Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved considerable performance across various agentic planning tasks. However, traditional agent planning approaches adopt a "flood irrigation" methodology that indiscriminately injects gold trajectories, external feedback, and domain knowledge into agent models. This practice overlooks the fundamental human cognitive principle of situational self-awareness during decision-making-the ability to dynamically assess situational demands and strategically employ resources during decision-making. We propose agentic knowledgeable self-awareness to address this gap, a novel paradigm enabling LLM-based agents to autonomously regulate knowledge utilization. Specifically, we propose KnowSelf, a data-centric approach that applies agents with knowledgeable self-awareness like humans. Concretely, we devise a heuristic situation judgement criterion to mark special tokens on the agent's self-explored trajectories for collecting training data. Through a two-stage training process, the agent model can switch between different situations by generating specific special tokens, achieving optimal planning effects with minimal costs. Our experiments demonstrate that KnowSelf can outperform various strong baselines on different tasks and models with minimal use of external knowledge. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/KnowSelf.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

Cognitive psychologists have documented that humans use cognitive heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make quick decisions while expending less effort. While performing annotation work on crowdsourcing platforms, we hypothesize that such heuristic use among annotators cascades on to data quality and model robustness. In this work, we study cognitive heuristic use in the context of annotating multiple-choice reading comprehension datasets. We propose tracking annotator heuristic traces, where we tangibly measure low-effort annotation strategies that could indicate usage of various cognitive heuristics. We find evidence that annotators might be using multiple such heuristics, based on correlations with a battery of psychological tests. Importantly, heuristic use among annotators determines data quality along several dimensions: (1) known biased models, such as partial input models, more easily solve examples authored by annotators that rate highly on heuristic use, (2) models trained on annotators scoring highly on heuristic use don't generalize as well, and (3) heuristic-seeking annotators tend to create qualitatively less challenging examples. Our findings suggest that tracking heuristic usage among annotators can potentially help with collecting challenging datasets and diagnosing model biases.

A commonly used heuristic in RL is experience replay (e.g.~lin1993reinforcement, mnih2015human), in which a learner stores and re-uses past trajectories as if they were sampled online. In this work, we initiate a rigorous study of this heuristic in the setting of tabular Q-learning. We provide a convergence rate guarantee, and discuss how it compares to the convergence of Q-learning depending on important parameters such as the frequency and number of replay iterations. We also provide theoretical evidence showing when we might expect this heuristic to strictly improve performance, by introducing and analyzing a simple class of MDPs. Finally, we provide some experiments to support our theoretical findings.

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (It-LLMs) have been exhibiting outstanding abilities to reason around cognitive states, intentions, and reactions of all people involved, letting humans guide and comprehend day-to-day social interactions effectively. In fact, several multiple-choice questions (MCQ) benchmarks have been proposed to construct solid assessments of the models' abilities. However, earlier works are demonstrating the presence of inherent "order bias" in It-LLMs, posing challenges to the appropriate evaluation. In this paper, we investigate It-LLMs' resilience abilities towards a series of probing tests using four MCQ benchmarks. Introducing adversarial examples, we show a significant performance gap, mainly when varying the order of the choices, which reveals a selection bias and brings into discussion reasoning abilities. Following a correlation between first positions and model choices due to positional bias, we hypothesized the presence of structural heuristics in the decision-making process of the It-LLMs, strengthened by including significant examples in few-shot scenarios. Finally, by using the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) technique, we elicit the model to reason and mitigate the bias by obtaining more robust models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Heuristic algorithms play a vital role in solving combinatorial optimization (CO) problems, yet traditional designs depend heavily on manual expertise and struggle to generalize across diverse instances. We introduce HeurAgenix, a two-stage hyper-heuristic framework powered by large language models (LLMs) that first evolves heuristics and then selects among them automatically. In the heuristic evolution phase, HeurAgenix leverages an LLM to compare seed heuristic solutions with higher-quality solutions and extract reusable evolution strategies. During problem solving, it dynamically picks the most promising heuristic for each problem state, guided by the LLM's perception ability. For flexibility, this selector can be either a state-of-the-art LLM or a fine-tuned lightweight model with lower inference cost. To mitigate the scarcity of reliable supervision caused by CO complexity, we fine-tune the lightweight heuristic selector with a dual-reward mechanism that jointly exploits singals from selection preferences and state perception, enabling robust selection under noisy annotations. Extensive experiments on canonical benchmarks show that HeurAgenix not only outperforms existing LLM-based hyper-heuristics but also matches or exceeds specialized solvers. Code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/HeurAgenix.

This paper examines the role of cognitive biases in the decision-making processes of large language models (LLMs), challenging the conventional goal of eliminating all biases. We show that certain cognitive biases when properly balanced, can enhance decision-making efficiency through rational deviations and heuristic shortcuts. By introducing heuristic moderation and an abstention option, which allows LLMs to withhold responses when uncertain, we reduce error rates, improve decision accuracy, and optimize decision rates. Using the Balance Rigor and Utility (BRU) dataset, developed through expert collaboration, our findings demonstrate that targeted inspection of cognitive biases aligns LLM decisions more closely with human reasoning, enhancing reliability and suggesting strategies for future improvements. This approach offers a novel way to leverage cognitive biases to improve the practical utility of LLMs across various applications.

Heuristics are widely used for dealing with complex search and optimization problems. However, manual design of heuristics can be often very labour extensive and requires rich working experience and knowledge. This paper proposes Evolution of Heuristic (EoH), a novel evolutionary paradigm that leverages both Large Language Models (LLMs) and Evolutionary Computation (EC) methods for Automatic Heuristic Design (AHD). EoH represents the ideas of heuristics in natural language, termed thoughts. They are then translated into executable codes by LLMs. The evolution of both thoughts and codes in an evolutionary search framework makes it very effective and efficient for generating high-performance heuristics. Experiments on three widely studied combinatorial optimization benchmark problems demonstrate that EoH outperforms commonly used handcrafted heuristics and other recent AHD methods including FunSearch. Particularly, the heuristic produced by EoH with a low computational budget (in terms of the number of queries to LLMs) significantly outperforms widely-used human hand-crafted baseline algorithms for the online bin packing problem.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Offline reinforcement learning enables agents to leverage large pre-collected datasets of environment transitions to learn control policies, circumventing the need for potentially expensive or unsafe online data collection. Significant progress has been made recently in offline model-based reinforcement learning, approaches which leverage a learned dynamics model. This typically involves constructing a probabilistic model, and using the model uncertainty to penalize rewards where there is insufficient data, solving for a pessimistic MDP that lower bounds the true MDP. Existing methods, however, exhibit a breakdown between theory and practice, whereby pessimistic return ought to be bounded by the total variation distance of the model from the true dynamics, but is instead implemented through a penalty based on estimated model uncertainty. This has spawned a variety of uncertainty heuristics, with little to no comparison between differing approaches. In this paper, we compare these heuristics, and design novel protocols to investigate their interaction with other hyperparameters, such as the number of models, or imaginary rollout horizon. Using these insights, we show that selecting these key hyperparameters using Bayesian Optimization produces superior configurations that are vastly different to those currently used in existing hand-tuned state-of-the-art methods, and result in drastically stronger performance.

A popular approach for sequential decision-making is to perform simulator-based search guided with Machine Learning (ML) methods like policy learning. On the other hand, model-relaxation heuristics can guide the search effectively if a full declarative model is available. In this work, we consider how a practitioner can improve ML-based black-box planning on settings where a complete symbolic model is not available. We show that specifying an incomplete STRIPS model that describes only part of the problem enables the use of relaxation heuristics. Our findings on several planning domains suggest that this is an effective way to improve ML-based black-box planning beyond collecting more data or tuning ML architectures.

Intrigued by the claims of emergent reasoning capabilities in LLMs trained on general web corpora, in this paper, we set out to investigate their planning capabilities. We aim to evaluate (1) the effectiveness of LLMs in generating plans autonomously in commonsense planning tasks and (2) the potential of LLMs as a source of heuristic guidance for other agents (AI planners) in their planning tasks. We conduct a systematic study by generating a suite of instances on domains similar to the ones employed in the International Planning Competition and evaluate LLMs in two distinct modes: autonomous and heuristic. Our findings reveal that LLMs' ability to generate executable plans autonomously is rather limited, with the best model (GPT-4) having an average success rate of ~12% across the domains. However, the results in the heuristic mode show more promise. In the heuristic mode, we demonstrate that LLM-generated plans can improve the search process for underlying sound planners and additionally show that external verifiers can help provide feedback on the generated plans and back-prompt the LLM for better plan generation.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive planning abilities due to their vast "world knowledge". Yet, obtaining plans that are both feasible (grounded in affordances) and cost-effective (in plan length), remains a challenge, despite recent progress. This contrasts with heuristic planning methods that employ domain knowledge (formalized in action models such as PDDL) and heuristic search to generate feasible, optimal plans. Inspired by this, we propose to combine the power of LLMs and heuristic planning by leveraging the world knowledge of LLMs and the principles of heuristic search. Our approach, SayCanPay, employs LLMs to generate actions (Say) guided by learnable domain knowledge, that evaluates actions' feasibility (Can) and long-term reward/payoff (Pay), and heuristic search to select the best sequence of actions. Our contributions are (1) a novel framing of the LLM planning problem in the context of heuristic planning, (2) integrating grounding and cost-effective elements into the generated plans, and (3) using heuristic search over actions. Our extensive evaluations show that our model surpasses other LLM planning approaches.

Gaze-referential inference--the ability to infer what others are looking at--is a critical component of a theory of mind that underpins natural human-AI interaction. In a controlled study, we evaluated this skill across 111 Vision Language Models (VLMs) using photos taken with manipulated difficulty and variability, comparing performance with that of human participants (N = 65), and analyzed behaviors using mixed-effects models. We found that 94 of the 111 VLMs failed to do better than random guessing, while humans achieved near-ceiling accuracy. VLMs even respond with each choice almost equally frequently. Are they randomly guessing? Although most VLMs struggle, when we zoom in on five of the top-tier VLMs with above-chance performance, we find that their performance declined with increasing task difficulty but varied only slightly across different prompts and scene objects. These behavioral features cannot be explained by considering them as random guessers. Instead, they likely use a combination of heuristics and guessing such that their performance is subject to the task difficulty but robust to perceptual variations. This suggests that VLMs, lacking gaze inference capability, have yet to become technologies that can naturally interact with humans, but the potential remains.

