Daily Papers

Collaborative perception, which greatly enhances the sensing capability of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) by incorporating data from external resources, also brings forth potential security risks. CAVs' driving decisions rely on remote untrusted data, making them susceptible to attacks carried out by malicious participants in the collaborative perception system. However, security analysis and countermeasures for such threats are absent. To understand the impact of the vulnerability, we break the ground by proposing various real-time data fabrication attacks in which the attacker delivers crafted malicious data to victims in order to perturb their perception results, leading to hard brakes or increased collision risks. Our attacks demonstrate a high success rate of over 86\% on high-fidelity simulated scenarios and are realizable in real-world experiments. To mitigate the vulnerability, we present a systematic anomaly detection approach that enables benign vehicles to jointly reveal malicious fabrication. It detects 91.5% of attacks with a false positive rate of 3% in simulated scenarios and significantly mitigates attack impacts in real-world scenarios.

While numerous defense methods have been proposed to prohibit potential poisoning attacks from untrusted data sources, most research works only defend against specific attacks, which leaves many avenues for an adversary to exploit. In this work, we propose an efficient and robust training approach to defend against data poisoning attacks based on influence functions, named Healthy Influential-Noise based Training. Using influence functions, we craft healthy noise that helps to harden the classification model against poisoning attacks without significantly affecting the generalization ability on test data. In addition, our method can perform effectively when only a subset of the training data is modified, instead of the current method of adding noise to all examples that has been used in several previous works. We conduct comprehensive evaluations over two image datasets with state-of-the-art poisoning attacks under different realistic attack scenarios. Our empirical results show that HINT can efficiently protect deep learning models against the effect of both untargeted and targeted poisoning attacks.

Detecting prompt injection and jailbreak attacks is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely. As agents increasingly process untrusted data from emails, documents, tool outputs, and external APIs, robust attack detection becomes essential. Yet current evaluation practices and production systems have fundamental limitations. We present a comprehensive analysis using a diverse benchmark of 18 datasets spanning harmful requests, jailbreaks, indirect prompt injections, and extraction attacks. We propose Leave-One-Dataset-Out (LODO) evaluation to measure true out-of-distribution generalization, revealing that the standard practice of train-test splits from the same dataset sources severely overestimates performance: aggregate metrics show an 8.4 percentage point AUC inflation, but per-dataset gaps range from 1% to 25% accuracy-exposing heterogeneous failure modes. To understand why classifiers fail to generalize, we analyze Sparse Auto-Encoder (SAE) feature coefficients across LODO folds, finding that 28% of top features are dataset-dependent shortcuts whose class signal depends on specific dataset compositions rather than semantic content. We systematically compare production guardrails (PromptGuard 2, LlamaGuard) and LLM-as-judge approaches on our benchmark, finding all three fail on indirect attacks targeting agents (7-37% detection) and that PromptGuard 2 and LlamaGuard cannot evaluate agentic tool injection due to architectural limitations. Finally, we show that LODO-stable SAE features provide more reliable explanations for classifier decisions by filtering dataset artifacts. We release our evaluation framework at https://github.com/maxf-zn/prompt-mining to establish LODO as the appropriate protocol for prompt attack detection research.

Gemini is increasingly used to perform tasks on behalf of users, where function-calling and tool-use capabilities enable the model to access user data. Some tools, however, require access to untrusted data introducing risk. Adversaries can embed malicious instructions in untrusted data which cause the model to deviate from the user's expectations and mishandle their data or permissions. In this report, we set out Google DeepMind's approach to evaluating the adversarial robustness of Gemini models and describe the main lessons learned from the process. We test how Gemini performs against a sophisticated adversary through an adversarial evaluation framework, which deploys a suite of adaptive attack techniques to run continuously against past, current, and future versions of Gemini. We describe how these ongoing evaluations directly help make Gemini more resilient against manipulation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment. However, LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks when handling untrusted data. In this paper we propose CaMeL, a robust defense that creates a protective system layer around the LLM, securing it even when underlying models may be susceptible to attacks. To operate, CaMeL explicitly extracts the control and data flows from the (trusted) query; therefore, the untrusted data retrieved by the LLM can never impact the program flow. To further improve security, CaMeL relies on a notion of a capability to prevent the exfiltration of private data over unauthorized data flows. We demonstrate effectiveness of CaMeL by solving 67% of tasks with provable security in AgentDojo [NeurIPS 2024], a recent agentic security benchmark.

AI agents aim to solve complex tasks by combining text-based reasoning with external tool calls. Unfortunately, AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks where data returned by external tools hijacks the agent to execute malicious tasks. To measure the adversarial robustness of AI agents, we introduce AgentDojo, an evaluation framework for agents that execute tools over untrusted data. To capture the evolving nature of attacks and defenses, AgentDojo is not a static test suite, but rather an extensible environment for designing and evaluating new agent tasks, defenses, and adaptive attacks. We populate the environment with 97 realistic tasks (e.g., managing an email client, navigating an e-banking website, or making travel bookings), 629 security test cases, and various attack and defense paradigms from the literature. We find that AgentDojo poses a challenge for both attacks and defenses: state-of-the-art LLMs fail at many tasks (even in the absence of attacks), and existing prompt injection attacks break some security properties but not all. We hope that AgentDojo can foster research on new design principles for AI agents that solve common tasks in a reliable and robust manner. We release the code for AgentDojo at https://github.com/ethz-spylab/agentdojo.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time artifacts to inference-time dependencies, exposing agents to manipulation through untrusted data and probabilistic capability resolution. While prior work has focused on model-level vulnerabilities, security risks emerging from cyclic and interdependent runtime behavior remain fragmented. We systematize these risks within a unified runtime framework, categorizing threats into data supply chain attacks (transient context injection and persistent memory poisoning) and tool supply chain attacks (discovery, implementation, and invocation). We further identify the Viral Agent Loop, in which agents act as vectors for self-propagating generative worms without exploiting code-level flaws. Finally, we advocate a Zero-Trust Runtime Architecture that treats context as untrusted control flow and constrains tool execution through cryptographic provenance rather than semantic inference.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming commodity components of larger software systems. This poses natural security and privacy problems: poisoned data retrieved from one component can change the model's behavior and compromise the entire system, including coercing the model to spread confidential data to untrusted components. One promising approach is to tackle this problem at the system level via dynamic information flow (aka taint) tracking. Unfortunately, the traditional approach of propagating the most restrictive input label to the output is too conservative for applications where LLMs operate on inputs retrieved from diverse sources. In this paper, we propose a novel, more permissive approach to propagate information flow labels through LLM queries. The key idea behind our approach is to propagate only the labels of the samples that were influential in generating the model output and to eliminate the labels of unnecessary input. We implement and investigate the effectiveness of two variations of this approach, based on (i) prompt-based retrieval augmentation, and (ii) a k-nearest-neighbors language model. We compare these with the baseline of an introspection-based influence estimator that directly asks the language model to predict the output label. The results obtained highlight the superiority of our prompt-based label propagator, which improves the label in more than 85% of the cases in an LLM agent setting. These findings underscore the practicality of permissive label propagation for retrieval augmentation.

With the prosperity of large language models (LLMs), powerful LLM-based intelligent agents have been developed to provide customized services with a set of user-defined tools. State-of-the-art methods for constructing LLM agents adopt trained LLMs and further fine-tune them on data for the agent task. However, we show that such methods are vulnerable to our proposed backdoor attacks named BadAgent on various agent tasks, where a backdoor can be embedded by fine-tuning on the backdoor data. At test time, the attacker can manipulate the deployed LLM agents to execute harmful operations by showing the trigger in the agent input or environment. To our surprise, our proposed attack methods are extremely robust even after fine-tuning on trustworthy data. Though backdoor attacks have been studied extensively in natural language processing, to the best of our knowledge, we could be the first to study them on LLM agents that are more dangerous due to the permission to use external tools. Our work demonstrates the clear risk of constructing LLM agents based on untrusted LLMs or data. Our code is public at https://github.com/DPamK/BadAgent

Data-free knowledge distillation (KD) helps transfer knowledge from a pre-trained model (known as the teacher model) to a smaller model (known as the student model) without access to the original training data used for training the teacher model. However, the security of the synthetic or out-of-distribution (OOD) data required in data-free KD is largely unknown and under-explored. In this work, we make the first effort to uncover the security risk of data-free KD w.r.t. untrusted pre-trained models. We then propose Anti-Backdoor Data-Free KD (ABD), the first plug-in defensive method for data-free KD methods to mitigate the chance of potential backdoors being transferred. We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed ABD in diminishing transferred backdoor knowledge while maintaining compatible downstream performances as the vanilla KD. We envision this work as a milestone for alarming and mitigating the potential backdoors in data-free KD. Codes are released at https://github.com/illidanlab/ABD.

LLM agents rely on prompts to implement task-specific capabilities based on foundation LLMs, making agent prompts valuable intellectual property. However, in untrusted deployments, adversaries can copy and reuse these prompts with other proprietary LLMs, causing economic losses. To protect these prompts, we identify four key challenges: proactivity, runtime protection, usability, and non-portability that existing approaches fail to address. We present PragLocker, a prompt protection scheme that satisfies these requirements. PragLocker constructs function-preserving obfuscated prompts by anchoring semantics with code symbols and then using target-model feedback to inject noise, yielding prompts that only work on the target LLM. Experiments across multiple agent systems, datasets, and foundation LLMs show that PragLocker substantially reduces cross-LLM portability, maintains target performance, and remains robust against adaptive attackers.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as personal agents, accessing sensitive user data such as calendars, emails, and medical records. Users currently face a trade-off: They can send private records, many of which are stored in remote databases, to powerful but untrusted LLM providers, increasing their exposure risk. Alternatively, they can run less powerful models locally on trusted devices. We bridge this gap. Our Socratic Chain-of-Thought Reasoning first sends a generic, non-private user query to a powerful, untrusted LLM, which generates a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompt and detailed sub-queries without accessing user data. Next, we embed these sub-queries and perform encrypted sub-second semantic search using our Homomorphically Encrypted Vector Database across one million entries of a single user's private data. This represents a realistic scale of personal documents, emails, and records accumulated over years of digital activity. Finally, we feed the CoT prompt and the decrypted records to a local language model and generate the final response. On the LoCoMo long-context QA benchmark, our hybrid framework, combining GPT-4o with a local Llama-3.2-1B model, outperforms using GPT-4o alone by up to 7.1 percentage points. This demonstrates a first step toward systems where tasks are decomposed and split between untrusted strong LLMs and weak local ones, preserving user privacy.

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as dominant tools for various tasks, particularly when tailored for a specific target by prompt tuning. Nevertheless, concerns surrounding data privacy present obstacles due to the tuned prompts' dependency on sensitive private information. A practical solution is to host a local LLM and optimize a soft prompt privately using data. Yet, hosting a local model becomes problematic when model ownership is protected. Alternative methods, like sending data to the model's provider for training, intensify these privacy issues facing an untrusted provider. In this paper, we present a novel solution called Differentially-Private Offsite Prompt Tuning (DP-OPT) to address this challenge. Our approach involves tuning a discrete prompt on the client side and then applying it to the desired cloud models. We demonstrate that prompts suggested by LLMs themselves can be transferred without compromising performance significantly. To ensure that the prompts do not leak private information, we introduce the first private prompt generation mechanism, by a differentially-private (DP) ensemble of in-context learning with private demonstrations. With DP-OPT, generating privacy-preserving prompts by Vicuna-7b can yield competitive performance compared to non-private in-context learning on GPT3.5 or local private prompt tuning. Codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/DP-OPT .

AI agents are increasingly deployed across diverse domains to automate complex workflows through long-horizon and high-stakes action executions. Due to their high capability and flexibility, such agents raise significant security and safety concerns. A growing number of real-world incidents have shown that adversaries can easily manipulate agents into performing harmful actions, such as leaking API keys, deleting user data, or initiating unauthorized transactions. Evaluating agent security is inherently challenging, as agents operate in dynamic, untrusted environments involving external tools, heterogeneous data sources, and frequent user interactions. However, realistic, controllable, and reproducible environments for large-scale risk assessment remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap), the first controllable and interactive red-teaming platform for AI agents, spanning 14 real-world domains and over 50 simulation environments that replicate widely used systems such as Google Workspace, Paypal, and Slack. To scale the risk assessment of agents in DTap, we further propose DTap-Red, the first autonomous red-teaming agent that systematically explores diverse injection vectors (e.g., prompt, tool, skill, environment, combinations) and autonomously discovers effective attack strategies tailored to varying malicious goals. Using DTap-Red, we curate DTap-Bench, a large-scale red-teaming dataset comprising high-quality instances across domains, each paired with a verifiable judge to automatically validate attack outcomes. Through DTap, we conduct large-scale evaluations of popular AI agents built on various backbone models, spanning security policies, risk categories, and attack strategies, revealing systematic vulnerability patterns and providing valuable insights for developing secure next-generation agents.

