Daily Papers

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

Visual reasoning abilities play a crucial role in understanding complex multimodal data, advancing both domain-specific applications and artificial general intelligence (AGI). Existing methods improve VLM reasoning via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) supervised fine-tuning, using meticulously annotated training data to enhance visual reasoning capabilities. However, this training paradigm may lead to overfitting and cognitive rigidity, restricting the model's ability to transfer visual reasoning skills across domains and limiting its real-world applicability. To address these limitations, we propose Reason-RFT, a novel reinforcement fine-tuning framework that significantly enhances generalization capabilities in visual reasoning tasks. Reason-RFT introduces a two-phase training framework for visual reasoning: (1) Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) with curated Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data activates the reasoning potential of Vision-Language Models (VLMs), followed by (2) Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)-based reinforcement learning that generates multiple reasoning-response pairs, significantly enhancing generalization in visual reasoning tasks. To evaluate Reason-RFT's visual reasoning capabilities, we reconstructed a comprehensive dataset spanning visual counting, structure perception, and spatial transformation. Experimental results demonstrate Reasoning-RFT's three key advantages: (1) Performance Enhancement: achieving state-of-the-art results across multiple tasks, outperforming most mainstream open-source and proprietary models; (2) Generalization Superiority: consistently maintaining robust performance across diverse tasks and domains, outperforming alternative training paradigms; (3) Data Efficiency: excelling in few-shot learning scenarios while surpassing full-dataset SFT baselines. Project website: https://tanhuajie.github.io/ReasonRFT

This paper introduces KunLunBaizeRAG, a reinforcement learning-driven reasoning framework designed to enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in complex multi-hop question-answering tasks. The framework addresses key limitations of traditional RAG, such as retrieval drift, information redundancy, and strategy rigidity. Key innovations include the RAG-driven Reasoning Alignment (RDRA) mechanism, the Search-Think Iterative Enhancement (STIE) mechanism, the Network-Local Intelligent Routing (NLR) mechanism, and a progressive hybrid training strategy. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements in exact match (EM) and LLM-judged score (LJ) across four benchmarks, highlighting the framework's robustness and effectiveness in complex reasoning scenarios.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Recent work has demonstrated that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) often yields limited gains for soft-reasoning problems such as analytical and commonsense reasoning. CoT can also be unfaithful to a model's actual reasoning. We investigate the dynamics and faithfulness of CoT in soft-reasoning tasks across instruction-tuned, reasoning and reasoning-distilled models. Our findings reveal differences in how these models rely on CoT, and show that CoT influence and faithfulness are not always aligned.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, while powerful, can produce unnecessarily verbose output for simpler problems. We present a framework for difficulty-aware reasoning that teaches models to dynamically adjust reasoning depth based on problem complexity. Remarkably, we show that models can be endowed with such dynamic inference pathways without any architectural modifications; we simply post-train on data that is carefully curated to include chain-of-thought traces that are proportional in length to problem difficulty. Our analysis reveals that post-training via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) primarily captures patterns like reasoning length and format, while direct preference optimization (DPO) preserves reasoning accuracy, with their combination reducing length and maintaining or improving performance. Both quantitative metrics and qualitative assessments confirm that models can learn to "think proportionally", reasoning minimally on simple problems while maintaining depth for complex ones.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process that enables logical inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), reasoning has emerged as a key capability that distinguishes advanced AI systems from conventional models that empower chatbots. In this survey, we categorize existing methods along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) Regimes, which define the stage at which reasoning is achieved (either at inference time or through dedicated training); and (2) Architectures, which determine the components involved in the reasoning process, distinguishing between standalone LLMs and agentic compound systems that incorporate external tools, and multi-agent collaborations. Within each dimension, we analyze two key perspectives: (1) Input level, which focuses on techniques that construct high-quality prompts that the LLM condition on; and (2) Output level, which methods that refine multiple sampled candidates to enhance reasoning quality. This categorization provides a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape of LLM reasoning, highlighting emerging trends such as the shift from inference-scaling to learning-to-reason (e.g., DeepSeek-R1), and the transition to agentic workflows (e.g., OpenAI Deep Research, Manus Agent). Additionally, we cover a broad spectrum of learning algorithms, from supervised fine-tuning to reinforcement learning such as PPO and GRPO, and the training of reasoners and verifiers. We also examine key designs of agentic workflows, from established patterns like generator-evaluator and LLM debate to recent innovations. ...

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

We introduce S1-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate Large Reasoning Models' (LRMs) performance on simple tasks that favor intuitive system 1 thinking rather than deliberative system 2 reasoning. While LRMs have achieved significant breakthroughs in complex reasoning tasks through explicit chains of thought, their reliance on deep analytical thinking may limit their system 1 thinking capabilities. Moreover, a lack of benchmark currently exists to evaluate LRMs' performance in tasks that require such capabilities. To fill this gap, S1-Bench presents a set of simple, diverse, and naturally clear questions across multiple domains and languages, specifically designed to assess LRMs' performance in such tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation of 22 LRMs reveals significant lower efficiency tendencies, with outputs averaging 15.5 times longer than those of traditional small LLMs. Additionally, LRMs often identify correct answers early but continue unnecessary deliberation, with some models even producing numerous errors. These findings highlight the rigid reasoning patterns of current LRMs and underscore the substantial development needed to achieve balanced dual-system thinking capabilities that can adapt appropriately to task complexity.

Recent advances such as OpenAI-o1 and DeepSeek R1 have demonstrated the potential of Reinforcement Learning (RL) to enhance reasoning abilities in Large Language Models (LLMs). While open-source replication efforts have primarily focused on mathematical and coding domains, methods and resources for developing general reasoning capabilities remain underexplored. This gap is partly due to the challenge of collecting diverse and verifiable reasoning data suitable for RL. We hypothesize that logical reasoning is critical for developing general reasoning capabilities, as logic forms a fundamental building block of reasoning. In this work, we present SynLogic, a data synthesis framework and dataset that generates diverse logical reasoning data at scale, encompassing 35 diverse logical reasoning tasks. The SynLogic approach enables controlled synthesis of data with adjustable difficulty and quantity. Importantly, all examples can be verified by simple rules, making them ideally suited for RL with verifiable rewards. In our experiments, we validate the effectiveness of RL training on the SynLogic dataset based on 7B and 32B models. SynLogic leads to state-of-the-art logical reasoning performance among open-source datasets, surpassing DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B by 6 points on BBEH. Furthermore, mixing SynLogic data with mathematical and coding tasks improves the training efficiency of these domains and significantly enhances reasoning generalization. Notably, our mixed training model outperforms DeepSeek-R1-Zero-Qwen-32B across multiple benchmarks. These findings position SynLogic as a valuable resource for advancing the broader reasoning capabilities of LLMs. We open-source both the data synthesis pipeline and the SynLogic dataset at https://github.com/MiniMax-AI/SynLogic.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

With the emergence of advanced reasoning models like OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, their ability to perform rigorous logical reasoning remains an open question. This survey synthesizes recent advancements in logical reasoning within LLMs, a critical area of AI research. It outlines the scope of logical reasoning in LLMs, its theoretical foundations, and the benchmarks used to evaluate reasoning proficiency. We analyze existing capabilities across different reasoning paradigms - deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical - and assess strategies to enhance reasoning performance, including data-centric tuning, reinforcement learning, decoding strategies, and neuro-symbolic approaches. The review concludes with future directions, emphasizing the need for further exploration to strengthen logical reasoning in AI systems.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 2%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to suppress the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.1% of the model's parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+5.44%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+2.43%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/ThinkEdit

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a promising paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a critical paradox clouds its efficacy: RLVR-tuned models often underperform their base models on the Pass@K metric for solution-finding, leading to the hypothesis that RLVR merely re-weights existing reasoning paths at the cost of reasoning diversity. In this work, we resolve this contradiction by identifying the source of the problem: the Pass@K metric itself is a flawed measure of reasoning, as it credits correct final answers that probably arise from inaccurate or incomplete chains of thought (CoTs). To address this, we introduce a more precise evaluation metric, CoT-Pass@K, which mandates that both the reasoning path and the final answer be correct. We provide a new theoretical foundation that formalizes how RLVR, unlike traditional RL, is uniquely structured to incentivize logical integrity. Our empirical results are supportive: using CoT-Pass@K, we observe that RLVR can incentivize the generalization of correct reasoning for all values of K. Furthermore, by analyzing the training dynamics, we find that this enhanced reasoning capability emerges early in the training process and smoothly generalizes. Our work provides a clear perspective on the role of RLVR, offers a more reliable method for its evaluation, and confirms its potential to genuinely advance machine reasoning.

While large language models demonstrate impressive performance on static benchmarks, the true potential of large language models as self-learning and reasoning agents in dynamic environments remains unclear. This study systematically evaluates the efficacy of self-reflection, heuristic mutation, and planning as prompting techniques to test the adaptive capabilities of agents. We conduct experiments with various open-source language models in dynamic environments and find that larger models generally outperform smaller ones, but that strategic prompting can close this performance gap. Second, a too-long prompt can negatively impact smaller models on basic reactive tasks, while larger models show more robust behaviour. Third, advanced prompting techniques primarily benefit smaller models on complex games, but offer less improvement for already high-performing large language models. Yet, we find that advanced reasoning methods yield highly variable outcomes: while capable of significantly improving performance when reasoning and decision-making align, they also introduce instability and can lead to big performance drops. Compared to human performance, our findings reveal little evidence of true emergent reasoning. Instead, large language model performance exhibits persistent limitations in crucial areas such as planning, reasoning, and spatial coordination, suggesting that current-generation large language models still suffer fundamental shortcomings that may not be fully overcome through self-reflective prompting alone. Reasoning is a multi-faceted task, and while reasoning methods like Chain of thought improves multi-step reasoning on math word problems, our findings using dynamic benchmarks highlight important shortcomings in general reasoning capabilities, indicating a need to move beyond static benchmarks to capture the complexity of reasoning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs) but often leads to verbose and redundant outputs, thus increasing inference cost. We hypothesize that many reasoning steps are unnecessary for producing correct answers. To investigate this, we start with a systematic study to examine what is the minimum reasoning required for a model to reach a stable decision. We find that on math reasoning tasks like math, models typically converge to their final answers after 60\% of the reasoning steps, suggesting substantial redundancy in the remaining content. Based on these insights, we propose three inference-time strategies to improve efficiency: (1) early stopping via answer consistency, (2) boosting the probability of generating end-of-reasoning signals, and (3) a supervised method that learns when to stop based on internal activations. Experiments across five benchmarks and five open-weights LLMs show that our methods significantly reduce token usage with little or no accuracy drop. In particular, on NaturalQuestions, Answer Consistency reduces tokens by over 40\% while further improving accuracy. Our work underscores the importance of cost-effective reasoning methods that operate at inference time, offering practical benefits for real-world applications.

Reasoning has become a central paradigm for large language models (LLMs), consistently boosting accuracy across diverse benchmarks. Yet its suitability for precision-sensitive tasks remains unclear. We present the first systematic study of reasoning for classification tasks under strict low false positive rate (FPR) regimes. Our analysis covers two tasks--safety detection and hallucination detection--evaluated in both fine-tuned and zero-shot settings, using standard LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Our results reveal a clear trade-off: Think On (reasoning-augmented) generation improves overall accuracy, but underperforms at the low-FPR thresholds essential for practical use. In contrast, Think Off (no reasoning during inference) dominates in these precision-sensitive regimes, with Think On surpassing only when higher FPRs are acceptable. In addition, we find token-based scoring substantially outperforms self-verbalized confidence for precision-sensitive deployments. Finally, a simple ensemble of the two modes recovers the strengths of each. Taken together, our findings position reasoning as a double-edged tool: beneficial for average accuracy, but often ill-suited for applications requiring strict precision.

Reasoning models have demonstrated remarkable progress in solving complex and logic-intensive tasks by generating extended Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs) prior to arriving at a final answer. Yet, the emergence of this "slow-thinking" paradigm, with numerous tokens generated in sequence, inevitably introduces substantial computational overhead. To this end, it highlights an urgent need for effective acceleration. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in efficient reasoning. It categorizes existing works into three key directions: (1) shorter - compressing lengthy CoTs into concise yet effective reasoning chains; (2) smaller - developing compact language models with strong reasoning capabilities through techniques such as knowledge distillation, other model compression techniques, and reinforcement learning; and (3) faster - designing efficient decoding strategies to accelerate inference. A curated collection of papers discussed in this survey is available in our GitHub repository.

Recent advances in long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning have largely prioritized answer accuracy and token efficiency, while overlooking aspects critical to trustworthiness. We argue that usable reasoning systems must be trustworthy, characterized by three properties: interpretability, faithfulness, and reliability. To this end, we propose ReFIne, a new training framework that integrates supervised fine-tuning with GRPO to encourage models to: (i) improve interpretability by producing structured, tag-based traces with high-level planning that are easier for humans to follow; (ii) enhance faithfulness by explicitly disclosing the decisive information guiding each solution, with consistent cross-section references; and (iii) promote reliability by providing self-assessments of both the derivation's soundness and the confidence of the final answer. We apply ReFIne to the Qwen3 models at multiple scales (1.7B/4B/8B) and evaluate across mathematical benchmarks of varying difficulty. Our experimental results show that ReFIne models generate clearer and better-structured reasoning traces (interpretability +44.0%), more faithfully expose their underlying decision process (faithfulness +18.8%), and offer informative confidence estimates (reliability +42.4%). These findings highlight an overlooked but important direction: reasoning models should be optimized not only for accuracy, but also for broader dimensions of trustworthiness. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Training_Trustworthy_LRM_with_Refine

In this work, we use large language models (LLMs) to augment and accelerate research on the P versus NP problem, one of the most important open problems in theoretical computer science and mathematics. Specifically, we propose Socratic reasoning, a general framework that promotes in-depth thinking with LLMs for complex problem-solving. Socratic reasoning encourages LLMs to recursively discover, solve, and integrate problems while facilitating self-evaluation and refinement. Our pilot study on the P vs. NP problem shows that GPT-4 successfully produces a proof schema and engages in rigorous reasoning throughout 97 dialogue turns, concluding "P neq NP", which is in alignment with (Xu and Zhou, 2023). The investigation uncovers novel insights within the extensive solution space of LLMs, shedding light on LLM for Science.

Reasoning, a crucial ability for complex problem-solving, plays a pivotal role in various real-world settings such as negotiation, medical diagnosis, and criminal investigation. It serves as a fundamental methodology in the field of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). With the ongoing development of foundation models, e.g., Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a growing interest in exploring their abilities in reasoning tasks. In this paper, we introduce seminal foundation models proposed or adaptable for reasoning, highlighting the latest advancements in various reasoning tasks, methods, and benchmarks. We then delve into the potential future directions behind the emergence of reasoning abilities within foundation models. We also discuss the relevance of multimodal learning, autonomous agents, and super alignment in the context of reasoning. By discussing these future research directions, we hope to inspire researchers in their exploration of this field, stimulate further advancements in reasoning with foundation models, and contribute to the development of AGI.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

We study how large language models (LLMs) ``think'' through their representation space. We propose a novel geometric framework that models an LLM's reasoning as flows -- embedding trajectories evolving where logic goes. We disentangle logical structure from semantics by employing the same natural deduction propositions with varied semantic carriers, allowing us to test whether LLMs internalize logic beyond surface form. This perspective connects reasoning with geometric quantities such as position, velocity, and curvature, enabling formal analysis in representation and concept spaces. Our theory establishes: (1) LLM reasoning corresponds to smooth flows in representation space, and (2) logical statements act as local controllers of these flows' velocities. Using learned representation proxies, we design controlled experiments to visualize and quantify reasoning flows, providing empirical validation of our theoretical framework. Our work serves as both a conceptual foundation and practical tools for studying reasoning phenomenon, offering a new lens for interpretability and formal analysis of LLMs' behavior.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (RLLMs), whether explicitly trained for reasoning or prompted via chain-of-thought (CoT), have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many complex reasoning tasks. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: explicit CoT reasoning can significantly degrade instruction-following accuracy. Evaluating 15 models on two benchmarks: IFEval (with simple, rule-verifiable constraints) and ComplexBench (with complex, compositional constraints), we consistently observe performance drops when CoT prompting is applied. Through large-scale case studies and an attention-based analysis, we identify common patterns where reasoning either helps (e.g., with formatting or lexical precision) or hurts (e.g., by neglecting simple constraints or introducing unnecessary content). We propose a metric, constraint attention, to quantify model focus during generation and show that CoT reasoning often diverts attention away from instruction-relevant tokens. To mitigate these effects, we introduce and evaluate four strategies: in-context learning, self-reflection, self-selective reasoning, and classifier-selective reasoning. Our results demonstrate that selective reasoning strategies, particularly classifier-selective reasoning, can substantially recover lost performance. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically expose reasoning-induced failures in instruction-following and offer practical mitigation strategies.