Selecting the best code solution from multiple generated ones is an essential task in code generation, which can be achieved by using some reliable validators (e.g., developer-written test cases) for assistance. Since reliable test cases are not always available and can be expensive to build in practice, researchers propose to automatically generate test cases to assess code solutions. However, when both code solutions and test cases are plausible and not reliable, selecting the best solution becomes challenging. Although some heuristic strategies have been proposed to tackle this problem, they lack a strong theoretical guarantee and it is still an open question whether an optimal selection strategy exists. Our work contributes in two ways. First, we show that within a Bayesian framework, the optimal selection strategy can be defined based on the posterior probability of the observed passing states between solutions and tests. The problem of identifying the best solution is then framed as an integer programming problem. Second, we propose an efficient approach for approximating this optimal (yet uncomputable) strategy, where the approximation error is bounded by the correctness of prior knowledge. We then incorporate effective prior knowledge to tailor code generation tasks. Both theoretical and empirical studies confirm that existing heuristics are limited in selecting the best solutions with plausible test cases. Our proposed approximated optimal strategy B4 significantly surpasses existing heuristics in selecting code solutions generated by large language models (LLMs) with LLM-generated tests, achieving a relative performance improvement by up to 50% over the strongest heuristic and 246% over the random selection in the most challenging scenarios. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ZJU-CTAG/B4.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Decision-making is a dynamic process requiring perception, memory, and reasoning to make choices and find optimal policies. Traditional approaches to decision-making suffer from sample efficiency and generalization, while large-scale self-supervised pretraining has enabled fast adaptation with fine-tuning or few-shot learning in language and vision. We thus argue to integrate knowledge acquired from generic large-scale self-supervised pretraining into downstream decision-making problems. We propose Pretrain-Then-Adapt pipeline and survey recent work on data collection, pretraining objectives and adaptation strategies for decision-making pretraining and downstream inference. Finally, we identify critical challenges and future directions for developing decision foundation model with the help of generic and flexible self-supervised pretraining.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

LLMs are ideal for decision-making thanks to their ability to reason over long contexts. However, challenges arise when processing speech transcripts that describe complex scenarios, as they are verbose and include repetition, hedging, and vagueness. E.g., during a company's earnings call, an executive might project a positive revenue outlook to reassure investors, despite uncertainty regarding future earnings. It is crucial for LLMs to incorporate this uncertainty systematically when making decisions. In this paper, we introduce DeFine, a modular framework that constructs probabilistic factor profiles from complex scenarios. It then integrates these profiles with analogical reasoning, leveraging insights from similar past experiences to guide LLMs in making critical decisions in new situations. Our framework separates the tasks of quantifying uncertainty and incorporating it into LLM decision-making. This approach is particularly useful in areas such as consulting and financial deliberation, where making decisions under uncertainty is vital.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

We study the problem of planning under model uncertainty in an online meta-reinforcement learning (RL) setting where an agent is presented with a sequence of related tasks with limited interactions per task. The agent can use its experience in each task and across tasks to estimate both the transition model and the distribution over tasks. We propose an algorithm to meta-learn the underlying structure across tasks, utilize it to plan in each task, and upper-bound the regret of the planning loss. Our bound suggests that the average regret over tasks decreases as the number of tasks increases and as the tasks are more similar. In the classical single-task setting, it is known that the planning horizon should depend on the estimated model's accuracy, that is, on the number of samples within task. We generalize this finding to meta-RL and study this dependence of planning horizons on the number of tasks. Based on our theoretical findings, we derive heuristics for selecting slowly increasing discount factors, and we validate its significance empirically.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Expressing confidence is challenging for embodied agents navigating dynamic multimodal environments, where uncertainty arises from both perception and decision-making processes. We present the first work investigating embodied confidence elicitation in open-ended multimodal environments. We introduce Elicitation Policies, which structure confidence assessment across inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning, along with Execution Policies, which enhance confidence calibration through scenario reinterpretation, action sampling, and hypothetical reasoning. Evaluating agents in calibration and failure prediction tasks within the Minecraft environment, we show that structured reasoning approaches, such as Chain-of-Thoughts, improve confidence calibration. However, our findings also reveal persistent challenges in distinguishing uncertainty, particularly under abductive settings, underscoring the need for more sophisticated embodied confidence elicitation methods.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

Evaluating the performance of perception modules in autonomous driving is one of the most critical tasks in developing the complex intelligent system. While module-level unit test metrics adopted from traditional computer vision tasks are feasible to some extent, it remains far less explored to measure the impact of perceptual noise on the driving quality of autonomous vehicles in a consistent and holistic manner. In this work, we propose a principled framework that provides a coherent and systematic understanding of the impact an error in the perception module imposes on an autonomous agent's planning that actually controls the vehicle. Specifically, the planning process is formulated as expected utility maximisation, where all input signals from upstream modules jointly provide a world state description, and the planner strives for the optimal action by maximising the expected utility determined by both world states and actions. We show that, under practical conditions, the objective function can be represented as an inner product between the world state description and the utility function in a Hilbert space. This geometric interpretation enables a novel way to analyse the impact of noise in world state estimation on planning and leads to a universal metric for evaluating perception. The whole framework resembles the idea of transcendental idealism in the classical philosophical literature, which gives the name to our approach.

Thinking aloud is an effective meta-cognitive strategy human reasoners apply to solve difficult problems. We suggest to improve the reasoning ability of pre-trained neural language models in a similar way, namely by expanding a task's context with problem elaborations that are dynamically generated by the language model itself. Our main result is that dynamic problem elaboration significantly improves the zero-shot performance of GPT-2 in a deductive reasoning and natural language inference task: While the model uses a syntactic heuristic for predicting an answer, it is capable (to some degree) of generating reasoned additional context which facilitates the successful application of its heuristic. We explore different ways of generating elaborations, including fewshot learning, and find that their relative performance varies with the specific problem characteristics (such as problem difficulty). Moreover, the effectiveness of an elaboration can be explained in terms of the degree to which the elaboration semantically coheres with the corresponding problem. In particular, elaborations that are most faithful to the original problem description may boost accuracy by up to 24%.

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

The generality of pretrained large language models (LLMs) has prompted increasing interest in their use as in-context learning agents. To be successful, such agents must form beliefs about how to achieve their goals based on limited interaction with their environment, resulting in uncertainty about the best action to take at each step. In this paper, we study how LLM agents form and act on these beliefs by conducting experiments in controlled sequential decision-making tasks. To begin, we find that LLM agents are overconfident: They draw strong conclusions about what to do based on insufficient evidence, resulting in inadequately explorative behavior. We dig deeper into this phenomenon and show how it emerges from a collapse in the entropy of the action distribution implied by sampling from the LLM. We then demonstrate that existing token-level sampling techniques are by themselves insufficient to make the agent explore more. Motivated by this fact, we introduce Entropic Activation Steering (EAST), an activation steering method for in-context LLM agents. EAST computes a steering vector as an entropy-weighted combination of representations, and uses it to manipulate an LLM agent's uncertainty over actions by intervening on its activations during the forward pass. We show that EAST can reliably increase the entropy in an LLM agent's actions, causing more explorative behavior to emerge. Finally, EAST modifies the subjective uncertainty an LLM agent expresses, paving the way to interpreting and controlling how LLM agents represent uncertainty about their decisions.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have shown promise in automating mobile tasks but still struggle with input redundancy and decision ambiguity. In this paper, we present RecAgent, an uncertainty-aware agent that addresses these issues through adaptive perception. We distinguish two types of uncertainty in GUI navigation: (1) perceptual uncertainty, caused by input redundancy and noise from comprehensive screen information, and (2) decision uncertainty, arising from ambiguous tasks and complex reasoning. To reduce perceptual uncertainty, RecAgent employs a component recommendation mechanism that identifies and focuses on the most relevant UI elements. For decision uncertainty, it uses an interactive module to request user feedback in ambiguous situations, enabling intent-aware decisions. These components are integrated into a unified framework that proactively reduces input complexity and reacts to high-uncertainty cases via human-in-the-loop refinement. Additionally, we propose a dataset called ComplexAction to evaluate the success rate of GUI agents in executing specified single-step actions within complex scenarios. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach. The dataset and code will be available at https://github.com/Fanye12/RecAgent.

When working around other agents such as humans, it is important to model their perception capabilities to predict and make sense of their behavior. In this work, we consider agents whose perception capabilities are determined by their limited field of view, viewing range, and the potential to miss objects within their viewing range. By considering the perception capabilities and observation model of agents independently from their motion policy, we show that we can better predict the agents' behavior; i.e., by reasoning about the perception capabilities of other agents, one can better make sense of their actions. We perform a user study where human operators navigate a cluttered scene while scanning the region for obstacles with a limited field of view and range. We show that by reasoning about the limited observation space of humans, a robot can better learn a human's strategy for navigating an environment and navigate with minimal collision with dynamic and static obstacles. We also show that this learned model helps it successfully navigate a physical hardware vehicle in real-time. Code available at https://github.com/labicon/HRMotion-RestrictedView.

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

Despite significant advancements in multimodal reasoning tasks, existing Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are prone to producing visually ungrounded responses when interpreting associated images. In contrast, when humans embark on learning new knowledge, they often rely on a set of fundamental pre-study principles: reviewing outlines to grasp core concepts, summarizing key points to guide their focus and enhance understanding. However, such preparatory actions are notably absent in the current instruction tuning processes. This paper presents Re-Critic, an easily scalable rationale-augmented framework designed to incorporate fundamental rules and chain-of-thought (CoT) as a bridge to enhance reasoning abilities. Specifically, Re-Critic develops a visual rationale synthesizer that scalably augments raw instructions with rationale explanation. To probe more contextually grounded responses, Re-Critic employs an in-context self-critic mechanism to select response pairs for preference tuning. Experiments demonstrate that models fine-tuned with our rationale-augmented dataset yield gains that extend beyond hallucination-specific tasks to broader multimodal reasoning tasks.

Achieving human-level intelligence requires refining the transition from the fast, intuitive System 1 to the slower, more deliberate System 2 reasoning. While System 1 excels in quick, heuristic decisions, System 2 relies on logical reasoning for more accurate judgments and reduced biases. Foundational Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at fast decision-making but lack the depth for complex reasoning, as they have not yet fully embraced the step-by-step analysis characteristic of true System 2 thinking. Recently, reasoning LLMs like OpenAI's o1/o3 and DeepSeek's R1 have demonstrated expert-level performance in fields such as mathematics and coding, closely mimicking the deliberate reasoning of System 2 and showcasing human-like cognitive abilities. This survey begins with a brief overview of the progress in foundational LLMs and the early development of System 2 technologies, exploring how their combination has paved the way for reasoning LLMs. Next, we discuss how to construct reasoning LLMs, analyzing their features, the core methods enabling advanced reasoning, and the evolution of various reasoning LLMs. Additionally, we provide an overview of reasoning benchmarks, offering an in-depth comparison of the performance of representative reasoning LLMs. Finally, we explore promising directions for advancing reasoning LLMs and maintain a real-time https://github.com/zzli2022/Awesome-Slow-Reason-System{GitHub Repository} to track the latest developments. We hope this survey will serve as a valuable resource to inspire innovation and drive progress in this rapidly evolving field.

We consider tackling a single-agent RL problem by distributing it to n learners. These learners, called advisors, endeavour to solve the problem from a different focus. Their advice, taking the form of action values, is then communicated to an aggregator, which is in control of the system. We show that the local planning method for the advisors is critical and that none of the ones found in the literature is flawless: the egocentric planning overestimates values of states where the other advisors disagree, and the agnostic planning is inefficient around danger zones. We introduce a novel approach called empathic and discuss its theoretical aspects. We empirically examine and validate our theoretical findings on a fruit collection task.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Navigation in unfamiliar environments presents a major challenge for robots: while mapping and planning techniques can be used to build up a representation of the world, quickly discovering a path to a desired goal in unfamiliar settings with such methods often requires lengthy mapping and exploration. Humans can rapidly navigate new environments, particularly indoor environments that are laid out logically, by leveraging semantics -- e.g., a kitchen often adjoins a living room, an exit sign indicates the way out, and so forth. Language models can provide robots with such knowledge, but directly using language models to instruct a robot how to reach some destination can also be impractical: while language models might produce a narrative about how to reach some goal, because they are not grounded in real-world observations, this narrative might be arbitrarily wrong. Therefore, in this paper we study how the ``semantic guesswork'' produced by language models can be utilized as a guiding heuristic for planning algorithms. Our method, Language Frontier Guide (LFG), uses the language model to bias exploration of novel real-world environments by incorporating the semantic knowledge stored in language models as a search heuristic for planning with either topological or metric maps. We evaluate LFG in challenging real-world environments and simulated benchmarks, outperforming uninformed exploration and other ways of using language models.