AI agents powered by large language models are increasingly deployed as cloud services that autonomously access sensitive data, invoke external tools, and interact with other agents. However, these agents run within a complex multi-party ecosystem, where untrusted components can lead to data leakage, tampering, or unintended behavior. Existing Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) provide only per binary protection and offer no guarantees for cross-principal trust, accelerator-level isolation, or supervised agent behavior. We present Omega, a system that enables trusted AI agents by enforcing end-to-end isolation, establishing verifiable trust across all contributing principals, and supervising every external interaction with accountable provenance. Omega builds on Confidential VMs and Confidential GPUs to create a Trusted Agent Platform that hosts many agents within a single CVM using nested isolation. It also provides efficient multi-agent orchestration with cross-principal trust establishment via differential attestation, and a policy specification and enforcement framework that governs data access, tool usage, and inter-agent communication for data protection and regulatory compliance. Implemented on AMD SEV-SNP and NVIDIA H100, Omega fully secures agent state across CVM-GPU, and achieves high performance while enabling high-density, policy-compliant multi-agent deployments at cloud scale.

Machine Learning models increasingly face data integrity challenges due to the use of large-scale training datasets drawn from the Internet. We study what model developers can do if they detect that some data was manipulated or incorrect. Such manipulated data can cause adverse effects including vulnerability to backdoored samples, systemic biases, and reduced accuracy on certain input domains. Realistically, all manipulated training samples cannot be identified, and only a small, representative subset of the affected data can be flagged. We formalize Corrective Machine Unlearning as the problem of mitigating the impact of data affected by unknown manipulations on a trained model, only having identified a subset of the corrupted data. We demonstrate that the problem of corrective unlearning has significantly different requirements from traditional privacy-oriented unlearning. We find most existing unlearning methods, including retraining-from-scratch without the deletion set, require most of the manipulated data to be identified for effective corrective unlearning. However, one approach, Selective Synaptic Dampening, achieves limited success, unlearning adverse effects with just a small portion of the manipulated samples in our setting, which shows encouraging signs for future progress. We hope our work spurs research towards developing better methods for corrective unlearning and offers practitioners a new strategy to handle data integrity challenges arising from web-scale training. Code is available at https://github.com/drimpossible/corrective-unlearning-bench.

The recent success of machine learning models, especially large-scale classifiers and language models, relies heavily on training with massive data. These data are often collected from online sources. This raises serious concerns about the protection of user data, as individuals may not have given consent for their data to be used in training. To address this concern, recent studies introduce the concept of unlearnable examples, i.e., data instances that appear natural but are intentionally altered to prevent models from effectively learning from them. While existing methods demonstrate empirical effectiveness, they typically rely on heuristic trials and lack formal guarantees. Besides, when unlearnable examples are mixed with clean data, as is often the case in practice, their unlearnability disappears. In this work, we propose a novel approach to constructing unlearnable examples by systematically maximising the Bayes error, a measurement of irreducible classification error. We develop an optimisation-based approach and provide an efficient solution using projected gradient ascent. Our method provably increases the Bayes error and remains effective when the unlearning examples are mixed with clean samples. Experimental results across multiple datasets and model architectures are consistent with our theoretical analysis and show that our approach can restrict data learnability, effectively in practice.

Large-scale pre-training frameworks like CLIP have revolutionized multimodal learning, but their reliance on web-scraped datasets, frequently containing private user data, raises serious concerns about misuse. Unlearnable Examples (UEs) have emerged as a promising countermeasure against unauthorized model training, employing carefully crafted unlearnable noise to disrupt the learning of meaningful representations from protected data. Current approaches typically generate UEs by jointly optimizing unlearnable noise for both images and their associated text descriptions (or labels). However, this optimization process is often computationally prohibitive for on-device execution, forcing reliance on external third-party services. This creates a fundamental privacy paradox: users must initially expose their data to these very services to achieve protection, thereby compromising privacy in the process. Such a contradiction has severely hindered the development of practical, scalable data protection solutions. To resolve this paradox, we introduce Text-to-Unlearnable Example (T2UE), a novel framework that enables users to generate UEs using only text descriptions. T2UE circumvents the need for original image data by employing a text-to-image (T2I) model to map text descriptions into the image (noise) space, combined with an error-minimization framework to produce effective unlearnable noise. Extensive experiments show that T2UE-protected data substantially degrades performance in downstream tasks (e.g., cross-modal retrieval) for state-of-the-art models. Notably, the protective effect generalizes across diverse architectures and even to supervised learning settings. Our work demonstrates the feasibility of "zero-contact data protection", where personal data can be safeguarded based solely on their textual descriptions, eliminating the need for direct data exposure.

In recent years, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable advancements, drawing significant attention from the research community. Their capabilities are largely attributed to large-scale architectures, which require extensive training on massive datasets. However, such datasets often contain sensitive or copyrighted content sourced from the public internet, raising concerns about data privacy and ownership. Regulatory frameworks, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), grant individuals the right to request the removal of such sensitive information. This has motivated the development of machine unlearning algorithms that aim to remove specific knowledge from models without the need for costly retraining. Despite these advancements, evaluating the efficacy of unlearning algorithms remains a challenge due to the inherent complexity and generative nature of LLMs. In this work, we introduce a comprehensive auditing framework for unlearning evaluation, comprising three benchmark datasets, six unlearning algorithms, and five prompt-based auditing methods. By using various auditing algorithms, we evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of different unlearning strategies. To explore alternatives beyond prompt-based auditing, we propose a novel technique that leverages intermediate activation perturbations, addressing the limitations of auditing methods that rely solely on model inputs and outputs.

Large-scale training of modern deep learning models heavily relies on publicly available data on the web. This potentially unauthorized usage of online data leads to concerns regarding data privacy. Recent works aim to make unlearnable data for deep learning models by adding small, specially designed noises to tackle this issue. However, these methods are vulnerable to adversarial training (AT) and/or are computationally heavy. In this work, we propose a novel, model-free, Convolution-based Unlearnable DAtaset (CUDA) generation technique. CUDA is generated using controlled class-wise convolutions with filters that are randomly generated via a private key. CUDA encourages the network to learn the relation between filters and labels rather than informative features for classifying the clean data. We develop some theoretical analysis demonstrating that CUDA can successfully poison Gaussian mixture data by reducing the clean data performance of the optimal Bayes classifier. We also empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of CUDA with various datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-100, and Tiny-ImageNet), and architectures (ResNet-18, VGG-16, Wide ResNet-34-10, DenseNet-121, DeIT, EfficientNetV2-S, and MobileNetV2). Our experiments show that CUDA is robust to various data augmentations and training approaches such as smoothing, AT with different budgets, transfer learning, and fine-tuning. For instance, training a ResNet-18 on ImageNet-100 CUDA achieves only 8.96%, 40.08%, and 20.58% clean test accuracies with empirical risk minimization (ERM), L_{infty} AT, and L_{2} AT, respectively. Here, ERM on the clean training data achieves a clean test accuracy of 80.66%. CUDA exhibits unlearnability effect with ERM even when only a fraction of the training dataset is perturbed. Furthermore, we also show that CUDA is robust to adaptive defenses designed specifically to break it.

The training of contemporary deep learning models heavily relies on publicly available data, posing a risk of unauthorized access to online data and raising concerns about data privacy. Current approaches to creating unlearnable data involve incorporating small, specially designed noises, but these methods strictly limit data usability, overlooking its potential usage in authorized scenarios. In this paper, we extend the concept of unlearnable data to conditional data learnability and introduce UnGeneralizable Examples (UGEs). UGEs exhibit learnability for authorized users while maintaining unlearnability for potential hackers. The protector defines the authorized network and optimizes UGEs to match the gradients of the original data and its ungeneralizable version, ensuring learnability. To prevent unauthorized learning, UGEs are trained by maximizing a designated distance loss in a common feature space. Additionally, to further safeguard the authorized side from potential attacks, we introduce additional undistillation optimization. Experimental results on multiple datasets and various networks demonstrate that the proposed UGEs framework preserves data usability while reducing training performance on hacker networks, even under different types of attacks.

The volume of "free" data on the internet has been key to the current success of deep learning. However, it also raises privacy concerns about the unauthorized exploitation of personal data for training commercial models. It is thus crucial to develop methods to prevent unauthorized data exploitation. This paper raises the question: can data be made unlearnable for deep learning models? We present a type of error-minimizing noise that can indeed make training examples unlearnable. Error-minimizing noise is intentionally generated to reduce the error of one or more of the training example(s) close to zero, which can trick the model into believing there is "nothing" to learn from these example(s). The noise is restricted to be imperceptible to human eyes, and thus does not affect normal data utility. We empirically verify the effectiveness of error-minimizing noise in both sample-wise and class-wise forms. We also demonstrate its flexibility under extensive experimental settings and practicability in a case study of face recognition. Our work establishes an important first step towards making personal data unexploitable to deep learning models.

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

Existing private synthetic data generation algorithms are agnostic to downstream tasks. However, end users may have specific requirements that the synthetic data must satisfy. Failure to meet these requirements could significantly reduce the utility of the data for downstream use. We introduce a post-processing technique that improves the utility of the synthetic data with respect to measures selected by the end user, while preserving strong privacy guarantees and dataset quality. Our technique involves resampling from the synthetic data to filter out samples that do not meet the selected utility measures, using an efficient stochastic first-order algorithm to find optimal resampling weights. Through comprehensive numerical experiments, we demonstrate that our approach consistently improves the utility of synthetic data across multiple benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art synthetic data generation algorithms.

Synthetic data is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to share individual-level data while safeguarding privacy. While membership inference attacks (MIAs), based on shadow modeling, have become the standard to evaluate the privacy of synthetic data, they currently assume the attacker to have access to an auxiliary dataset sampled from a similar distribution as the training dataset. This is often seen as a very strong assumption in practice, especially as the proposed main use cases for synthetic tabular data (e.g. medical data, financial transactions) are very specific and don't have any reference datasets directly available. We here show how this assumption can be removed, allowing for MIAs to be performed using only the synthetic data. Specifically, we developed three different scenarios: (S1) Black-box access to the generator, (S2) only access to the released synthetic dataset and (S3) a theoretical setup as upper bound for the attack performance using only synthetic data. Our results show that MIAs are still successful, across two real-world datasets and two synthetic data generators. These results show how the strong hypothesis made when auditing synthetic data releases - access to an auxiliary dataset - can be relaxed, making the attacks more realistic in practice.

RAG has emerged as a key technique for enhancing response quality of LLMs without high computational cost. In traditional architectures, RAG services are provided by a single entity that hosts the dataset within a trusted local environment. However, individuals or small organizations often lack the resources to maintain data storage servers, leading them to rely on outsourced cloud storage. This dependence on untrusted third-party services introduces privacy risks. Embedding-based retrieval mechanisms, commonly used in RAG systems, are vulnerable to privacy leakage such as vector-to-text reconstruction attacks and structural leakage via vector analysis. Several privacy-preserving RAG techniques have been proposed but most existing approaches rely on partially homomorphic encryption, which incurs substantial computational overhead. To address these challenges, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving RAG framework (ppRAG) tailored for untrusted cloud environments that defends against vector-to-text attack, vector analysis, and query analysis. We propose Conditional Approximate Distance-Comparison-Preserving Symmetric Encryption (CAPRISE) that encrypts embeddings while still allowing the cloud to compute similarity between an encrypted query and the encrypted database embeddings. CAPRISE preserves only the relative distance ordering between the encrypted query and each encrypted database embedding, without exposing inter-database distances, thereby enhancing both privacy and efficiency. To mitigate query analysis, we introduce DP by perturbing the query embedding prior to encryption, preventing the cloud from inferring sensitive patterns. Experimental results show that ppRAG achieves efficient processing throughput, high retrieval accuracy, strong privacy guarantees, making it a practical solution for resource-constrained users seeking secure cloud-augmented LLMs.

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.

Machine learning systems deployed in the wild are often trained on a source distribution but deployed on a different target distribution. Unlabeled data can be a powerful point of leverage for mitigating these distribution shifts, as it is frequently much more available than labeled data and can often be obtained from distributions beyond the source distribution as well. However, existing distribution shift benchmarks with unlabeled data do not reflect the breadth of scenarios that arise in real-world applications. In this work, we present the WILDS 2.0 update, which extends 8 of the 10 datasets in the WILDS benchmark of distribution shifts to include curated unlabeled data that would be realistically obtainable in deployment. These datasets span a wide range of applications (from histology to wildlife conservation), tasks (classification, regression, and detection), and modalities (photos, satellite images, microscope slides, text, molecular graphs). The update maintains consistency with the original WILDS benchmark by using identical labeled training, validation, and test sets, as well as the evaluation metrics. On these datasets, we systematically benchmark state-of-the-art methods that leverage unlabeled data, including domain-invariant, self-training, and self-supervised methods, and show that their success on WILDS is limited. To facilitate method development and evaluation, we provide an open-source package that automates data loading and contains all of the model architectures and methods used in this paper. Code and leaderboards are available at https://wilds.stanford.edu.