Achieving human-level intelligence requires refining the transition from the fast, intuitive System 1 to the slower, more deliberate System 2 reasoning. While System 1 excels in quick, heuristic decisions, System 2 relies on logical reasoning for more accurate judgments and reduced biases. Foundational Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at fast decision-making but lack the depth for complex reasoning, as they have not yet fully embraced the step-by-step analysis characteristic of true System 2 thinking. Recently, reasoning LLMs like OpenAI's o1/o3 and DeepSeek's R1 have demonstrated expert-level performance in fields such as mathematics and coding, closely mimicking the deliberate reasoning of System 2 and showcasing human-like cognitive abilities. This survey begins with a brief overview of the progress in foundational LLMs and the early development of System 2 technologies, exploring how their combination has paved the way for reasoning LLMs. Next, we discuss how to construct reasoning LLMs, analyzing their features, the core methods enabling advanced reasoning, and the evolution of various reasoning LLMs. Additionally, we provide an overview of reasoning benchmarks, offering an in-depth comparison of the performance of representative reasoning LLMs. Finally, we explore promising directions for advancing reasoning LLMs and maintain a real-time https://github.com/zzli2022/Awesome-Slow-Reason-System{GitHub Repository} to track the latest developments. We hope this survey will serve as a valuable resource to inspire innovation and drive progress in this rapidly evolving field.

Logical reasoning is central to complex human activities, such as thinking, debating, and planning; it is also a central component of many AI systems as well. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which encoder-only transformer language models (LMs) can reason according to logical rules. We ask whether those LMs can deduce theorems in propositional calculus and first-order logic; if their relative success in these problems reflects general logical capabilities; and which layers contribute the most to the task. First, we show for several encoder-only LMs that they can be trained, to a reasonable degree, to determine logical validity on various datasets. Next, by cross-probing fine-tuned models on these datasets, we show that LMs have difficulty in transferring their putative logical reasoning ability, which suggests that they may have learned dataset-specific features, instead of a general capability. Finally, we conduct a layerwise probing experiment, which shows that the hypothesis classification task is mostly solved through higher layers.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

This work revisits the dominant supervised fine-tuning (SFT) then reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm for training Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), and reveals a key finding: SFT can significantly undermine subsequent RL by inducing ``pseudo reasoning paths'' imitated from expert models. While these paths may resemble the native reasoning paths of RL models, they often involve prolonged, hesitant, less informative steps, and incorrect reasoning. To systematically study this effect, we introduce VLAA-Thinking, a new multimodal dataset designed to support reasoning in LVLMs. Constructed via a six-step pipeline involving captioning, reasoning distillation, answer rewrite and verification, VLAA-Thinking comprises high-quality, step-by-step visual reasoning traces for SFT, along with a more challenging RL split from the same data source. Using this dataset, we conduct extensive experiments comparing SFT, RL and their combinations. Results show that while SFT helps models learn reasoning formats, it often locks aligned models into imitative, rigid reasoning modes that impede further learning. In contrast, building on the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a novel mixed reward module integrating both perception and cognition signals, our RL approach fosters more genuine, adaptive reasoning behavior. Notably, our model VLAA-Thinker, based on Qwen2.5VL 3B, achieves top-1 performance on Open LMM Reasoning Leaderboard (https://huggingface.co/spaces/opencompass/Open_LMM_Reasoning_Leaderboard) among 4B scale LVLMs, surpassing the previous state-of-the-art by 1.8%. We hope our findings provide valuable insights in developing reasoning-capable LVLMs and can inform future research in this area.

We present a fundamental discovery that challenges our understanding of how complex reasoning emerges in large language models. While conventional wisdom suggests that sophisticated reasoning tasks demand extensive training data (>100,000 examples), we demonstrate that complex mathematical reasoning abilities can be effectively elicited with surprisingly few examples. Through comprehensive experiments, our proposed model LIMO demonstrates unprecedented performance in mathematical reasoning. With merely 817 curated training samples, LIMO achieves 57.1% accuracy on AIME and 94.8% on MATH, improving from previous SFT-based models' 6.5% and 59.2% respectively, while only using 1% of the training data required by previous approaches. LIMO demonstrates exceptional out-of-distribution generalization, achieving 40.5% absolute improvement across 10 diverse benchmarks, outperforming models trained on 100x more data, challenging the notion that SFT leads to memorization rather than generalization. Based on these results, we propose the Less-Is-More Reasoning Hypothesis (LIMO Hypothesis): In foundation models where domain knowledge has been comprehensively encoded during pre-training, sophisticated reasoning capabilities can emerge through minimal but precisely orchestrated demonstrations of cognitive processes. This hypothesis posits that the elicitation threshold for complex reasoning is determined by two key factors: (1) the completeness of the model's encoded knowledge foundation during pre-training, and (2) the effectiveness of post-training examples as "cognitive templates" that show the model how to utilize its knowledge base to solve complex reasoning tasks. To facilitate reproducibility and future research in data-efficient reasoning, we release LIMO as a comprehensive open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/LIMO.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

The recent rise of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) has significantly improved multi-step reasoning performance, but often at the cost of generating excessively long reasoning chains. This paper revisits the efficiency of such reasoning processes through an information-theoretic lens, revealing a fundamental trade-off between reasoning length and semantic efficiency. We propose two metrics, InfoBias and InfoGain, to quantify divergence from ideal reasoning paths and stepwise information contribution, respectively. Empirical analyses show that longer reasoning chains tend to exhibit higher information bias and diminishing information gain, especially for incorrect answers. Motivated by these findings, we introduce an entropy-based Adaptive Think strategy that dynamically halts reasoning once confidence is sufficiently high, improving efficiency while maintaining competitive accuracy. Compared to the Vanilla Think approach (default mode), our strategy yields a 1.10% improvement in average accuracy and a 50.80% reduction in token usage on QwQ-32B across six benchmark tasks spanning diverse reasoning types and difficulty levels, demonstrating superior efficiency and reasoning performance. These results underscore the promise of entropy-based methods for enhancing both accuracy and cost-effiiciency in large language model deployment.

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow user instructions is central to their reliability, safety, and usefulness. While prior studies assess instruction adherence in the model's main responses, we argue that it is also critical for large reasoning models (LRMs) to follow user instructions throughout their reasoning process. Reasoning instruction following makes LRMs more controllable and transparent, while reducing risks of undesirable shortcuts, hallucinations, or reward hacking within reasoning traces. To evaluate this dimension, we introduce ReasonIF, a systematic benchmark for assessing reasoning instruction following. ReasonIF includes six categories of instruction prompts, spanning multilingual reasoning, formatting and length control. Across many open-source LRMs including GPT-OSS, Qwen3, and DeepSeek-R1, we find substantial failures in reasoning instruction adherence: the highest instruction following score (IFS) remains below 0.25, meaning that fewer than 25% of reasoning traces comply with the given instructions. Notably, as task difficulty increases, reasoning instruction following degrades further. We also explore two strategies to enhance reasoning instruction fidelity. (1) multi-turn reasoning and (2) Reasoning Instruction Finetuning (RIF) using synthetic data. RIF improves the IFS of GPT-OSS-20B from 0.11 to 0.27, indicating measurable progress but leaving ample room for improvement.

Mechanical reasoning is a hallmark of human intelligence, defined by its ubiquitous yet irreplaceable role in human activities ranging from routine tasks to civil engineering. Embedding machines with mechanical reasoning is therefore an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, we leveraged 155 cognitive experiments to test the understanding of system stability, gears and pulley systems, leverage principle, inertia and motion, and fluid mechanics in 26 Vision Language Models (VLMs). Results indicate that VLMs consistently perform worse than humans on all domains, while demonstrate significant difficulty in reasoning about gear systems and fluid mechanics. Notably, their performance on these tasks do not improve as number of parameters increase, suggesting that current attention-based architecture may fail to grasp certain underlying mechanisms required for mechanical reasoning, particularly those pertaining to mental simulations.

Reasoning, as an essential ability for complex problem-solving, can provide back-end support for various real-world applications, such as medical diagnosis, negotiation, etc. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research on reasoning with language model prompting. We introduce research works with comparisons and summaries and provide systematic resources to help beginners. We also discuss the potential reasons for emerging such reasoning abilities and highlight future research directions. Resources are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/Prompt4ReasoningPapers (updated periodically).

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Reasoning lies at the heart of intelligence, shaping the ability to make decisions, draw conclusions, and generalize across domains. In artificial intelligence, as systems increasingly operate in open, uncertain, and multimodal environments, reasoning becomes essential for enabling robust and adaptive behavior. Large Multimodal Reasoning Models (LMRMs) have emerged as a promising paradigm, integrating modalities such as text, images, audio, and video to support complex reasoning capabilities and aiming to achieve comprehensive perception, precise understanding, and deep reasoning. As research advances, multimodal reasoning has rapidly evolved from modular, perception-driven pipelines to unified, language-centric frameworks that offer more coherent cross-modal understanding. While instruction tuning and reinforcement learning have improved model reasoning, significant challenges remain in omni-modal generalization, reasoning depth, and agentic behavior. To address these issues, we present a comprehensive and structured survey of multimodal reasoning research, organized around a four-stage developmental roadmap that reflects the field's shifting design philosophies and emerging capabilities. First, we review early efforts based on task-specific modules, where reasoning was implicitly embedded across stages of representation, alignment, and fusion. Next, we examine recent approaches that unify reasoning into multimodal LLMs, with advances such as Multimodal Chain-of-Thought (MCoT) and multimodal reinforcement learning enabling richer and more structured reasoning chains. Finally, drawing on empirical insights from challenging benchmarks and experimental cases of OpenAI O3 and O4-mini, we discuss the conceptual direction of native large multimodal reasoning models (N-LMRMs), which aim to support scalable, agentic, and adaptive reasoning and planning in complex, real-world environments.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Reasoning models such as OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1 have demonstrated strong performance on reasoning-intensive tasks through extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. While longer reasoning traces can facilitate a more thorough exploration of solution paths for complex problems, researchers have observed that these models often "overthink", leading to inefficient inference. In this paper, we introduce ShorterBetter, a simple yet effective reinforcement learning methed that enables reasoning language models to discover their own optimal CoT lengths without human intervention. By sampling multiple outputs per problem and defining the Sample Optimal Length (SOL) as the shortest correct response among all the outputs, our method dynamically guides the model toward optimal inference lengths. Applied to the DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-1.5B model, ShorterBetter achieves up to an 80% reduction in output length on both in-domain and out-of-domain reasoning tasks while maintaining accuracy. Our analysis shows that overly long reasoning traces often reflect loss of reasoning direction, and thus suggests that the extended CoT produced by reasoning models is highly compressible.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are highly proficient in language-based tasks. Their language capabilities have positioned them at the forefront of the future AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) race. However, on closer inspection, Valmeekam et al. (2024); Zecevic et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2024) highlight a significant gap between their language proficiency and reasoning abilities. Reasoning in LLMs and Vision Language Models (VLMs) aims to bridge this gap by enabling these models to think and re-evaluate their actions and responses. Reasoning is an essential capability for complex problem-solving and a necessary step toward establishing trust in Artificial Intelligence (AI). This will make AI suitable for deployment in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, banking, law, defense, security etc. In recent times, with the advent of powerful reasoning models like OpenAI O1 and DeepSeek R1, reasoning endowment has become a critical research topic in LLMs. In this paper, we provide a detailed overview and comparison of existing reasoning techniques and present a systematic survey of reasoning-imbued language models. We also study current challenges and present our findings.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, transitioning from fast and intuitive thinking (System 1) to slow and deep reasoning (System 2). While System 2 reasoning improves task accuracy, it often incurs substantial computational costs due to its slow thinking nature and inefficient or unnecessary reasoning behaviors. In contrast, System 1 reasoning is computationally efficient but leads to suboptimal performance. Consequently, it is critical to balance the trade-off between performance (benefits) and computational costs (budgets), giving rise to the concept of reasoning economy. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive analysis of reasoning economy in both the post-training and test-time inference stages of LLMs, encompassing i) the cause of reasoning inefficiency, ii) behavior analysis of different reasoning patterns, and iii) potential solutions to achieve reasoning economy. By offering actionable insights and highlighting open challenges, we aim to shed light on strategies for improving the reasoning economy of LLMs, thereby serving as a valuable resource for advancing research in this evolving area. We also provide a public repository to continually track developments in this fast-evolving field.

Recent reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable improvements in mathematical reasoning capabilities through long Chain-of-Thought. The reasoning tokens of these models enable self-correction within reasoning chains, enhancing robustness. This motivates our exploration: how vulnerable are reasoning LLMs to subtle errors in their input reasoning chains? We introduce "Compromising Thought" (CPT), a vulnerability where models presented with reasoning tokens containing manipulated calculation results tend to ignore correct reasoning steps and adopt incorrect results instead. Through systematic evaluation across multiple reasoning LLMs, we design three increasingly explicit prompting methods to measure CPT resistance, revealing that models struggle significantly to identify and correct these manipulations. Notably, contrary to existing research suggesting structural alterations affect model performance more than content modifications, we find that local ending token manipulations have greater impact on reasoning outcomes than structural changes. Moreover, we discover a security vulnerability in DeepSeek-R1 where tampered reasoning tokens can trigger complete reasoning cessation. Our work enhances understanding of reasoning robustness and highlights security considerations for reasoning-intensive applications.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

The reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) have improved with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, allowing models to solve complex tasks in a stepwise manner. However, training CoT capabilities requires detailed reasoning data, which is often scarce. The self-taught reasoner (STaR) framework addresses this by using reinforcement learning to automatically generate reasoning steps, reducing reliance on human-labeled data. Although STaR and its variants have demonstrated empirical success, a theoretical foundation explaining these improvements is lacking. This work provides a theoretical framework for understanding the effectiveness of reinforcement learning on CoT reasoning and STaR. Our contributions are: (1) an analysis of policy improvement, showing why LLM reasoning improves iteratively with STaR; (2) conditions for convergence to an optimal reasoning policy; (3) an examination of STaR's robustness, explaining how it can improve reasoning even when incorporating occasional incorrect steps; and (4) criteria for the quality of pre-trained models necessary to initiate effective reasoning improvement. This framework aims to bridge empirical findings with theoretical insights, advancing reinforcement learning approaches for reasoning in LLMs.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become the dominant paradigm for endowing language models with advanced reasoning capabilities. Despite the substantial empirical gains demonstrated by RL-based training methods like GRPO, a granular understanding of their advantages is still lacking. To address this gap, we introduce a fine-grained analytic framework to dissect the impact of RL on reasoning. Our framework specifically investigates key elements that have been hypothesized to benefit from RL training: (1) plan-following and execution, (2) problem decomposition, and (3) improved reasoning and knowledge utilization. Using this framework, we gain insights beyond mere accuracy. For instance, providing models with explicit step-by-step plans surprisingly degrades performance on the most challenging benchmarks, yet RL-tuned models exhibit greater robustness, experiencing markedly smaller performance drops than their base counterparts. This suggests that RL may not primarily enhance the execution of external plans but rather empower models to formulate and follow internal strategies better suited to their reasoning processes. Conversely, we observe that RL enhances the model's capacity to integrate provided knowledge into its reasoning process, leading to performance improvements across diverse tasks. We also study difficulty, showing improved training by developing new ways to exploit hard problems. Our findings lay a foundation for more principled training and evaluation of reasoning models.