Hierarchical classification offers an approach to incorporate the concept of mistake severity by leveraging a structured, labeled hierarchy. However, decoding in such settings frequently relies on heuristic decision rules, which may not align with task-specific evaluation metrics. In this work, we propose a framework for the optimal decoding of an output probability distribution with respect to a target metric. We derive optimal decision rules for increasingly complex prediction settings, providing universal algorithms when candidates are limited to the set of nodes. In the most general case of predicting a subset of nodes, we focus on rules dedicated to the hierarchical hF_{beta} scores, tailored to hierarchical settings. To demonstrate the practical utility of our approach, we conduct extensive empirical evaluations, showcasing the superiority of our proposed optimal strategies, particularly in underdetermined scenarios. These results highlight the potential of our methods to enhance the performance and reliability of hierarchical classifiers in real-world applications. The code is available at https://github.com/RomanPlaud/hierarchical_decision_rules

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Complex visual reasoning remains a key challenge today. Typically, the challenge is tackled using methodologies such as Chain of Thought (COT) and visual instruction tuning. However, how to organically combine these two methodologies for greater success remains unexplored. Also, issues like hallucinations and high training cost still need to be addressed. In this work, we devise an innovative multi-round training and reasoning framework suitable for lightweight Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Our self-questioning approach heuristically guides MLLMs to focus on visual clues relevant to the target problem, reducing hallucinations and enhancing the model's ability to describe fine-grained image details. This ultimately enables the model to perform well in complex visual reasoning and question-answering tasks. We have named this framework Socratic Questioning(SQ). To facilitate future research, we create a multimodal mini-dataset named CapQA, which includes 1k images of fine-grained activities, for visual instruction tuning and evaluation, our proposed SQ method leads to a 31.2% improvement in the hallucination score. Our extensive experiments on various benchmarks demonstrate SQ's remarkable capabilities in heuristic self-questioning, zero-shot visual reasoning and hallucination mitigation. Our model and code will be publicly available.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in various artificial intelligence problems. However, they fail to plan reliably, even when prompted with a detailed definition of the planning task. Attempts to improve their planning capabilities, such as chain-of-thought prompting, fine-tuning, and explicit "reasoning" still yield incorrect plans and usually fail to generalize to larger tasks. In this paper, we show how to use LLMs to generate correct plans, even for out-of-distribution tasks of increasing size. For a given planning domain, we ask an LLM to generate several domain-dependent heuristic functions in the form of Python code, evaluate them on a set of training tasks within a greedy best-first search, and choose the strongest one. The resulting LLM-generated heuristics solve many more unseen test tasks than state-of-the-art domain-independent heuristics for classical planning. They are even competitive with the strongest learning algorithm for domain-dependent planning. These findings are especially remarkable given that our proof-of-concept implementation is based on an unoptimized Python planner and the baselines all build upon highly optimized C++ code. In some domains, the LLM-generated heuristics expand fewer states than the baselines, revealing that they are not only efficiently computable, but sometimes even more informative than the state-of-the-art heuristics. Overall, our results show that sampling a set of planning heuristic function programs can significantly improve the planning capabilities of LLMs.

Combinatorial Optimization underpins many real-world applications and yet, designing performant algorithms to solve these complex, typically NP-hard, problems remains a significant research challenge. Reinforcement Learning (RL) provides a versatile framework for designing heuristics across a broad spectrum of problem domains. However, despite notable progress, RL has not yet supplanted industrial solvers as the go-to solution. Current approaches emphasize pre-training heuristics that construct solutions but often rely on search procedures with limited variance, such as stochastically sampling numerous solutions from a single policy or employing computationally expensive fine-tuning of the policy on individual problem instances. Building on the intuition that performant search at inference time should be anticipated during pre-training, we propose COMPASS, a novel RL approach that parameterizes a distribution of diverse and specialized policies conditioned on a continuous latent space. We evaluate COMPASS across three canonical problems - Travelling Salesman, Capacitated Vehicle Routing, and Job-Shop Scheduling - and demonstrate that our search strategy (i) outperforms state-of-the-art approaches on 11 standard benchmarking tasks and (ii) generalizes better, surpassing all other approaches on a set of 18 procedurally transformed instance distributions.

Go-Explore is a powerful family of algorithms designed to solve hard-exploration problems, built on the principle of archiving discovered states, and iteratively returning to and exploring from the most promising states. This approach has led to superhuman performance across a wide variety of challenging problems including Atari games and robotic control, but requires manually designing heuristics to guide exploration, which is time-consuming and infeasible in general. To resolve this, we propose Intelligent Go-Explore (IGE) which greatly extends the scope of the original Go-Explore by replacing these heuristics with the intelligence and internalized human notions of interestingness captured by giant foundation models (FMs). This provides IGE with a human-like ability to instinctively identify how interesting or promising any new state is (e.g. discovering new objects, locations, or behaviors), even in complex environments where heuristics are hard to define. Moreover, IGE offers the exciting and previously impossible opportunity to recognize and capitalize on serendipitous discoveries that cannot be predicted ahead of time. We evaluate IGE on a range of language-based tasks that require search and exploration. In Game of 24, a multistep mathematical reasoning problem, IGE reaches 100% success rate 70.8% faster than the best classic graph search baseline. Next, in BabyAI-Text, a challenging partially observable gridworld, IGE exceeds the previous SOTA with orders of magnitude fewer online samples. Finally, in TextWorld, we show the unique ability of IGE to succeed in settings requiring long-horizon exploration where prior SOTA FM agents like Reflexion completely fail. Overall, IGE combines the tremendous strengths of FMs and the powerful Go-Explore algorithm, opening up a new frontier of research into creating more generally capable agents with impressive exploration capabilities.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has demonstrated great promise in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preference. Depending on the availability of preference data, both online and offline RLHF are active areas of investigation. A key bottleneck is understanding how to incorporate uncertainty estimation in the reward function learned from the preference data for RLHF, regardless of how the preference data is collected. While the principles of optimism or pessimism under uncertainty are well-established in standard reinforcement learning (RL), a practically-implementable and theoretically-grounded form amenable to large language models is not yet available, as standard techniques for constructing confidence intervals become intractable under arbitrary policy parameterizations. In this paper, we introduce a unified approach to online and offline RLHF -- value-incentivized preference optimization (VPO) -- which regularizes the maximum-likelihood estimate of the reward function with the corresponding value function, modulated by a sign to indicate whether the optimism or pessimism is chosen. VPO also directly optimizes the policy with implicit reward modeling, and therefore shares a simpler RLHF pipeline similar to direct preference optimization. Theoretical guarantees of VPO are provided for both online and offline settings, matching the rates of their standard RL counterparts. Moreover, experiments on text summarization and dialog verify the practicality and effectiveness of VPO.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning but can still exhibit harmful behaviors. Current alignment strategies typically embed safety into model weights, making these controls implicit, static, and difficult to modify. This paper introduces Cognition-of-Thought (CooT), a novel decoding-time framework that equips LLMs with an explicit cognitive self-monitoring loop. CooT couples a standard text Generator with a cognitive Perceiver that continuously monitors the unfolding sequence. The Perceiver uses a structured, precedence-based hierarchy of principles (e.g., safety over obedience) to detect potential misalignments as they arise. When violations are flagged, CooT intervenes by rolling back the generation to the point of error and regenerating under injected guidance that combines universal social priors with context-specific warnings. CooT thus transforms alignment from a fixed property into an explicit, dynamic, and auditable process active during inference, allowing for flexible policy updates without retraining the model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and model families confirm that CooT consistently improves safety and social reasoning performance.

In this study, we explore the sophisticated domain of task planning for robust household embodied agents, with a particular emphasis on the intricate task of selecting substitute objects. We introduce the CommonSense Object Affordance Task (COAT), a novel framework designed to analyze reasoning capabilities in commonsense scenarios. This approach is centered on understanding how these agents can effectively identify and utilize alternative objects when executing household tasks, thereby offering insights into the complexities of practical decision-making in real-world environments.Drawing inspiration from human decision-making, we explore how large language models tackle this challenge through three meticulously crafted commonsense question-and-answer datasets, featuring refined rules and human annotations. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art language models on these datasets sheds light on three pivotal considerations: 1) aligning an object's inherent utility with the task at hand, 2) navigating contextual dependencies (societal norms, safety, appropriateness, and efficiency), and 3) accounting for the current physical state of the object. To maintain accessibility, we introduce five abstract variables reflecting an object's physical condition, modulated by human insights to simulate diverse household scenarios. Our contributions include insightful Object-Utility mappings addressing the first consideration and two extensive QA datasets (15k and 130k questions) probing the intricacies of contextual dependencies and object states. The datasets, along with our findings, are accessible at: https://github.com/com-phy-affordance/COAT. This research not only advances our understanding of physical commonsense reasoning in language models but also paves the way for future improvements in household agent intelligence.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

Providing Emotional Support (ES) to soothe people in emotional distress is an essential capability in social interactions. Most existing researches on building ES conversation systems only considered single-turn interactions with users, which was over-simplified. In comparison, multi-turn ES conversation systems can provide ES more effectively, but face several new technical challenges, including: (1) how to adopt appropriate support strategies to achieve the long-term dialogue goal of comforting the user's emotion; (2) how to dynamically model the user's state. In this paper, we propose a novel system MultiESC to address these issues. For strategy planning, drawing inspiration from the A* search algorithm, we propose lookahead heuristics to estimate the future user feedback after using particular strategies, which helps to select strategies that can lead to the best long-term effects. For user state modeling, MultiESC focuses on capturing users' subtle emotional expressions and understanding their emotion causes. Extensive experiments show that MultiESC significantly outperforms competitive baselines in both dialogue generation and strategy planning. Our codes are available at https://github.com/lwgkzl/MultiESC.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

Conformant planning is the problem of finding a sequence of actions for achieving a goal in the presence of uncertainty in the initial state or action effects. The problem has been approached as a path-finding problem in belief space where good belief representations and heuristics are critical for scaling up. In this work, a different formulation is introduced for conformant problems with deterministic actions where they are automatically converted into classical ones and solved by an off-the-shelf classical planner. The translation maps literals L and sets of assumptions t about the initial situation, into new literals KL/t that represent that L must be true if t is initially true. We lay out a general translation scheme that is sound and establish the conditions under which the translation is also complete. We show that the complexity of the complete translation is exponential in a parameter of the problem called the conformant width, which for most benchmarks is bounded. The planner based on this translation exhibits good performance in comparison with existing planners, and is the basis for T0, the best performing planner in the Conformant Track of the 2006 International Planning Competition.

This work pioneers evaluating emergent planning capabilities based on situational awareness in large language models. We contribute (i) novel benchmarks and metrics for standardized assessment; (ii) a unique dataset to spur progress; and (iii) demonstrations that prompting and multi-agent schemes significantly enhance planning performance in context-sensitive planning tasks. Positioning this within a situated agent and automated planning research, we highlight inherent reliability challenges--efficiently mapping world states to actions without environmental guidance remains open despite simulated domain advances. Although out-of-scope, limitations around validation methodology and data availability indicate exciting directions, including fine-tuning on expanded planning corpora and optimizations for triggering fast latent planning. By conclusively demonstrating current methods' promise and limitations via rigorous comparison, we catalyze investigating reliable goal-directed reasoning for situated agents.

When people answer questions about a specific situation, e.g., "I cheated on my mid-term exam last week. Was that wrong?", cognitive science suggests that they form a mental picture of that situation before answering. While we do not know how language models (LMs) answer such questions, we conjecture that they may answer more accurately if they are also provided with additional details about the question situation, elaborating the "scene". To test this conjecture, we train a new model, DREAM, to answer questions that elaborate the scenes that situated questions are about, and then provide those elaborations as additional context to a question-answering (QA) model. We find that DREAM is able to create better scene elaborations (more accurate, useful, and consistent) than a representative state-of-the-art, zero-shot model (Macaw). We also find that using the scene elaborations as additional context improves the answer accuracy of a downstream QA system, including beyond that obtainable by simply further finetuning the QA system on DREAM's training data. These results suggest that adding focused elaborations about a situation can improve a system's reasoning about it, and may serve as an effective way of injecting new scenario based knowledge into QA models. Finally, our approach is dataset-neutral; we observe improved QA performance across different models, with even bigger gains on models with fewer parameters. We make our dataset and model publicly available at https://github.com/allenai/dream.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities, especially when prompted to generate intermediate reasoning steps (e.g., Chain-of-Thought, CoT). However, LLMs can still struggle with problems that are easy for humans, such as generating action plans for executing tasks in a given environment, or performing complex math, logical, and commonsense reasoning. The deficiency stems from the key fact that LLMs lack an internal world model to predict the world state (e.g., environment status, intermediate variable values) and simulate long-term outcomes of actions. This prevents LLMs from performing deliberate planning akin to human brains, which involves exploring alternative reasoning paths, anticipating future states and rewards, and iteratively refining existing reasoning steps. To overcome the limitations, we propose a new LLM reasoning framework, Reasoning via Planning (RAP). RAP repurposes the LLM as both a world model and a reasoning agent, and incorporates a principled planning algorithm (based on Monto Carlo Tree Search) for strategic exploration in the vast reasoning space. During reasoning, the LLM (as agent) incrementally builds a reasoning tree under the guidance of the LLM (as world model) and task-specific rewards, and obtains a high-reward reasoning path efficiently with a proper balance between exploration vs. exploitation. We apply RAP to a variety of challenging reasoning problems including plan generation, math reasoning, and logical inference. Empirical results on these tasks demonstrate the superiority of RAP over various strong baselines, including CoT and least-to-most prompting with self-consistency. RAP on LLAMA-33B surpasses CoT on GPT-4 with 33% relative improvement in a plan generation setting.