Recent advances in machine learning, particularly in Natural Language Processing (NLP), have produced powerful models trained on vast datasets. However, these models risk leaking sensitive information, raising privacy concerns. In response, regulatory measures such as the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) have driven increasing interest in Machine Unlearning techniques, which enable models to selectively forget specific data entries. Early unlearning approaches primarily relied on pre-processing methods, while more recent research has shifted towards training-based solutions. Despite their effectiveness, a key limitation persists: most methods require access to original training data, which is often unavailable. Additionally, directly applying unlearning techniques bears the cost of undermining the model's expressive capabilities. To address these challenges, we introduce the Iterative Contrastive Unlearning (ICU) framework, which consists of three core components: A Knowledge Unlearning Induction module designed to target specific knowledge for removal using an unlearning loss; A Contrastive Learning Enhancement module to preserve the model's expressive capabilities against the pure unlearning goal; And an Iterative Unlearning Refinement module that dynamically adjusts the unlearning process through ongoing evaluation and updates. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our ICU method in unlearning sensitive information while maintaining the model's overall performance, offering a promising solution for privacy-conscious machine learning applications.

Data collected from the real world tends to be biased, unbalanced, and at risk of exposing sensitive and private information. This reality has given rise to the idea of creating synthetic datasets to alleviate risk, bias, harm, and privacy concerns inherent in the real data. This concept relies on Generative AI models to produce unbiased, privacy-preserving synthetic data while being true to the real data. In this new paradigm, how can we tell if this approach delivers on its promises? We present an auditing framework that offers a holistic assessment of synthetic datasets and AI models trained on them, centered around bias and discrimination prevention, fidelity to the real data, utility, robustness, and privacy preservation. We showcase our framework by auditing multiple generative models on diverse use cases, including education, healthcare, banking, human resources, and across different modalities, from tabular, to time-series, to natural language. Our use cases demonstrate the importance of a holistic assessment in order to ensure compliance with socio-technical safeguards that regulators and policymakers are increasingly enforcing. For this purpose, we introduce the trust index that ranks multiple synthetic datasets based on their prescribed safeguards and their desired trade-offs. Moreover, we devise a trust-index-driven model selection and cross-validation procedure via auditing in the training loop that we showcase on a class of transformer models that we dub TrustFormers, across different modalities. This trust-driven model selection allows for controllable trust trade-offs in the resulting synthetic data. We instrument our auditing framework with workflows that connect different stakeholders from model development to audit and certification via a synthetic data auditing report.

Large Language Models are typically trained on datasets collected from the web, which may inadvertently contain harmful or sensitive personal information. To address growing privacy concerns, unlearning methods have been proposed to remove the influence of specific data from trained models. Of these, exact unlearning -- which retrains the model from scratch without the target data -- is widely regarded the gold standard for mitigating privacy risks in deployment. In this paper, we revisit this assumption in a practical deployment setting where both the pre- and post-unlearning logits API are exposed, such as in open-weight scenarios. Targeting this setting, we introduce a novel data extraction attack that leverages signals from the pre-unlearning model to guide the post-unlearning model, uncovering patterns that reflect the removed data distribution. Combining model guidance with a token filtering strategy, our attack significantly improves extraction success rates -- doubling performance in some cases -- across common benchmarks such as MUSE, TOFU, and WMDP. Furthermore, we demonstrate our attack's effectiveness on a simulated medical diagnosis dataset to highlight real-world privacy risks associated with exact unlearning. In light of our findings, which suggest that unlearning may, in a contradictory way, increase the risk of privacy leakage during real-world deployments, we advocate for evaluation of unlearning methods to consider broader threat models that account not only for post-unlearning models but also for adversarial access to prior checkpoints. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Nicholas0228/unlearned_data_extraction_llm.

We revisit the efficacy of several practical methods for approximate machine unlearning developed for large-scale deep learning. In addition to complying with data deletion requests, one often-cited potential application for unlearning methods is to remove the effects of poisoned data. We experimentally demonstrate that, while existing unlearning methods have been demonstrated to be effective in a number of settings, they fail to remove the effects of data poisoning across a variety of types of poisoning attacks (indiscriminate, targeted, and a newly-introduced Gaussian poisoning attack) and models (image classifiers and LLMs); even when granted a relatively large compute budget. In order to precisely characterize unlearning efficacy, we introduce new evaluation metrics for unlearning based on data poisoning. Our results suggest that a broader perspective, including a wider variety of evaluations, are required to avoid a false sense of confidence in machine unlearning procedures for deep learning without provable guarantees. Moreover, while unlearning methods show some signs of being useful to efficiently remove poisoned data without having to retrain, our work suggests that these methods are not yet ``ready for prime time,'' and currently provide limited benefit over retraining.

Large Language Models (LLMs) embed sensitive, human-generated data, prompting the need for unlearning methods. Although certified unlearning offers strong privacy guarantees, its restrictive assumptions make it unsuitable for LLMs, giving rise to various heuristic approaches typically assessed through empirical evaluations. These standard evaluations randomly select data for removal, apply unlearning techniques, and use membership inference attacks (MIAs) to compare unlearned models against models retrained without the removed data. However, to ensure robust privacy protections for every data point, it is essential to account for scenarios in which certain data subsets face elevated risks. Prior research suggests that outliers, particularly including data tied to minority groups, often exhibit higher memorization propensity which indicates they may be more difficult to unlearn. Building on these insights, we introduce a complementary, minority-aware evaluation framework to highlight blind spots in existing frameworks. We substantiate our findings with carefully designed experiments, using canaries with personally identifiable information (PII) to represent these minority subsets and demonstrate that they suffer at least 20% higher privacy leakage across various unlearning methods, MIAs, datasets, and LLM scales. Our proposed minority-aware evaluation framework marks an essential step toward more equitable and comprehensive assessments of LLM unlearning efficacy.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has made its way into various scientific fields, providing astonishing improvements over existing algorithms for a wide variety of tasks. In recent years, there have been severe concerns over the trustworthiness of AI technologies. The scientific community has focused on the development of trustworthy AI algorithms. However, machine and deep learning algorithms, popular in the AI community today, depend heavily on the data used during their development. These learning algorithms identify patterns in the data, learning the behavioral objective. Any flaws in the data have the potential to translate directly into algorithms. In this study, we discuss the importance of Responsible Machine Learning Datasets and propose a framework to evaluate the datasets through a responsible rubric. While existing work focuses on the post-hoc evaluation of algorithms for their trustworthiness, we provide a framework that considers the data component separately to understand its role in the algorithm. We discuss responsible datasets through the lens of fairness, privacy, and regulatory compliance and provide recommendations for constructing future datasets. After surveying over 100 datasets, we use 60 datasets for analysis and demonstrate that none of these datasets is immune to issues of fairness, privacy preservation, and regulatory compliance. We provide modifications to the ``datasheets for datasets" with important additions for improved dataset documentation. With governments around the world regularizing data protection laws, the method for the creation of datasets in the scientific community requires revision. We believe this study is timely and relevant in today's era of AI.

Designing data sharing mechanisms providing performance and strong privacy guarantees is a hot topic for the Online Advertising industry. Namely, a prominent proposal discussed under the Improving Web Advertising Business Group at W3C only allows sharing advertising signals through aggregated, differentially private reports of past displays. To study this proposal extensively, an open Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning Challenge took place at AdKDD'21, a premier workshop on Advertising Science with data provided by advertising company Criteo. In this paper, we describe the challenge tasks, the structure of the available datasets, report the challenge results, and enable its full reproducibility. A key finding is that learning models on large, aggregated data in the presence of a small set of unaggregated data points can be surprisingly efficient and cheap. We also run additional experiments to observe the sensitivity of winning methods to different parameters such as privacy budget or quantity of available privileged side information. We conclude that the industry needs either alternate designs for private data sharing or a breakthrough in learning with aggregated data only to keep ad relevance at a reasonable level.

Data trading is essential to accelerate the development of data-driven machine learning pipelines. The central problem in data trading is to estimate the utility of a seller's dataset with respect to a given buyer's machine learning task, also known as data valuation. Typically, data valuation requires one or more participants to share their raw dataset with others, leading to potential risks of intellectual property (IP) violations. In this paper, we tackle the novel task of preemptively protecting the IP of datasets that need to be shared during data valuation. First, we identify and formalize two kinds of novel IP risks in visual datasets: data-item (image) IP and statistical (dataset) IP. Then, we propose a novel algorithm to convert the raw dataset into a sanitized version, that provides resistance to IP violations, while at the same time allowing accurate data valuation. The key idea is to limit the transfer of information from the raw dataset to the sanitized dataset, thereby protecting against potential intellectual property violations. Next, we analyze our method for the likely existence of a solution and immunity against reconstruction attacks. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on three computer vision datasets demonstrating the advantages of our method in comparison to other baselines.

Semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) is gaining popularity as it reduces the cost of training ML models. It does so by using very small amounts of (expensive, well-inspected) labeled data and large amounts of (cheap, non-inspected) unlabeled data. SSL has shown comparable or even superior performances compared to conventional fully-supervised ML techniques. In this paper, we show that the key feature of SSL that it can learn from (non-inspected) unlabeled data exposes SSL to strong poisoning attacks. In fact, we argue that, due to its reliance on non-inspected unlabeled data, poisoning is a much more severe problem in SSL than in conventional fully-supervised ML. Specifically, we design a backdoor poisoning attack on SSL that can be conducted by a weak adversary with no knowledge of target SSL pipeline. This is unlike prior poisoning attacks in fully-supervised settings that assume strong adversaries with practically-unrealistic capabilities. We show that by poisoning only 0.2% of the unlabeled training data, our attack can cause misclassification of more than 80% of test inputs (when they contain the adversary's backdoor trigger). Our attacks remain effective across twenty combinations of benchmark datasets and SSL algorithms, and even circumvent the state-of-the-art defenses against backdoor attacks. Our work raises significant concerns about the practical utility of existing SSL algorithms.

There is a growing interest in developing unlearnable examples (UEs) against visual privacy leaks on the Internet. UEs are training samples added with invisible but unlearnable noise, which have been found can prevent unauthorized training of machine learning models. UEs typically are generated via a bilevel optimization framework with a surrogate model to remove (minimize) errors from the original samples, and then applied to protect the data against unknown target models. However, existing UE generation methods all rely on an ideal assumption called label-consistency, where the hackers and protectors are assumed to hold the same label for a given sample. In this work, we propose and promote a more practical label-agnostic setting, where the hackers may exploit the protected data quite differently from the protectors. E.g., a m-class unlearnable dataset held by the protector may be exploited by the hacker as a n-class dataset. Existing UE generation methods are rendered ineffective in this challenging setting. To tackle this challenge, we present a novel technique called Unlearnable Clusters (UCs) to generate label-agnostic unlearnable examples with cluster-wise perturbations. Furthermore, we propose to leverage VisionandLanguage Pre-trained Models (VLPMs) like CLIP as the surrogate model to improve the transferability of the crafted UCs to diverse domains. We empirically verify the effectiveness of our proposed approach under a variety of settings with different datasets, target models, and even commercial platforms Microsoft Azure and Baidu PaddlePaddle. Code is available at https://github.com/jiamingzhang94/Unlearnable-Clusters.

In the current data driven era, synthetic data, artificially generated data that resembles the characteristics of real world data without containing actual personal information, is gaining prominence. This is due to its potential to safeguard privacy, increase the availability of data for research, and reduce bias in machine learning models. This paper investigates the policies governing the creation, utilization, and dissemination of synthetic data. Synthetic data can be a powerful instrument for protecting the privacy of individuals, but it also presents challenges, such as ensuring its quality and authenticity. A well crafted synthetic data policy must strike a balance between privacy concerns and the utility of data, ensuring that it can be utilized effectively without compromising ethical or legal standards. Organizations and institutions must develop standardized guidelines and best practices in order to capitalize on the benefits of synthetic data while addressing its inherent challenges.

Fine-tuning large language models on private data for downstream applications poses significant privacy risks in potentially exposing sensitive information. Several popular community platforms now offer convenient distribution of a large variety of pre-trained models, allowing anyone to publish without rigorous verification. This scenario creates a privacy threat, as pre-trained models can be intentionally crafted to compromise the privacy of fine-tuning datasets. In this study, we introduce a novel poisoning technique that uses model-unlearning as an attack tool. This approach manipulates a pre-trained language model to increase the leakage of private data during the fine-tuning process. Our method enhances both membership inference and data extraction attacks while preserving model utility. Experimental results across different models, datasets, and fine-tuning setups demonstrate that our attacks significantly surpass baseline performance. This work serves as a cautionary note for users who download pre-trained models from unverified sources, highlighting the potential risks involved.

The growing use of large language models in sensitive domains has exposed a critical weakness: the inability to ensure that private information can be permanently forgotten. Yet these systems still lack reliable mechanisms to guarantee that sensitive information can be permanently removed once it has been used. Retraining from the beginning is prohibitively costly, and existing unlearning methods remain fragmented, difficult to verify, and often vulnerable to recovery. This paper surveys recent research on machine unlearning for LLMs and considers how far current approaches can address these challenges. We review methods for evaluating whether forgetting has occurred, the resilience of unlearned models against adversarial attacks, and mechanisms that can support user trust when model complexity or proprietary limits restrict transparency. Technical solutions such as differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, federated learning, and ephemeral memory are examined alongside institutional safeguards including auditing practices and regulatory frameworks. The review finds steady progress, but robust and verifiable unlearning is still unresolved. Efficient techniques that avoid costly retraining, stronger defenses against adversarial recovery, and governance structures that reinforce accountability are needed if LLMs are to be deployed safely in sensitive applications. By integrating technical and organizational perspectives, this study outlines a pathway toward AI systems that can be required to forget, while maintaining both privacy and public trust.