Time series reasoning treats time as a first-class axis and incorporates intermediate evidence directly into the answer. This survey defines the problem and organizes the literature by reasoning topology with three families: direct reasoning in one step, linear chain reasoning with explicit intermediates, and branch-structured reasoning that explores, revises, and aggregates. The topology is crossed with the main objectives of the field, including traditional time series analysis, explanation and understanding, causal inference and decision making, and time series generation, while a compact tag set spans these axes and captures decomposition and verification, ensembling, tool use, knowledge access, multimodality, agent loops, and LLM alignment regimes. Methods and systems are reviewed across domains, showing what each topology enables and where it breaks down in faithfulness or robustness, along with curated datasets, benchmarks, and resources that support study and deployment (https://github.com/blacksnail789521/Time-Series-Reasoning-Survey). Evaluation practices that keep evidence visible and temporally aligned are highlighted, and guidance is distilled on matching topology to uncertainty, grounding with observable artifacts, planning for shift and streaming, and treating cost and latency as design budgets. We emphasize that reasoning structures must balance capacity for grounding and self-correction against computational cost and reproducibility, while future progress will likely depend on benchmarks that tie reasoning quality to utility and on closed-loop testbeds that trade off cost and risk under shift-aware, streaming, and long-horizon settings. Taken together, these directions mark a shift from narrow accuracy toward reliability at scale, enabling systems that not only analyze but also understand, explain, and act on dynamic worlds with traceable evidence and credible outcomes.

While advancements in the reasoning abilities of LLMs have significantly enhanced their performance in solving mathematical problems, coding tasks, and general puzzles, their effectiveness in accurately adhering to instructions remains inconsistent, particularly with more complex directives. Our investigation identifies lazy reasoning during the thinking stage as the primary factor contributing to poor instruction adherence. To mitigate this issue, we propose a comprehensive framework designed to enable rigorous reasoning processes involving preview and self-checking, essential for satisfying strict instruction constraints. Specifically, we first generate instructions with complex constraints and apply a filtering process to obtain valid prompts, resulting in three distinct prompt datasets categorized as hard, easy, and pass. Then, we employ rejection sampling on the pass prompts to curate a small yet high-quality dataset, enabling a cold-start initialization of the model and facilitating its adaptation to effective reasoning patterns. Subsequently, we employ an entropy-preserving supervised fine-tuning (Entropy-SFT) strategy coupled with token-wise entropy-adaptive (TEA-RL) reinforcement learning guided by rule-based dense rewards. This approach encourages the model to transform its reasoning mechanism, ultimately fostering generalizable reasoning abilities that encompass preview and self-checking. Extensive experiments conducted on instruction-following benchmarks demonstrate remarkable performance improvements across various model scales. Notably, our Light-IF-32B model surpasses both larger open-source models such as DeepSeek-R1 and closed-source models like Doubao-1.6.

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly benefit from Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in performing various reasoning tasks. While CoT allows models to produce more comprehensive reasoning processes, its emphasis on intermediate reasoning steps can inadvertently introduce hallucinations and accumulated errors, thereby limiting models' ability to solve complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by how humans engage in careful and meticulous deductive logical reasoning processes to solve tasks, we seek to enable language models to perform explicit and rigorous deductive reasoning, and also ensure the trustworthiness of their reasoning process through self-verification. However, directly verifying the validity of an entire deductive reasoning process is challenging, even with advanced models like ChatGPT. In light of this, we propose to decompose a reasoning verification process into a series of step-by-step subprocesses, each only receiving their necessary context and premises. To facilitate this procedure, we propose Natural Program, a natural language-based deductive reasoning format. Our approach enables models to generate precise reasoning steps where subsequent steps are more rigorously grounded on prior steps. It also empowers language models to carry out reasoning self-verification in a step-by-step manner. By integrating this verification process into each deductive reasoning stage, we significantly enhance the rigor and trustfulness of generated reasoning steps. Along this process, we also improve the answer correctness on complex reasoning tasks. Code will be released at https://github.com/lz1oceani/verify_cot.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong generalization across a wide range of tasks. Reasoning with LLMs is central to solving multi-step problems and complex decision-making. To support efficient reasoning, recent studies have shifted attention from explicit chain-of-thought prompting toward implicit reasoning, where reasoning occurs silently via latent structures without emitting intermediate textual steps. Implicit reasoning brings advantages such as lower generation cost, faster inference, and better alignment with internal computation. Although prior surveys have discussed latent representations in the context of reasoning, a dedicated and mechanism-level examination of how reasoning unfolds internally within LLMs remains absent. This survey fills that gap by introducing a taxonomy centered on execution paradigms, shifting the focus from representational forms to computational strategies. We organize existing methods into three execution paradigms based on \textit{how and where internal computation unfolds}: latent optimization, signal-guided control, and layer-recurrent execution. We also review structural, behavioral and representation-based evidence that supports the presence of implicit reasoning in LLMs. We further provide a structured overview of the evaluation metrics and benchmarks used in existing works to assess the effectiveness and reliability of implicit reasoning. We maintain a continuously updated project at: https://github.com/digailab/awesome-llm-implicit-reasoning.

Reasoning has long been viewed as an emergent property of large language models (LLMs), appearing at or above a certain scale (sim100B parameters). However, recent studies challenge this assumption, showing that small language models (SLMs) can also achieve competitive reasoning performance. SLMs are increasingly favored for their efficiency and deployability. However, there is a lack of systematic study on the reasoning abilities of diverse SLMs, including those trained from scratch or derived from LLMs through quantization, pruning, and distillation. This raises a critical question: Can SLMs achieve reasoning abilities comparable to LLMs? In this work, we systematically survey, benchmark, and analyze 72 SLMs from six model families across 14 reasoning benchmarks. For reliable evaluation, we examine four evaluation methods and compare four LLM judges against human evaluations on 800 data points. We repeat all experiments three times to ensure a robust performance assessment. Additionally, we analyze the impact of different prompting strategies in small models. Beyond accuracy, we also evaluate model robustness under adversarial conditions and intermediate reasoning steps. Our findings challenge the assumption that scaling is the only way to achieve strong reasoning. Instead, we foresee a future where SLMs with strong reasoning capabilities can be developed through structured training or post-training compression. They can serve as efficient alternatives to LLMs for reasoning-intensive tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities given chain-of-thought prompts (examples with intermediate reasoning steps). Existing benchmarks measure reasoning ability indirectly, by evaluating accuracy on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear how these models obtain the answers and whether they rely on simple heuristics rather than the generated chain-of-thought. To enable systematic exploration of the reasoning ability of LLMs, we present a new synthetic question-answering dataset called PrOntoQA, where each example is generated from a synthetic world model represented in first-order logic. This allows us to parse the generated chain-of-thought into symbolic proofs for formal analysis. Our analysis on InstructGPT and GPT-3 shows that LLMs are quite capable of making correct individual deduction steps, and so are generally capable of reasoning, even in fictional contexts. However, they have difficulty with proof planning: When multiple valid deduction steps are available, they are not able to systematically explore the different options.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

The nature of abstract reasoning is a matter of debate. Modern artificial neural network (ANN) models, like large language models, demonstrate impressive success when tested on abstract reasoning problems. However, it has been argued that their success reflects some form of memorization of similar problems (data contamination) rather than a general-purpose abstract reasoning capability. This concern is supported by evidence of brittleness, and the requirement of extensive training. In our study, we explored whether abstract reasoning can be achieved using the toolbox of ANNs, without prior training. Specifically, we studied an ANN model in which the weights of a naive network are optimized during the solution of the problem, using the problem data itself, rather than any prior knowledge. We tested this modeling approach on visual reasoning problems and found that it performs relatively well. Crucially, this success does not rely on memorization of similar problems. We further suggest an explanation of how it works. Finally, as problem solving is performed by changing the ANN weights, we explored the connection between problem solving and the accumulation of knowledge in the ANNs.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to improve Large Language Model (LLM) performance on various tasks. With this approach, LLMs appear to produce human-like reasoning steps before providing answers (a.k.a., CoT reasoning), which often leads to the perception that they engage in deliberate inferential processes. However, some initial findings suggest that CoT reasoning may be more superficial than it appears, motivating us to explore further. In this paper, we study CoT reasoning via a data distribution lens and investigate if CoT reasoning reflects a structured inductive bias learned from in-distribution data, allowing the model to conditionally generate reasoning paths that approximate those seen during training. Thus, its effectiveness is fundamentally bounded by the degree of distribution discrepancy between the training data and the test queries. With this lens, we dissect CoT reasoning via three dimensions: task, length, and format. To investigate each dimension, we design DataAlchemy, an isolated and controlled environment to train LLMs from scratch and systematically probe them under various distribution conditions. Our results reveal that CoT reasoning is a brittle mirage that vanishes when it is pushed beyond training distributions. This work offers a deeper understanding of why and when CoT reasoning fails, emphasizing the ongoing challenge of achieving genuine and generalizable reasoning.

Traditional language model-based theorem proving assumes that by training on a sufficient amount of formal proof data, a model will learn to prove theorems. Our key observation is that a wealth of informal information that is not present in formal proofs can be useful for learning to prove theorems. For instance, humans think through steps of a proof, but this thought process is not visible in the resulting code. We present Lean-STaR, a framework for training language models to produce informal thoughts prior to each step of a proof, thereby boosting the model's theorem-proving capabilities. Lean-STaR uses retrospective ground-truth tactics to generate synthetic thoughts for training the language model. At inference time, the trained model directly generates the thoughts prior to the prediction of the tactics in each proof step. Building on the self-taught reasoner framework, we then apply expert iteration to further fine-tune the model on the correct proofs it samples and verifies using the Lean solver. Lean-STaR achieves state-of-the-art results on the miniF2F-test benchmark within the Lean theorem proving environment, significantly outperforming base models (43.4% rightarrow 46.3%, Pass@64). We also analyze the impact of the augmented thoughts on various aspects of the theorem proving process, providing insights into their effectiveness.

There is intense interest in investigating how inference time compute (ITC) (e.g. repeated sampling, refinements, etc) can improve large language model (LLM) capabilities. At the same time, recent breakthroughs in reasoning models, such as Deepseek-R1, unlock the opportunity for reinforcement learning to improve LLM reasoning skills. An in-depth understanding of how ITC interacts with reasoning across different models could provide important guidance on how to further advance the LLM frontier. This work conducts a comprehensive analysis of inference-time scaling methods for both reasoning and non-reasoning models on challenging reasoning tasks. Specifically, we focus our research on verifier-free inference time-scaling methods due to its generalizability without needing a reward model. We construct the Pareto frontier of quality and efficiency. We find that non-reasoning models, even with an extremely high inference budget, still fall substantially behind reasoning models. For reasoning models, majority voting proves to be a robust inference strategy, generally competitive or outperforming other more sophisticated ITC methods like best-of-N and sequential revisions, while the additional inference compute offers minimal improvements. We further perform in-depth analyses of the association of key response features (length and linguistic markers) with response quality, with which we can improve the existing ITC methods. We find that correct responses from reasoning models are typically shorter and have fewer hedging and thinking markers (but more discourse markers) than the incorrect responses.

The reasoning steps generated by LLMs might be incomplete, as they mimic logical leaps common in everyday communication found in their pre-training data: underlying rationales are frequently left implicit (unstated). To address this challenge, we introduce RATIONALYST, a model for process-supervision of reasoning based on pre-training on a vast collection of rationale annotations extracted from unlabeled data. We extract 79k rationales from web-scale unlabelled dataset (the Pile) and a combination of reasoning datasets with minimal human intervention. This web-scale pre-training for reasoning allows RATIONALYST to consistently generalize across diverse reasoning tasks, including mathematical, commonsense, scientific, and logical reasoning. Fine-tuned from LLaMa-3-8B, RATIONALYST improves the accuracy of reasoning by an average of 3.9% on 7 representative reasoning benchmarks. It also demonstrates superior performance compared to significantly larger verifiers like GPT-4 and similarly sized models fine-tuned on matching training sets.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities through test-time computation (TTC) techniques such as chain-of-thought prompting and tree-based reasoning. However, we argue that current reasoning LLMs (RLLMs) lack the ability to systematically explore the solution space. This paper formalizes what constitutes systematic problem solving and identifies common failure modes that reveal reasoning LLMs to be wanderers rather than systematic explorers. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, we uncover persistent issues: invalid reasoning steps, redundant explorations, hallucinated or unfaithful conclusions, and so on. Our findings suggest that current models' performance can appear to be competent on simple tasks yet degrade sharply as complexity increases. Based on the findings, we advocate for new metrics and tools that evaluate not just final outputs but the structure of the reasoning process itself.

Reasoning models enhance performance by tackling problems in a step-by-step manner, decomposing them into sub-problems and exploring long chains of thought before producing an answer. However, applying extended reasoning to every step introduces substantial redundancy, as sub-problems vary widely in difficulty and complexity: a small number of pivotal steps are genuinely challenging and decisive for the final answer, while many others only involve straightforward revisions or simple computations. Therefore, a natural idea is to endow reasoning models with the ability to adaptively respond to this variation, rather than treating all steps with the same level of elaboration. To this end, we propose MixReasoning, a framework that dynamically adjusts the depth of reasoning within a single response. The resulting chain of thought then becomes a mixture of detailed reasoning on difficult steps and concise inference on simpler ones. Experiments on GSM8K, MATH-500, and AIME show that MixReasoning shortens reasoning length and substantially improves efficiency without compromising accuracy.

Reasoning is central to human intelligence, enabling structured problem-solving across diverse tasks. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have greatly enhanced their reasoning abilities in arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic domains. However, effectively extending these capabilities into multimodal contexts-where models must integrate both visual and textual inputs-continues to be a significant challenge. Multimodal reasoning introduces complexities, such as handling conflicting information across modalities, which require models to adopt advanced interpretative strategies. Addressing these challenges involves not only sophisticated algorithms but also robust methodologies for evaluating reasoning accuracy and coherence. This paper offers a concise yet insightful overview of reasoning techniques in both textual and multimodal LLMs. Through a thorough and up-to-date comparison, we clearly formulate core reasoning challenges and opportunities, highlighting practical methods for post-training optimization and test-time inference. Our work provides valuable insights and guidance, bridging theoretical frameworks and practical implementations, and sets clear directions for future research.