Large Reasoning Models like DeepSeek-R1 mark a fundamental shift in how LLMs approach complex problems. Instead of directly producing an answer for a given input, DeepSeek-R1 creates detailed multi-step reasoning chains, seemingly "thinking" about a problem before providing an answer. This reasoning process is publicly available to the user, creating endless opportunities for studying the reasoning behaviour of the model and opening up the field of Thoughtology. Starting from a taxonomy of DeepSeek-R1's basic building blocks of reasoning, our analyses on DeepSeek-R1 investigate the impact and controllability of thought length, management of long or confusing contexts, cultural and safety concerns, and the status of DeepSeek-R1 vis-\`a-vis cognitive phenomena, such as human-like language processing and world modelling. Our findings paint a nuanced picture. Notably, we show DeepSeek-R1 has a 'sweet spot' of reasoning, where extra inference time can impair model performance. Furthermore, we find a tendency for DeepSeek-R1 to persistently ruminate on previously explored problem formulations, obstructing further exploration. We also note strong safety vulnerabilities of DeepSeek-R1 compared to its non-reasoning counterpart, which can also compromise safety-aligned LLMs.

"Search for" or "Navigate to"? When finding an object, the two choices always come up in our subconscious mind. Before seeing the target, we search for the target based on experience. After seeing the target, we remember the target location and navigate to. However, recently methods in object navigation field almost only consider using object association to enhance "search for" phase while neglect the importance of "navigate to" phase. Therefore, this paper proposes the dual adaptive thinking (DAT) method to flexibly adjust the different thinking strategies at different navigation stages. Dual thinking includes search thinking with the object association ability and navigation thinking with the target location ability. To make the navigation thinking more effective, we design the target-oriented memory graph (TOMG) to store historical target information and the target-aware multi-scale aggregator (TAMSA) to encode the relative target position. We assess our methods on the AI2-Thor dataset. Compared with the state-of-the-art (SOTA) method, our method reports 10.8%, 21.5% and 15.7% increase in success rate (SR), success weighted by path length (SPL) and success weighted by navigation efficiency (SNE), respectively.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

LLM-as-a-Judge refers to the automatic modeling of preferences for responses generated by Large Language Models (LLMs), which is of significant importance for both LLM evaluation and reward modeling. Although generative LLMs have made substantial progress in various tasks, their performance as LLM-Judge still falls short of expectations. In this work, we propose Think-J, which improves generative LLM-as-a-Judge by learning how to think. We first utilized a small amount of curated data to develop the model with initial judgment thinking capabilities. Subsequently, we optimize the judgment thinking traces based on reinforcement learning (RL). We propose two methods for judgment thinking optimization, based on offline and online RL, respectively. The offline RL requires training a critic model to construct positive and negative examples for learning. The online method defines rule-based reward as feedback for optimization. Experimental results showed that our approach can significantly enhance the evaluation capability of generative LLM-Judge, surpassing both generative and classifier-based LLM-Judge without requiring extra human annotations.

This paper argues that deep neural networks (DNNs) mostly determine their outputs during the early stages of inference, where biases inherent in the model play a crucial role in shaping this process. We draw a parallel between this phenomenon and human decision-making, which often relies on fast, intuitive heuristics. Using diffusion models (DMs) as a case study, we demonstrate that DNNs often make early-stage decision-making influenced by the type and extent of bias in their design and training. Our findings offer a new perspective on bias mitigation, efficient inference, and the interpretation of machine learning systems. By identifying the temporal dynamics of decision-making in DNNs, this paper aims to inspire further discussion and research within the machine learning community.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks, their performance in dynamic, interactive, and competitive scenarios - such as business strategy and stock market analysis - remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we formally explore the dynamic reasoning capabilities of LLMs for decision-making in rapidly evolving environments. We introduce two game theory-based pilot challenges that mirror the complexities of real-world dynamic decision-making. These challenges are well-defined, enabling clear, controllable, and precise evaluation of LLMs' dynamic reasoning abilities. Through extensive experiments, we find that existing reasoning methods tend to falter in dynamic settings that require k-level thinking - a key concept not tackled by previous works. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning approach for LLMs, named "K-Level Reasoning". This approach adopts the perspective of rivals to recursively employ k-level thinking based on available historical information, which significantly improves the prediction accuracy of rivals' subsequent moves and informs more strategic decision-making. This research not only sets a robust quantitative benchmark for the assessment of dynamic reasoning but also markedly enhances the proficiency of LLMs in dynamic contexts.

Understanding sentence meanings and updating information states appropriately across time -- what we call "situational understanding" (SU) -- is a critical ability for human-like AI agents. SU is essential in particular for chat models, such as ChatGPT, to enable consistent, coherent, and effective dialogue between humans and AI. Previous works have identified certain SU limitations in non-chatbot Large Language models (LLMs), but the extent and causes of these limitations are not well understood, and capabilities of current chat-based models in this domain have not been explored. In this work we tackle these questions, proposing a novel synthetic environment for SU testing which allows us to do controlled and systematic testing of SU in chat-oriented models, through assessment of models' ability to track and enumerate environment states. Our environment also allows for close analysis of dynamics of model performance, to better understand underlying causes for performance patterns. We apply our test to ChatGPT, the state-of-the-art chatbot, and find that despite the fundamental simplicity of the task, the model's performance reflects an inability to retain correct environment states across time. Our follow-up analyses suggest that performance degradation is largely because ChatGPT has non-persistent in-context memory (although it can access the full dialogue history) and it is susceptible to hallucinated updates -- including updates that artificially inflate accuracies. Our findings suggest overall that ChatGPT is not currently equipped for robust tracking of situation states, and that trust in the impressive dialogue performance of ChatGPT comes with risks. We release the codebase for reproducing our test environment, as well as all prompts and API responses from ChatGPT, at https://github.com/yangalan123/SituationalTesting.

Online alignment (e.g., GRPO) is generally more performant than offline alignment (e.g., DPO) -- but why? Drawing on prospect theory from behavioral economics, we propose a human-centric explanation. We prove that online on-policy sampling better approximates the human-perceived distribution of what the model can produce, and PPO/GRPO-style clipping -- originally introduced to just stabilize training -- recovers a perceptual bias in how humans perceive probability. In this sense, PPO/GRPO act as perceptual losses already. Our theory further suggests that the online/offline dichotomy is itself incidental to maximizing human utility, since we can achieve the same effect by selectively training on any data in a manner that mimics human perception, rather than restricting ourselves to online on-policy data. Doing so would allow us to post-train more quickly, cheaply, and flexibly without sacrificing performance. To this end, we propose a design pattern that explicitly incorporates perceptual distortions of probability into objectives like DPO/KTO/GRPO, creating humanline variants of them. Surprisingly, we find that these humanline variants, even when trained with offline off-policy data, can match the performance of their online counterparts on both verifiable and unverifiable tasks.

Spatial reasoning plays a vital role in both human cognition and machine intelligence, prompting new research into language models' (LMs) capabilities in this regard. However, existing benchmarks reveal shortcomings in evaluating qualitative spatial reasoning (QSR). These benchmarks typically present oversimplified scenarios or unclear natural language descriptions, hindering effective evaluation. We present a novel benchmark for assessing QSR in LMs, which is grounded in realistic 3D simulation data, offering a series of diverse room layouts with various objects and their spatial relationships. This approach provides a more detailed and context-rich narrative for spatial reasoning evaluation, diverging from traditional, toy-task-oriented scenarios. Our benchmark encompasses a broad spectrum of qualitative spatial relationships, including topological, directional, and distance relations. These are presented with different viewing points, varied granularities, and density of relation constraints to mimic real-world complexities. A key contribution is our logic-based consistency-checking tool, which enables the assessment of multiple plausible solutions, aligning with real-world scenarios where spatial relationships are often open to interpretation. Our benchmark evaluation of advanced LMs reveals their strengths and limitations in spatial reasoning. They face difficulties with multi-hop spatial reasoning and interpreting a mix of different view descriptions, pointing to areas for future improvement.

Reasoning models have demonstrated remarkable progress in solving complex and logic-intensive tasks by generating extended Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs) prior to arriving at a final answer. Yet, the emergence of this "slow-thinking" paradigm, with numerous tokens generated in sequence, inevitably introduces substantial computational overhead. To this end, it highlights an urgent need for effective acceleration. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in efficient reasoning. It categorizes existing works into three key directions: (1) shorter - compressing lengthy CoTs into concise yet effective reasoning chains; (2) smaller - developing compact language models with strong reasoning capabilities through techniques such as knowledge distillation, other model compression techniques, and reinforcement learning; and (3) faster - designing efficient decoding strategies to accelerate inference. A curated collection of papers discussed in this survey is available in our GitHub repository.

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

Planning with a learned model is arguably a key component of intelligence. There are several challenges in realizing such a component in large-scale reinforcement learning (RL) problems. One such challenge is dealing effectively with continuous action spaces when using tree-search planning (e.g., it is not feasible to consider every action even at just the root node of the tree). In this paper we present a method for selecting affordances useful for planning -- for learning which small number of actions/options from a continuous space of actions/options to consider in the tree-expansion process during planning. We consider affordances that are goal-and-state-conditional mappings to actions/options as well as unconditional affordances that simply select actions/options available in all states. Our selection method is gradient based: we compute gradients through the planning procedure to update the parameters of the function that represents affordances. Our empirical work shows that it is feasible to learn to select both primitive-action and option affordances, and that simultaneously learning to select affordances and planning with a learned value-equivalent model can outperform model-free RL.

The recently presented idea to learn heuristics for combinatorial optimization problems is promising as it can save costly development. However, to push this idea towards practical implementation, we need better models and better ways of training. We contribute in both directions: we propose a model based on attention layers with benefits over the Pointer Network and we show how to train this model using REINFORCE with a simple baseline based on a deterministic greedy rollout, which we find is more efficient than using a value function. We significantly improve over recent learned heuristics for the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), getting close to optimal results for problems up to 100 nodes. With the same hyperparameters, we learn strong heuristics for two variants of the Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP), the Orienteering Problem (OP) and (a stochastic variant of) the Prize Collecting TSP (PCTSP), outperforming a wide range of baselines and getting results close to highly optimized and specialized algorithms.