Dataset ownership verification, the process of determining if a dataset is used in a model's training data, is necessary for detecting unauthorized data usage and data contamination. Existing approaches, such as backdoor watermarking, rely on inducing a detectable behavior into the trained model on a part of the data distribution. However, these approaches have limitations, as they can be harmful to the model's performances or require unpractical access to the model's internals. Most importantly, previous approaches lack guarantee against false positives. This paper introduces data taggants, a novel non-backdoor dataset ownership verification technique. Our method uses pairs of out-of-distribution samples and random labels as secret keys, and leverages clean-label targeted data poisoning to subtly alter a dataset, so that models trained on it respond to the key samples with the corresponding key labels. The keys are built as to allow for statistical certificates with black-box access only to the model. We validate our approach through comprehensive and realistic experiments on ImageNet1k using ViT and ResNet models with state-of-the-art training recipes. Our findings demonstrate that data taggants can reliably make models trained on the protected dataset detectable with high confidence, without compromising validation accuracy, and demonstrates superiority over backdoor watermarking. Moreover, our method shows to be stealthy and robust against various defense mechanisms.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Unlearning algorithms aim to remove deleted data's influence from trained models at a cost lower than full retraining. However, prior guarantees of unlearning in literature are flawed and don't protect the privacy of deleted records. We show that when users delete their data as a function of published models, records in a database become interdependent. So, even retraining a fresh model after deletion of a record doesn't ensure its privacy. Secondly, unlearning algorithms that cache partial computations to speed up the processing can leak deleted information over a series of releases, violating the privacy of deleted records in the long run. To address these, we propose a sound deletion guarantee and show that the privacy of existing records is necessary for the privacy of deleted records. Under this notion, we propose an accurate, computationally efficient, and secure machine unlearning algorithm based on noisy gradient descent.

RAG enables LLMs to easily incorporate external data, raising concerns for data owners regarding unauthorized usage of their content. The challenge of detecting such unauthorized usage remains underexplored, with datasets and methods from adjacent fields being ill-suited for its study. We take several steps to bridge this gap. First, we formalize this problem as (black-box) RAG Dataset Inference (RAG-DI). We then introduce a novel dataset designed for realistic benchmarking of RAG-DI methods, alongside a set of baselines. Finally, we propose Ward, a method for RAG-DI based on LLM watermarks that equips data owners with rigorous statistical guarantees regarding their dataset's misuse in RAG corpora. Ward consistently outperforms all baselines, achieving higher accuracy, superior query efficiency and robustness. Our work provides a foundation for future studies of RAG-DI and highlights LLM watermarks as a promising approach to this problem.

The emergence of open data portals necessitates more attention to protecting sensitive data before datasets get published and exchanged. While an abundance of methods for suppressing sensitive data exist, the conceptualization of sensitive data and methods to detect it, focus particularly on personal data that, if disclosed, may be harmful or violate privacy. We observe the need for refining and broadening our definitions of sensitive data, and argue that the sensitivity of data depends on its context. Based on this definition, we introduce two mechanisms for contextual sensitive data detection that consider the broader context of a dataset at hand. First, we introduce type contextualization, which first detects the semantic type of particular data values, then considers the overall context of the data values within the dataset or document. Second, we introduce domain contextualization which determines sensitivity of a given dataset in the broader context based on the retrieval of relevant rules from documents that specify data sensitivity (e.g., data topic and geographic origin). Experiments with these mechanisms, assisted by large language models (LLMs), confirm that: 1) type-contextualization significantly reduces the number of false positives for type-based sensitive data detection and reaches a recall of 94% compared to 63% with commercial tools, and 2) domain-contextualization leveraging sensitivity rule retrieval is effective for context-grounded sensitive data detection in non-standard data domains such as humanitarian datasets. Evaluation with humanitarian data experts also reveals that context-grounded LLM explanations provide useful guidance in manual data auditing processes, improving consistency. We open-source mechanisms and annotated datasets for contextual sensitive data detection at https://github.com/trl-lab/sensitive-data-detection.

For a fixed parameter size, the capabilities of large models are primarily determined by the quality and quantity of its training data. Consequently, training datasets now grow faster than the rate at which new data is indexed on the web, leading to projected data exhaustion over the next decade. Much more data exists as user-generated content that is not publicly indexed, but incorporating such data comes with considerable risks, such as leaking private information and other undesirable content. We introduce a framework, Generative Data Refinement (GDR), for using pretrained generative models to transform a dataset with undesirable content into a refined dataset that is more suitable for training. Our experiments show that GDR can outperform industry-grade solutions for dataset anonymization, as well as enable direct detoxification of highly unsafe datasets. Moreover, we show that by generating synthetic data that is conditioned on each example in the real dataset, GDR's refined outputs naturally match the diversity of web scale datasets, and thereby avoid the often challenging task of generating diverse synthetic data via model prompting. The simplicity and effectiveness of GDR make it a powerful tool for scaling up the total stock of training data for frontier models.

The trustworthy machine learning (ML) community is increasingly recognizing the crucial need for models capable of selectively 'unlearning' data points after training. This leads to the problem of machine unlearning (MU), aiming to eliminate the influence of chosen data points on model performance, while still maintaining the model's utility post-unlearning. Despite various MU methods for data influence erasure, evaluations have largely focused on random data forgetting, ignoring the vital inquiry into which subset should be chosen to truly gauge the authenticity of unlearning performance. To tackle this issue, we introduce a new evaluative angle for MU from an adversarial viewpoint. We propose identifying the data subset that presents the most significant challenge for influence erasure, i.e., pinpointing the worst-case forget set. Utilizing a bi-level optimization principle, we amplify unlearning challenges at the upper optimization level to emulate worst-case scenarios, while simultaneously engaging in standard training and unlearning at the lower level, achieving a balance between data influence erasure and model utility. Our proposal offers a worst-case evaluation of MU's resilience and effectiveness. Through extensive experiments across different datasets (including CIFAR-10, 100, CelebA, Tiny ImageNet, and ImageNet) and models (including both image classifiers and generative models), we expose critical pros and cons in existing (approximate) unlearning strategies. Our results illuminate the complex challenges of MU in practice, guiding the future development of more accurate and robust unlearning algorithms. The code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-WorstCase.

The digitization of medical records ushered in a new era of big data to clinical science, and with it the possibility that data could be shared, to multiply insights beyond what investigators could abstract from paper records. The need to share individual-level medical data to accelerate innovation in precision medicine continues to grow, and has never been more urgent, as scientists grapple with the COVID-19 pandemic. However, enthusiasm for the use of big data has been tempered by a fully appropriate concern for patient autonomy and privacy. That is, the ability to extract private or confidential information about an individual, in practice, renders it difficult to share data, since significant infrastructure and data governance must be established before data can be shared. Although HIPAA provided de-identification as an approved mechanism for data sharing, linkage attacks were identified as a major vulnerability. A variety of mechanisms have been established to avoid leaking private information, such as field suppression or abstraction, strictly limiting the amount of information that can be shared, or employing mathematical techniques such as differential privacy. Another approach, which we focus on here, is creating synthetic data that mimics the underlying data. For synthetic data to be a useful mechanism in support of medical innovation and a proxy for real-world evidence, one must demonstrate two properties of the synthetic dataset: (1) any analysis on the real data must be matched by analysis of the synthetic data (statistical fidelity) and (2) the synthetic data must preserve privacy, with minimal risk of re-identification (privacy guarantee). In this paper we propose a framework for quantifying the statistical fidelity and privacy preservation properties of synthetic datasets and demonstrate these metrics for synthetic data generated by Syntegra technology.

Despite widespread adoption, machine learning models remain mostly black boxes. Understanding the reasons behind predictions is, however, quite important in assessing trust, which is fundamental if one plans to take action based on a prediction, or when choosing whether to deploy a new model. Such understanding also provides insights into the model, which can be used to transform an untrustworthy model or prediction into a trustworthy one. In this work, we propose LIME, a novel explanation technique that explains the predictions of any classifier in an interpretable and faithful manner, by learning an interpretable model locally around the prediction. We also propose a method to explain models by presenting representative individual predictions and their explanations in a non-redundant way, framing the task as a submodular optimization problem. We demonstrate the flexibility of these methods by explaining different models for text (e.g. random forests) and image classification (e.g. neural networks). We show the utility of explanations via novel experiments, both simulated and with human subjects, on various scenarios that require trust: deciding if one should trust a prediction, choosing between models, improving an untrustworthy classifier, and identifying why a classifier should not be trusted.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities in understanding and generating natural language. However, these models can inadvertently memorize private information, posing significant privacy risks. This study addresses the challenge of enabling LLMs to protect specific individuals' private data without the need for complete retraining. We propose \return, a Real-world pErsonal daTa UnleaRNing dataset, comprising 2,492 individuals from Wikipedia with associated QA pairs, to evaluate machine unlearning (MU) methods for protecting personal data in a realistic scenario. Additionally, we introduce the Name-Aware Unlearning Framework (NAUF) for Privacy Protection, which enables the model to learn which individuals' information should be protected without affecting its ability to answer questions related to other unrelated individuals. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that NAUF achieves a state-of-the-art average unlearning score, surpassing the best baseline method by 5.65 points, effectively protecting target individuals' personal data while maintaining the model's general capabilities.

Machine unlearning aims to erase data from a model as if the latter never saw them during training. While existing approaches unlearn information from complete or partial access to the training data, this access can be limited over time due to privacy regulations. Currently, no setting or benchmark exists to probe the effectiveness of unlearning methods in such scenarios. To fill this gap, we propose a novel task we call One-Shot Unlearning of Personal Identities (1-SHUI) that evaluates unlearning models when the training data is not available. We focus on unlearning identity data, which is specifically relevant due to current regulations requiring personal data deletion after training. To cope with data absence, we expect users to provide a portraiting picture to aid unlearning. We design requests on CelebA, CelebA-HQ, and MUFAC with different unlearning set sizes to evaluate applicable methods in 1-SHUI. Moreover, we propose MetaUnlearn, an effective method that meta-learns to forget identities from a single image. Our findings indicate that existing approaches struggle when data availability is limited, especially when there is a dissimilarity between the provided samples and the training data. Source code available at https://github.com/tdemin16/one-shui.

In domains with high stakes such as law, recruitment, and healthcare, learning models frequently rely on sensitive user data for inference, necessitating the complete set of features. This not only poses significant privacy risks for individuals but also demands substantial human effort from organizations to verify information accuracy. This paper asks whether it is necessary to use all input features for accurate predictions at inference time. The paper demonstrates that, in a personalized setting, individuals may only need to disclose a small subset of their features without compromising decision-making accuracy. The paper also provides an efficient sequential algorithm to determine the appropriate attributes for each individual to provide. Evaluations across various learning tasks show that individuals can potentially report as little as 10\% of their information while maintaining the same accuracy level as a model that employs the full set of user information.

Modern machine learning research relies on relatively few carefully curated datasets. Even in these datasets, and typically in `untidy' or raw data, practitioners are faced with significant issues of data quality and diversity which can be prohibitively labor intensive to address. Existing methods for dealing with these challenges tend to make strong assumptions about the particular issues at play, and often require a priori knowledge or metadata such as domain labels. Our work is orthogonal to these methods: we instead focus on providing a unified and efficient framework for Metadata Archaeology -- uncovering and inferring metadata of examples in a dataset. We curate different subsets of data that might exist in a dataset (e.g. mislabeled, atypical, or out-of-distribution examples) using simple transformations, and leverage differences in learning dynamics between these probe suites to infer metadata of interest. Our method is on par with far more sophisticated mitigation methods across different tasks: identifying and correcting mislabeled examples, classifying minority-group samples, prioritizing points relevant for training and enabling scalable human auditing of relevant examples.

As AI models are trained on ever-expanding datasets, the ability to remove the influence of specific data from trained models has become essential for privacy protection and regulatory compliance. Unlearning addresses this challenge by selectively removing parametric knowledge from the trained models without retraining from scratch, which is critical for resource-intensive models such as Large Language Models (LLMs). Existing unlearning methods often degrade model performance by removing more information than necessary when attempting to ''forget'' specific data. We introduce Forgetting-MarI, an LLM unlearning framework that provably removes only the additional (marginal) information contributed by the data to be unlearned, while preserving the information supported by the data to be retained. By penalizing marginal information, our method yields an explicit upper bound on the unlearn dataset's residual influence in the trained models, providing provable undetectability. Extensive experiments confirm that our approach outperforms current state-of-the-art unlearning methods, delivering reliable forgetting and better preserved general model performance across diverse benchmarks. This advancement represents an important step toward making AI systems more controllable and compliant with privacy and copyright regulations without compromising their effectiveness.

