Large language models (LLMs) empowered by chain-of-thought reasoning have achieved impressive accuracy on complex tasks but suffer from excessive inference costs and latency when applied uniformly to all problems. We propose SABER (Switchable and Balanced Training for Efficient LLM Reasoning), a reinforcement learning framework that endows LLMs with user-controllable, token-budgeted reasoning. SABER first profiles each training example's base-model thinking token usage and assigns it to one of the predefined budget tiers. During fine-tuning, the model is guided by system prompts and length-aware rewards to respect its assigned budget. In parallel, we incorporate no-think examples to ensure the model remains reliable even when explicit reasoning is turned off. SABER further supports four discrete inference modes - NoThink, FastThink, CoreThink, and DeepThink, enabling flexible trade-offs between latency and reasoning depth. Extensive evaluations on math reasoning (MATH, GSM8K), code generation (MBPP), and logical reasoning (LiveBench-Reasoning) demonstrate that SABER achieves high accuracy under tight budgets, graceful degradation, and effective cross-scale and cross-domain generalization. In particular, SABER-FastThink cuts reasoning length by 65.4% and yields a 3.6% accuracy gain compared with the base model on the MATH benchmark.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently been shown to deliver impressive performance in various NLP tasks. To tackle multi-step reasoning tasks, few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting includes a few manually crafted step-by-step reasoning demonstrations which enable LLMs to explicitly generate reasoning steps and improve their reasoning task accuracy. To eliminate the manual effort, Zero-shot-CoT concatenates the target problem statement with "Let's think step by step" as an input prompt to LLMs. Despite the success of Zero-shot-CoT, it still suffers from three pitfalls: calculation errors, missing-step errors, and semantic misunderstanding errors. To address the missing-step errors, we propose Plan-and-Solve (PS) Prompting. It consists of two components: first, devising a plan to divide the entire task into smaller subtasks, and then carrying out the subtasks according to the plan. To address the calculation errors and improve the quality of generated reasoning steps, we extend PS prompting with more detailed instructions and derive PS+ prompting. We evaluate our proposed prompting strategy on ten datasets across three reasoning problems. The experimental results over GPT-3 show that our proposed zero-shot prompting consistently outperforms Zero-shot-CoT across all datasets by a large margin, is comparable to or exceeds Zero-shot-Program-of-Thought Prompting, and has comparable performance with 8-shot CoT prompting on the math reasoning problem. The code can be found at https://github.com/AGI-Edgerunners/Plan-and-Solve-Prompting.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Argumentation is one of society's foundational pillars, and, sparked by advances in NLP and the vast availability of text data, automated mining of arguments receives increasing attention. A decisive property of arguments is their strength or quality. While there are works on the automated estimation of argument strength, their scope is narrow: they focus on isolated datasets and neglect the interactions with related argument mining tasks, such as argument identification, evidence detection, or emotional appeal. In this work, we close this gap by approaching argument quality estimation from multiple different angles: Grounded on rich results from thorough empirical evaluations, we assess the generalization capabilities of argument quality estimation across diverse domains, the interplay with related argument mining tasks, and the impact of emotions on perceived argument strength. We find that generalization depends on a sufficient representation of different domains in the training part. In zero-shot transfer and multi-task experiments, we reveal that argument quality is among the more challenging tasks but can improve others. Finally, we show that emotions play a minor role in argument quality than is often assumed.