In this work, we investigate how explicitly modeling problem's difficulty prior information shapes the effectiveness of reinforcement learning based fine-tuning for multimodal reasoning. Our exploration mainly comprises of following three perspective: First, through offline data curation, we analyze the U-shaped difficulty distribution of two given datasets using the base model by multi-round sampling, and then filter out prompts that are either too simple or extremely difficult to provide meaningful gradients and perform subsequent two-stage training. Second, we implement an online advantage differentiation, computing group-wise empirical accuracy as a difficulty proxy to adaptively reweight advantages estimation, providing stronger learning signals for more challenging problems. Finally, we introduce difficulty hints as explicit prompts for more complex samples in the second training stage, encouraging the model to calibrate its reasoning depth and perform reflective validation checks. Our comprehensive approach demonstrates significant performances across various multi-modal mathematical reasoning benchmarks with only 2K+0.6K two-stage training data.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

Programming robot behavior in a complex world faces challenges on multiple levels, from dextrous low-level skills to high-level planning and reasoning. Recent pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning ability in few-shot robotic planning. However, it remains challenging to ground LLMs in multimodal sensory input and continuous action output, while enabling a robot to interact with its environment and acquire novel information as its policies unfold. We develop a robot interaction scenario with a partially observable state, which necessitates a robot to decide on a range of epistemic actions in order to sample sensory information among multiple modalities, before being able to execute the task correctly. An interactive perception framework is therefore proposed with an LLM as its backbone, whose ability is exploited to instruct epistemic actions and to reason over the resulting multimodal sensations (vision, sound, haptics, proprioception), as well as to plan an entire task execution based on the interactively acquired information. Our study demonstrates that LLMs can provide high-level planning and reasoning skills and control interactive robot behavior in a multimodal environment, while multimodal modules with the context of the environmental state help ground the LLMs and extend their processing ability. The project website can be found at https://matcha-model.github.io{blue{https://matcha-model.github.io/}}.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, but their effectiveness in planning remains underexplored. In this study, we evaluate the planning capabilities of OpenAI's o1 models across a variety of benchmark tasks, focusing on three key aspects: feasibility, optimality, and generalizability. Through empirical evaluations on constraint-heavy tasks (e.g., Barman, Tyreworld) and spatially complex environments (e.g., Termes, Floortile), we highlight o1-preview's strengths in self-evaluation and constraint-following, while also identifying bottlenecks in decision-making and memory management, particularly in tasks requiring robust spatial reasoning. Our results reveal that o1-preview outperforms GPT-4 in adhering to task constraints and managing state transitions in structured environments. However, the model often generates suboptimal solutions with redundant actions and struggles to generalize effectively in spatially complex tasks. This pilot study provides foundational insights into the planning limitations of LLMs, offering key directions for future research on improving memory management, decision-making, and generalization in LLM-based planning. Code available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/o1-planning.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

As models increasingly leverage multi-step reasoning strategies to solve complex problems, supervising the logical validity of these intermediate steps has become a critical research challenge. Process reward models address this by providing step-by-step feedback, but current approaches have two major drawbacks: they typically function as classifiers without providing explanations, and their reliance on supervised fine-tuning with static datasets limits generalization. Inspired by recent advances, we reframe stepwise reward modeling from a classification task to a reasoning task itself. We thus propose a generative judge that reasons about the policy model's reasoning steps (i.e., meta-reasons), outputting thinking tokens before delivering a final verdict. Our model, StepWiser, is trained by reinforcement learning using relative outcomes of rollouts. We show it provides (i) better judgment accuracy on intermediate steps than existing methods; (ii) can be used to improve the policy model at training time; and (iii) improves inference-time search.

Mobile robots are increasingly required to navigate and interact within unknown and unstructured environments to meet human demands. Demand-driven navigation (DDN) enables robots to identify and locate objects based on implicit human intent, even when object locations are unknown. However, traditional data-driven DDN methods rely on pre-collected data for model training and decision-making, limiting their generalization capability in unseen scenarios. In this paper, we propose CogDDN, a VLM-based framework that emulates the human cognitive and learning mechanisms by integrating fast and slow thinking systems and selectively identifying key objects essential to fulfilling user demands. CogDDN identifies appropriate target objects by semantically aligning detected objects with the given instructions. Furthermore, it incorporates a dual-process decision-making module, comprising a Heuristic Process for rapid, efficient decisions and an Analytic Process that analyzes past errors, accumulates them in a knowledge base, and continuously improves performance. Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning strengthens the decision-making process. Extensive closed-loop evaluations on the AI2Thor simulator with the ProcThor dataset show that CogDDN outperforms single-view camera-only methods by 15%, demonstrating significant improvements in navigation accuracy and adaptability. The project page is available at https://yuehaohuang.github.io/CogDDN/.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate extensive chain-of-thought reasoning, we lack a principled framework for understanding how these thoughts are structured. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach by applying Schoenfeld's Episode Theory, a classic cognitive framework for human mathematical problem-solving, to analyze the reasoning traces of LRMs. We annotated thousands of sentences and paragraphs from model-generated solutions to math problems using seven cognitive labels (e.g., Plan, Implement, Verify). The result is the first publicly available benchmark for the fine-grained analysis of machine reasoning, including a large annotated corpus and detailed annotation guidebooks. Our preliminary analysis reveals distinct patterns in LRM reasoning, such as the transition dynamics between cognitive states. This framework provides a theoretically grounded methodology for interpreting LRM cognition and enables future work on more controllable and transparent reasoning systems.

Recently, there have been notable advancements in large language models (LLMs), demonstrating their growing abilities in complex reasoning. However, existing research largely overlooks a thorough and systematic comparison of these models' reasoning processes and outputs, particularly regarding their self-reflection pattern (also termed "Aha moment") and the interconnections across diverse domains. This paper proposes a novel framework for analyzing the reasoning characteristics of four cutting-edge large reasoning models (GPT-o1, DeepSeek-R1, Kimi-k1.5, and Grok-3) using keywords statistic and LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. Our approach connects their internal thinking processes with their final outputs. A diverse dataset consists of real-world scenario-based questions covering logical deduction, causal inference, and multi-step problem-solving. Additionally, a set of metrics is put forward to assess both the coherence of reasoning and the accuracy of the outputs. The research results uncover various patterns of how these models balance exploration and exploitation, deal with problems, and reach conclusions during the reasoning process. Through quantitative and qualitative comparisons, disparities among these models are identified in aspects such as the depth of reasoning, the reliance on intermediate steps, and the degree of similarity between their thinking processes and output patterns and those of GPT-o1. This work offers valuable insights into the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning robustness and provides practical recommendations for enhancing model design and evaluation in practical applications. We publicly release our project at: https://github.com/ChangWenhan/FromThinking2Output

Recent years have seen considerable advancements in multi-step reasoning with Large Language Models (LLMs). The previous studies have elucidated the merits of integrating feedback or search mechanisms during model inference to improve the reasoning accuracy. The Process-Supervised Reward Model (PRM), typically furnishes LLMs with step-by-step feedback during the training phase, akin to Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) or reject sampling. Our objective is to examine the efficacy of PRM in the inference phase to help discern the optimal solution paths for multi-step tasks such as mathematical reasoning and code generation. To this end, we propose a heuristic greedy search algorithm that employs the step-level feedback from PRM to optimize the reasoning pathways explored by LLMs. This tailored PRM demonstrated enhanced results compared to the Chain of Thought (CoT) on mathematical benchmarks like GSM8K and MATH. Additionally, to explore the versatility of our approach, we develop a novel method to automatically generate step-level reward dataset for coding tasks and observed similar improved performance in the code generation tasks. Thus highlighting the robust nature of our reward-model-based approach to inference for reasoning tasks.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant advancements in reasoning and agent-based problem-solving, current evaluation methodologies fail to adequately assess their capabilities: existing benchmarks either rely on closed-ended questions prone to saturation and memorization, or subjective comparisons that lack consistency and rigor. In this work, we introduce HeuriGym, an agentic framework designed for evaluating heuristic algorithms generated by LLMs for combinatorial optimization problems, characterized by clearly defined objectives and expansive solution spaces. HeuriGym empowers LLMs to propose heuristics, receive evaluative feedback via code execution, and iteratively refine their solutions. We evaluate nine state-of-the-art models on nine problems across domains such as computer systems, logistics, and biology, exposing persistent limitations in tool use, planning, and adaptive reasoning. To quantify performance, we propose the Quality-Yield Index (QYI), a metric that captures both solution pass rate and quality. Even top models like GPT-o4-mini-high and Gemini-2.5-Pro attain QYI scores of only 0.6, well below the expert baseline of 1. Our open-source benchmark aims to guide the development of LLMs toward more effective and realistic problem-solving in scientific and engineering domains.

Many resource management problems require sequential decision-making under uncertainty, where the only uncertainty affecting the decision outcomes are exogenous variables outside the control of the decision-maker. We model these problems as Exo-MDPs (Markov Decision Processes with Exogenous Inputs) and design a class of data-efficient algorithms for them termed Hindsight Learning (HL). Our HL algorithms achieve data efficiency by leveraging a key insight: having samples of the exogenous variables, past decisions can be revisited in hindsight to infer counterfactual consequences that can accelerate policy improvements. We compare HL against classic baselines in the multi-secretary and airline revenue management problems. We also scale our algorithms to a business-critical cloud resource management problem -- allocating Virtual Machines (VMs) to physical machines, and simulate their performance with real datasets from a large public cloud provider. We find that HL algorithms outperform domain-specific heuristics, as well as state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Forecasting is an important task in many domains, such as technology and economics. However existing forecasting benchmarks largely lack comprehensive confidence assessment, focus on limited question types, and often consist of artificial questions that do not align with real-world human forecasting needs. To address these gaps, we introduce FOReCAst (Future Outcome Reasoning and Confidence Assessment), a benchmark that evaluates models' ability to make predictions and their confidence in them. FOReCAst spans diverse forecasting scenarios involving Boolean questions, timeframe prediction, and quantity estimation, enabling a comprehensive evaluation of both prediction accuracy and confidence calibration for real-world applications.

Recent advances in large reasoning language models (LRLMs) rely on test-time scaling, which extends long chain-of-thought (CoT) generation to solve complex tasks. However, overthinking in long CoT not only slows down the efficiency of problem solving, but also risks accuracy loss due to the extremely detailed or redundant reasoning steps. We propose a simple yet effective method that allows LLMs to self-truncate CoT sequences by early exit during generation. Instead of relying on fixed heuristics, the proposed method monitors model behavior at potential reasoning transition points (e.g.,"Wait" tokens) and dynamically terminates the next reasoning chain's generation when the model exhibits high confidence in a trial answer. Our method requires no additional training and can be seamlessly integrated into existing o1-like reasoning LLMs. Experiments on 10 reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, MATH-500, AMC, GPQA, AIME and LiveCodeBench) show that the proposed method is consistently effective on 11 cutting-edge reasoning LLMs of varying series and sizes, reducing the length of CoT sequences by an average of 19.1% to 80.1% while improving accuracy by 0.3% to 5.0%.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

The omnipresence of NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems (COPs) compels domain experts to engage in trial-and-error heuristic design. The long-standing endeavor of design automation has gained new momentum with the rise of large language models (LLMs). This paper introduces Language Hyper-Heuristics (LHHs), an emerging variant of Hyper-Heuristics that leverages LLMs for heuristic generation, featuring minimal manual intervention and open-ended heuristic spaces. To empower LHHs, we present Reflective Evolution (ReEvo), a novel integration of evolutionary search for efficiently exploring the heuristic space, and LLM reflections to provide verbal gradients within the space. Across five heterogeneous algorithmic types, six different COPs, and both white-box and black-box views of COPs, ReEvo yields state-of-the-art and competitive meta-heuristics, evolutionary algorithms, heuristics, and neural solvers, while being more sample-efficient than prior LHHs.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

PRefLexOR (Preference-based Recursive Language Modeling for Exploratory Optimization of Reasoning) combines preference optimization with concepts from Reinforcement Learning to enable models to self-teach through iterative reasoning improvements. We propose a recursive learning approach that engages the model in multi-step reasoning, revisiting, and refining intermediate steps before producing a final output in training and inference phases. Through multiple training stages, the model first learns to align its reasoning with accurate decision paths by optimizing the log odds between preferred and non-preferred responses. During this process, PRefLexOR builds a dynamic knowledge graph by generating questions from random text chunks and retrieval-augmentation to contextualize relevant details from the entire training corpus. In the second stage, preference optimization enhances model performance by using rejection sampling to fine-tune reasoning quality by continually producing in-situ training data while masking the reasoning steps. Recursive optimization within a thinking token framework introduces iterative feedback loops, where the model refines reasoning, achieving deeper coherence, consistency, and adaptability. Implemented in small language models with only 3 billion parameters, we should that even tiny models can iteratively teach themselves to reason with greater depth and reflectivity. Our implementation is straightforward and can be incorporated into any existing pretrained LLM. We focus our examples on applications in biological materials science and demonstrate the method in a variety of case studies that range from in-domain to cross-domain applications. Using reasoning strategies that include thinking and reflection modalities we build a multi-agent recursive self-improving inference approach to successively improve responses via repeated sampling in inference time.