Personal digital data is a critical asset, and governments worldwide have enforced laws and regulations to protect data privacy. Data users have been endowed with the right to be forgotten of their data. In the course of machine learning (ML), the forgotten right requires a model provider to delete user data and its subsequent impact on ML models upon user requests. Machine unlearning emerges to address this, which has garnered ever-increasing attention from both industry and academia. While the area has developed rapidly, there is a lack of comprehensive surveys to capture the latest advancements. Recognizing this shortage, we conduct an extensive exploration to map the landscape of machine unlearning including the (fine-grained) taxonomy of unlearning algorithms under centralized and distributed settings, debate on approximate unlearning, verification and evaluation metrics, challenges and solutions for unlearning under different applications, as well as attacks targeting machine unlearning. The survey concludes by outlining potential directions for future research, hoping to serve as a guide for interested scholars.

With the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), we have witnessed intense competition among the major LLM products like ChatGPT, LLaMa, and Gemini. However, various issues (e.g. privacy leakage and copyright violation) of the training corpus still remain underexplored. For example, the Times sued OpenAI and Microsoft for infringing on its copyrights by using millions of its articles for training. From the perspective of LLM practitioners, handling such unintended privacy violations can be challenging. Previous work addressed the ``unlearning" problem of LLMs using gradient information, while they mostly introduced significant overheads like data preprocessing or lacked robustness. In this paper, contrasting with the methods based on first-order information, we revisit the unlearning problem via the perspective of second-order information (Hessian). Our unlearning algorithms, which are inspired by classic Newton update, are not only data-agnostic/model-agnostic but also proven to be robust in terms of utility preservation or privacy guarantee. Through a comprehensive evaluation with four NLP datasets as well as a case study on real-world datasets, our methods consistently show superiority over the first-order methods.

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have shown surprising performance in generating high-quality images. However, concerns have arisen regarding the unauthorized data usage during the training or fine-tuning process. One example is when a model trainer collects a set of images created by a particular artist and attempts to train a model capable of generating similar images without obtaining permission and giving credit to the artist. To address this issue, we propose a method for detecting such unauthorized data usage by planting the injected memorization into the text-to-image diffusion models trained on the protected dataset. Specifically, we modify the protected images by adding unique contents on these images using stealthy image warping functions that are nearly imperceptible to humans but can be captured and memorized by diffusion models. By analyzing whether the model has memorized the injected content (i.e., whether the generated images are processed by the injected post-processing function), we can detect models that had illegally utilized the unauthorized data. Experiments on Stable Diffusion and VQ Diffusion with different model training or fine-tuning methods (i.e, LoRA, DreamBooth, and standard training) demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in detecting unauthorized data usages. Code: https://github.com/ZhentingWang/DIAGNOSIS.

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

Machine unlearning aims to unlearn data points from a learned model, offering a principled way to process data-deletion requests and mitigate privacy risks without full retraining. Prior work has mainly studied unsupervised / supervised machine unlearning, leaving unlearning for sequential decision-making systems far less understood. We initiate the first study of a foundational sequential decision-making problem: offline stochastic multi-armed bandits (MAB). We formalize the privacy constraint for offline MAB and measure utility by the post-unlearning decision quality. We conduct a systematic study of both single- and multi-source unlearning scenarios under two data-generation models, the fixed-sample model and the distribution model. For these settings, our algorithmic design is built on two canonical base algorithms: Gaussian mechanism and rollback, and we propose adaptive algorithms that switch between them according to the data regime and privacy constraint. We further introduce a mixing procedure that elucidates the rationale behind these baselines. We provide performance guarantees across the above settings and establish lower bounds under both dataset models. Experiments validate the predicted tradeoffs and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

New capabilities in foundation models are owed in large part to massive, widely-sourced, and under-documented training data collections. Existing practices in data collection have led to challenges in documenting data transparency, tracing authenticity, verifying consent, privacy, representation, bias, copyright infringement, and the overall development of ethical and trustworthy foundation models. In response, regulation is emphasizing the need for training data transparency to understand foundation models' limitations. Based on a large-scale analysis of the foundation model training data landscape and existing solutions, we identify the missing infrastructure to facilitate responsible foundation model development practices. We examine the current shortcomings of common tools for tracing data authenticity, consent, and documentation, and outline how policymakers, developers, and data creators can facilitate responsible foundation model development by adopting universal data provenance standards.

Machine unlearning aims to remove sensitive or undesired data from large language models. However, recent studies suggest that unlearning is often shallow, claiming that removed knowledge can easily be recovered. In this work, we critically examine standard unlearning evaluation practices and uncover key limitations that shake our trust in those findings. First, we show that some evaluations introduce substantial new information into the model, potentially masking true unlearning performance by re-teaching the model during testing. Second, we demonstrate that evaluation outcomes vary significantly across tasks, undermining the generalizability of current evaluation routines. Finally, we find that many evaluations rely on spurious correlations, making their results difficult to trust and interpret. Taken together, these issues suggest that current evaluation protocols may both overstate and understate unlearning success. To address this, we propose two principles for future unlearning evaluations: minimal information injection and downstream task awareness. We validate these principles through a series of targeted experiments, showing how violations of each can lead to misleading conclusions.

The rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have primarily focused on the process of learning from data to acquire knowledgeable learning systems. As these systems are increasingly deployed in critical areas, ensuring their privacy and alignment with human values is paramount. Recently, selective forgetting (also known as machine unlearning) has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, and has emerged as a transformative paradigm shift in the field of AI. It refers to the ability of a model to selectively erase the influence of previously seen data, which is especially important for compliance with modern data protection regulations and for aligning models with human values. Despite its promise, selective forgetting raises significant privacy concerns, especially when the data involved come from sensitive domains. While new unlearning-induced privacy attacks are continuously proposed, each is shown to outperform its predecessors using different experimental settings, which can lead to overly optimistic and potentially unfair assessments that may disproportionately favor one particular attack over the others. In this work, we present the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating privacy vulnerabilities in selective forgetting. We extensively investigate privacy vulnerabilities of machine unlearning techniques and benchmark privacy leakage across a wide range of victim data, state-of-the-art unlearning privacy attacks, unlearning methods, and model architectures. We systematically evaluate and identify critical factors related to unlearning-induced privacy leakage. With our novel insights, we aim to provide a standardized tool for practitioners seeking to deploy customized unlearning applications with faithful privacy assessments.

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

Computer vision has long relied on ImageNet and other large datasets of images sampled from the Internet for pretraining models. However, these datasets have ethical and technical shortcomings, such as containing personal information taken without consent, unclear license usage, biases, and, in some cases, even problematic image content. On the other hand, state-of-the-art pretraining is nowadays obtained with unsupervised methods, meaning that labelled datasets such as ImageNet may not be necessary, or perhaps not even optimal, for model pretraining. We thus propose an unlabelled dataset PASS: Pictures without humAns for Self-Supervision. PASS only contains images with CC-BY license and complete attribution metadata, addressing the copyright issue. Most importantly, it contains no images of people at all, and also avoids other types of images that are problematic for data protection or ethics. We show that PASS can be used for pretraining with methods such as MoCo-v2, SwAV and DINO. In the transfer learning setting, it yields similar downstream performances to ImageNet pretraining even on tasks that involve humans, such as human pose estimation. PASS does not make existing datasets obsolete, as for instance it is insufficient for benchmarking. However, it shows that model pretraining is often possible while using safer data, and it also provides the basis for a more robust evaluation of pretraining methods.

Training machine learning models requires the storage of large datasets, which often contain sensitive or private data. Storing data is associated with a number of potential risks which increase over time, such as database breaches and malicious adversaries. Machine unlearning is the study of methods to efficiently remove the influence of training data subsets from previously-trained models. Existing unlearning methods typically require direct access to the "forget set" -- the data to be forgotten-and organisations must retain this data for unlearning rather than deleting it immediately upon request, increasing risks associated with the forget set. We introduce partially-blind unlearning -- utilizing auxiliary information to unlearn without explicit access to the forget set. We also propose a practical framework Reload, a partially-blind method based on gradient optimization and structured weight sparsification to operationalize partially-blind unlearning. We show that Reload efficiently unlearns, approximating models retrained from scratch, and outperforms several forget set-dependent approaches. On language models, Reload unlearns entities using <0.025% of the retain set and <7% of model weights in <8 minutes on Llama2-7B. In the corrective case, Reload achieves unlearning even when only 10% of corrupted data is identified.

Language Models (LMs) are prone to ''memorizing'' training data, including substantial sensitive user information. To mitigate privacy risks and safeguard the right to be forgotten, machine unlearning has emerged as a promising approach for enabling LMs to efficiently ''forget'' specific texts. However, despite the good intentions, is textual unlearning really as effective and reliable as expected? To address the concern, we first propose Unlearning Likelihood Ratio Attack+ (U-LiRA+), a rigorous textual unlearning auditing method, and find that unlearned texts can still be detected with very high confidence after unlearning. Further, we conduct an in-depth investigation on the privacy risks of textual unlearning mechanisms in deployment and present the Textual Unlearning Leakage Attack (TULA), along with its variants in both black- and white-box scenarios. We show that textual unlearning mechanisms could instead reveal more about the unlearned texts, exposing them to significant membership inference and data reconstruction risks. Our findings highlight that existing textual unlearning actually gives a false sense of unlearning, underscoring the need for more robust and secure unlearning mechanisms.

We explore machine unlearning (MU) in the domain of large language models (LLMs), referred to as LLM unlearning. This initiative aims to eliminate undesirable data influence (e.g., sensitive or illegal information) and the associated model capabilities, while maintaining the integrity of essential knowledge generation and not affecting causally unrelated information. We envision LLM unlearning becoming a pivotal element in the life-cycle management of LLMs, potentially standing as an essential foundation for developing generative AI that is not only safe, secure, and trustworthy, but also resource-efficient without the need of full retraining. We navigate the unlearning landscape in LLMs from conceptual formulation, methodologies, metrics, and applications. In particular, we highlight the often-overlooked aspects of existing LLM unlearning research, e.g., unlearning scope, data-model interaction, and multifaceted efficacy assessment. We also draw connections between LLM unlearning and related areas such as model editing, influence functions, model explanation, adversarial training, and reinforcement learning. Furthermore, we outline an effective assessment framework for LLM unlearning and explore its applications in copyright and privacy safeguards and sociotechnical harm reduction.

Growing concerns over data privacy and security highlight the importance of machine unlearning--removing specific data influences from trained models without full retraining. Techniques like Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) are widely used to externally assess successful unlearning. However, existing methods face two key limitations: (1) maximizing MIA effectiveness (e.g., via online attacks) requires prohibitive computational resources, often exceeding retraining costs; (2) MIAs, designed for binary inclusion tests, struggle to capture granular changes in approximate unlearning. To address these challenges, we propose the Interpolated Approximate Measurement (IAM), a framework natively designed for unlearning inference. IAM quantifies sample-level unlearning completeness by interpolating the model's generalization-fitting behavior gap on queried samples. IAM achieves strong performance in binary inclusion tests for exact unlearning and high correlation for approximate unlearning--scalable to LLMs using just one pre-trained shadow model. We theoretically analyze how IAM's scoring mechanism maintains performance efficiently. We then apply IAM to recent approximate unlearning algorithms, revealing general risks of both over-unlearning and under-unlearning, underscoring the need for stronger safeguards in approximate unlearning systems. The code is available at https://github.com/Happy2Git/Unlearning_Inference_IAM.

The need for machine unlearning is critical for data privacy, yet existing methods often cause Knowledge Contamination by unintentionally damaging related knowledge. Such a degraded model performance after unlearning has been recently leveraged for new inference and backdoor attacks. Most studies design adversarial unlearning requests that require poisoning or duplicating training data. In this study, we introduce a new unlearning-induced attack model, namely indirect unlearning attack, which does not require data manipulation but exploits the consequence of knowledge contamination to perturb the model accuracy on security-critical predictions. To mitigate this attack, we introduce a theoretical framework that models neural networks as Neural Knowledge Systems. Based on this, we propose ROKA, a robust unlearning strategy centered on Neural Healing. Unlike conventional unlearning methods that only destroy information, ROKA constructively rebalances the model by nullifying the influence of forgotten data while strengthening its conceptual neighbors. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a theoretical guarantee for knowledge preservation during unlearning. Evaluations on various large models, including vision transformers, multi-modal models, and large language models, show that ROKA effectively unlearns targets while preserving, or even enhancing, the accuracy of retained data, thereby mitigating the indirect unlearning attacks.

Large language models trained on massive corpora of data from the web can memorize and reproduce sensitive or private data raising both legal and ethical concerns. Unlearning, or tuning models to forget information present in their training data, provides us with a way to protect private data after training. Although several methods exist for such unlearning, it is unclear to what extent they result in models equivalent to those where the data to be forgotten was never learned in the first place. To address this challenge, we present TOFU, a Task of Fictitious Unlearning, as a benchmark aimed at helping deepen our understanding of unlearning. We offer a dataset of 200 diverse synthetic author profiles, each consisting of 20 question-answer pairs, and a subset of these profiles called the forget set that serves as the target for unlearning. We compile a suite of metrics that work together to provide a holistic picture of unlearning efficacy. Finally, we provide a set of baseline results from existing unlearning algorithms. Importantly, none of the baselines we consider show effective unlearning motivating continued efforts to develop approaches for unlearning that effectively tune models so that they truly behave as if they were never trained on the forget data at all.

