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Oct 30

PyTorch-Direct: Enabling GPU Centric Data Access for Very Large Graph Neural Network Training with Irregular Accesses

With the increasing adoption of graph neural networks (GNNs) in the machine learning community, GPUs have become an essential tool to accelerate GNN training. However, training GNNs on very large graphs that do not fit in GPU memory is still a challenging task. Unlike conventional neural networks, mini-batching input samples in GNNs requires complicated tasks such as traversing neighboring nodes and gathering their feature values. While this process accounts for a significant portion of the training time, we find existing GNN implementations using popular deep neural network (DNN) libraries such as PyTorch are limited to a CPU-centric approach for the entire data preparation step. This "all-in-CPU" approach has negative impact on the overall GNN training performance as it over-utilizes CPU resources and hinders GPU acceleration of GNN training. To overcome such limitations, we introduce PyTorch-Direct, which enables a GPU-centric data accessing paradigm for GNN training. In PyTorch-Direct, GPUs are capable of efficiently accessing complicated data structures in host memory directly without CPU intervention. Our microbenchmark and end-to-end GNN training results show that PyTorch-Direct reduces data transfer time by 47.1% on average and speeds up GNN training by up to 1.6x. Furthermore, by reducing CPU utilization, PyTorch-Direct also saves system power by 12.4% to 17.5% during training. To minimize programmer effort, we introduce a new "unified tensor" type along with necessary changes to the PyTorch memory allocator, dispatch logic, and placement rules. As a result, users need to change at most two lines of their PyTorch GNN training code for each tensor object to take advantage of PyTorch-Direct.

  • 8 authors
·
Jan 19, 2021

Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

  • 3 authors
·
Jul 12, 2023

Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

  • 10 authors
·
Jun 3

Knapsack RL: Unlocking Exploration of LLMs via Optimizing Budget Allocation

Large Language Models (LLMs) can self-improve through reinforcement learning, where they generate trajectories to explore and discover better solutions. However, this exploration process is computationally expensive, often forcing current methods to assign limited exploration budgets to each task. This uniform allocation creates problematic edge cases: easy tasks consistently succeed while difficult tasks consistently fail, both producing zero gradients during training updates for the widely used Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We address this problem from the lens of exploration budget allocation. Viewing each task's exploration as an "item" with a distinct "value" and "cost", we establish a connection to the classical knapsack problem. This formulation allows us to derive an optimal assignment rule that adaptively distributes resources based on the model's current learning status. When applied to GRPO, our method increases the effective ratio of non-zero policy gradients by 20-40% during training. Acting as a computational "free lunch", our approach could reallocate exploration budgets from tasks where learning is saturated to those where it is most impactful. This enables significantly larger budgets (e.g., 93 rollouts) for especially challenging problems, which would be computationally prohibitive under a uniform allocation. These improvements translate to meaningful gains on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, with average improvements of 2-4 points and peak gains of 9 points on specific tasks. Notably, achieving comparable performance with traditional homogeneous allocation would require about 2x the computational resources.

Chinese vs. World Bank Development Projects: Insights from Earth Observation and Computer Vision on Wealth Gains in Africa, 2002-2013

Debates about whether development projects improve living conditions persist, partly because observational estimates can be biased by incomplete adjustment and because reliable outcome data are scarce at the neighborhood level. We address both issues in a continent-scale, sector-specific evaluation of Chinese and World Bank projects across 9,899 neighborhoods in 36 African countries (2002 to 2013), representative of 88% of the population. First, we use a recent dataset that measures living conditions with a machine-learned wealth index derived from contemporaneous satellite imagery, yielding a consistent panel of 6.7 km square mosaics. Second, to strengthen identification, we proxy officials' map-based placement criteria using pre-treatment daytime satellite images and fuse these with rich tabular covariates to estimate funder- and sector-specific ATEs via inverse-probability weighting. Incorporating imagery systematically shrinks effects relative to tabular-only models, indicating prior work likely overstated benefits. On average, both donors raise wealth, with larger gains for China; sector extremes in our sample include Trade and Tourism for the World Bank (+6.27 IWI points), and Emergency Response for China (+14.32). Assignment-mechanism analyses show World Bank placement is generally more predictable from imagery alone, as well as from tabular covariates. This suggests that Chinese project placements are more driven by non-visible, political, or event-driven factors than World Bank placements. To probe residual concerns about selection on observables, we also estimate within-neighborhood (unit) fixed-effects models at a spatial resolution about 450 times finer than prior fixed effects analyses, leveraging the computer-vision-imputed IWI panels; these deliver smaller but directionally consistent effects.

Discovering and Exploiting Sparse Rewards in a Learned Behavior Space

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 2, 2021

Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

  • 7 authors
·
Jan 10, 2017

An Algorithm for Recommending Groceries Based on an Item Ranking Method

This research proposes a new recommender system algorithm for online grocery shopping. The algorithm is based on the perspective that, since the grocery items are usually bought in bulk, a grocery recommender system should be capable of recommending the items in bulk. The algorithm figures out the possible dishes a user may cook based on the items added to the basket and recommends the ingredients accordingly. Our algorithm does not depend on the user ratings. Customers usually do not have the patience to rate the groceries they purchase. Therefore, algorithms that are not dependent on user ratings need to be designed. Instead of using a brute force search, this algorithm limits the search space to a set of only a few probably food categories. Each food category consists of several food subcategories. For example, "fried rice" and "biryani" are food subcategories that belong to the food category "rice". For each food category, items are ranked according to how well they can differentiate a food subcategory. To each food subcategory in the activated search space, this algorithm attaches a score. The score is calculated based on the rank of the items added to the basket. Once the score exceeds a threshold value, its corresponding subcategory gets activated. The algorithm then uses a basket-to-recipe similarity measure to identify the best recipe matches within the activated subcategories only. This reduces the search space to a great extent. We may argue that this algorithm is similar to the content-based recommender system in some sense, but it does not suffer from the limitations like limited content, over-specialization, or the new user problem.

  • 2 authors
·
May 3, 2021

Feature Responsiveness Scores: Model-Agnostic Explanations for Recourse

Machine learning models routinely automate decisions in applications like lending and hiring. In such settings, consumer protection rules require companies that deploy models to explain predictions to decision subjects. These rules are motivated, in part, by the belief that explanations can promote recourse by revealing information that individuals can use to contest or improve their outcomes. In practice, many companies comply with these rules by providing individuals with a list of the most important features for their prediction, which they identify based on feature importance scores from feature attribution methods such as SHAP or LIME. In this work, we show how these practices can undermine consumers by highlighting features that would not lead to an improved outcome and by explaining predictions that cannot be changed. We propose to address these issues by highlighting features based on their responsiveness score -- i.e., the probability that an individual can attain a target prediction by changing a specific feature. We develop efficient methods to compute responsiveness scores for any model and any dataset. We conduct an extensive empirical study on the responsiveness of explanations in lending. Our results show that standard practices in consumer finance can backfire by presenting consumers with reasons without recourse, and demonstrate how our approach improves consumer protection by highlighting responsive features and identifying fixed predictions.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 29, 2024