Following instructions in real-world conditions requires the ability to adapt to the world's volatility and entanglement: the environment is dynamic and unpredictable, instructions can be linguistically complex with diverse vocabulary, and the number of possible goals an agent may encounter is vast. Despite extensive research in this area, most studies are conducted in static environments with simple instructions and a limited vocabulary, making it difficult to assess agent performance in more diverse and challenging settings. To address this gap, we introduce CrafText, a benchmark for evaluating instruction following in a multimodal environment with diverse instructions and dynamic interactions. CrafText includes 3,924 instructions with 3,423 unique words, covering Localization, Conditional, Building, and Achievement tasks. Additionally, we propose an evaluation protocol that measures an agent's ability to generalize to novel instruction formulations and dynamically evolving task configurations, providing a rigorous test of both linguistic understanding and adaptive decision-making.

This paper considers a scenario in city navigation: an AI agent is provided with language descriptions of the goal location with respect to some well-known landmarks; By only observing the scene around, including recognizing landmarks and road network connections, the agent has to make decisions to navigate to the goal location without instructions. This problem is very challenging, because it requires agent to establish self-position and acquire spatial representation of complex urban environment, where landmarks are often invisible. In the absence of navigation instructions, such abilities are vital for the agent to make high-quality decisions in long-range city navigation. With the emergent reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs), a tempting baseline is to prompt LLMs to "react" on each observation and make decisions accordingly. However, this baseline has very poor performance that the agent often repeatedly visits same locations and make short-sighted, inconsistent decisions. To address these issues, this paper introduces a novel agentic workflow featured by its abilities to perceive, reflect and plan. Specifically, we find LLaVA-7B can be fine-tuned to perceive the direction and distance of landmarks with sufficient accuracy for city navigation. Moreover, reflection is achieved through a memory mechanism, where past experiences are stored and can be retrieved with current perception for effective decision argumentation. Planning uses reflection results to produce long-term plans, which can avoid short-sighted decisions in long-range navigation. We show the designed workflow significantly improves navigation ability of the LLM agent compared with the state-of-the-art baselines.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Active inference is a unifying theory for perception and action resting upon the idea that the brain maintains an internal model of the world by minimizing free energy. From a behavioral perspective, active inference agents can be seen as self-evidencing beings that act to fulfill their optimistic predictions, namely preferred outcomes or goals. In contrast, reinforcement learning requires human-designed rewards to accomplish any desired outcome. Although active inference could provide a more natural self-supervised objective for control, its applicability has been limited because of the shortcomings in scaling the approach to complex environments. In this work, we propose a contrastive objective for active inference that strongly reduces the computational burden in learning the agent's generative model and planning future actions. Our method performs notably better than likelihood-based active inference in image-based tasks, while also being computationally cheaper and easier to train. We compare to reinforcement learning agents that have access to human-designed reward functions, showing that our approach closely matches their performance. Finally, we also show that contrastive methods perform significantly better in the case of distractors in the environment and that our method is able to generalize goals to variations in the background. Website and code: https://contrastive-aif.github.io/

Recently DeepSeek R1 demonstrated how reinforcement learning with simple rule-based incentives can enable autonomous development of complex reasoning in large language models, characterized by the "aha moment", in which the model manifest self-reflection and increased response length during training. However, attempts to extend this success to multimodal reasoning often failed to reproduce these key characteristics. In this report, we present the first successful replication of these emergent characteristics for multimodal reasoning on only a non-SFT 2B model. Starting with Qwen2-VL-2B and applying reinforcement learning directly on the SAT dataset, our model achieves 59.47% accuracy on CVBench, outperforming the base model by approximately ~30% and exceeding both SFT setting by ~2%. In addition, we share our failed attempts and insights in attempting to achieve R1-like reasoning using RL with instruct models. aiming to shed light on the challenges involved. Our key observations include: (1) applying RL on instruct model often results in trivial reasoning trajectories, and (2) naive length reward are ineffective in eliciting reasoning capabilities. The project code is available at https://github.com/turningpoint-ai/VisualThinker-R1-Zero

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

As more non-AI experts use complex AI systems for daily tasks, there has been an increasing effort to develop methods that produce explanations of AI decision making that are understandable by non-AI experts. Towards this effort, leveraging higher-level concepts and producing concept-based explanations have become a popular method. Most concept-based explanations have been developed for classification techniques, and we posit that the few existing methods for sequential decision making are limited in scope. In this work, we first contribute a desiderata for defining concepts in sequential decision making settings. Additionally, inspired by the Protege Effect which states explaining knowledge often reinforces one's self-learning, we explore how concept-based explanations of an RL agent's decision making can in turn improve the agent's learning rate, as well as improve end-user understanding of the agent's decision making. To this end, we contribute a unified framework, State2Explanation (S2E), that involves learning a joint embedding model between state-action pairs and concept-based explanations, and leveraging such learned model to both (1) inform reward shaping during an agent's training, and (2) provide explanations to end-users at deployment for improved task performance. Our experimental validations, in Connect 4 and Lunar Lander, demonstrate the success of S2E in providing a dual-benefit, successfully informing reward shaping and improving agent learning rate, as well as significantly improving end user task performance at deployment time.

Search agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in tackling knowledge-intensive tasks. Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training these agents to perform complex, multi-step reasoning. However, prior RL-based methods often rely on sparse or rule-based rewards, which can lead agents to commit to suboptimal or erroneous reasoning paths without the ability to recover. To address these limitations, we propose ReSeek, a novel self-correcting framework for training search agents. Our framework introduces a self-correction mechanism that empowers the agent to dynamically identify and recover from erroneous search paths during an episode. By invoking a special JUDGE action, the agent can judge the information and re-plan its search strategy. To guide this process, we design a dense, instructive process reward function, which decomposes into a correctness reward for retrieving factual information and a utility reward for finding information genuinely useful for the query. Furthermore, to mitigate the risk of data contamination in existing datasets, we introduce FictionalHot, a new and challenging benchmark with recently curated questions requiring complex reasoning. Being intuitively reasonable and practically simple, extensive experiments show that agents trained with ReSeek significantly outperform SOTA baselines in task success rate and path faithfulness.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

We consider enhancing large language models (LLMs) for complex planning tasks. While existing methods allow LLMs to explore intermediate steps to make plans, they either depend on unreliable self-verification or external verifiers to evaluate these steps, which demand significant data and computations. Here, we propose automated heuristics discovery (AutoHD), a novel approach that enables LLMs to explicitly generate heuristic functions to guide inference-time search, allowing accurate evaluation of intermediate states. These heuristic functions are further refined through a heuristic evolution process, improving their robustness and effectiveness. Our proposed method requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the explicit definition of heuristic functions generated by the LLMs provides interpretability and insights into the reasoning process. Extensive experiments across diverse benchmarks demonstrate significant gains over multiple baselines, including nearly twice the accuracy on some datasets, establishing our approach as a reliable and interpretable solution for complex planning tasks.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown substantially improved reasoning capabilities over traditional Large Language Models (LLMs) by incorporating extended thinking processes prior to producing final responses. However, excessively lengthy thinking introduces substantial overhead in terms of token consumption and latency, which is particularly unnecessary for simple queries. In this work, we introduce Large Hybrid-Reasoning Models (LHRMs), the first kind of model capable of adaptively determining whether to perform thinking based on the contextual information of user queries. To achieve this, we propose a two-stage training pipeline comprising Hybrid Fine-Tuning (HFT) as a cold start, followed by online reinforcement learning with the proposed Hybrid Group Policy Optimization (HGPO) to implicitly learn to select the appropriate thinking mode. Furthermore, we introduce a metric called Hybrid Accuracy to quantitatively assess the model's capability for hybrid thinking. Extensive experimental results show that LHRMs can adaptively perform hybrid thinking on queries of varying difficulty and type. It outperforms existing LRMs and LLMs in reasoning and general capabilities while significantly improving efficiency. Together, our work advocates for a reconsideration of the appropriate use of extended thinking processes and provides a solid starting point for building hybrid thinking systems.

We introduce a novel framework for incorporating human expertise into algorithmic predictions. Our approach leverages human judgment to distinguish inputs which are algorithmically indistinguishable, or "look the same" to predictive algorithms. We argue that this framing clarifies the problem of human-AI collaboration in prediction tasks, as experts often form judgments by drawing on information which is not encoded in an algorithm's training data. Algorithmic indistinguishability yields a natural test for assessing whether experts incorporate this kind of "side information", and further provides a simple but principled method for selectively incorporating human feedback into algorithmic predictions. We show that this method provably improves the performance of any feasible algorithmic predictor and precisely quantify this improvement. We find empirically that although algorithms often outperform their human counterparts on average, human judgment can improve algorithmic predictions on specific instances (which can be identified ex-ante). In an X-ray classification task, we find that this subset constitutes nearly 30% of the patient population. Our approach provides a natural way of uncovering this heterogeneity and thus enabling effective human-AI collaboration.

Reasoning training incentivizes LLMs to produce long chains of thought (long CoT), which among other things, allows them to explore solution strategies with self-checking. This results in higher accuracy, but inflates context length, token/compute cost, and answer latency. We ask: Can current models leverage their metacognition to provide other combinations on this Pareto frontier, e.g., better accuracy with lower context length and/or latency? Abstractly, we view the model as an improvement operator on its own "thoughts" with a continuum of possible strategies. We identify an interesting inference family Parallel-Distill-Refine (PDR), which performs the following: (i) generate diverse drafts in parallel; (ii) distill them into a bounded, textual workspace; and (iii) refine conditioned on this workspace, producing an output that seeds the next round. Importantly, context length (hence compute cost) is controllable via degree of parallelism, and is no longer conflated with the total number of generated tokens. We report PDR instantiations of current models that give better accuracy than long CoT while incurring lower latency. Setting degree of parallelism to 1 yields an interesting subcase, Sequential Refinement (SR) (iteratively improve a single candidate answer) which provides performance superior to long CoT. Success of such model orchestrations raises the question whether further training could shift the Pareto frontier. To this end, we train an 8B thinking model with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to make it consistent with PDR as the inference method. On math tasks with verifiable answers, iterative pipelines surpass single-pass baselines at matched sequential budgets, with PDR delivering the largest gains (e.g., +11% on AIME 2024 and +9% on AIME 2025).

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

An obstacle to artificial general intelligence is set by continual learning of multiple tasks of different nature. Recently, various heuristic tricks, both from machine learning and from neuroscience angles, were proposed, but they lack a unified theory ground. Here, we focus on continual learning in single-layered and multi-layered neural networks of binary weights. A variational Bayesian learning setting is thus proposed, where the neural networks are trained in a field-space, rather than gradient-ill-defined discrete-weight space, and furthermore, weight uncertainty is naturally incorporated, and modulates synaptic resources among tasks. From a physics perspective, we translate the variational continual learning into Franz-Parisi thermodynamic potential framework, where previous task knowledge acts as a prior and a reference as well. We thus interpret the continual learning of the binary perceptron in a teacher-student setting as a Franz-Parisi potential computation. The learning performance can then be analytically studied with mean-field order parameters, whose predictions coincide with numerical experiments using stochastic gradient descent methods. Based on the variational principle and Gaussian field approximation of internal preactivations in hidden layers, we also derive the learning algorithm considering weight uncertainty, which solves the continual learning with binary weights using multi-layered neural networks, and performs better than the currently available metaplasticity algorithm. Our proposed principled frameworks also connect to elastic weight consolidation, weight-uncertainty modulated learning, and neuroscience inspired metaplasticity, providing a theory-grounded method for the real-world multi-task learning with deep networks.