An unintended consequence of the vast pretraining of Large Language Models (LLMs) is the verbatim memorization of fragments of their training data, which may contain sensitive or copyrighted information. In recent years, unlearning has emerged as a solution to effectively remove sensitive knowledge from models after training. Yet, recent work has shown that supposedly deleted information can still be extracted by malicious actors through various attacks. Still, current attacks retrieve sets of possible candidate generations and are unable to pinpoint the output that contains the actual target information. We propose activation steering as a method for exact information retrieval from unlearned LLMs. We introduce a novel approach to generating steering vectors, named Anonymized Activation Steering. Additionally, we develop a simple word frequency method to pinpoint the correct answer among a set of candidates when retrieving unlearned information. Our evaluation across multiple unlearning techniques and datasets demonstrates that activation steering successfully recovers general knowledge (e.g., widely known fictional characters) while revealing limitations in retrieving specific information (e.g., details about non-public individuals). Overall, our results demonstrate that exact information retrieval from unlearned models is possible, highlighting a severe vulnerability of current unlearning techniques.

Recent advances in synthetic data generation (SDG) have been hailed as a solution to the difficult problem of sharing sensitive data while protecting privacy. SDG aims to learn statistical properties of real data in order to generate "artificial" data that are structurally and statistically similar to sensitive data. However, prior research suggests that inference attacks on synthetic data can undermine privacy, but only for specific outlier records. In this work, we introduce a new attribute inference attack against synthetic data. The attack is based on linear reconstruction methods for aggregate statistics, which target all records in the dataset, not only outliers. We evaluate our attack on state-of-the-art SDG algorithms, including Probabilistic Graphical Models, Generative Adversarial Networks, and recent differentially private SDG mechanisms. By defining a formal privacy game, we show that our attack can be highly accurate even on arbitrary records, and that this is the result of individual information leakage (as opposed to population-level inference). We then systematically evaluate the tradeoff between protecting privacy and preserving statistical utility. Our findings suggest that current SDG methods cannot consistently provide sufficient privacy protection against inference attacks while retaining reasonable utility. The best method evaluated, a differentially private SDG mechanism, can provide both protection against inference attacks and reasonable utility, but only in very specific settings. Lastly, we show that releasing a larger number of synthetic records can improve utility but at the cost of making attacks far more effective.

Instruction-following large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, have become widely popular among everyday users. However, these models inadvertently disclose private, sensitive information to their users, underscoring the need for machine unlearning techniques to remove selective information from the models. While prior work has focused on forgetting small, random subsets of training data at the instance-level, we argue that real-world scenarios often require the removal of an entire user data, which may require a more careful maneuver. In this study, we explore entity-level unlearning, which aims to erase all knowledge related to a target entity while preserving the remaining model capabilities. To address this, we introduce Opt-Out, an optimal transport-based unlearning method that utilizes the Wasserstein distance from the model's initial parameters to achieve more effective and fine-grained unlearning. We also present the first Entity-Level Unlearning Dataset (ELUDe) designed to evaluate entity-level unlearning. Our empirical results demonstrate that Opt-Out surpasses existing methods, establishing a new standard for secure and adaptable LLMs that can accommodate user data removal requests without the need for full retraining.

Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of specific training data from a model without requiring full retraining. This capability is crucial for ensuring privacy, safety, and regulatory compliance. Therefore, verifying whether a model has truly forgotten target data is essential for maintaining reliability and trustworthiness. However, existing evaluation methods often assess forgetting at the level of individual inputs. This approach may overlook residual influence present in semantically similar examples. Such influence can compromise privacy and lead to indirect information leakage. We propose REMIND (Residual Memorization In Neighborhood Dynamics), a novel evaluation method aiming to detect the subtle remaining influence of unlearned data and classify whether the data has been effectively forgotten. REMIND analyzes the model's loss over small input variations and reveals patterns unnoticed by single-point evaluations. We show that unlearned data yield flatter, less steep loss landscapes, while retained or unrelated data exhibit sharper, more volatile patterns. REMIND requires only query-based access, outperforms existing methods under similar constraints, and demonstrates robustness across different models, datasets, and paraphrased inputs, making it practical for real-world deployment. By providing a more sensitive and interpretable measure of unlearning effectiveness, REMIND provides a reliable framework to assess unlearning in language models. As a result, REMIND offers a novel perspective on memorization and unlearning.

Synthetic data generators, when trained using privacy-preserving techniques like differential privacy, promise to produce synthetic data with formal privacy guarantees, facilitating the sharing of sensitive data. However, it is crucial to empirically assess the privacy risks associated with the generated synthetic data before deploying generative technologies. This paper outlines the key concepts and assumptions underlying empirical privacy evaluation in machine learning-based generative and predictive models. Then, this paper explores the practical challenges for privacy evaluations of generative models for use cases with millions of training records, such as data from statistical agencies and healthcare providers. Our findings indicate that methods designed to verify the correct operation of the training algorithm are effective for large datasets, but they often assume an adversary that is unrealistic in many scenarios. Based on the findings, we highlight a crucial trade-off between the computational feasibility of the evaluation and the level of realism of the assumed threat model. Finally, we conclude with ideas and suggestions for future research.

Phishing remains a pervasive and growing threat, inflicting heavy economic and reputational damage. While machine learning has been effective in real-time detection of phishing attacks, progress is hindered by lack of large, high-quality datasets and benchmarks. In addition to poor-quality due to challenges in data collection, existing datasets suffer from leakage and unrealistic base rates, leading to overly optimistic performance results. In this paper, we introduce PhreshPhish, a large-scale, high-quality dataset of phishing websites that addresses these limitations. Compared to existing public datasets, PhreshPhish is substantially larger and provides significantly higher quality, as measured by the estimated rate of invalid or mislabeled data points. Additionally, we propose a comprehensive suite of benchmark datasets specifically designed for realistic model evaluation by minimizing leakage, increasing task difficulty, enhancing dataset diversity, and adjustment of base rates more likely to be seen in the real world. We train and evaluate multiple solution approaches to provide baseline performance on the benchmark sets. We believe the availability of this dataset and benchmarks will enable realistic, standardized model comparison and foster further advances in phishing detection. The datasets and benchmarks are available on Hugging Face (https://huggingface.co/datasets/phreshphish/phreshphish).

Recent research advances achieve human-level accuracy for de-identifying free-text clinical notes on research datasets, but gaps remain in reproducing this in large real-world settings. This paper summarizes lessons learned from building a system used to de-identify over one billion real clinical notes, in a fully automated way, that was independently certified by multiple organizations for production use. A fully automated solution requires a very high level of accuracy that does not require manual review. A hybrid context-based model architecture is described, which outperforms a Named Entity Recogniton (NER) - only model by 10% on the i2b2-2014 benchmark. The proposed system makes 50%, 475%, and 575% fewer errors than the comparable AWS, Azure, and GCP services respectively while also outperforming ChatGPT by 33%. It exceeds 98% coverage of sensitive data across 7 European languages, without a need for fine tuning. A second set of described models enable data obfuscation -- replacing sensitive data with random surrogates -- while retaining name, date, gender, clinical, and format consistency. Both the practical need and the solution architecture that provides for reliable & linked anonymized documents are described.

Publishing a large language model (LLM) benchmark on the Internet risks contaminating future LLMs: the benchmark may be unintentionally (or intentionally) used to train or select a model. A common mitigation is to keep the benchmark private and let participants submit their models or predictions to the organizers. However, this strategy will require trust in a single organization and still permits test-set overfitting through repeated queries. To overcome this issue, we propose a way to publish benchmarks without completely disclosing the ground-truth answers to the questions, while still maintaining the ability to openly evaluate LLMs. The main underlying idea is to reduces the best possible accuracy, i.e., Bayes accuracy, by injecting randomness to the answers by preparing several logically correct answers, and only include one of them as the solution in the benchmark. Not only is this helpful to keep us from disclosing the ground truth, but this also offers a test for detecting data contamination. In principle, even fully capable models should not surpass the Bayes accuracy. If a model surpasses this ceiling despite this expectation, this is a strong signal of data contamination. We present experimental evidence that our method can detect data contamination accurately on a wide range of benchmarks, models, and training methodologies.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes exhibit dangerous unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is massive -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for all possible inputs that may elicit such behavior. One specific and particularly challenging case is that if data-poisoning-injected trojans, since there is no way to know what they are to search for them. To our knowledge, there is no generally applicable method to unlearn unknown trojans injected during pre-training. This work seeks to provide a general purpose recipe (filters) and a specific implementation (LoRA) filters that work in practice on small to medium sized models. The focus is primarily empirical, though some perplexing behavior opens the door to the fundamental question of how LLMs store and process information. Not unexpectedly, we find that our filters work best on the residual stream and the latest layers.

Recent observations have underscored a disparity between the inflated benchmark scores and the actual performance of LLMs, raising concerns about potential contamination of evaluation benchmarks. This issue is especially critical for closed-source models and certain open-source models where training data transparency is lacking. In this paper we study data contamination by proposing two methods tailored for both open-source and proprietary LLMs. We first introduce a retrieval-based system to explore potential overlaps between evaluation benchmarks and pretraining corpora. We further present a novel investigation protocol named Testset Slot Guessing (TS-Guessing), applicable to both open and proprietary models. This approach entails masking a wrong answer in a multiple-choice question and prompting the model to fill in the gap. Additionally, it involves obscuring an unlikely word in an evaluation example and asking the model to produce it. We find that certain commercial LLMs could surprisingly guess the missing option in various test sets. Specifically, in the TruthfulQA benchmark, we find that LLMs exhibit notable performance improvement when provided with additional metadata in the benchmark. Further, in the MMLU benchmark, ChatGPT and GPT-4 demonstrated an exact match rate of 52\% and 57\%, respectively, in guessing the missing options in benchmark test data. We hope these results underscore the need for more robust evaluation methodologies and benchmarks in the field.

Machine unlearning is a process to remove specific data points from a trained model while maintaining the performance on retain data, addressing privacy or legal requirements. Despite its importance, existing unlearning evaluations tend to focus on logit-based metrics (i.e., accuracy) under small-scale scenarios. We observe that this could lead to a false sense of security in unlearning approaches under real-world scenarios. In this paper, we conduct a new comprehensive evaluation that employs representation-based evaluations of the unlearned model under large-scale scenarios to verify whether the unlearning approaches genuinely eliminate the targeted forget data from the model's representation perspective. Our analysis reveals that current state-of-the-art unlearning approaches either completely degrade the representational quality of the unlearned model or merely modify the classifier (i.e., the last layer), thereby achieving superior logit-based evaluation metrics while maintaining significant representational similarity to the original model. Furthermore, we introduce a rigorous unlearning evaluation setup, in which the forgetting classes exhibit semantic similarity to downstream task classes, necessitating that feature representations diverge significantly from those of the original model, thus enabling a more rigorous evaluation from a representation perspective. We hope our benchmark serves as a standardized protocol for evaluating unlearning algorithms under realistic conditions.

Efficiency and trustworthiness are two eternal pursuits when applying deep learning in real-world applications. With regard to efficiency, dataset distillation (DD) endeavors to reduce training costs by distilling the large dataset into a tiny synthetic dataset. However, existing methods merely concentrate on in-distribution (InD) classification in a closed-world setting, disregarding out-of-distribution (OOD) samples. On the other hand, OOD detection aims to enhance models' trustworthiness, which is always inefficiently achieved in full-data settings. For the first time, we simultaneously consider both issues and propose a novel paradigm called Trustworthy Dataset Distillation (TrustDD). By distilling both InD samples and outliers, the condensed datasets are capable of training models competent in both InD classification and OOD detection. To alleviate the requirement of real outlier data, we further propose to corrupt InD samples to generate pseudo-outliers, namely Pseudo-Outlier Exposure (POE). Comprehensive experiments on various settings demonstrate the effectiveness of TrustDD, and POE surpasses the state-of-the-art method Outlier Exposure (OE). Compared with the preceding DD, TrustDD is more trustworthy and applicable to open-world scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/mashijie1028/TrustDD

The tremendous amount of accessible data in cyberspace face the risk of being unauthorized used for training deep learning models. To address this concern, methods are proposed to make data unlearnable for deep learning models by adding a type of error-minimizing noise. However, such conferred unlearnability is found fragile to adversarial training. In this paper, we design new methods to generate robust unlearnable examples that are protected from adversarial training. We first find that the vanilla error-minimizing noise, which suppresses the informative knowledge of data via minimizing the corresponding training loss, could not effectively minimize the adversarial training loss. This explains the vulnerability of error-minimizing noise in adversarial training. Based on the observation, robust error-minimizing noise is then introduced to reduce the adversarial training loss. Experiments show that the unlearnability brought by robust error-minimizing noise can effectively protect data from adversarial training in various scenarios. The code is available at https://github.com/fshp971/robust-unlearnable-examples.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

With the widespread digitization of finance and the increasing popularity of cryptocurrencies, the sophistication of fraud schemes devised by cybercriminals is growing. Money laundering -- the movement of illicit funds to conceal their origins -- can cross bank and national boundaries, producing complex transaction patterns. The UN estimates 2-5\% of global GDP or \0.8 - 2.0 trillion dollars are laundered globally each year. Unfortunately, real data to train machine learning models to detect laundering is generally not available, and previous synthetic data generators have had significant shortcomings. A realistic, standardized, publicly-available benchmark is needed for comparing models and for the advancement of the area. To this end, this paper contributes a synthetic financial transaction dataset generator and a set of synthetically generated AML (Anti-Money Laundering) datasets. We have calibrated this agent-based generator to match real transactions as closely as possible and made the datasets public. We describe the generator in detail and demonstrate how the datasets generated can help compare different machine learning models in terms of their AML abilities. In a key way, using synthetic data in these comparisons can be even better than using real data: the ground truth labels are complete, whilst many laundering transactions in real data are never detected.