As large language models (LLMs) perform more difficult tasks, it becomes harder to verify the correctness and safety of their behavior. One approach to help with this issue is to prompt LLMs to externalize their reasoning, e.g., by having them generate step-by-step reasoning as they answer a question (Chain-of-Thought; CoT). The reasoning may enable us to check the process that models use to perform tasks. However, this approach relies on the stated reasoning faithfully reflecting the model's actual reasoning, which is not always the case. To improve over the faithfulness of CoT reasoning, we have models generate reasoning by decomposing questions into subquestions. Decomposition-based methods achieve strong performance on question-answering tasks, sometimes approaching that of CoT while improving the faithfulness of the model's stated reasoning on several recently-proposed metrics. By forcing the model to answer simpler subquestions in separate contexts, we greatly increase the faithfulness of model-generated reasoning over CoT, while still achieving some of the performance gains of CoT. Our results show it is possible to improve the faithfulness of model-generated reasoning; continued improvements may lead to reasoning that enables us to verify the correctness and safety of LLM behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) have dramatically enhanced the field of language intelligence, as demonstrably evidenced by their formidable empirical performance across a spectrum of complex reasoning tasks. Additionally, theoretical proofs have illuminated their emergent reasoning capabilities, providing a compelling showcase of their advanced cognitive abilities in linguistic contexts. Critical to their remarkable efficacy in handling complex reasoning tasks, LLMs leverage the intriguing chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning techniques, obliging them to formulate intermediate steps en route to deriving an answer. The CoT reasoning approach has not only exhibited proficiency in amplifying reasoning performance but also in enhancing interpretability, controllability, and flexibility. In light of these merits, recent research endeavors have extended CoT reasoning methodologies to nurture the development of autonomous language agents, which adeptly adhere to language instructions and execute actions within varied environments. This survey paper orchestrates a thorough discourse, penetrating vital research dimensions, encompassing: (i) the foundational mechanics of CoT techniques, with a focus on elucidating the circumstances and justification behind its efficacy; (ii) the paradigm shift in CoT; and (iii) the burgeoning of language agents fortified by CoT approaches. Prospective research avenues envelop explorations into generalization, efficiency, customization, scaling, and safety. This paper caters to a wide audience, including beginners seeking comprehensive knowledge of CoT reasoning and language agents, as well as experienced researchers interested in foundational mechanics and engaging in cutting-edge discussions on these topics. A repository for the related papers is available at https://github.com/Zoeyyao27/CoT-Igniting-Agent.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Mathematical reasoning---a core ability within human intelligence---presents some unique challenges as a domain: we do not come to understand and solve mathematical problems primarily on the back of experience and evidence, but on the basis of inferring, learning, and exploiting laws, axioms, and symbol manipulation rules. In this paper, we present a new challenge for the evaluation (and eventually the design) of neural architectures and similar system, developing a task suite of mathematics problems involving sequential questions and answers in a free-form textual input/output format. The structured nature of the mathematics domain, covering arithmetic, algebra, probability and calculus, enables the construction of training and test splits designed to clearly illuminate the capabilities and failure-modes of different architectures, as well as evaluate their ability to compose and relate knowledge and learned processes. Having described the data generation process and its potential future expansions, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of models from two broad classes of the most powerful sequence-to-sequence architectures and find notable differences in their ability to resolve mathematical problems and generalize their knowledge.

Logical reasoning is central to human cognition and intelligence. Past research of logical reasoning within AI uses formal language as knowledge representation~(and symbolic reasoners). However, reasoning with formal language has proved challenging~(e.g., brittleness and knowledge-acquisition bottleneck). This paper provides a comprehensive overview on a new paradigm of logical reasoning, which uses natural language as knowledge representation~(and pretrained language models as reasoners), including philosophical definition and categorization of logical reasoning, advantages of the new paradigm, benchmarks and methods, challenges of the new paradigm, desirable tasks & methods in the future, and relation to related NLP fields. This new paradigm is promising since it not only alleviates many challenges of formal representation but also has advantages over end-to-end neural methods.

Instruction-following is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with user intent. While recent reasoning-oriented models exhibit impressive performance on complex mathematical problems, their ability to adhere to natural language instructions remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce MathIF, a dedicated benchmark for evaluating instruction-following in mathematical reasoning tasks. Our empirical analysis reveals a consistent tension between scaling up reasoning capacity and maintaining controllability, as models that reason more effectively often struggle to comply with user directives. We find that models tuned on distilled long chains-of-thought or trained with reasoning-oriented reinforcement learning often degrade in instruction adherence, especially when generation length increases. Furthermore, we show that even simple interventions can partially recover obedience, though at the cost of reasoning performance. These findings highlight a fundamental tension in current LLM training paradigms and motivate the need for more instruction-aware reasoning models. We release the code and data at https://github.com/TingchenFu/MathIF.

A key property of reasoning systems is the ability to make sharp decisions on their input data. For contemporary AI systems, a key carrier of sharp behaviour is the softmax function, with its capability to perform differentiable query-key lookups. It is a common belief that the predictive power of networks leveraging softmax arises from "circuits" which sharply perform certain kinds of computations consistently across many diverse inputs. However, for these circuits to be robust, they would need to generalise well to arbitrary valid inputs. In this paper, we dispel this myth: even for tasks as simple as finding the maximum key, any learned circuitry must disperse as the number of items grows at test time. We attribute this to a fundamental limitation of the softmax function to robustly approximate sharp functions, prove this phenomenon theoretically, and propose adaptive temperature as an ad-hoc technique for improving the sharpness of softmax at inference time.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities in tasks such as algorithmic coding and mathematical problem-solving. Recent methods have improved reasoning through expanded corpus and multistage training combining reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning. Although some methods suggest that small but targeted dataset can incentivize reasoning via only distillation, a reasoning scaling laws is still taking shape, increasing computational costs. To address this, we propose a data-efficient distillation framework (DED) that optimizes the Pareto frontier of reasoning distillation. Inspired by the on-policy learning and diverse roll-out strategies of reinforcement learning, the key idea of our approach is threefold: (1) We identify that benchmark scores alone do not determine an effective teacher model. Through comprehensive comparisons of leading reasoning LLMs, we develop a method to select an optimal teacher model. (2) While scaling distillation can enhance reasoning, it often degrades out-of-domain performance. A carefully curated, smaller corpus achieves a balanced trade-off between in-domain and out-of-domain capabilities. (3) Diverse reasoning trajectories encourage the student model to develop robust reasoning skills. We validate our method through evaluations on mathematical reasoning (AIME 2024/2025, MATH-500) and code generation (LiveCodeBench), achieving state-of-the-art results with only 0.8k carefully curated examples, bypassing the need for extensive scaling. Our systematic analysis demonstrates that DED outperforms existing methods by considering factors beyond superficial hardness, token length, or teacher model capability. This work offers a practical and efficient pathway to advanced reasoning while preserving general capabilities.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting enables large language models to solve complex reasoning problems by generating intermediate steps. However, confined by its inherent single-pass and sequential generation process, CoT heavily relies on the initial decisions, causing errors in early steps to accumulate and impact the final answers. In contrast, humans adopt recursive thinking when tackling complex reasoning problems, i.e., iteratively breaking the original problem into approachable sub-problems and aggregating their answers to resolve the original one. Inspired by the human cognitive process, we propose SOCRATIC QUESTIONING, a divide-and-conquer style algorithm that mimics the recursive thinking process. Specifically, SOCRATIC QUESTIONING leverages large language models to raise and answer sub-questions until collecting enough information to tackle the original question. Unlike CoT, SOCRATIC QUESTIONING explicitly navigates the thinking space, stimulates effective recursive thinking, and is more robust towards errors in the thinking process. Extensive experiments on several complex reasoning tasks, including MMLU, MATH, LogiQA, and visual question-answering demonstrate significant performance improvements over the state-of-the-art prompting methods, such as CoT, and Tree-of-Thought. The qualitative analysis clearly shows that the intermediate reasoning steps elicited by SOCRATIC QUESTIONING are similar to humans' recursively thinking process of complex reasoning problems.

Current multimodal benchmarks often conflate reasoning with domain-specific knowledge, making it difficult to isolate and evaluate general reasoning abilities in non-expert settings. To address this, we introduce VisualPuzzles, a benchmark that targets visual reasoning while deliberately minimizing reliance on specialized knowledge. VisualPuzzles consists of diverse questions spanning five categories: algorithmic, analogical, deductive, inductive, and spatial reasoning. One major source of our questions is manually translated logical reasoning questions from the Chinese Civil Service Examination. Experiments show that VisualPuzzles requires significantly less intensive domain-specific knowledge and more complex reasoning compared to benchmarks like MMMU, enabling us to better evaluate genuine multimodal reasoning. Evaluations show that state-of-the-art multimodal large language models consistently lag behind human performance on VisualPuzzles, and that strong performance on knowledge-intensive benchmarks does not necessarily translate to success on reasoning-focused, knowledge-light tasks. Additionally, reasoning enhancements such as scaling up inference compute (with "thinking" modes) yield inconsistent gains across models and task types, and we observe no clear correlation between model size and performance. We also found that models exhibit different reasoning and answering patterns on VisualPuzzles compared to benchmarks with heavier emphasis on knowledge. VisualPuzzles offers a clearer lens through which to evaluate reasoning capabilities beyond factual recall and domain knowledge.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Deductive reasoning is a crucial logical capability that assists us in solving complex problems based on existing knowledge. Although augmented by Chain-of-Thought prompts, Large Language Models (LLMs) might not follow the correct reasoning paths. Enhancing the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs, and leveraging their extensive built-in knowledge for various reasoning tasks, remains an open question. Attempting to mimic the human deductive reasoning paradigm, we propose a multi-stage Syllogistic-Reasoning Framework of Thought (SR-FoT) that enables LLMs to perform syllogistic deductive reasoning to handle complex knowledge-based reasoning tasks. Our SR-FoT begins by interpreting the question and then uses the interpretation and the original question to propose a suitable major premise. It proceeds by generating and answering minor premise questions in two stages to match the minor premises. Finally, it guides LLMs to use the previously generated major and minor premises to perform syllogistic deductive reasoning to derive the answer to the original question. Extensive and thorough experiments on knowledge-based reasoning tasks have demonstrated the effectiveness and advantages of our SR-FoT.

Reasoning requires going beyond pattern matching or memorization of solutions to identify and implement "algorithmic procedures" that can be used to deduce answers to hard problems. Doing so requires realizing the most relevant primitives, intermediate results, or shared procedures, and building upon them. While RL post-training on long chains of thought ultimately aims to uncover this kind of algorithmic behavior, most reasoning traces learned by large models fail to consistently capture or reuse procedures, instead drifting into verbose and degenerate exploration. To address more effective reasoning, we introduce reasoning abstractions: concise natural language descriptions of procedural and factual knowledge that guide the model toward learning successful reasoning. We train models to be capable of proposing multiple abstractions given a problem, followed by RL that incentivizes building a solution while using the information provided by these abstractions. This results in a two-player RL training paradigm, abbreviated as RLAD, that jointly trains an abstraction generator and a solution generator. This setup effectively enables structured exploration, decouples learning signals of abstraction proposal and solution generation, and improves generalization to harder problems. We also show that allocating more test-time compute to generating abstractions is more beneficial for performance than generating more solutions at large test budgets, illustrating the role of abstractions in guiding meaningful exploration.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting enhances the reasoning of large language models (LLMs) by decomposing problems into sequential steps, mimicking human logic and reducing errors. However, complex tasks with vast solution spaces and vague constraints often exceed the capacity of a single reasoning chain. Inspired by Minimal Free Resolution (MFR) in commutative algebra and algebraic geometry, we propose Syzygy of Thoughts (SoT)-a novel framework that extends CoT by introducing auxiliary, interrelated reasoning paths. SoT captures deeper logical dependencies, enabling more robust and structured problem-solving. MFR decomposes a module into a sequence of free modules with minimal rank, providing a structured analytical approach to complex systems. This method introduces the concepts of "Module", "Betti numbers","Freeness", "Mapping", "Exactness" and "Minimality", enabling the systematic decomposition of the original complex problem into logically complete minimal subproblems while preserving key problem features and reducing reasoning length. We tested SoT across diverse datasets (e.g., GSM8K, MATH) and models (e.g., GPT-4o-mini, Qwen2.5), achieving inference accuracy that matches or surpasses mainstream CoTs standards. Additionally, by aligning the sampling process with algebraic constraints, our approach enhances the scalability of inference time in LLMs, ensuring both transparent reasoning and high performance. Our code will be publicly available at https://github.com/dlMARiA/Syzygy-of-thoughts.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable progress on complex tasks by generating extended chains of thought (CoT). However, their uncontrolled output lengths pose significant challenges for real-world deployment, where inference-time budgets on tokens, latency, or compute are strictly constrained. We propose Elastic Reasoning, a novel framework for scalable chain of thoughts that explicitly separates reasoning into two phases--thinking and solution--with independently allocated budgets. At test time, Elastic Reasoning prioritize that completeness of solution segments, significantly improving reliability under tight resource constraints. To train models that are robust to truncated thinking, we introduce a lightweight budget-constrained rollout strategy, integrated into GRPO, which teaches the model to reason adaptively when the thinking process is cut short and generalizes effectively to unseen budget constraints without additional training. Empirical results on mathematical (AIME, MATH500) and programming (LiveCodeBench, Codeforces) benchmarks demonstrate that Elastic Reasoning performs robustly under strict budget constraints, while incurring significantly lower training cost than baseline methods. Remarkably, our approach also produces more concise and efficient reasoning even in unconstrained settings. Elastic Reasoning offers a principled and practical solution to the pressing challenge of controllable reasoning at scale.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

Mathematical reasoning has long represented one of the most fundamental and challenging frontiers in artificial intelligence research. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in this area. This survey examines the development of mathematical reasoning abilities in LLMs through two high-level cognitive phases: comprehension, where models gain mathematical understanding via diverse pretraining strategies, and answer generation, which has progressed from direct prediction to step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. We review methods for enhancing mathematical reasoning, ranging from training-free prompting to fine-tuning approaches such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, and discuss recent work on extended CoT and "test-time scaling". Despite notable progress, fundamental challenges remain in terms of capacity, efficiency, and generalization. To address these issues, we highlight promising research directions, including advanced pretraining and knowledge augmentation techniques, formal reasoning frameworks, and meta-generalization through principled learning paradigms. This survey tries to provide some insights for researchers interested in enhancing reasoning capabilities of LLMs and for those seeking to apply these techniques to other domains.

This study investigates the reasoning robustness of large language models (LLMs) on mathematical problem-solving tasks under systematically introduced input perturbations. Using the GSM8K dataset as a controlled testbed, we evaluate how well state-of-the-art models maintain logical consistency and correctness when confronted with four categories of prompt perturbations: irrelevant context, pathological instructions, factually relevant but non-essential context, and a combination of the latter two. Our experiments, conducted on thirteen open-source and closed-source LLMs, reveal that introducing irrelevant context within the model's context window significantly degrades performance, suggesting that distinguishing essential from extraneous details remains a pressing challenge. Surprisingly, performance regressions are relatively insensitive to the complexity of the reasoning task, as measured by the number of steps required, and are not strictly correlated with model size. Moreover, we observe that certain perturbations inadvertently trigger chain-of-thought-like reasoning behaviors, even without explicit prompting. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in current LLMs and underscore the need for improved robustness against noisy, misleading, and contextually dense inputs, paving the way for more resilient and reliable reasoning in real-world applications.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

LLMs can perform multi-step reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT), but they cannot reliably verify their own logic. Even when they reach correct answers, the underlying reasoning may be flawed, undermining trust in high-stakes scenarios. To mitigate this issue, we introduce VeriCoT, a neuro-symbolic method that extracts and verifies formal logical arguments from CoT reasoning. VeriCoT formalizes each CoT reasoning step into first-order logic and identifies premises that ground the argument in source context, commonsense knowledge, or prior reasoning steps. The symbolic representation enables automated solvers to verify logical validity while the NL premises allow humans and systems to identify ungrounded or fallacious reasoning steps. Experiments on the ProofWriter, LegalBench, and BioASQ datasets show VeriCoT effectively identifies flawed reasoning, and serves as a strong predictor of final answer correctness. We also leverage VeriCoT's verification signal for (1) inference-time self-reflection, (2) supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on VeriCoT-distilled datasets and (3) preference fine-tuning (PFT) with direct preference optimization (DPO) using verification-based pairwise rewards, further improving reasoning validity and accuracy.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Human cognition typically involves thinking through abstract, fluid concepts rather than strictly using discrete linguistic tokens. Current reasoning models, however, are constrained to reasoning within the boundaries of human language, processing discrete token embeddings that represent fixed points in the semantic space. This discrete constraint restricts the expressive power and upper potential of such reasoning models, often causing incomplete exploration of reasoning paths, as standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods rely on sampling one token per step. In this work, we introduce Soft Thinking, a training-free method that emulates human-like "soft" reasoning by generating soft, abstract concept tokens in a continuous concept space. These concept tokens are created by the probability-weighted mixture of token embeddings, which form the continuous concept space, enabling smooth transitions and richer representations that transcend traditional discrete boundaries. In essence, each generated concept token encapsulates multiple meanings from related discrete tokens, implicitly exploring various reasoning paths to converge effectively toward the correct answer. Empirical evaluations on diverse mathematical and coding benchmarks consistently demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of Soft Thinking, improving pass@1 accuracy by up to 2.48 points while simultaneously reducing token usage by up to 22.4% compared to standard CoT. Qualitative analysis further reveals that Soft Thinking outputs remain highly interpretable and readable, highlighting the potential of Soft Thinking to break the inherent bottleneck of discrete language-based reasoning. Code is available at https://github.com/eric-ai-lab/Soft-Thinking.