The advent of autonomous agents is transforming interactions with Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) by employing natural language as a powerful intermediary. Despite the predominance of Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) methods in current GUI agents for achieving spatial localization, these methods face substantial challenges due to their limited capacity to accurately perceive positional data. Existing strategies, such as reinforcement learning, often fail to assess positional accuracy effectively, thereby restricting their utility. In response, we introduce Location Preference Optimization (LPO), a novel approach that leverages locational data to optimize interaction preferences. LPO uses information entropy to predict interaction positions by focusing on zones rich in information. Besides, it further introduces a dynamic location reward function based on physical distance, reflecting the varying importance of interaction positions. Supported by Group Relative Preference Optimization (GRPO), LPO facilitates an extensive exploration of GUI environments and significantly enhances interaction precision. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate LPO's superior performance, achieving SOTA results across both offline benchmarks and real-world online evaluations. Our code will be made publicly available soon, at https://github.com/AIDC-AI/LPO.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

Being able to carry out complicated vision language reasoning tasks in 3D space represents a significant milestone in developing household robots and human-centered embodied AI. In this work, we demonstrate that a critical and distinct challenge in 3D vision language reasoning is situational awareness, which incorporates two key components: (1) The autonomous agent grounds its self-location based on a language prompt. (2) The agent answers open-ended questions from the perspective of its calculated position. To address this challenge, we introduce SIG3D, an end-to-end Situation-Grounded model for 3D vision language reasoning. We tokenize the 3D scene into sparse voxel representation and propose a language-grounded situation estimator, followed by a situated question answering module. Experiments on the SQA3D and ScanQA datasets show that SIG3D outperforms state-of-the-art models in situation estimation and question answering by a large margin (e.g., an enhancement of over 30% on situation estimation accuracy). Subsequent analysis corroborates our architectural design choices, explores the distinct functions of visual and textual tokens, and highlights the importance of situational awareness in the domain of 3D question answering.

Reasoning before action and imagining potential outcomes (i.e., world models) are essential for embodied agents operating in complex open-world environments. Yet, prior work either incorporates only one of these abilities in an end-to-end agent or integrates multiple specialized models into an agent system, limiting the learning efficiency and generalization of the policy. Thus, this paper makes the first attempt to synergize Reasoning and Imagination in an end-to-end Generalist policy, termed RIG. To train RIG in an end-to-end manner, we construct a data pipeline that progressively integrates and enriches the content of imagination and reasoning in the trajectories collected from existing agents. The joint learning of reasoning and next image generation explicitly models the inherent correlation between reasoning, action, and dynamics of environments, and thus exhibits more than 17times sample efficiency improvements and generalization in comparison with previous works. During inference, RIG first reasons about the next action, produces potential action, and then predicts the action outcomes, which offers the agent a chance to review and self-correct based on the imagination before taking real actions. Experimental results show that the synergy of reasoning and imagination not only improves the robustness, generalization, and interoperability of generalist policy but also enables test-time scaling to enhance overall performance.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs), particularly those enhanced through reinforced post-training, have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, as exemplified by models such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1. However, these capabilities are predominantly benchmarked on domains like mathematical problem solving and code generation -- leaving open the question of whether such reasoning skills generalize to complex, real-world scenarios. In this paper, we introduce LocationReasoner, a benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs' reasoning abilities in the context of real-world site selection, where models must identify feasible locations by reasoning over diverse and complicated spatial, environmental, and logistical constraints. The benchmark comprises over 300 carefully crafted queries of varying difficulty levels, supported by a sandbox environment with in-house tools for constraint-based location search. Extensive evaluations reveal that state-of-the-art reasoning models offer limited improvement over their non-reasoning predecessors in real-world contexts, with even the latest OpenAI o4 model failing on 30% of site selection tasks. Moreover, agentic strategies such as ReAct and Reflexion often suffer from over-reasoning, leading to worse outcomes than direct code-generation prompting. With key limitations of LLMs in holistic and non-linear reasoning highlighted, we release LocationReasoner to foster the development of LLMs and agents capable of robust, grounded reasoning in real-world decision-making tasks. Codes and data for our benchmark are available at https://github.com/miho-koda/LocationReasoner.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Addressing the discrepancies between predictions and actual outcomes often aids individuals in expanding their thought processes and engaging in reflection, thereby facilitating reasoning in the correct direction. In this paper, we introduce PreAct, an agent framework that integrates prediction with reasoning and action. Leveraging the information provided by predictions, a large language model (LLM) based agent can offer more diversified and strategically oriented reasoning, which in turn leads to more effective actions that help the agent complete complex tasks. Our experiments demonstrate that PreAct outperforms the ReAct approach in accomplishing complex tasks and that PreAct can be co-enhanced when combined with Reflexion methods. We prompt the model with different numbers of historical predictions and find that historical predictions have a sustained positive effect on LLM planning. The differences in single-step reasoning between PreAct and ReAct show that PreAct indeed offers advantages in terms of diversity and strategic directivity over ReAct.

To make effective decisions in novel environments with long-horizon goals, it is crucial to engage in hierarchical reasoning across spatial and temporal scales. This entails planning abstract subgoal sequences, visually reasoning about the underlying plans, and executing actions in accordance with the devised plan through visual-motor control. We propose Compositional Foundation Models for Hierarchical Planning (HiP), a foundation model which leverages multiple expert foundation model trained on language, vision and action data individually jointly together to solve long-horizon tasks. We use a large language model to construct symbolic plans that are grounded in the environment through a large video diffusion model. Generated video plans are then grounded to visual-motor control, through an inverse dynamics model that infers actions from generated videos. To enable effective reasoning within this hierarchy, we enforce consistency between the models via iterative refinement. We illustrate the efficacy and adaptability of our approach in three different long-horizon table-top manipulation tasks.

Symbolic world modeling requires inferring and representing an environment's transitional dynamics as an executable program. Prior work has focused on largely deterministic environments with abundant interaction data, simple mechanics, and human guidance. We address a more realistic and challenging setting, learning in a complex, stochastic environment where the agent has only "one life" to explore a hostile environment without human guidance. We introduce OneLife, a framework that models world dynamics through conditionally-activated programmatic laws within a probabilistic programming framework. Each law operates through a precondition-effect structure, activating in relevant world states. This creates a dynamic computation graph that routes inference and optimization only through relevant laws, avoiding scaling challenges when all laws contribute to predictions about a complex, hierarchical state, and enabling the learning of stochastic dynamics even with sparse rule activation. To evaluate our approach under these demanding constraints, we introduce a new evaluation protocol that measures (a) state ranking, the ability to distinguish plausible future states from implausible ones, and (b) state fidelity, the ability to generate future states that closely resemble reality. We develop and evaluate our framework on Crafter-OO, our reimplementation of the Crafter environment that exposes a structured, object-oriented symbolic state and a pure transition function that operates on that state alone. OneLife can successfully learn key environment dynamics from minimal, unguided interaction, outperforming a strong baseline on 16 out of 23 scenarios tested. We also test OneLife's planning ability, with simulated rollouts successfully identifying superior strategies. Our work establishes a foundation for autonomously constructing programmatic world models of unknown, complex environments.

In-context Learning (ICL) enables large language models (LLMs) to tackle downstream tasks through sophisticated prompting and high-quality demonstrations. However, this traditional ICL paradigm shows limitations when facing complex mathematical reasoning tasks, primarily due to its heavy dependence on example quality and the necessity for human intervention in challenging scenarios. To address these limitations, this paper presents HiAR-ICL, a High-level Automated Reasoning paradigm in ICL that shifts focus from specific examples to abstract thinking patterns, extending the conventional concept of context in ICL. HiAR-ICL introduces five atomic reasoning actions as fundamental components for constructing chain-structured patterns. Using Monte Carlo Tree Search, we explore reasoning paths and construct thought cards to guide subsequent inference. We then develop a cognitive complexity framework that dynamically matches problems with appropriate thought cards. Experimental results demonstrate HiAR-ICL's effectiveness, achieving state-of-the-art accuracy (79.6%) on the MATH benchmark with Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, surpassing GPT-4o (76.6%) and Claude 3.5 (71.1%).

A modified LAB algorithm is introduced in this paper. It builds upon the original LAB algorithm (Reddy et al. 2023), which is a socio-inspired algorithm that models competitive and learning behaviours within a group, establishing hierarchical roles. The proposed algorithm incorporates the roulette wheel approach and a reduction factor introducing inter-group competition and iteratively narrowing down the sample space. The algorithm is validated by solving the benchmark test problems from CEC 2005 and CEC 2017. The solutions are validated using standard statistical tests such as two-sided and pairwise signed rank Wilcoxon test and Friedman rank test. The algorithm exhibited improved and superior robustness as well as search space exploration capabilities. Furthermore, a Clustering-Based Search Space Reduction (C-SSR) method is proposed, making the algorithm capable to solve constrained problems. The C-SSR method enables the algorithm to identify clusters of feasible regions, satisfying the constraints and contributing to achieve the optimal solution. This method demonstrates its effectiveness as a potential alternative to traditional constraint handling techniques. The results obtained using the Modified LAB algorithm are then compared with those achieved by other recent metaheuristic algorithms.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Recent work analyzing in-context learning (ICL) has identified a broad set of strategies that describe model behavior in different experimental conditions. We aim to unify these findings by asking why a model learns these disparate strategies in the first place. Specifically, we start with the observation that when trained to learn a mixture of tasks, as is popular in the literature, the strategies learned by a model for performing ICL can be captured by a family of Bayesian predictors: a memorizing predictor, which assumes a discrete prior on the set of seen tasks, and a generalizing predictor, where the prior matches the underlying task distribution. Adopting the normative lens of rational analysis, where a learner's behavior is explained as an optimal adaptation to data given computational constraints, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian framework that almost perfectly predicts Transformer next-token predictions throughout training -- without assuming access to its weights. Under this framework, pretraining is viewed as a process of updating the posterior probability of different strategies, and inference-time behavior as a posterior-weighted average over these strategies' predictions. Our framework draws on common assumptions about neural network learning dynamics, which make explicit a tradeoff between loss and complexity among candidate strategies: beyond how well it explains the data, a model's preference towards implementing a strategy is dictated by its complexity. This helps explain well-known ICL phenomena, while offering novel predictions: e.g., we show a superlinear trend in the timescale for transitioning from generalization to memorization as task diversity increases. Overall, our work advances an explanatory and predictive account of ICL grounded in tradeoffs between strategy loss and complexity.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

We propose the Intuitive Reasoning Network (IRENE) - a novel neural model for intuitive psychological reasoning about agents' goals, preferences, and actions that can generalise previous experiences to new situations. IRENE combines a graph neural network for learning agent and world state representations with a transformer to encode the task context. When evaluated on the challenging Baby Intuitions Benchmark, IRENE achieves new state-of-the-art performance on three out of its five tasks - with up to 48.9% improvement. In contrast to existing methods, IRENE is able to bind preferences to specific agents, to better distinguish between rational and irrational agents, and to better understand the role of blocking obstacles. We also investigate, for the first time, the influence of the training tasks on test performance. Our analyses demonstrate the effectiveness of IRENE in combining prior knowledge gained during training for unseen evaluation tasks.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving abilities in mathematics, as evaluated by existing benchmarks exclusively on well-defined problems. However, such evaluation setup constitutes a critical gap, since a genuine intelligent agent should not only solve problems (as a math quiz solver), but also be able~to ask for information when the problems lack sufficient information, enabling proactivity in responding users' requests. To bridge such gap, we proposes a new dataset consisting of two types of incomplete problems with diverse contexts. Based on the dataset, our systematical evaluation of LRMs reveals their inability in proactively asking for information. In addition, we uncover the behaviors related to overthinking and hallucination of LRMs, and highlight the potential and challenges of supervised fine-tuning in learning such ability. We hope to provide new insights in developing LRMs with genuine intelligence, rather than just solving problems.