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has triggered legal and ethical concerns, especially regarding the unauthorized use of copyrighted materials in their training datasets. This has led to lawsuits against tech companies accused of using protected content without permission. Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to detect whether specific documents were used in a given LLM pretraining, but their effectiveness is undermined by biases such as time-shifts and n-gram overlaps. This paper addresses the evaluation of MIAs on LLMs with partially inferable training sets, under the ex-post hypothesis, which acknowledges inherent distributional biases between members and non-members datasets. We propose and validate algorithms to create ``non-biased'' and ``non-classifiable'' datasets for fairer MIA assessment. Experiments using the Gutenberg dataset on OpenLamma and Pythia show that neutralizing known biases alone is insufficient. Our methods produce non-biased ex-post datasets with AUC-ROC scores comparable to those previously obtained on genuinely random datasets, validating our approach. Globally, MIAs yield results close to random, with only one being effective on both random and our datasets, but its performance decreases when bias is removed.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has demonstrated effectiveness in removing the influence of undesirable data (also known as forget data). Existing approaches typically assume full access to the forget dataset, overlooking two key challenges: (1) Forget data is often privacy-sensitive, rare, or legally regulated, making it expensive or impractical to obtain (2) The distribution of available forget data may not align with how that information is represented within the model. To address these limitations, we propose a ``Reveal-and-Release'' method to unlearn with self-generated data, where we prompt the model to reveal what it knows using optimized instructions. To fully utilize the self-generated forget data, we propose an iterative unlearning framework, where we make incremental adjustments to the model's weight space with parameter-efficient modules trained on the forget data. Experimental results demonstrate that our method balances the tradeoff between forget quality and utility preservation.

Neural networks unintentionally memorize training data, creating privacy risks in federated learning (FL) systems, such as inference and reconstruction attacks on sensitive data. To mitigate these risks and to comply with privacy regulations, Federated Unlearning (FU) has been introduced to enable participants in FL systems to remove their data's influence from the global model. However, current FU methods primarily act post-hoc, struggling to efficiently erase information deeply memorized by neural networks. We argue that effective unlearning necessitates a paradigm shift: designing FL systems inherently amenable to forgetting. To this end, we propose a learning-to-unlearn Transformation-guided Federated Unlearning (ToFU) framework that incorporates transformations during the learning process to reduce memorization of specific instances. Our theoretical analysis reveals how transformation composition provably bounds instance-specific information, directly simplifying subsequent unlearning. Crucially, ToFU can work as a plug-and-play framework that improves the performance of existing FU methods. Experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and the MUFAC benchmark show that ToFU outperforms existing FU baselines, enhances performance when integrated with current methods, and reduces unlearning time.

Data contamination hinders fair LLM evaluation by introducing test data into newer models' training sets. Existing studies solve this challenge by updating benchmarks with newly collected data. However, they fail to guarantee contamination-free evaluation as the newly collected data may contain pre-existing knowledge, and their benchmark updates rely on intensive human labor. To address these issues, we in this paper propose AntiLeak-Bench, an automated anti-leakage benchmarking framework. Instead of simply using newly collected data, we construct samples with explicitly new knowledge absent from LLMs' training sets, which thus ensures strictly contamination-free evaluation. We further design a fully automated workflow to build and update our benchmark without human labor. This significantly reduces the cost of benchmark maintenance to accommodate emerging LLMs. Through extensive experiments, we highlight that data contamination likely exists before LLMs' cutoff time and demonstrate AntiLeak-Bench effectively overcomes this challenge.

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in natural language understanding and generation. However, their tendency to memorize training data raises concerns regarding privacy, copyright compliance, and security, particularly in cases involving Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Effective machine unlearning techniques are essential to mitigate these risks, yet existing methods remain underdeveloped for LLMs due to their open-ended output space. In this work, we apply the Adaptive Representation Misdirection Unlearning (RMU) technique to unlearn sensitive information from LLMs. Through extensive experiments, we analyze the effects of unlearning across different decoder layers to determine the most effective regions for sensitive information removal. Our technique ranked 4th on the official leaderboard of both 1B parameter and 7B parameter models.

Foundation models have transformed multimedia analysis by enabling robust and transferable representations across diverse modalities and tasks. However, their static deployment conflicts with growing societal and regulatory demands -- particularly the need to unlearn specific data upon request, as mandated by privacy frameworks such as the GDPR. Traditional unlearning approaches, including retraining, activation editing, or distillation, are often computationally expensive, fragile, and ill-suited for real-time or continuously evolving systems. In this paper, we propose a paradigm shift: rethinking unlearning not as a retroactive intervention but as a built-in capability. We introduce a prompt-based learning framework that unifies knowledge acquisition and removal within a single training phase. Rather than encoding information in model weights, our approach binds class-level semantics to dedicated prompt tokens. This design enables instant unlearning simply by removing the corresponding prompt -- without retraining, model modification, or access to original data. Experiments demonstrate that our framework preserves predictive performance on retained classes while effectively erasing forgotten ones. Beyond utility, our method exhibits strong privacy and security guarantees: it is resistant to membership inference attacks, and prompt removal prevents any residual knowledge extraction, even under adversarial conditions. This ensures compliance with data protection principles and safeguards against unauthorized access to forgotten information, making the framework suitable for deployment in sensitive and regulated environments. Overall, by embedding removability into the architecture itself, this work establishes a new foundation for designing modular, scalable and ethically responsive AI models.

Machine learning models that are overfitted/overtrained are more vulnerable to knowledge leakage, which poses a risk to privacy. Suppose we download or receive a model from a third-party collaborator without knowing its training accuracy. How can we determine if it has been overfitted or overtrained on its training data? It's possible that the model was intentionally over-trained to make it vulnerable during testing. While an overfitted or overtrained model may perform well on testing data and even some generalization tests, we can't be sure it's not over-fitted. Conducting a comprehensive generalization test is also expensive. The goal of this paper is to address these issues and ensure the privacy and generalization of our method using only testing data. To achieve this, we analyze the null space in the last layer of neural networks, which enables us to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowledge of the accuracy of those data. We evaluated our approach on various architectures and datasets and observed a distinct pattern in the angle of null space when models are overfitted. Furthermore, we show that models with poor generalization exhibit specific characteristics in this space. Our work represents the first attempt to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowing any knowledge about the training samples.

The security of biomedical Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has attracted increasing attention. However, training samples easily contain private information and incorrect knowledge that are difficult to detect, potentially leading to privacy leakage or erroneous outputs after deployment. An intuitive idea is to reprocess the training set to remove unwanted content and retrain the model from scratch. Yet, this is impractical due to significant computational costs, especially for large language models. Machine unlearning has emerged as a solution to this problem, which avoids complete retraining by selectively removing undesired knowledge derived from harmful samples while preserving required capabilities on normal cases. However, there exist no available datasets to evaluate the unlearning quality for security protection in biomedical MLLMs. To bridge this gap, we propose the first benchmark Multimodal Large Language Model Unlearning for BioMedicine (MLLMU-Med) built upon our novel data generation pipeline that effectively integrates synthetic private data and factual errors into the training set. Our benchmark targets two key scenarios: 1) Privacy protection, where patient private information is mistakenly included in the training set, causing models to unintentionally respond with private data during inference; and 2) Incorrectness removal, where wrong knowledge derived from unreliable sources is embedded into the dataset, leading to unsafe model responses. Moreover, we propose a novel Unlearning Efficiency Score that directly reflects the overall unlearning performance across different subsets. We evaluate five unlearning approaches on MLLMU-Med and find that these methods show limited effectiveness in removing harmful knowledge from biomedical MLLMs, indicating significant room for improvement. This work establishes a new pathway for further research in this promising field.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained using massive datasets, which often contain undesirable content such as harmful texts, personal information, and copyrighted material. To address this, machine unlearning aims to remove information from trained models. Recent work has shown that soft token attacks (STA) can successfully extract unlearned information from LLMs, but in this work we show that STAs can be an inadequate tool for auditing unlearning. Using common benchmarks such as Who Is Harry Potter? and TOFU, we demonstrate that in a strong auditor setting such attacks can elicit any information from the LLM, regardless of the deployed unlearning algorithm or whether the queried content was originally present in the training corpus. We further show that STA with just a few soft tokens (1-10) can elicit random strings over 400 characters long, indicating that STAs must be used carefully to effectively audit unlearning. Example code can be found at: https://github.com/IntelLabs/LLMart/tree/main/examples/unlearning

Modern machine learning (ML) systems demand substantial training data, often resorting to external sources. Nevertheless, this practice renders them vulnerable to backdoor poisoning attacks. Prior backdoor defense strategies have primarily focused on the identification of backdoored models or poisoned data characteristics, typically operating under the assumption of access to clean data. In this work, we delve into a relatively underexplored challenge: the automatic identification of backdoor data within a poisoned dataset, all under realistic conditions, i.e., without the need for additional clean data or without manually defining a threshold for backdoor detection. We draw an inspiration from the scaled prediction consistency (SPC) technique, which exploits the prediction invariance of poisoned data to an input scaling factor. Based on this, we pose the backdoor data identification problem as a hierarchical data splitting optimization problem, leveraging a novel SPC-based loss function as the primary optimization objective. Our innovation unfolds in several key aspects. First, we revisit the vanilla SPC method, unveiling its limitations in addressing the proposed backdoor identification problem. Subsequently, we develop a bi-level optimization-based approach to precisely identify backdoor data by minimizing the advanced SPC loss. Finally, we demonstrate the efficacy of our proposal against a spectrum of backdoor attacks, encompassing basic label-corrupted attacks as well as more sophisticated clean-label attacks, evaluated across various benchmark datasets. Experiment results show that our approach often surpasses the performance of current baselines in identifying backdoor data points, resulting in about 4%-36% improvement in average AUROC. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/BackdoorMSPC.

Machine learning models often incorporate vast amounts of data, raising significant privacy concerns. Machine unlearning, the ability to remove the influence of specific data points from a trained model, addresses these concerns. This paper explores practical methods for implementing machine unlearning, focusing on a first-epoch gradient-ascent approach. Key findings include: 1. Single vs. Multi-Epoch Unlearning: First-epoch gradient unlearning is more effective than multi-epoch gradients. 2. Layer-Based Unlearning: The embedding layer in GPT-2 is crucial for effective unlearning. Gradients from the output layers (11 and 12) have no impact. Efficient unlearning can be achieved using only the embedding layer, halving space complexity. 3. Influence Functions & Scoring: Techniques like Hessian Vector Product and the dot product of activations and tensors are used for quantifying unlearning. 4. Gradient Ascent Considerations: Calibration is necessary to avoid overexposing the model to specific data points during unlearning, which could prematurely terminate the process. 5. Fuzzy Matching vs. Iterative Unlearning: Fuzzy matching techniques shift the model to a new optimum, while iterative unlearning provides a more complete modality. Our empirical evaluation confirms that first-epoch gradient ascent for machine unlearning is more effective than whole-model gradient ascent. These results highlight the potential of machine unlearning for enhancing data privacy and compliance with regulations such as GDPR and CCPA. The study underscores the importance of formal methods to comprehensively evaluate the unlearning process.

During pretraining, LLMs inadvertently memorize sensitive or copyrighted data, posing significant compliance challenges under legal frameworks like the GDPR and the EU AI Act. Fulfilling these mandates demands techniques that can remove information from a deployed model without retraining from scratch. Existing unlearning approaches attempt to address this need, but often leak the very data they aim to erase, sacrifice fluency and robustness, or depend on costly external reward models. We introduce PURGE (Policy Unlearning through Relative Group Erasure), a novel method grounded in the Group Relative Policy Optimization framework that formulates unlearning as a verifiable problem. PURGE uses an intrinsic reward signal that penalizes any mention of forbidden concepts, allowing safe and consistent unlearning. Our approach achieves up to x46 lower token usage per target than state-of-the-art methods, while improving fluency by +5.48% and adversarial robustness by +12.02% over the base model. Extensive evaluation on the Real World Knowledge Unlearning (RWKU) benchmark shows that PURGE reaches 11% unlearning effectiveness while preserving 98% of original utility. PURGE shows that framing LLM unlearning as a verifiable task enables more reliable, efficient, and scalable forgetting, suggesting a promising new direction for unlearning research that combines theoretical guarantees, improved safety, and practical deployment efficiency.