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Human cognition naturally engages with abstract and fluid concepts, whereas existing reasoning models often rely on generating discrete tokens, potentially constraining their expressive capabilities. Recent advancements aim to address this limitation by enabling large language models (LLMs) to generate soft, abstract tokens, thus facilitating reasoning within a continuous concept space. This paper explores the `Soft Thinking' capabilities of various LLMs by examining the models' internal behavior using a suite of probing techniques. Contrary to the common belief that Soft Thinking enables the simultaneous exploration of diverse reasoning paths, our findings reveal that LLMs predominantly rely on the most influential component of the soft inputs during subsequent decoding steps. This reliance hinders the exploration of different reasoning paths and reduces vanilla Soft Thinking to a form of greedy decoding, obscuring the advantage of transmitting more information through Soft Tokens. To tackle this issue, we explore sampling strategies to introduce randomness, employing methods such as Dirichlet resampling and the Gumbel-Softmax trick. Our experiments demonstrate that incorporating randomness can alleviate the limitations of vanilla approaches and unleash the potential of Soft Thinking. Notably, the Gumbel-Softmax trick provides adequate randomness with controlled smoothness, resulting in superior performance across eight reasoning benchmarks.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

Large-scale pre-trained language models (PLMs) bring new opportunities to challenging problems, especially those that need high-level intelligence, such as the math word problem (MWPs). However, directly applying existing PLMs to MWPs can fail as the generation process lacks sufficient supervision and thus lacks fast adaptivity as humans. We notice that human reasoning has a dual reasoning framework that consists of an immediate reaction system (system 1) and a delicate reasoning system (system 2), where the entire reasoning is determined by their interaction. This inspires us to develop a cooperative reasoning-induced PLM for solving MWPs, called Cooperative Reasoning (CoRe), resulting in a human-like reasoning architecture with system 1 as the generator and system 2 as the verifier. In our approach, the generator is responsible for generating reasoning paths, and the verifiers are used to supervise the evaluation in order to obtain reliable feedback for the generator. We evaluate our CoRe framework on several mathematical reasoning datasets and achieve decent improvement over state-of-the-art methods, up to 9.6% increase over best baselines. Our codes are available at https://github.com/TianHongZXY/CoRe

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

Investigating the reasoning abilities of transformer models, and discovering new challenging tasks for them, has been a topic of much interest. Recent studies have found these models to be surprisingly strong at performing deductive reasoning over formal logical theories expressed in natural language. A shortcoming of these studies, however, is that they do not take into account that logical theories, when sampled uniformly at random, do not necessarily lead to hard instances. We propose a new methodology for creating challenging algorithmic reasoning datasets that focus on natural language satisfiability (NLSat) problems. The key idea is to draw insights from empirical sampling of hard propositional SAT problems and from complexity-theoretic studies of language. This methodology allows us to distinguish easy from hard instances, and to systematically increase the complexity of existing reasoning benchmarks such as RuleTaker. We find that current transformers, given sufficient training data, are surprisingly robust at solving the resulting NLSat problems of substantially increased difficulty. They also exhibit some degree of scale-invariance - the ability to generalize to problems of larger size and scope. Our results, however, reveal important limitations too: a careful sampling of training data is crucial for building models that generalize to larger problems, and transformer models' limited scale-invariance suggests they are far from learning robust deductive reasoning algorithms.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has recently demonstrated notable success in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, particularly in mathematics and programming tasks. It is widely believed that RLVR enables LLMs to continuously self-improve, thus acquiring novel reasoning abilities that exceed corresponding base models' capacity. In this study, however, we critically re-examines this assumption by measuring the pass@k metric with large values of k to explore the reasoning capability boundary of the models across a wide range of model families and benchmarks. Surprisingly, the RL does not, in fact, elicit fundamentally new reasoning patterns. While RL-trained models outperform their base models at smaller values of k (\eg, k=1), base models can achieve a comparable or even higher pass@k score compared to their RL counterparts at large k values. The reasoning paths generated by RL-trained models are already included in the base models' sampling distribution, suggesting that most reasoning abilities manifested in RL-trained models are already obtained by base models. Further analysis shows that RL training boosts the performance by biasing the model's output distribution toward paths that are more likely to yield rewards, therefore sampling correct responses more efficiently. But this also results in a narrower reasoning capability boundary compared to base models. Similar results are observed in visual reasoning tasks trained with RLVR. Moreover, we find that distillation can genuinely introduce new knowledge into the model, different from RLVR. These findings underscore a critical limitation of RLVR in advancing LLM reasoning abilities which requires us to fundamentally rethink the impact of RL training in reasoning LLMs and the need of a better paradigm. Project Page: https://limit-of-RLVR.github.io

Reasoning is a fundamental substrate for solving novel and complex problems. Deliberate efforts in learning and developing frameworks around System 2 reasoning have made great strides, yet problems of sufficient complexity remain largely out of reach for open models. To address this gap, we examine the potential of Generative Flow Networks as a fine-tuning method for LLMs to unlock advanced reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we present a proof of concept in the domain of formal reasoning, specifically in the Neural Theorem Proving (NTP) setting, where proofs specified in a formal language such as Lean can be deterministically and objectively verified. Unlike classical reward-maximization reinforcement learning, which frequently over-exploits high-reward actions and fails to effectively explore the state space, GFlowNets have emerged as a promising approach for sampling compositional objects, improving generalization, and enabling models to maintain diverse hypotheses. Our early results demonstrate GFlowNet fine-tuning's potential for enhancing model performance in a search setting, which is especially relevant given the paradigm shift towards inference time compute scaling and "thinking slowly."

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning tasks but often suffer from overthinking, generating overly long and redundant reasoning trajectories. To explore its essence, our empirical analysis reveals that LRMs are primarily limited to recognizing task properties (i.e., difficulty levels) like humans before solving the problem, leading to a one-size-fits-all reasoning process. Inspired by this, a pressing and natural question emerges: Can we explicitly bootstrap such ability to alleviate overthinking in LRMs? In this paper, we propose Think-How-to-Think (TH2T), a novel two-stage fine-tuning strategy that progressively inspires LRMs' difficulty cognition and redundancy cognition of LRMs. Specifically, we first inject difficulty hypnosis into output prefixes to guide the model toward adaptive reasoning depth, trained on a hybrid dataset mixing short and long reasoning paths. Then, we incorporate redundancy hypnosis, which supervises the intermediate reasoning steps to identify and eliminate unnecessary reasoning patterns. Experiments on 7B/14B/32B models demonstrate that TH2T significantly reduces inference costs by over 70% on easy tasks and 40% on hard tasks while maintaining performance stability. The resulting outputs exhibit clear signs of difficulty-aware capabilities and reduced redundancy (e.g., reflection and looping).

Knights and knaves problems represent a classic genre of logical puzzles where characters either tell the truth or lie. The objective is to logically deduce each character's identity based on their statements. The challenge arises from the truth-telling or lying behavior, which influences the logical implications of each statement. Solving these puzzles requires not only direct deductions from individual statements, but the ability to assess the truthfulness of statements by reasoning through various hypothetical scenarios. As such, knights and knaves puzzles serve as compelling examples of suppositional reasoning. In this paper, we introduce TruthQuest, a benchmark for suppositional reasoning based on the principles of knights and knaves puzzles. Our benchmark presents problems of varying complexity, considering both the number of characters and the types of logical statements involved. Evaluations on TruthQuest show that large language models like Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x7B exhibit significant difficulties solving these tasks. A detailed error analysis of the models' output reveals that lower-performing models exhibit a diverse range of reasoning errors, frequently failing to grasp the concept of truth and lies. In comparison, more proficient models primarily struggle with accurately inferring the logical implications of potentially false statements.

Recent work shows that, beyond discrete reasoning through explicit chain-of-thought steps, which are limited by the boundaries of natural languages, large language models (LLMs) can also reason continuously in latent space, allowing richer information per step and thereby improving token efficiency. Despite this promise, latent reasoning still faces two challenges, especially in training-free settings: 1) purely latent reasoning broadens the search distribution by maintaining multiple implicit paths, which diffuses probability mass, introduces noise, and impedes convergence to a single high-confidence solution, thereby hurting accuracy; and 2) overthinking persists even without explicit text, wasting tokens and degrading efficiency. To address these issues, we introduce SwiReasoning, a training-free framework for LLM reasoning which features two key innovations: 1) SwiReasoning dynamically switches between explicit and latent reasoning, guided by block-wise confidence estimated from entropy trends in next-token distributions, to balance exploration and exploitation and promote timely convergence. 2) By limiting the maximum number of thinking-block switches, SwiReasoning curbs overthinking and improves token efficiency across varying problem difficulties. On widely used mathematics and STEM benchmarks, SwiReasoning consistently improves average accuracy by 1.5%-2.8% across reasoning LLMs of different model families and scales. Furthermore, under constrained budgets, SwiReasoning improves average token efficiency by 56%-79%, with larger gains as budgets tighten.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

Reasoning-based language models have demonstrated strong performance across various domains, with the most notable gains seen in mathematical and coding tasks. Recent research has shown that reasoning also offers significant benefits for LLM safety and guardrail applications. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of training reasoning-based guardrail models for content moderation, with an emphasis on generalization to custom safety policies at inference time. Our study focuses on two key dimensions: data efficiency and inference efficiency. On the data front, we find that reasoning-based models exhibit strong sample efficiency, achieving competitive performance with significantly fewer training examples than their non-reasoning counterparts. This unlocks the potential to repurpose the remaining data for mining high-value, difficult samples that further enhance model performance. On the inference side, we evaluate practical trade-offs by introducing reasoning budgets, examining the impact of reasoning length on latency and accuracy, and exploring dual-mode training to allow runtime control over reasoning behavior. Our findings will provide practical insights for researchers and developers to effectively and efficiently train and deploy reasoning-based guardrails models in real-world systems.

Beginning with McCarthy's Advice Taker (1959), AI has pursued the goal of providing a system with explicit, general knowledge and having the system reason over that knowledge. However, expressing the knowledge in a formal (logical or probabilistic) representation has been a major obstacle to this research. This paper investigates a modern approach to this problem where the facts and rules are provided as natural language sentences, thus bypassing a formal representation. We train transformers to reason (or emulate reasoning) over these sentences using synthetically generated data. Our models, that we call RuleTakers, provide the first empirical demonstration that this kind of soft reasoning over language is learnable, can achieve high (99%) accuracy, and generalizes to test data requiring substantially deeper chaining than seen during training (95%+ scores). We also demonstrate that the models transfer well to two hand-authored rulebases, and to rulebases paraphrased into more natural language. These findings are significant as it suggests a new role for transformers, namely as limited "soft theorem provers" operating over explicit theories in language. This in turn suggests new possibilities for explainability, correctability, and counterfactual reasoning in question-answering.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

Reasoning is an essential component of human intelligence as it plays a fundamental role in our ability to think critically, support responsible decisions, and solve challenging problems. Traditionally, AI has addressed reasoning in the context of logic-based representations of knowledge. However, the recent leap forward in natural language processing, with the emergence of language models based on transformers, is hinting at the possibility that these models exhibit reasoning abilities, particularly as they grow in size and are trained on more data. Despite ongoing discussions about what reasoning is in language models, it is still not easy to pin down to what extent these models are actually capable of reasoning. The goal of this workshop is to create a platform for researchers from different disciplines and/or AI perspectives, to explore approaches and techniques with the aim to reconcile reasoning between language models using transformers and using logic-based representations. The specific objectives include analyzing the reasoning abilities of language models measured alongside KR methods, injecting KR-style reasoning abilities into language models (including by neuro-symbolic means), and formalizing the kind of reasoning language models carry out. This exploration aims to uncover how language models can effectively integrate and leverage knowledge and reasoning with it, thus improving their application and utility in areas where precision and reliability are a key requirement.

We introduce Phi-4-reasoning, a 14-billion parameter reasoning model that achieves strong performance on complex reasoning tasks. Trained via supervised fine-tuning of Phi-4 on carefully curated set of "teachable" prompts-selected for the right level of complexity and diversity-and reasoning demonstrations generated using o3-mini, Phi-4-reasoning generates detailed reasoning chains that effectively leverage inference-time compute. We further develop Phi-4-reasoning-plus, a variant enhanced through a short phase of outcome-based reinforcement learning that offers higher performance by generating longer reasoning traces. Across a wide range of reasoning tasks, both models outperform significantly larger open-weight models such as DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-70B model and approach the performance levels of full DeepSeek-R1 model. Our comprehensive evaluations span benchmarks in math and scientific reasoning, coding, algorithmic problem solving, planning, and spatial understanding. Interestingly, we observe a non-trivial transfer of improvements to general-purpose benchmarks as well. In this report, we provide insights into our training data, our training methodologies, and our evaluations. We show that the benefit of careful data curation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) extends to reasoning language models, and can be further amplified by reinforcement learning (RL). Finally, our evaluation points to opportunities for improving how we assess the performance and robustness of reasoning models.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has played an important role in improving the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). Some studies apply RL directly to smaller base models (known as zero-RL) and also achieve notable progress. However, in this paper, we show that using only 920 examples, a simple distillation method based on the base model can clearly outperform zero-RL, which typically requires much more data and computational cost. By analyzing the token frequency in model outputs, we find that the distilled model shows more flexible reasoning. It uses anthropomorphic tokens and logical connectors much more often than the zero-RL model. Further analysis reveals that distillation enhances the presence of two advanced cognitive behaviors: Multi-Perspective Thinking or Attempting and Metacognitive Awareness. Frequent occurrences of these two advanced cognitive behaviors give rise to flexible reasoning, which is essential for solving complex reasoning problems, while zero-RL fails to significantly boost the frequency of these behaviors.

Reasoning-capable language models achieve state-of-the-art performance in diverse complex tasks by generating long, explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. While recent works show that base models can acquire such reasoning traces via reinforcement learning or distillation from stronger models like DeepSeek-R1, previous works demonstrate that even short CoT prompting without fine-tuning is able to improve reasoning. We ask whether long CoT can be induced in a base model using only prompting or minimal tuning. Using just 20 long CoT examples from the reasoning model QwQ-32B-Preview, we lightly fine-tune the base model Qwen2.5-32B. The resulting model outperforms the much larger Qwen2.5-Math-72B-Instruct, showing that a handful of high-quality examples can unlock strong reasoning capabilities. We further explore using CoT data from non-reasoning models and human annotators, enhanced with prompt engineering, multi-pass editing, and structural guidance. However, neither matches the performance of reasoning model traces, suggesting that certain latent qualities of expert CoT are difficult to replicate. We analyze key properties of reasoning data, such as problem difficulty, diversity, and answer length, that influence reasoning distillation. While challenges remain, we are optimistic that carefully curated human-written CoT, even in small quantities, can activate reasoning behaviors in base models. We release our human-authored dataset across refinement stages and invite further investigation into what makes small-scale reasoning supervision so effective.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate extensive chain-of-thought reasoning, we lack a principled framework for understanding how these thoughts are structured. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach by applying Schoenfeld's Episode Theory, a classic cognitive framework for human mathematical problem-solving, to analyze the reasoning traces of LRMs. We annotated thousands of sentences and paragraphs from model-generated solutions to math problems using seven cognitive labels (e.g., Plan, Implement, Verify). The result is the first publicly available benchmark for the fine-grained analysis of machine reasoning, including a large annotated corpus and detailed annotation guidebooks. Our preliminary analysis reveals distinct patterns in LRM reasoning, such as the transition dynamics between cognitive states. This framework provides a theoretically grounded methodology for interpreting LRM cognition and enables future work on more controllable and transparent reasoning systems.