Evaluating the step-by-step reliability of large language model (LLM) reasoning, such as Chain-of-Thought, remains challenging due to the difficulty and cost of obtaining high-quality step-level supervision. In this paper, we introduce Self-Play Critic (SPC), a novel approach where a critic model evolves its ability to assess reasoning steps through adversarial self-play games, eliminating the need for manual step-level annotation. SPC involves fine-tuning two copies of a base model to play two roles, namely a "sneaky generator" that deliberately produces erroneous steps designed to be difficult to detect, and a "critic" that analyzes the correctness of reasoning steps. These two models engage in an adversarial game in which the generator aims to fool the critic, while the critic model seeks to identify the generator's errors. Using reinforcement learning based on the game outcomes, the models iteratively improve; the winner of each confrontation receives a positive reward and the loser receives a negative reward, driving continuous self-evolution. Experiments on three reasoning process benchmarks (ProcessBench, PRM800K, DeltaBench) demonstrate that our SPC progressively enhances its error detection capabilities (e.g., accuracy increases from 70.8% to 77.7% on ProcessBench) and surpasses strong baselines, including distilled R1 model. Furthermore, applying SPC to guide the test-time search of diverse LLMs significantly improves their mathematical reasoning performance on MATH500 and AIME2024, outperforming state-of-the-art process reward models.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) systems capture deep truths about general, human problem-solving. In domains where new data can be simulated cheaply, these systems uncover sequential decision-making policies that far exceed the ability of any human. Society faces many problems whose solutions require this skill, but they are often in domains where new data cannot be cheaply simulated. In such scenarios, we can learn simulators from existing data, but these will only ever be approximately correct, and can be pathologically incorrect when queried outside of their training distribution. As a result, a misalignment between the environments in which we train our agents and the real-world in which we wish to deploy our agents is inevitable. Dealing with this misalignment is the primary concern of zero-shot reinforcement learning, a problem setting where the agent must generalise to a new task or domain with zero practice shots. Whilst impressive progress has been made on methods that perform zero-shot RL in idealised settings, new work is needed if these results are to be replicated in real-world settings. In this thesis, we argue that doing so requires us to navigate (at least) three constraints. First, the data quality constraint: real-world datasets are small and homogeneous. Second, the observability constraint: states, dynamics and rewards in the real-world are often only partially observed. And third, the data availability constraint: a priori access to data cannot always be assumed. This work proposes a suite of methods that perform zero-shot RL subject to these constraints. In a series of empirical studies we expose the failings of existing methods, and justify our techniques for remedying them. We believe these designs take us a step closer to RL methods that can be deployed to solve real-world problems.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Given questions regarding some prototypical situation such as Name something that people usually do before they leave the house for work? a human can easily answer them via acquired experiences. There can be multiple right answers for such questions, with some more common for a situation than others. This paper introduces a new question answering dataset for training and evaluating common sense reasoning capabilities of artificial intelligence systems in such prototypical situations. The training set is gathered from an existing set of questions played in a long-running international game show FAMILY- FEUD. The hidden evaluation set is created by gathering answers for each question from 100 crowd-workers. We also propose a generative evaluation task where a model has to output a ranked list of answers, ideally covering all prototypical answers for a question. After presenting multiple competitive baseline models, we find that human performance still exceeds model scores on all evaluation metrics with a meaningful gap, supporting the challenging nature of the task.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

In arena-style evaluation of large language models (LLMs), two LLMs respond to a user query, and the user chooses the winning response or deems the "battle" a draw, resulting in an adjustment to the ratings of both models. The prevailing approach for modeling these rating dynamics is to view battles as two-player game matches, as in chess, and apply the Elo rating system and its derivatives. In this paper, we critically examine this paradigm. Specifically, we question whether a draw genuinely means that the two models are equal and hence whether their ratings should be equalized. Instead, we conjecture that draws are more indicative of query difficulty: if the query is too easy, then both models are more likely to succeed equally. On three real-world arena datasets, we show that ignoring rating updates for draws yields a 1-3% relative increase in battle outcome prediction accuracy (which includes draws) for all four rating systems studied. Further analyses suggest that draws occur more for queries rated as very easy and those as highly objective, with risk ratios of 1.37 and 1.35, respectively. We recommend future rating systems to reconsider existing draw semantics and to account for query properties in rating updates.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

When reward functions are hand-designed, deep reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from reward misspecification, causing them to learn suboptimal policies in terms of the intended task objectives. In the single-agent case, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques attempt to address this issue by inferring the reward function from expert demonstrations. However, in multi-agent problems, misalignment between the learned and true objectives is exacerbated due to increased environment non-stationarity and variance that scales with multiple agents. As such, in multi-agent general-sum games, multi-agent IRL algorithms have difficulty balancing cooperative and competitive objectives. To address these issues, we propose Multi-Agent Marginal Q-Learning from Demonstrations (MAMQL), a novel sample-efficient framework for multi-agent IRL. For each agent, MAMQL learns a critic marginalized over the other agents' policies, allowing for a well-motivated use of Boltzmann policies in the multi-agent context. We identify a connection between optimal marginalized critics and single-agent soft-Q IRL, allowing us to apply a direct, simple optimization criterion from the single-agent domain. Across our experiments on three different simulated domains, MAMQL significantly outperforms previous multi-agent methods in average reward, sample efficiency, and reward recovery by often more than 2-5x. We make our code available at https://sites.google.com/view/mamql .