The trustworthiness of machine learning has emerged as a critical topic in the field, encompassing various applications and research areas such as robustness, security, interpretability, and fairness. The last decade saw the development of numerous methods addressing these challenges. In this survey, we systematically review these advancements from a data-centric perspective, highlighting the shortcomings of traditional empirical risk minimization (ERM) training in handling challenges posed by the data. Interestingly, we observe a convergence of these methods, despite being developed independently across trustworthy machine learning subfields. Pearl's hierarchy of causality offers a unifying framework for these techniques. Accordingly, this survey presents the background of trustworthy machine learning development using a unified set of concepts, connects this language to Pearl's causal hierarchy, and finally discusses methods explicitly inspired by causality literature. We provide a unified language with mathematical vocabulary to link these methods across robustness, adversarial robustness, interpretability, and fairness, fostering a more cohesive understanding of the field. Further, we explore the trustworthiness of large pretrained models. After summarizing dominant techniques like fine-tuning, parameter-efficient fine-tuning, prompting, and reinforcement learning with human feedback, we draw connections between them and the standard ERM. This connection allows us to build upon the principled understanding of trustworthy methods, extending it to these new techniques in large pretrained models, paving the way for future methods. Existing methods under this perspective are also reviewed. Lastly, we offer a brief summary of the applications of these methods and discuss potential future aspects related to our survey. For more information, please visit http://trustai.one.

Research involving privacy-sensitive data has always been constrained by data scarcity, standing in sharp contrast to other areas that have benefited from data scaling. This challenge is becoming increasingly urgent as modern AI agents--such as OpenClaw and Gemini Agent--are granted persistent access to highly sensitive personal information. To tackle this longstanding bottleneck and the rising risks, we present Privasis (i.e., privacy oasis), the first million-scale fully synthetic dataset entirely built from scratch--an expansive reservoir of texts with rich and diverse private information--designed to broaden and accelerate research in areas where processing sensitive social data is inevitable. Compared to existing datasets, Privasis, comprising 1.4 million records, offers orders-of-magnitude larger scale with quality, and far greater diversity across various document types, including medical history, legal documents, financial records, calendars, and text messages with a total of 55.1 million annotated attributes such as ethnicity, date of birth, workplace, etc. We leverage Privasis to construct a parallel corpus for text sanitization with our pipeline that decomposes texts and applies targeted sanitization. Our compact sanitization models (<=4B) trained on this dataset outperform state-of-the-art large language models, such as GPT-5 and Qwen-3 235B. We plan to release data, models, and code to accelerate future research on privacy-sensitive domains and agents.

The race to train language models on vast, diverse, and inconsistently documented datasets has raised pressing concerns about the legal and ethical risks for practitioners. To remedy these practices threatening data transparency and understanding, we convene a multi-disciplinary effort between legal and machine learning experts to systematically audit and trace 1800+ text datasets. We develop tools and standards to trace the lineage of these datasets, from their source, creators, series of license conditions, properties, and subsequent use. Our landscape analysis highlights the sharp divides in composition and focus of commercially open vs closed datasets, with closed datasets monopolizing important categories: lower resource languages, more creative tasks, richer topic variety, newer and more synthetic training data. This points to a deepening divide in the types of data that are made available under different license conditions, and heightened implications for jurisdictional legal interpretations of copyright and fair use. We also observe frequent miscategorization of licenses on widely used dataset hosting sites, with license omission of 72%+ and error rates of 50%+. This points to a crisis in misattribution and informed use of the most popular datasets driving many recent breakthroughs. As a contribution to ongoing improvements in dataset transparency and responsible use, we release our entire audit, with an interactive UI, the Data Provenance Explorer, which allows practitioners to trace and filter on data provenance for the most popular open source finetuning data collections: www.dataprovenance.org.

A great deal of effort has been devoted to reducing the risk of spurious scientific discoveries, from the use of sophisticated validation techniques, to deep statistical methods for controlling the false discovery rate in multiple hypothesis testing. However, there is a fundamental disconnect between the theoretical results and the practice of data analysis: the theory of statistical inference assumes a fixed collection of hypotheses to be tested, or learning algorithms to be applied, selected non-adaptively before the data are gathered, whereas in practice data is shared and reused with hypotheses and new analyses being generated on the basis of data exploration and the outcomes of previous analyses. In this work we initiate a principled study of how to guarantee the validity of statistical inference in adaptive data analysis. As an instance of this problem, we propose and investigate the question of estimating the expectations of m adaptively chosen functions on an unknown distribution given n random samples. We show that, surprisingly, there is a way to estimate an exponential in n number of expectations accurately even if the functions are chosen adaptively. This gives an exponential improvement over standard empirical estimators that are limited to a linear number of estimates. Our result follows from a general technique that counter-intuitively involves actively perturbing and coordinating the estimates, using techniques developed for privacy preservation. We give additional applications of this technique to our question.

We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.

Language models (LMs) are trained on vast amounts of text data, which may include private and copyrighted content. Data owners may request the removal of their data from a trained model due to privacy or copyright concerns. However, exactly unlearning only these datapoints (i.e., retraining with the data removed) is intractable in modern-day models. This has led to the development of many approximate unlearning algorithms. The evaluation of the efficacy of these algorithms has traditionally been narrow in scope, failing to precisely quantify the success and practicality of the algorithm from the perspectives of both the model deployers and the data owners. We address this issue by proposing MUSE, a comprehensive machine unlearning evaluation benchmark that enumerates six diverse desirable properties for unlearned models: (1) no verbatim memorization, (2) no knowledge memorization, (3) no privacy leakage, (4) utility preservation on data not intended for removal, (5) scalability with respect to the size of removal requests, and (6) sustainability over sequential unlearning requests. Using these criteria, we benchmark how effectively eight popular unlearning algorithms on 7B-parameter LMs can unlearn Harry Potter books and news articles. Our results demonstrate that most algorithms can prevent verbatim memorization and knowledge memorization to varying degrees, but only one algorithm does not lead to severe privacy leakage. Furthermore, existing algorithms fail to meet deployer's expectations because they often degrade general model utility and also cannot sustainably accommodate successive unlearning requests or large-scale content removal. Our findings identify key issues with the practicality of existing unlearning algorithms on language models, and we release our benchmark to facilitate further evaluations: muse-bench.github.io

Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of specific data points from a trained model to satisfy privacy, copyright, and safety requirements. In real deployments, providers distribute a global model to many edge devices, where each client personalizes the model using private data. When a deletion request is issued, clients may ignore it or falsely claim compliance, and providers cannot check their parameters or data. This makes verification difficult, especially because personalized models must forget the targeted samples while preserving local utility, and verification must remain lightweight on edge devices. We introduce ZK APEX, a zero-shot personalized unlearning method that operates directly on the personalized model without retraining. ZK APEX combines sparse masking on the provider side with a small Group OBS compensation step on the client side, using a blockwise empirical Fisher matrix to create a curvature-aware update designed for low overhead. Paired with Halo2 zero-knowledge proofs, it enables the provider to verify that the correct unlearning transformation was applied without revealing any private data or personalized parameters. On Vision Transformer classification tasks, ZK APEX recovers nearly all personalization accuracy while effectively removing the targeted information. Applied to the OPT125M generative model trained on code data, it recovers around seventy percent of the original accuracy. Proof generation for the ViT case completes in about two hours, more than ten million times faster than retraining-based checks, with less than one gigabyte of memory use and proof sizes around four hundred megabytes. These results show the first practical framework for verifiable personalized unlearning on edge devices.

Data poisoning attacks pose a significant threat to the integrity of machine learning models by leading to misclassification of target distribution data by injecting adversarial examples during training. Existing state-of-the-art (SoTA) defense methods suffer from limitations, such as significantly reduced generalization performance and significant overhead during training, making them impractical or limited for real-world applications. In response to this challenge, we introduce a universal data purification method that defends naturally trained classifiers from malicious white-, gray-, and black-box image poisons by applying a universal stochastic preprocessing step Psi_{T}(x), realized by iterative Langevin sampling of a convergent Energy Based Model (EBM) initialized with an image x. Mid-run dynamics of Psi_{T}(x) purify poison information with minimal impact on features important to the generalization of a classifier network. We show that EBMs remain universal purifiers, even in the presence of poisoned EBM training data, and achieve SoTA defense on leading triggered and triggerless poisons. This work is a subset of a larger framework introduced in \pgen with a more detailed focus on EBM purification and poison defense.

We introduce a fairness-aware dataset for job recommendation in advertising, designed to foster research in algorithmic fairness within real-world scenarios. It was collected and prepared to comply with privacy standards and business confidentiality. An additional challenge is the lack of access to protected user attributes such as gender, for which we propose a solution to obtain a proxy estimate. Despite being anonymized and including a proxy for a sensitive attribute, our dataset preserves predictive power and maintains a realistic and challenging benchmark. This dataset addresses a significant gap in the availability of fairness-focused resources for high-impact domains like advertising -- the actual impact being having access or not to precious employment opportunities, where balancing fairness and utility is a common industrial challenge. We also explore various stages in the advertising process where unfairness can occur and introduce a method to compute a fair utility metric for the job recommendations in online systems case from a biased dataset. Experimental evaluations of bias mitigation techniques on the released dataset demonstrate potential improvements in fairness and the associated trade-offs with utility.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

Pretrained Language Models (LMs) memorize a vast amount of knowledge during initial pretraining, including information that may violate the privacy of personal lives and identities. Previous work addressing privacy issues for language models has mostly focused on data preprocessing and differential privacy methods, both requiring re-training the underlying LM. We propose knowledge unlearning as an alternative method to reduce privacy risks for LMs post hoc. We show that simply performing gradient ascent on target token sequences is effective at forgetting them with little to no degradation of general language modeling performances for larger LMs; it sometimes even substantially improves the underlying LM with just a few iterations. We also find that sequential unlearning is better than trying to unlearn all the data at once and that unlearning is highly dependent on which kind of data (domain) is forgotten. By showing comparisons with a previous data preprocessing method and a decoding method known to mitigate privacy risks for LMs, we show that unlearning can give a stronger empirical privacy guarantee in scenarios where the data vulnerable to extraction attacks are known a priori while being much more efficient and robust. We release the code and dataset needed to replicate our results at https://github.com/joeljang/knowledge-unlearning.

Many individuals are concerned about the governance of machine learning systems and the prevention of algorithmic harms. The EU's recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been seen as a core tool for achieving better governance of this area. While the GDPR does apply to the use of models in some limited situations, most of its provisions relate to the governance of personal data, while models have traditionally been seen as intellectual property. We present recent work from the information security literature around `model inversion' and `membership inference' attacks, which indicate that the process of turning training data into machine learned systems is not one-way, and demonstrate how this could lead some models to be legally classified as personal data. Taking this as a probing experiment, we explore the different rights and obligations this would trigger and their utility, and posit future directions for algorithmic governance and regulation.

With local differential privacy (LDP), users can privatize their data and thus guarantee privacy properties before transmitting it to the server (a.k.a. the aggregator). One primary objective of LDP is frequency (or histogram) estimation, in which the aggregator estimates the number of users for each possible value. In practice, when a study with rich content on a population is desired, the interest is in the multiple attributes of the population, that is to say, in multidimensional data (d geq 2). However, contrary to the problem of frequency estimation of a single attribute (the majority of the works), the multidimensional aspect imposes to pay particular attention to the privacy budget. This one can indeed grow extremely quickly due to the composition theorem. To the authors' knowledge, two solutions seem to stand out for this task: 1) splitting the privacy budget for each attribute, i.e., send each value with fracε{d}-LDP (Spl), and 2) random sampling a single attribute and spend all the privacy budget to send it with ε-LDP (Smp). Although Smp adds additional sampling error, it has proven to provide higher data utility than the former Spl solution. However, we argue that aggregators (who are also seen as attackers) are aware of the sampled attribute and its LDP value, which is protected by a "less strict" e^ε probability bound (rather than e^{ε/d}). This way, we propose a solution named Random Sampling plus Fake Data (RS+FD), which allows creating uncertainty over the sampled attribute by generating fake data for each non-sampled attribute; RS+FD further benefits from amplification by sampling. We theoretically and experimentally validate our proposed solution on both synthetic and real-world datasets to show that RS+FD achieves nearly the same or better utility than the state-of-the-art Smp solution.

As industrial applications are increasingly automated by machine learning models, enforcing personal data ownership and intellectual property rights requires tracing training data back to their rightful owners. Membership inference algorithms approach this problem by using statistical techniques to discern whether a target sample was included in a model's training set. However, existing methods only utilize the unaltered target sample or simple augmentations of the target to compute statistics. Such a sparse sampling of the model's behavior carries little information, leading to poor inference capabilities. In this work, we use adversarial tools to directly optimize for queries that are discriminative and diverse. Our improvements achieve significantly more accurate membership inference than existing methods, especially in offline scenarios and in the low false-positive regime which is critical in legal settings. Code is available at https://github.com/YuxinWenRick/canary-in-a-coalmine.