Reasoning is most powerful when an LLM accurately aggregates relevant information. We examine the critical role of information aggregation in reasoning by requiring the LLM to analyze sports narratives. To succeed at this task, an LLM must infer points from actions, identify related entities, attribute points accurately to players and teams, and compile key statistics to draw conclusions. We conduct comprehensive experiments with real NBA basketball data and present SportsGen, a new method to synthesize game narratives. By synthesizing data, we can rigorously evaluate LLMs' reasoning capabilities under complex scenarios with varying narrative lengths and density of information. Our findings show that most models, including GPT-4o, often fail to accurately aggregate basketball scores due to frequent scoring patterns. Open-source models like Llama-3 further suffer from significant score hallucinations. Finally, the effectiveness of reasoning is influenced by narrative complexity, information density, and domain-specific terms, highlighting the challenges in analytical reasoning tasks.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

Test-time compute has led to remarkable success in the large language model (LLM) community, particularly for complex tasks, where longer chains of thought (CoTs) are generated to enhance reasoning capabilities. However, growing evidence reveals that such reasoning models often produce CoTs plagued by excessive redundancy, including unnecessary verification steps and repetitive reasoning shifts. The root cause lies in post-training of them that overly rely on outcome reward paradigms, as the data of process reward paradigms, which regulate intermediate reasoning steps, is difficult to construct at scale. To address this, we propose PI, a novel framework for Test-time Prompt Intervention. PI provides an interface to dynamically guide and regulate reasoning paths during inference through timely (When module) and proper (How module) interventions and post-intervention sampling (Which module). This allows human problem-solving expertise and cognitive science principles to be seamlessly integrated into LLMs' reasoning processes, enhancing controllability and interpretability. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that PI significantly shortens CoTs while reducing hallucination, yielding more concise and reliable reasoning.

Chain-of-Thought significantly enhances a model's reasoning capability, but it also comes with a considerable increase in inference costs due to long chains. With the observation that the reasoning path can be easily compressed under easy tasks but struggle on hard tasks, we explore the feasibility of elastically controlling the length of reasoning paths with only one model, thereby reducing the inference overhead of reasoning models dynamically based on task difficulty. We introduce a new tuning and inference strategy named CoT-Valve, designed to allow models to generate reasoning chains of varying lengths. To achieve this, we propose to identify a direction in the parameter space that, when manipulated, can effectively control the length of generated CoT. Moreover, we show that this property is valuable for compressing the reasoning chain. We construct datasets with chains from long to short for the same questions and explore two enhanced strategies for CoT-Valve: (1) a precise length-compressible CoT tuning method, and (2) a progressive chain length compression approach. Our experiments show that CoT-Valve successfully enables controllability and compressibility of the chain and shows better performance than the prompt-based control. We applied this method to QwQ-32B-Preview, reducing reasoning chains on GSM8K from 741 to 225 tokens with a minor performance drop (95.07% to 94.92%) and on AIME from 6827 to 4629 tokens, with only one additional incorrect answer.

Recent developments, particularly OpenAI's O1 model, have demonstrated the remarkable potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex reasoning tasks. Through analysis of O1's outputs and provided sample Chain-of-Thought (CoT) demonstrations, we observe that it approaches problem-solving in a distinctly human-like manner, systematically brainstorming ideas, testing hypotheses, verifying results, and planning comprehensive solutions. These sophisticated reasoning capabilities remain notably absent in other state-of-the-art language models. In this paper, we hypothesize that this performance gap stems from the limited availability of high-quality reasoning process data in current training sets. We demonstrate that by constructing a specialized dataset focused on explicit problem-solving workflows ("worked solutions"), we can elicit substantially improved planning capabilities from existing models. Additionally, we propose the Reasoning Enhancement Loop (REL), a method for generating synthetic worked solutions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance on complex reasoning tasks with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, conventional CoT relies on reasoning steps explicitly verbalized in natural language, introducing inefficiencies and limiting its applicability to abstract reasoning. To address this, there has been growing research interest in latent CoT reasoning, where inference occurs within latent spaces. By decoupling reasoning from language, latent reasoning promises richer cognitive representations and more flexible, faster inference. Researchers have explored various directions in this promising field, including training methodologies, structural innovations, and internal reasoning mechanisms. This paper presents a comprehensive overview and analysis of this reasoning paradigm. We begin by proposing a unified taxonomy from four perspectives: token-wise strategies, internal mechanisms, analysis, and applications. We then provide in-depth discussions and comparative analyses of representative methods, highlighting their design patterns, strengths, and open challenges. We aim to provide a structured foundation for advancing this emerging direction in LLM reasoning. The relevant papers will be regularly updated at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/Awesome-Latent-CoT.

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

Recent advancements in reasoning with large language models (RLLMs), such as OpenAI-O1 and DeepSeek-R1, have demonstrated their impressive capabilities in complex domains like mathematics and coding. A central factor in their success lies in the application of long chain-of-thought (Long CoT) characteristics, which enhance reasoning abilities and enable the solution of intricate problems. However, despite these developments, a comprehensive survey on Long CoT is still lacking, limiting our understanding of its distinctions from traditional short chain-of-thought (Short CoT) and complicating ongoing debates on issues like "overthinking" and "test-time scaling." This survey seeks to fill this gap by offering a unified perspective on Long CoT. (1) We first distinguish Long CoT from Short CoT and introduce a novel taxonomy to categorize current reasoning paradigms. (2) Next, we explore the key characteristics of Long CoT: deep reasoning, extensive exploration, and feasible reflection, which enable models to handle more complex tasks and produce more efficient, coherent outcomes compared to the shallower Short CoT. (3) We then investigate key phenomena such as the emergence of Long CoT with these characteristics, including overthinking, and test-time scaling, offering insights into how these processes manifest in practice. (4) Finally, we identify significant research gaps and highlight promising future directions, including the integration of multi-modal reasoning, efficiency improvements, and enhanced knowledge frameworks. By providing a structured overview, this survey aims to inspire future research and further the development of logical reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Test-time compute is emerging as a new paradigm for enhancing language models' complex multi-step reasoning capabilities, as demonstrated by the success of OpenAI's o1 and o3, as well as DeepSeek's R1. Compared to explicit reasoning in test-time compute, implicit reasoning is more inference-efficient, requiring fewer generated tokens. However, why does the advanced reasoning capability fail to emerge in the implicit reasoning style? In this work, we train GPT-2 from scratch on a curated multi-step mathematical reasoning dataset and conduct analytical experiments to investigate how language models perform implicit reasoning in multi-step tasks. Our findings reveal: 1) Language models can perform step-by-step reasoning and achieve high accuracy in both in-domain and out-of-domain tests via implicit reasoning. However, this capability only emerges when trained on fixed-pattern data. 2) Conversely, implicit reasoning abilities emerging from training on unfixed-pattern data tend to overfit a specific pattern and fail to generalize further. Notably, this limitation is also observed in state-of-the-art large language models. These findings suggest that language models acquire implicit reasoning through shortcut learning, enabling strong performance on tasks with similar patterns while lacking generalization.

Reasoning has emerged as the next major frontier for language models (LMs), with rapid advances from both academic and industrial labs. However, this progress often outpaces methodological rigor, with many evaluations relying on benchmarking practices that lack transparency, robustness, or statistical grounding. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study and find that current mathematical reasoning benchmarks are highly sensitive to subtle implementation choices - including decoding parameters, random seeds, prompt formatting, and even hardware and software-framework configurations. Performance gains reported in recent studies frequently hinge on unclear comparisons or unreported sources of variance. To address these issues, we propose a standardized evaluation framework with clearly defined best practices and reporting standards. Using this framework, we reassess recent methods and find that reinforcement learning (RL) approaches yield only modest improvements - far below prior claims - and are prone to overfitting, especially on small-scale benchmarks like AIME24. In contrast, supervised finetuning (SFT) methods show consistently stronger generalization. To foster reproducibility, we release all code, prompts, and model outputs, for reasoning benchmarks, establishing more rigorous foundations for future work.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

The effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) is heavily influenced by the reasoning strategies, or styles of thought, employed in their prompts. However, the interplay between these reasoning styles, model architecture, and task type remains poorly understood. To address this, we introduce StyleBench, a comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating reasoning styles across diverse tasks and models. We assess five representative reasoning styles, including Chain of Thought (CoT), Tree of Thought (ToT), Algorithm of Thought (AoT), Sketch of Thought (SoT), and Chain-of-Draft (CoD) on five reasoning tasks, using 15 open-source models from major families (LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, Gemma, GPT-OSS, Phi, and DeepSeek) ranging from 270M to 120B parameters. Our large-scale analysis reveals that no single style is universally optimal. We demonstrate that strategy efficacy is highly contingent on both model scale and task type: search-based methods (AoT, ToT) excel in open-ended problems but require large-scale models, while concise styles (SoT, CoD) achieve radical efficiency gains on well-defined tasks. Furthermore, we identify key behavioral patterns: smaller models frequently fail to follow output instructions and default to guessing, while reasoning robustness emerges as a function of scale. Our findings offer a crucial roadmap for selecting optimal reasoning strategies based on specific constraints, we open source the benchmark in https://github.com/JamesJunyuGuo/Style_Bench.

Recent advanced large reasoning models (LRMs) leverage extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Despite their success, we identify a critical issue: a substantial portion of simple tasks solved by LRMs can also be addressed by non-reasoning LLMs using significantly fewer tokens, indicating the complex reasoning may not always be necessary. To address this, we systematically analyze the reasoning trajectories of LRMs and present a method utilizing identified paradigms and LLM-Judge to classify these trajectories as either Redundant Reasoning or Essential Reasoning. And we introduce OThink-R1, a method that prunes redundant reasoning steps while preserving logical validity. OThink-R1 dynamically employs the non-thinking mode (fast-thinking) for straightforward problems while engaging in deliberate thinking (slow-thinking) for complex problems. Experiments across mathematical and question-answering tasks demonstrate that OThink-R1 reduces reasoning redundancy by almost 23\% on average without compromising accuracy, offering practical guidelines for efficient reasoning models. The code is available at https://github.com/AgenticIR-Lab/OThink-R1.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become a central focus in today's large language model (LLM) research, where models are designed to output a step-by-step thinking process before arriving at a final answer to handle complex reasoning tasks. Despite their promise, recent empirical studies (e.g., [Shojaee et al., 2025] from Apple) suggest that this thinking process may not actually enhance reasoning ability, where LLMs without explicit reasoning actually outperform LRMs on tasks with low or high complexity. In this work, we revisit these findings and investigate whether the limitations of LRMs persist when tool augmentations are introduced. We incorporate two types of tools, Python interpreters and scratchpads, and evaluate three representative LLMs and their LRM counterparts on Apple's benchmark reasoning puzzles. Our results show that, with proper tool use, LRMs consistently outperform their non-reasoning counterparts across all levels of task complexity. These findings challenge the recent narrative that reasoning is an illusion and highlight the potential of tool-augmented LRMs for solving complex problems.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

This study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview model in higher-order cognitive domains, including critical thinking, systematic thinking, computational thinking, data literacy, creative thinking, logical reasoning, and scientific reasoning. Using established benchmarks, we compared the o1-preview models's performance to human participants from diverse educational levels. o1-preview achieved a mean score of 24.33 on the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (EWCTET), surpassing undergraduate (13.8) and postgraduate (18.39) participants (z = 1.60 and 0.90, respectively). In systematic thinking, it scored 46.1, SD = 4.12 on the Lake Urmia Vignette, significantly outperforming the human mean (20.08, SD = 8.13, z = 3.20). For data literacy, o1-preview scored 8.60, SD = 0.70 on Merk et al.'s "Use Data" dimension, compared to the human post-test mean of 4.17, SD = 2.02 (z = 2.19). On creative thinking tasks, the model achieved originality scores of 2.98, SD = 0.73, higher than the human mean of 1.74 (z = 0.71). In logical reasoning (LogiQA), it outperformed humans with average 90%, SD = 10% accuracy versus 86%, SD = 6.5% (z = 0.62). For scientific reasoning, it achieved near-perfect performance (mean = 0.99, SD = 0.12) on the TOSLS,, exceeding the highest human scores of 0.85, SD = 0.13 (z = 1.78). While o1-preview excelled in structured tasks, it showed limitations in problem-solving and adaptive reasoning. These results demonstrate the potential of AI to complement education in structured assessments but highlight the need for ethical oversight and refinement for broader applications.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

The Uniform Information Density (UID) hypothesis suggests that effective communication maintains a stable flow of information. In this work, we revisit this principle in the context of large language model (LLM) reasoning traces, asking whether step-level uniformity reflects reasoning quality. To this end, we propose an entropy-based stepwise information density metric and introduce two complementary measures of uniformity, local and global uniformity scores. Across the experiments on six different reasoning benchmarks, we find that step-level uniformity not only provides a strong theoretical lens but also yields practical performance benefits; for example, selecting reasoning traces with more uniform information density at the step-level improves accuracy by 10-32\% relative gains over baselines at AIME2025. Our analysis further reveals that correct reasoning traces tend to avoid sharp information density spikes, while incorrect traces exhibit irregular information bursts. These results demonstrate that UID-inspired information density measures outperform alternative internal signals as predictors of reasoning quality. Results highlight the uniformity of the information density as a robust diagnostic and selection criterion for building more reliable and accurate reasoning systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in proving formal theorems using proof assistants such as Lean. However, existing methods are difficult to reproduce or build on, due to private code, data, and large compute requirements. This has created substantial barriers to research on machine learning methods for theorem proving. This paper removes these barriers by introducing LeanDojo: an open-source Lean playground consisting of toolkits, data, models, and benchmarks. LeanDojo extracts data from Lean and enables interaction with the proof environment programmatically. It contains fine-grained annotations of premises in proofs, providing valuable data for premise selection: a key bottleneck in theorem proving. Using this data, we develop ReProver (Retrieval-Augmented Prover): the first LLM-based prover that is augmented with retrieval for selecting premises from a vast math library. It is inexpensive and needs only one GPU week of training. Our retriever leverages LeanDojo's program analysis capability to identify accessible premises and hard negative examples, which makes retrieval much more effective. Furthermore, we construct a new benchmark consisting of 96,962 theorems and proofs extracted from Lean's math library. It features challenging data split requiring the prover to generalize to theorems relying on novel premises that are never used in training. We use this benchmark for training and evaluation, and experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of ReProver over non-retrieval baselines and GPT-4. We thus provide the first set of open-source LLM-based theorem provers without any proprietary datasets and release it under a permissive MIT license to facilitate further research.