With the recent advances of large language models (LLMs), it is no longer infeasible to build an automated debate system that helps people to synthesise persuasive arguments. Previous work attempted this task by integrating multiple components. In our work, we introduce an argument mining dataset that captures the end-to-end process of preparing an argumentative essay for a debate, which covers the tasks of claim and evidence identification (Task 1 ED), evidence convincingness ranking (Task 2 ECR), argumentative essay summarisation and human preference ranking (Task 3 ASR) and metric learning for automated evaluation of resulting essays, based on human feedback along argument quality dimensions (Task 4 SQE). Our dataset contains 14k examples of claims that are fully annotated with the various properties supporting the aforementioned tasks. We evaluate multiple generative baselines for each of these tasks, including representative LLMs. We find, that while they show promising results on individual tasks in our benchmark, their end-to-end performance on all four tasks in succession deteriorates significantly, both in automated measures as well as in human-centred evaluation. This challenge presented by our proposed dataset motivates future research on end-to-end argument mining and summarisation. The repository of this project is available at https://github.com/HarrywillDr/ArgSum-Datatset

Constructing benchmarks that test the abilities of modern natural language understanding models is difficult - pre-trained language models exploit artifacts in benchmarks to achieve human parity, but still fail on adversarial examples and make errors that demonstrate a lack of common sense. In this work, we propose gamification as a framework for data construction. The goal of players in the game is to compose questions that mislead a rival AI while using specific phrases for extra points. The game environment leads to enhanced user engagement and simultaneously gives the game designer control over the collected data, allowing us to collect high-quality data at scale. Using our method we create CommonsenseQA 2.0, which includes 14,343 yes/no questions, and demonstrate its difficulty for models that are orders-of-magnitude larger than the AI used in the game itself. Our best baseline, the T5-based Unicorn with 11B parameters achieves an accuracy of 70.2%, substantially higher than GPT-3 (52.9%) in a few-shot inference setup. Both score well below human performance which is at 94.1%.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has played an important role in improving the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). Some studies apply RL directly to smaller base models (known as zero-RL) and also achieve notable progress. However, in this paper, we show that using only 920 examples, a simple distillation method based on the base model can clearly outperform zero-RL, which typically requires much more data and computational cost. By analyzing the token frequency in model outputs, we find that the distilled model shows more flexible reasoning. It uses anthropomorphic tokens and logical connectors much more often than the zero-RL model. Further analysis reveals that distillation enhances the presence of two advanced cognitive behaviors: Multi-Perspective Thinking or Attempting and Metacognitive Awareness. Frequent occurrences of these two advanced cognitive behaviors give rise to flexible reasoning, which is essential for solving complex reasoning problems, while zero-RL fails to significantly boost the frequency of these behaviors.

The game of chess is the most widely-studied domain in the history of artificial intelligence. The strongest programs are based on a combination of sophisticated search techniques, domain-specific adaptations, and handcrafted evaluation functions that have been refined by human experts over several decades. In contrast, the AlphaGo Zero program recently achieved superhuman performance in the game of Go, by tabula rasa reinforcement learning from games of self-play. In this paper, we generalise this approach into a single AlphaZero algorithm that can achieve, tabula rasa, superhuman performance in many challenging domains. Starting from random play, and given no domain knowledge except the game rules, AlphaZero achieved within 24 hours a superhuman level of play in the games of chess and shogi (Japanese chess) as well as Go, and convincingly defeated a world-champion program in each case.

For reinforcement learning systems to be widely adopted, their users must understand and trust them. We present a theoretical analysis of explaining reinforcement learning using Shapley values, following a principled approach from game theory for identifying the contribution of individual players to the outcome of a cooperative game. We call this general framework Shapley Values for Explaining Reinforcement Learning (SVERL). Our analysis exposes the limitations of earlier uses of Shapley values in reinforcement learning. We then develop an approach that uses Shapley values to explain agent performance. In a variety of domains, SVERL produces meaningful explanations that match and supplement human intuition.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

The generalization of decision-making agents encompasses two fundamental elements: learning from past experiences and reasoning in novel contexts. However, the predominant emphasis in most interactive environments is on learning, often at the expense of complexity in reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CivRealm, an environment inspired by the Civilization game. Civilization's profound alignment with human history and society necessitates sophisticated learning, while its ever-changing situations demand strong reasoning to generalize. Particularly, CivRealm sets up an imperfect-information general-sum game with a changing number of players; it presents a plethora of complex features, challenging the agent to deal with open-ended stochastic environments that require diplomacy and negotiation skills. Within CivRealm, we provide interfaces for two typical agent types: tensor-based agents that focus on learning, and language-based agents that emphasize reasoning. To catalyze further research, we present initial results for both paradigms. The canonical RL-based agents exhibit reasonable performance in mini-games, whereas both RL- and LLM-based agents struggle to make substantial progress in the full game. Overall, CivRealm stands as a unique learning and reasoning challenge for decision-making agents. The code is available at https://github.com/bigai-ai/civrealm.