Reasoning abilities, especially those for solving complex math problems, are crucial components of general intelligence. Recent advances by proprietary companies, such as o-series models of OpenAI, have made remarkable progress on reasoning tasks. However, the complete technical details remain unrevealed, and the techniques that are believed certainly to be adopted are only reinforcement learning (RL) and the long chain of thoughts. This paper proposes a new RL framework, termed OREAL, to pursue the performance limit that can be achieved through Outcome REwArd-based reinforcement Learning for mathematical reasoning tasks, where only binary outcome rewards are easily accessible. We theoretically prove that behavior cloning on positive trajectories from best-of-N (BoN) sampling is sufficient to learn the KL-regularized optimal policy in binary feedback environments. This formulation further implies that the rewards of negative samples should be reshaped to ensure the gradient consistency between positive and negative samples. To alleviate the long-existing difficulties brought by sparse rewards in RL, which are even exacerbated by the partial correctness of the long chain of thought for reasoning tasks, we further apply a token-level reward model to sample important tokens in reasoning trajectories for learning. With OREAL, for the first time, a 7B model can obtain 94.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500 through RL, being on par with 32B models. OREAL-32B also surpasses previous 32B models trained by distillation with 95.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500. Our investigation also indicates the importance of initial policy models and training queries for RL. Code, models, and data will be released to benefit future researchhttps://github.com/InternLM/OREAL.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Logical reasoning, i.e., deductively inferring the truth value of a conclusion from a set of premises, is an important task for artificial intelligence with wide potential impacts on science, mathematics, and society. While many prompting-based strategies have been proposed to enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to do such reasoning more effectively, they still appear unsatisfactory, often failing in subtle and unpredictable ways. In this work, we investigate the validity of instead reformulating such tasks as modular neurosymbolic programming, which we call LINC: Logical Inference via Neurosymbolic Computation. In LINC, the LLM acts as a semantic parser, translating premises and conclusions from natural language to expressions in first-order logic. These expressions are then offloaded to an external theorem prover, which symbolically performs deductive inference. Leveraging this approach, we observe significant performance gains on FOLIO and a balanced subset of ProofWriter for three different models in nearly all experimental conditions we evaluate. On ProofWriter, augmenting the comparatively small open-source StarCoder+ (15.5B parameters) with LINC even outperforms GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting by an absolute 38% and 10%, respectively. When used with GPT-4, LINC scores 26% higher than CoT on ProofWriter while performing comparatively on FOLIO. Further analysis reveals that although both methods on average succeed roughly equally often on this dataset, they exhibit distinct and complementary failure modes. We thus provide promising evidence for how logical reasoning over natural language can be tackled through jointly leveraging LLMs alongside symbolic provers. All corresponding code is publicly available at https://github.com/benlipkin/linc

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance on complex reasoning tasks by generating detailed chain-of-thought (CoT) explanations. However, these responses are often excessively long, containing redundant reasoning steps that inflate inference cost and reduce usability. Controlling the length of generated reasoning without sacrificing accuracy remains an open challenge. Through a systematic empirical analysis, we reveal a consistent positive correlation between model entropy and response length at different reasoning stages across diverse LRMs: the thinking phase exhibits higher entropy, reflecting exploratory behavior of longer responses, while the final answer phase shows lower entropy, indicating a more deterministic solution. This observation suggests that entropy at different reasoning stages can serve as a control knob for balancing conciseness and performance. Based on this insight, this paper introduces Phase Entropy Aware Reward (PEAR), a reward mechanism that incorporating phase-dependent entropy into the reward design. Instead of treating all tokens uniformly, PEAR penalize excessive entropy during the thinking phase and allowing moderate exploration at the final answer phase, which encourages models to generate concise reasoning traces that retain sufficient flexibility to solve the task correctly. This enables adaptive control of response length without relying on explicit length targets or rigid truncation rules. Extensive experiments across four benchmarks demonstrate that PEAR consistently reduces response length while sustaining competitive accuracy across model scales. In addition, PEAR demonstrates strong out-of-distribution (OOD) robustness beyond the training distribution. Our code is available at: https://github.com/iNLP-Lab/PEAR.

Reasoning models excel in complex problem solving but exhibit a concerning trade off between reasoning capabilities and instruction following abilities. Existing approaches for improving instruction following rely on stronger external models, creating methodological bottlenecks and practical limitations including increased costs and accessibility constraints. We propose a self-supervised RL framework that leverages reasoning models' own internal signals to improve instruction following capabilities without external supervision. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our framework significantly improves instruction following capabilities while maintaining reasoning performance, offering a scalable and cost-effective approach to enhance instruction following in reasoning models. The data and code are publicly available at https://github.com/Rainier-rq/verl-if.

Reinforcement learning (RL) plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of large language and reasoning models (LLMs/LRMs). However, it often produces brittle and unstable policies, leading to critical failures such as spurious reasoning, deceptive alignment, and instruction disobedience that undermine the trustworthiness and safety of LLMs/LRMs. Currently, these issues lack a unified theoretical explanation and are typically addressed using ad-hoc heuristics. This paper presents a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing the stability of the mapping from a reward function to the optimal policy. We show that policy brittleness often stems from non-unique optimal actions, a common occurrence when multiple valid traces exist in a reasoning task. This theoretical lens provides a unified explanation for a range of seemingly disparate failures, reframing them as rational outcomes of optimizing rewards that may be incomplete or noisy, especially in the presence of action degeneracy. We extend this analysis from the fundamental single-reward setting to the more realistic multi-reward RL across diverse domains, showing how stability is governed by an "effective reward" aggregation mechanism. We also prove that entropy regularization restores policy stability at the cost of increased stochasticity. Our framework provides a unified explanation for recent empirical findings on deceptive reasoning, instruction-following trade-offs, and RLHF-induced sophistry, and is further validated through perturbation experiments in multi-reward RL. This work advances policy-stability analysis from empirical heuristics towards a principled theory, offering essential insights for designing safer and more trustworthy AI systems.

Reasoning, the process of devising and executing complex goal-oriented action sequences, remains a critical challenge in AI. Current large language models (LLMs) primarily employ Chain-of-Thought (CoT) techniques, which suffer from brittle task decomposition, extensive data requirements, and high latency. Inspired by the hierarchical and multi-timescale processing in the human brain, we propose the Hierarchical Reasoning Model (HRM), a novel recurrent architecture that attains significant computational depth while maintaining both training stability and efficiency. HRM executes sequential reasoning tasks in a single forward pass without explicit supervision of the intermediate process, through two interdependent recurrent modules: a high-level module responsible for slow, abstract planning, and a low-level module handling rapid, detailed computations. With only 27 million parameters, HRM achieves exceptional performance on complex reasoning tasks using only 1000 training samples. The model operates without pre-training or CoT data, yet achieves nearly perfect performance on challenging tasks including complex Sudoku puzzles and optimal path finding in large mazes. Furthermore, HRM outperforms much larger models with significantly longer context windows on the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), a key benchmark for measuring artificial general intelligence capabilities. These results underscore HRM's potential as a transformative advancement toward universal computation and general-purpose reasoning systems.

Reasoning models have recently shown remarkable progress in domains such as math and coding. However, their expert-level abilities in math and coding contrast sharply with their performance in long-horizon, interactive tasks such as web navigation and computer/phone-use. Inspired by literature on human cognition, we argue that current AI agents need ''vicarious trial and error'' - the capacity to mentally simulate alternative futures before acting - in order to enhance their understanding and performance in complex interactive environments. We introduce Dyna-Mind, a two-stage training framework that explicitly teaches (V)LM agents to integrate such simulation into their reasoning. In stage 1, we introduce Reasoning with Simulations (ReSim), which trains the agent to generate structured reasoning traces from expanded search trees built from real experience gathered through environment interactions. ReSim thus grounds the agent's reasoning in faithful world dynamics and equips it with the ability to anticipate future states in its reasoning. In stage 2, we propose Dyna-GRPO, an online reinforcement learning method to further strengthen the agent's simulation and decision-making ability by using both outcome rewards and intermediate states as feedback from real rollouts. Experiments on two synthetic benchmarks (Sokoban and ALFWorld) and one realistic benchmark (AndroidWorld) demonstrate that (1) ReSim effectively infuses simulation ability into AI agents, and (2) Dyna-GRPO leverages outcome and interaction-level signals to learn better policies for long-horizon, planning-intensive tasks. Together, these results highlight the central role of simulation in enabling AI agents to reason, plan, and act more effectively in the ever more challenging environments.

Fuzzy reasoning is vital due to the frequent use of imprecise information in daily contexts. However, the ability of current large language models (LLMs) to handle such reasoning remains largely uncharted. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark, FRoG, for fuzzy reasoning, featuring real-world mathematical word problems that incorporate generalized quantifiers. Our experimental findings reveal that fuzzy reasoning continues to pose significant challenges for LLMs. Moreover, we find that existing methods designed to enhance reasoning do not consistently improve performance in tasks involving fuzzy logic. Additionally, our results show an inverse scaling effect in the performance of LLMs on FRoG. Interestingly, we also demonstrate that strong mathematical reasoning skills are not necessarily indicative of success on our benchmark.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning abilities in complex tasks, often relying on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, due to their autoregressive token-level generation, the reasoning process is largely constrained to local decision-making and lacks global planning. This limitation frequently results in redundant, incoherent, or inaccurate reasoning, which significantly degrades overall performance. Existing approaches, such as tree-based algorithms and reinforcement learning (RL), attempt to address this issue but suffer from high computational costs and often fail to produce optimal reasoning trajectories. To tackle this challenge, we propose Plan-Then-Action Enhanced Reasoning with Group Relative Policy Optimization PTA-GRPO, a two-stage framework designed to improve both high-level planning and fine-grained CoT reasoning. In the first stage, we leverage advanced LLMs to distill CoT into compact high-level guidance, which is then used for supervised fine-tuning (SFT). In the second stage, we introduce a guidance-aware RL method that jointly optimizes the final output and the quality of high-level guidance, thereby enhancing reasoning effectiveness. We conduct extensive experiments on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including MATH, AIME2024, AIME2025, and AMC, across diverse base models such as Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-14B, and LLaMA3.2-3B. Experimental results demonstrate that PTA-GRPO consistently achieves stable and significant improvements across different models and tasks, validating its effectiveness and generalization.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Reasoning protocols such as Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thought (ToT) organize internal deliberation but lack an explicit mechanism for external questioning that elicits self-revision. We present FOR-Prompting (From Objection to Revision Prompting), an asymmetric protocol where a Defender proposes an answer, an Objectioner raises question-style objections with no direct fixes, and a Host enforces consistency and closure. On GSM8K we observe about a 22% point gain over single-prompt and accuracy on par with CoT, with more than 10% higher ratings in reasoning and coherence from a uniform GPT 4.1 judge. FOR-Prompting also corrects mistakes without tools or human supervision on tricky queries, and improves performance for small-scale model (approx. 19% accuracy improved on Llama3.2:1b for GSM8K task), highlighting promise for small models and on personal device use. Beyond factual QA, qualitative analyses on open-ended tasks show enhanced exploration and refinement, with dialogue traces that make assumptions and trade-offs explicit. The protocol is model agnostic and operates purely at the prompt level through role-structured turns, so it works with hosted and local models of different sizes without retraining, and it supports large-scale study of objection-guided reasoning.

Recent years have witnessed significant progress in large language models' (LLMs) reasoning, which is largely due to the chain-of-thought (CoT) approaches, allowing models to generate intermediate reasoning steps before reaching the final answer. Building on these advances, state-of-the-art LLMs are instruction-tuned to provide long and detailed CoT pathways when responding to reasoning-related questions. However, human beings are naturally cognitive misers and will prompt language models to give rather short responses, thus raising a significant conflict with CoT reasoning. In this paper, we delve into how LLMs' reasoning performance changes when users provide short-path prompts. The results and analysis reveal that language models can reason effectively and robustly without explicit CoT prompts, while under short-path prompting, LLMs' reasoning ability drops significantly and becomes unstable, even on grade-school problems. To address this issue, we propose two approaches: an instruction-guided approach and a fine-tuning approach, both designed to effectively manage the conflict. Experimental results show that both methods achieve high accuracy, providing insights into the trade-off between instruction adherence and reasoning accuracy in current models.

Emergent chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities promise to improve performance and explainability of large language models (LLMs). However, uncertainties remain about how reasoning strategies formulated for previous model generations generalize to new model generations and different datasets. In this small-scale study, we compare different reasoning strategies induced by zero-shot prompting across six recently released LLMs (davinci-002, davinci-003, GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, Flan-T5-xxl and Cohere command-xlarge) on a mixture of six question-answering datasets, including datasets from scientific and medical domains. Our findings demonstrate that while some variations in effectiveness occur, gains from CoT reasoning strategies remain robust across different models and datasets. GPT-4 has the most benefit from current state-of-the-art reasoning strategies and exhibits the best performance by applying a prompt previously discovered through automated discovery.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

Existing reasoning segmentation approaches typically fine-tune multimodal large language models (MLLMs) using image-text pairs and corresponding mask labels. However, they exhibit limited generalization to out-of-distribution scenarios without an explicit reasoning process. Although recent efforts leverage reinforcement learning through group-relative policy optimization (GRPO) to enhance reasoning ability, they often suffer from overthinking - producing uniformly verbose reasoning chains irrespective of task complexity. This results in elevated computational costs and limited control over reasoning quality. To address this problem, we propose PixelThink, a simple yet effective scheme that integrates externally estimated task difficulty and internally measured model uncertainty to regulate reasoning generation within a reinforcement learning paradigm. The model learns to compress reasoning length in accordance with scene complexity and predictive confidence. To support comprehensive evaluation, we introduce ReasonSeg-Diff, an extended benchmark with annotated reasoning references and difficulty scores, along with a suite of metrics designed to assess segmentation accuracy, reasoning quality, and efficiency jointly. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach improves both reasoning efficiency and overall segmentation performance. Our work contributes novel perspectives towards efficient and interpretable multimodal understanding. The code and model will be publicly available.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting can dramatically improve the multi-step reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). CoT explicitly encourages the LLM to generate intermediate rationales for solving a problem, by providing a series of reasoning steps in the demonstrations. Despite its success, there is still little understanding of what makes CoT prompting effective and which aspects of the demonstrated reasoning steps contribute to its performance. In this paper, we show that CoT reasoning is possible even with invalid demonstrations - prompting with invalid reasoning steps can achieve over 80-90% of the performance obtained using CoT under various metrics, while still generating coherent lines of reasoning during inference. Further experiments show that other aspects of the rationales, such as being relevant to the query and correctly ordering the reasoning steps, are much more important for effective CoT reasoning. Overall, these findings both deepen our understanding of CoT prompting, and open up new questions regarding LLMs' capability to learn to reason in context.

Enhancing the capability of large language models (LLMs) in reasoning has gained significant attention in recent years. Previous studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of various prompting strategies in aiding LLMs in reasoning (called "reasoning actions"), such as step-by-step thinking, reflecting before answering, solving with programs, and their combinations. However, these approaches often applied static, predefined reasoning actions uniformly to all questions, without considering the specific characteristics of each question or the capability of the task-solving LLM. In this paper, we propose DOTS, an approach enabling LLMs to reason dynamically via optimal reasoning trajectory search, tailored to the specific characteristics of each question and the inherent capability of the task-solving LLM. Our approach involves three key steps: i) defining atomic reasoning action modules that can be composed into various reasoning action trajectories; ii) searching for the optimal action trajectory for each training question through iterative exploration and evaluation for the specific task-solving LLM; and iii) using the collected optimal trajectories to train an LLM to plan for the reasoning trajectories of unseen questions. In particular, we propose two learning paradigms, i.e., fine-tuning an external LLM as a planner to guide the task-solving LLM, or directly fine-tuning the task-solving LLM with an internalized capability for reasoning actions planning. Our experiments across eight reasoning tasks show that our method consistently outperforms static reasoning techniques and the vanilla instruction tuning approach. Further analysis reveals that our method enables LLMs to adjust their computation based on problem complexity, allocating deeper thinking and reasoning to harder problems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning but are traditionally evaluated in static, "frozen world" settings: model responses are assumed to be instantaneous, and the context of a request is presumed to be immutable over the duration of the response. While generally true for short-term tasks, the "frozen world" assumption breaks down in modern reasoning tasks such as assistive programming, where models may take hours to think through problems and code may change dramatically from the time the model starts thinking to the model's final output. In this work, we challenge the frozen world assumption and evaluate LRM robustness under two realistic dynamic scenarios: interruptions, which test the quality of the model's partial outputs on a limited budget, and dynamic context, which tests model adaptation to in-flight changes. Across mathematics and programming benchmarks that require long-form reasoning, static evaluations consistently overestimate robustness: even state-of-the-art LRMs, which achieve high accuracy in static settings, can fail unpredictably when interrupted or exposed to changing context, with performance dropping by up to 60% when updates are introduced late in the reasoning process. Our analysis further reveals several novel failure modes, including reasoning leakage, where models fold the reasoning into their final answer when interrupted; panic, where under time pressure models abandon reasoning entirely and return incorrect answers; and self-doubt, where performance degrades while incorporating updated information.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

The chain-of-though (CoT) prompting methods were successful in various natural language processing (NLP) tasks thanks to their ability to unveil the underlying complex reasoning processes. Such reasoning processes typically exhibit implicitly structured steps. Recent efforts also started investigating methods to encourage more explicitly structured reasoning procedures to be captured. In this work, we propose Tab-CoT, a novel tabular-format CoT prompting method, which allows the complex reasoning process to be explicitly modelled in a highly structured manner. Despite its simplicity, we show that our approach is capable of performing reasoning across multiple dimensions (i.e., both rows and columns). We demonstrate our approach's strong zero-shot and few-shot capabilities through extensive experiments on a range of reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) are restricted to reason in the "language space", where they typically express the reasoning process with a chain-of-thought (CoT) to solve a complex reasoning problem. However, we argue that language space may not always be optimal for reasoning. For example, most word tokens are primarily for textual coherence and not essential for reasoning, while some critical tokens require complex planning and pose huge challenges to LLMs. To explore the potential of LLM reasoning in an unrestricted latent space instead of using natural language, we introduce a new paradigm Coconut (Chain of Continuous Thought). We utilize the last hidden state of the LLM as a representation of the reasoning state (termed "continuous thought"). Rather than decoding this into a word token, we feed it back to the LLM as the subsequent input embedding directly in the continuous space. Experiments show that Coconut can effectively augment the LLM on several reasoning tasks. This novel latent reasoning paradigm leads to emergent advanced reasoning patterns: the continuous thought can encode multiple alternative next reasoning steps, allowing the model to perform a breadth-first search (BFS) to solve the problem, rather than prematurely committing to a single deterministic path like CoT. Coconut outperforms CoT in certain logical reasoning tasks that require substantial backtracking during planning, with fewer thinking tokens during inference. These findings demonstrate the promise of latent reasoning and offer valuable insights for future research.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.