OpenSpiel is a collection of environments and algorithms for research in general reinforcement learning and search/planning in games. OpenSpiel supports n-player (single- and multi- agent) zero-sum, cooperative and general-sum, one-shot and sequential, strictly turn-taking and simultaneous-move, perfect and imperfect information games, as well as traditional multiagent environments such as (partially- and fully- observable) grid worlds and social dilemmas. OpenSpiel also includes tools to analyze learning dynamics and other common evaluation metrics. This document serves both as an overview of the code base and an introduction to the terminology, core concepts, and algorithms across the fields of reinforcement learning, computational game theory, and search.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

While Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is increasingly expanding more areas of application, little has been applied to make deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) more comprehensible. As RL becomes ubiquitous and used in critical and general public applications, it is essential to develop methods that make it better understood and more interpretable. This study proposes a novel approach to explain cooperative strategies in multiagent RL using Shapley values, a game theory concept used in XAI that successfully explains the rationale behind decisions taken by Machine Learning algorithms. Through testing common assumptions of this technique in two cooperation-centered socially challenging multi-agent environments environments, this article argues that Shapley values are a pertinent way to evaluate the contribution of players in a cooperative multi-agent RL context. To palliate the high overhead of this method, Shapley values are approximated using Monte Carlo sampling. Experimental results on Multiagent Particle and Sequential Social Dilemmas show that Shapley values succeed at estimating the contribution of each agent. These results could have implications that go beyond games in economics, (e.g., for non-discriminatory decision making, ethical and responsible AI-derived decisions or policy making under fairness constraints). They also expose how Shapley values only give general explanations about a model and cannot explain a single run, episode nor justify precise actions taken by agents. Future work should focus on addressing these critical aspects.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS) as components of collaborative intelligence, where peer interactions dynamically shape individual decision-making. Although prior work has focused on conformity bias, we extend the analysis to examine how LLMs form trust from previous impressions, resist misinformation, and integrate peer input during interaction, key factors for achieving collective intelligence under complex social dynamics. We present KAIROS, a benchmark simulating quiz contests with peer agents of varying reliability, offering fine-grained control over conditions such as expert-novice roles, noisy crowds, and adversarial peers. LLMs receive both historical interactions and current peer responses, allowing systematic investigation into how trust, peer action, and self-confidence influence decisions. As for mitigation strategies, we evaluate prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), across multiple models. Our results reveal that GRPO with multi-agent context combined with outcome-based rewards and unconstrained reasoning achieves the best overall performance, but also decreases the robustness to social influence compared to Base models. The code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/declare-lab/KAIROS.

Mathematical reasoning lies at the heart of artificial intelligence, underpinning applications in education, program verification, and research-level mathematical discovery. Mathematical competitions, in particular, present two challenging problem types: theorem proving, which requires rigorous proofs of stated conclusions, and answer construction, which involves hypothesizing and formally verifying mathematical objects. Large Language Models (LLMs) effectively generate creative candidate answers but struggle with formal verification, while symbolic provers ensure rigor but cannot efficiently handle creative conjecture generation. We introduce the Enumerate-Conjecture-Prove (ECP) framework, a modular neuro-symbolic method integrating LLM-based enumeration and pattern-driven conjecturing with formal theorem proving. We present ConstructiveBench, a dataset of 3,431 answer-construction problems in various math competitions with verified Lean formalizations. On the ConstructiveBench dataset, ECP improves the accuracy of answer construction from a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) baseline of 14.54% to 45.06% with the gpt-4.1-mini model. Moreover, combined with ECP's constructed answers, the state-of-the-art DeepSeek-Prover-V2-7B model generates correct proofs for 858 of the 3,431 constructive problems in Lean, achieving 25.01% accuracy compared to 9.86% for symbolic-only baselines. Our code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/JackSun200312/ECP.

Game-theoretic interactions between agents with Large Language Models (LLMs) have revealed many emergent capabilities, yet the linguistic diversity of these interactions has not been sufficiently quantified. In this paper, we present the Conversational Robustness Evaluation Score: CORE, a metric to quantify the effectiveness of language use within multi-agent systems across different game-theoretic interactions. CORE integrates measures of cluster entropy, lexical repetition, and semantic similarity, providing a direct lens of dialog quality. We apply CORE to pairwise LLM dialogs across competitive, cooperative, and neutral settings, further grounding our analysis in Zipf's and Heaps' Laws to characterize word frequency distributions and vocabulary growth. Our findings show that cooperative settings exhibit both steeper Zipf distributions and higher Heap exponents, indicating more repetition alongside greater vocabulary expansion. In contrast, competitive interactions display lower Zipf and Heaps exponents, reflecting less repetition and more constrained vocabularies. These results provide new insights into how social incentives influence language adaptation, and highlight CORE as a robust diagnostic for measuring linguistic robustness in multi-agent LLM systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/psyonp/core.

Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients, making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with existing methods.