Recent large language models have shown promising capabilities in long-form reasoning, following structured chains of thought before arriving at a final answer. However, we observe that these reasoning paths tend to include substantial redundancy; analyzing attention patterns reveals that attention scores are widely scattered, particularly incorrect answers exhibit greater attention sparsity. In this paper, we demonstrate that deliberately removing this redundancy in the reasoning process significantly improves performance through clear thinking, i.e., removing distraction. Specifically, we systematically identify reasoning redundancy by measuring token-level attention scores to a special end-of-thinking token, which is appended to an explicit instruction inserted to conclude each intermediate reasoning step. Furthermore, we propose structure-aware pruning that prioritizes removing tokens in low-contributing reasoning chunks over individual tokens. After evicting redundant tokens, we remove the injected end-of-thinking instruction, then resume the reasoning generation. We demonstrate that our method significantly improves overall accuracy across reasoning-intensive benchmarks without any training involved. In particular, our method shows strong performance on challenging mathematical competition benchmarks such as AIME and AMC, where reasoning redundancy is more prevalent.

We endow Large Language Models (LLMs) with fine-grained self-evaluation to refine multi-step reasoning inference. We propose an effective prompting approach that integrates self-evaluation guidance through stochastic beam search. Our approach explores the reasoning search space using a well-calibrated automatic criterion. This enables an efficient search to produce higher-quality final predictions. With the self-evaluation guided stochastic beam search, we also balance the quality-diversity trade-off in the generation of reasoning chains. This allows our approach to adapt well with majority voting and surpass the corresponding Codex-backboned baselines by 6.34%, 9.56%, and 5.46% on the GSM8K, AQuA, and StrategyQA benchmarks, respectively, in few-shot accuracy. Analysis of our decompositional reasoning finds it pinpoints logic failures and leads to higher consistency and robustness. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuxiXie/SelfEval-Guided-Decoding.

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) tends to produce substantially longer token generation sequences than simpler language modeling tasks. This extended generation length reflects the multi-step, compositional nature of reasoning and is often correlated with higher solution accuracy. From an efficiency perspective, longer token generation exacerbates the inherently sequential and memory-bound decoding phase of LLMs. However, not all parts of this expensive reasoning process are equally difficult to generate. We leverage this observation by offloading only the most challenging parts of the reasoning process to a larger, more capable model, while performing most of the generation with a smaller, more efficient model; furthermore, we teach the smaller model to identify these difficult segments and independently trigger offloading when needed. To enable this behavior, we annotate difficult segments across 18k reasoning traces from the OpenR1-Math-220k chain-of-thought (CoT) dataset. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning fine-tuning (RLFT) to a 1.5B-parameter reasoning model, training it to learn to offload the most challenging parts of its own reasoning process to a larger model. This approach improves AIME24 reasoning accuracy by 24% and 28.3% while offloading 1.35% and 5% of the generated tokens respectively. We open-source our SplitReason model, data, code and logs.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

In the realm of embodied artificial intelligence, the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) play a pivotal role. Although there are effective methods like program-of-thought prompting for LLMs which uses programming language to tackle complex reasoning tasks, the specific impact of code data on the improvement of reasoning capabilities remains under-explored. To address this gap, we propose complexity-impacted reasoning score (CIRS), which combines structural and logical attributes, to measure the correlation between code and reasoning abilities. Specifically, we use the abstract syntax tree to encode the structural information and calculate logical complexity by considering the difficulty and the cyclomatic complexity. Through an empirical analysis, we find not all code data of complexity can be learned or understood by LLMs. Optimal level of complexity is critical to the improvement of reasoning abilities by program-aided prompting. Then we design an auto-synthesizing and stratifying algorithm, and apply it to instruction generation for mathematical reasoning and code data filtering for code generation tasks. Extensive results demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed approach. Code will be integrated into the EasyInstruct framework at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyInstruct.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

Large Language Models (LLMs) with chains-of-thought have demonstrated strong performance on an increasing range of tasks, particularly those involving complex logical reasoning. However, excessively long chains can lead to overthinking, causing computational waste and slower responses. This raises a question: can LLMs dynamically adjust the length of their reasoning processes based on task complexity? To address this, we propose the Think in Blocks framework, which enables adaptive reasoning-from zero to deep reasoning-by partitioning the reasoning process into a tunable number of blocks. Our main contributions are: (1) Establishing an explicit block-structured paradigm in which the model first predicts an integer reasoning budget-the number of blocks-and then partitions its reasoning accordingly; (2) Training an adaptive model through a three-stage pipeline-Supervised Fine-Tuning, reward-guided Direct Preference Optimization, and Reinforcement Learning-that adjusts its reasoning depth to problem difficulty; (3) Exploiting the explicit block count to dynamically control reasoning depth at inference time, allowing flexible adjustment of chain-of-thought length during deployment.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on complex tasks, including logical puzzle games that require deriving solutions satisfying all constraints. However, whether they can flexibly apply appropriate rules to varying conditions, particularly when faced with non-canonical game variants, remains an open question. Existing corpora focus on popular puzzles like 9x9 Sudoku, risking overfitting to canonical formats and memorization of solution patterns, which can mask deficiencies in understanding novel rules or adapting strategies to new variants. To address this, we introduce HardcoreLogic, a challenging benchmark of over 5,000 puzzles across 10 games, designed to test the robustness of LRMs on the "long-tail" of logical games. HardcoreLogic systematically transforms canonical puzzles through three dimensions: Increased Complexity (IC), Uncommon Elements (UE), and Unsolvable Puzzles (UP), reducing reliance on shortcut memorization. Evaluations on a diverse set of LRMs reveal significant performance drops, even for models achieving top scores on existing benchmarks, indicating heavy reliance on memorized stereotypes. While increased complexity is the dominant source of difficulty, models also struggle with subtle rule variations that do not necessarily increase puzzle difficulty. Our systematic error analysis on solvable and unsolvable puzzles further highlights gaps in genuine reasoning. Overall, HardcoreLogic exposes the limitations of current LRMs and establishes a benchmark for advancing high-level logical reasoning.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

Large Language Reasoning Models have demonstrated remarkable success on static tasks, yet their application to multi-round agentic planning in interactive environments faces two fundamental challenges. First, the intractable credit assignment problem renders conventional reinforcement learning ineffective in sparse-reward settings. Second, the computational overhead of verbose, step-by-step reasoning histories is prohibitive. To address these challenges, we propose BPO, a three-stage framework (bootstrapping, extrapolation, and refinement) that establishes a self-improving data flywheel to develop robust reasoning models for long-horizon, sparse-reward environments. Our framework first bootstraps efficient reasoning using the proposed planning quaternions with long-short chain-of-thought fusion. It then extrapolates to out-of-distribution tasks through complexity-stratified curriculum learning. Finally, the model iteratively refines itself by learning exclusively on experiences selected via reward-gated rejection sampling. Experiments on ALFWorld, ScienceWorld, and WebShop demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art with significant token efficiency, providing a new recipe for reasoning models in agentic planning.

Mathematical reasoning, a core aspect of human cognition, is vital across many domains, from educational problem-solving to scientific advancements. As artificial general intelligence (AGI) progresses, integrating large language models (LLMs) with mathematical reasoning tasks is becoming increasingly significant. This survey provides the first comprehensive analysis of mathematical reasoning in the era of multimodal large language models (MLLMs). We review over 200 studies published since 2021, and examine the state-of-the-art developments in Math-LLMs, with a focus on multimodal settings. We categorize the field into three dimensions: benchmarks, methodologies, and challenges. In particular, we explore multimodal mathematical reasoning pipeline, as well as the role of (M)LLMs and the associated methodologies. Finally, we identify five major challenges hindering the realization of AGI in this domain, offering insights into the future direction for enhancing multimodal reasoning capabilities. This survey serves as a critical resource for the research community in advancing the capabilities of LLMs to tackle complex multimodal reasoning tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate strong performance on mathematical problems when prompted with Chain-of-Thought (CoT), yet it remains unclear whether this success stems from search, rote procedures, or rule-consistent reasoning. To address this, we propose modeling CoT as a certain rule-based stochastic process over directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), where nodes represent intermediate derivation states and edges encode rule applications. Within this framework, we introduce logical closeness, a metric that quantifies how well a model's CoT trajectory (i.e., the LLM's final output) adheres to the DAG structure, providing evaluation beyond classical PASS@k metrics. Building on this, we introduce the DAG-MATH CoT format and construct a benchmark that guides LLMs to generate CoT trajectories in this format, thereby enabling the evaluation of their reasoning ability under our framework. Across standard mathematical reasoning datasets, our analysis uncovers statistically significant differences in reasoning fidelity among representative LLM families-even when PASS@k is comparable-highlighting gaps between final-answer accuracy and rule-consistent derivation. Our framework provides a balance between free-form CoT and formal proofs systems, offering actionable diagnostics for LLMs reasoning evaluation. Our benchmark and code are available at: https://github.com/YuanheZ/DAG-MATH-Formatted-CoT.

Inspired by the success of DeepSeek-R1, we explore the potential of rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) in large reasoning models. To analyze reasoning dynamics, we use synthetic logic puzzles as training data due to their controllable complexity and straightforward answer verification. We make some key technical contributions that lead to effective and stable RL training: a system prompt that emphasizes the thinking and answering process, a stringent format reward function that penalizes outputs for taking shortcuts, and a straightforward training recipe that achieves stable convergence. Our 7B model develops advanced reasoning skills-such as reflection, verification, and summarization-that are absent from the logic corpus. Remarkably, after training on just 5K logic problems, it demonstrates generalization abilities to the challenging math benchmarks AIME and AMC.

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

Reasoning stands as a cornerstone of intelligence, enabling the synthesis of existing knowledge to solve complex problems. Despite remarkable progress, existing reasoning benchmarks often fail to rigorously evaluate the nuanced reasoning capabilities required for complex, real-world problemsolving, particularly in multi-disciplinary and multimodal contexts. In this paper, we introduce a graduate-level, multi-disciplinary, EnglishChinese benchmark, dubbed as Reasoning Bench (R-Bench), for assessing the reasoning capability of both language and multimodal models. RBench spans 1,094 questions across 108 subjects for language model evaluation and 665 questions across 83 subjects for multimodal model testing in both English and Chinese. These questions are meticulously curated to ensure rigorous difficulty calibration, subject balance, and crosslinguistic alignment, enabling the assessment to be an Olympiad-level multi-disciplinary benchmark. We evaluate widely used models, including OpenAI o1, GPT-4o, DeepSeek-R1, etc. Experimental results indicate that advanced models perform poorly on complex reasoning, especially multimodal reasoning. Even the top-performing model OpenAI o1 achieves only 53.2% accuracy on our multimodal evaluation. Data and code are made publicly available at here.

Large language models often require costly optimization, such as reinforcement learning, to master complex reasoning tasks. This work demonstrates that reasoning ability, once learned, can be extracted and transferred between models as a compact task vector. We source two publicly available, identically initialized Qwen2.5 models, one fine-tuned with supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and the other with group relative policy optimization (GRPO) on the same dataset. From these, we extract a reasoning vector: v_{reason} = theta_{GRPO} - theta_{SFT}. We hypothesize that this vector captures the reasoning capability instilled by reinforcement learning while factoring out shared knowledge from the SFT process. When added to compatible instruction-tuned models through simple arithmetic, this vector consistently improves performance across diverse reasoning benchmarks: GSM8K (+4.9%), HumanEval (+4.3%), SciQ (+1.7%), and BigBenchHard (+12.3% for the 1.5B model). The performance improvements persist under adversarial conditions. Conversely, subtracting the vector causes significant performance degradation (-11.8% on GSM8K), demonstrating the vector's strong contribution to the model's reasoning abilities. This work shows how reasoning capabilities, typically developed through expensive training, can be extracted from existing open-source models and reused through simple tensor arithmetic, offering a practical way to enhance models by recycling prior computational investments.

Logical reasoning remains a challenge for natural language processing, but it can be improved by training language models to mimic theorem provers on procedurally generated problems. Previous work used domain-specific proof generation algorithms, which biases reasoning toward specific proof traces and limits auditability and extensibility. We present a simpler and more general declarative framework with flexible context-sensitive rules binding multiple languages (specifically, simplified English and the TPTP theorem-proving language). We construct first-order logic problems by selecting up to 32 premises and one hypothesis. We demonstrate that using semantic constraints during generation and careful English verbalization of predicates enhances logical reasoning without hurting natural English tasks. We use relatively small DeBERTa-v3 models to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy on the FOLIO human-authored logic dataset, surpassing GPT-4 in accuracy with or without an external solver by 12%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in natural language processing. Recent advances have led to the developing of a new class of reasoning LLMs; for example, open-source DeepSeek-R1 has achieved state-of-the-art performance by integrating deep thinking and complex reasoning. Despite these impressive capabilities, the internal reasoning mechanisms of such models remain unexplored. In this work, we employ Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), a method to learn a sparse decomposition of latent representations of a neural network into interpretable features, to identify features that drive reasoning in the DeepSeek-R1 series of models. First, we propose an approach to extract candidate ''reasoning features'' from SAE representations. We validate these features through empirical analysis and interpretability methods, demonstrating their direct correlation with the model's reasoning abilities. Crucially, we demonstrate that steering these features systematically enhances reasoning performance, offering the first mechanistic account of reasoning in LLMs. Code available at https://github.com/AIRI-Institute/SAE-Reasoning

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance on challenging tasks, yet their deep reasoning often incurs substantial computational costs. To achieve efficient reasoning, existing reinforcement learning methods still struggle to construct short reasoning path during the rollout stage, limiting effective learning. Inspired by Evidence Accumulation Models, we find that LRMs have accumulated sufficient information early in reasoning, making further reasoning steps redundant. Based on this insight, we propose Just-Enough Thinking (JET), which trains models to proactively terminate unnecessary reasoning. JET performs trajectory truncation during rollout to expose the model to short, distributionally consistent reasoning paths. Besides, it uses a quality-controlled length reward to better encourage concise reasoning while maintaining correctness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that JET significantly improves reasoning efficiency without sacrificing accuracy. Especially, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-1.5B achieves a 4.6% accuracy gain while reducing output length by 46.3% on the Olympiad benchmark. Our code is available in the GitHub.

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.