Multimodal AI models are increasingly used in fields like healthcare, finance, and autonomous driving, where information is drawn from multiple sources or modalities such as images, texts, audios, videos. However, effectively managing uncertainty - arising from noise, insufficient evidence, or conflicts between modalities - is crucial for reliable decision-making. Current uncertainty-aware machine learning methods leveraging, for example, evidence averaging, or evidence accumulation underestimate uncertainties in high-conflict scenarios. Moreover, the state-of-the-art evidence averaging strategy is not order invariant and fails to scale to multiple modalities. To address these challenges, we propose a novel multimodal learning method with order-invariant evidence fusion and introduce a conflict-based discounting mechanism that reallocates uncertain mass when unreliable modalities are detected. We provide both theoretical analysis and experimental validation, demonstrating that unlike the previous work, the proposed approach effectively distinguishes between conflicting and non-conflicting samples based on the provided uncertainty estimates, and outperforms the previous models in uncertainty-based conflict detection.

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

Foundation models pretrained on diverse data at scale have demonstrated extraordinary capabilities in a wide range of vision and language tasks. When such models are deployed in real world environments, they inevitably interface with other entities and agents. For example, language models are often used to interact with human beings through dialogue, and visual perception models are used to autonomously navigate neighborhood streets. In response to these developments, new paradigms are emerging for training foundation models to interact with other agents and perform long-term reasoning. These paradigms leverage the existence of ever-larger datasets curated for multimodal, multitask, and generalist interaction. Research at the intersection of foundation models and decision making holds tremendous promise for creating powerful new systems that can interact effectively across a diverse range of applications such as dialogue, autonomous driving, healthcare, education, and robotics. In this manuscript, we examine the scope of foundation models for decision making, and provide conceptual tools and technical background for understanding the problem space and exploring new research directions. We review recent approaches that ground foundation models in practical decision making applications through a variety of methods such as prompting, conditional generative modeling, planning, optimal control, and reinforcement learning, and discuss common challenges and open problems in the field.

Reliable estimation of predictive uncertainty is crucial for machine learning applications, particularly in high-stakes scenarios where hedging against risks is essential. Despite its significance, there is no universal agreement on how to best quantify predictive uncertainty. In this work, we revisit core concepts to propose a framework for information-theoretic measures of predictive uncertainty. Our proposed framework categorizes predictive uncertainty measures according to two factors: (I) The predicting model (II) The approximation of the true predictive distribution. Examining all possible combinations of these two factors, we derive a set of predictive uncertainty measures that includes both known and newly introduced ones. We extensively evaluate these measures across a broad set of tasks, identifying conditions under which certain measures excel. Our findings show the importance of aligning the choice of uncertainty measure with the predicting model on in-distribution (ID) data, the limitations of epistemic uncertainty measures for out-of-distribution (OOD) data, and that the disentanglement between measures varies substantially between ID and OOD data. Together, these insights provide a more comprehensive understanding of predictive uncertainty measures, revealing their implicit assumptions and relationships.

Recent improvements in conditional generative modeling have made it possible to generate high-quality images from language descriptions alone. We investigate whether these methods can directly address the problem of sequential decision-making. We view decision-making not through the lens of reinforcement learning (RL), but rather through conditional generative modeling. To our surprise, we find that our formulation leads to policies that can outperform existing offline RL approaches across standard benchmarks. By modeling a policy as a return-conditional diffusion model, we illustrate how we may circumvent the need for dynamic programming and subsequently eliminate many of the complexities that come with traditional offline RL. We further demonstrate the advantages of modeling policies as conditional diffusion models by considering two other conditioning variables: constraints and skills. Conditioning on a single constraint or skill during training leads to behaviors at test-time that can satisfy several constraints together or demonstrate a composition of skills. Our results illustrate that conditional generative modeling is a powerful tool for decision-making.

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes.

Much has been said about observability in system theory and control; however, it has been recently that observability in complex networks has seriously attracted the attention of researchers. This paper examines the state-of-the-art and discusses some issues raised due to "complexity" and "stochasticity". These unresolved issues call for a new practical methodology. For stochastic systems, a degree of observability may be defined and the observability problem is not a binary (i.e., yes-no) question anymore. Here, we propose to employ a goal-seeking system to play a supervisory role in the network. Hence, improving the degree of observability would be a valid objective for the supervisory system. Towards this goal, the supervisor dynamically optimizes the observation process by reconfiguring the sensory parts in the network. A cognitive dynamic system is suggested as a proper choice for the supervisory system. In this framework, the network itself is viewed as the environment with which the cognitive dynamic system interacts. Computer experiments confirm the potential of the proposed approach for addressing some of the issues raised in networks due to complexity and stochasticity.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Inspired by the success of DeepSeek-R1, we explore the potential of rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) in MLLM post-training for perception policy learning. While promising, our initial experiments reveal that incorporating a thinking process through RL does not consistently lead to performance gains across all visual perception tasks. This leads us to delve into the essential role of RL in the context of visual perception. In this work, we return to the fundamentals and explore the effects of RL on different perception tasks. We observe that the perceptual complexity is a major factor in determining the effectiveness of RL. We also observe that reward design plays a crucial role in further approching the upper limit of model perception. To leverage these findings, we propose Perception-R1, a scalable RL framework using GRPO during MLLM post-training. With a standard Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct, Perception-R1 achieves +4.2% on RefCOCO+, +17.9% on PixMo-Count, +4.2% on PageOCR, and notably, 31.9% AP on COCO2017 val for the first time, establishing a strong baseline for perception policy learning.

The ability to observe the effects of actions performed by others and to infer their intent, most likely goals, or course of action, is known as a plan or intention recognition cognitive capability and has long been one of the fundamental research challenges in AI. Deep learning has recently been making significant inroads on various pattern recognition problems, except for intention recognition. While extensively explored since the seventies, the problem remains unsolved for most interesting cases in various areas, ranging from natural language understanding to human behavior understanding based on video feeds. This paper compares symbolic inverse planning, one of the most investigated approaches to goal recognition, to deep learning using CNN and LTSM neural network architectures, on five synthetic benchmarks often used in the literature. The results show that the deep learning approach achieves better goal-prediction accuracy and timeliness than the symbolic cost-based plan recognizer in these domains. Although preliminary, these results point to interesting future research avenues.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Developing a generalist agent is a longstanding objective in artificial intelligence. Previous efforts utilizing extensive offline datasets from various tasks demonstrate remarkable performance in multitasking scenarios within Reinforcement Learning. However, these works encounter challenges in extending their capabilities to new tasks. Recent approaches integrate textual guidance or visual trajectory into decision networks to provide task-specific contextual cues, representing a promising direction. However, it is observed that relying solely on textual guidance or visual trajectory is insufficient for accurately conveying the contextual information of tasks. This paper explores enhanced forms of task guidance for agents, enabling them to comprehend gameplay instructions, thereby facilitating a "read-to-play" capability. Drawing inspiration from the success of multimodal instruction tuning in visual tasks, we treat the visual-based RL task as a long-horizon vision task and construct a set of multimodal game instructions to incorporate instruction tuning into a decision transformer. Experimental results demonstrate that incorporating multimodal game instructions significantly enhances the decision transformer's multitasking and generalization capabilities.

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are used to model environments where the full state cannot be perceived by an agent. As such the agent needs to reason taking into account the past observations and actions. However, simply remembering the full history is generally intractable due to the exponential growth in the history space. Maintaining a probability distribution that models the belief over what the true state is can be used as a sufficient statistic of the history, but its computation requires access to the model of the environment and is often intractable. While SOTA algorithms use Recurrent Neural Networks to compress the observation-action history aiming to learn a sufficient statistic, they lack guarantees of success and can lead to sub-optimal policies. To overcome this, we propose the Wasserstein Belief Updater, an RL algorithm that learns a latent model of the POMDP and an approximation of the belief update. Our approach comes with theoretical guarantees on the quality of our approximation ensuring that our outputted beliefs allow for learning the optimal value function.

Understanding and recognizing human-object interaction (HOI) is a pivotal application in AR/VR and robotics. Recent open-vocabulary HOI detection approaches depend exclusively on large language models for richer textual prompts, neglecting their inherent 3D spatial understanding capabilities. To address this shortcoming, we introduce HOID-R1, the first HOI detection framework that integrates chain-of-thought (CoT) guided supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with group relative policy optimization (GRPO) within a reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm. Specifically, we initially apply SFT to imbue the model with essential reasoning capabilities, forcing the model to articulate its thought process in the output. Subsequently, we integrate GRPO to leverage multi-reward signals for policy optimization, thereby enhancing alignment across diverse modalities. To mitigate hallucinations in the CoT reasoning, we introduce an "MLLM-as-a-judge" mechanism that supervises the CoT outputs, further improving generalization. Extensive experiments show that HOID-R1 achieves state-of-the-art performance on HOI detection benchmarks and outperforms existing methods in open-world generalization to novel scenarios.

The academic field of learning instruction-guided visual navigation can be generally categorized into high-level category-specific search and low-level language-guided navigation, depending on the granularity of language instruction, in which the former emphasizes the exploration process, while the latter concentrates on following detailed textual commands. Despite the differing focuses of these tasks, the underlying requirements of interpreting instructions, comprehending the surroundings, and inferring action decisions remain consistent. This paper consolidates diverse navigation tasks into a unified and generic framework -- we investigate the core difficulties of sharing general knowledge and exploiting task-specific capabilities in learning navigation and propose a novel State-Adaptive Mixture of Experts (SAME) model that effectively enables an agent to infer decisions based on different-granularity language and dynamic observations. Powered by SAME, we present a versatile agent capable of addressing seven navigation tasks simultaneously that outperforms or achieves highly comparable performance to task-specific agents.

Accelerating Entrepreneurial Decision-Making Through Hybrid Intelligence DESIGN PARADIGMS AND PRINCIPLES FOR DECISIONAL GUIDANCE IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Humans can flexibly switch between different modes of thinking based on task complexity: from rapid intuitive judgments to in-depth analytical understanding. However, current Graphical User Interface (GUI) grounding systems which locate interface elements based on natural language instructions rely solely on immediate prediction without reasoning, struggling to understand complex interface layouts with nested structures and hierarchical relationships, limiting their effectiveness on complex interfaces. Inspired by human dual-system cognition, we present Focus, a novel GUI grounding framework that combines fast prediction with systematic analysis. The framework dynamically switches between rapid and deliberate processing through an adaptive system switching based on task complexity, optimizing both efficiency and accuracy. Focus decomposes grounding into progressive stages: interface summarization, visual focused analysis, and precise coordinate prediction. This structured decomposition enables systematic understanding of both interface layouts and visual relationships. Extensive experiments show that Focus achieves state-of-the-art performance using only 300K of the training data with a 2B parameter model compared to existing approaches. Focus demonstrates superior performance particularly in complex GUI scenarios, achieving 77.4% average accuracy on ScreenSpot and 13.3% on the more challenging ScreenSpot-Pro. Our analysis reveals the effectiveness of this dual-system approach while demonstrating its potential for improving complex GUI interaction scenarios.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning enables large language models (LLMs) to break down complex problems into interpretable intermediate steps, significantly enhancing model transparency and performance in reasoning tasks. However, conventional CoT methods rely on heuristic sampling without structured modeling of reasoning transitions, constraining their ability to systematically explore and discover diverse and effective reasoning trajectories. In this work, we introduce CTRLS, a framework that formulates CoT reasoning as a Markov decision process (MDP) with latent state transitions, enabling principled and state-aware exploration via distributional reinforcement learning. By modelling reasoning actions as explicit probability distributions in latent space, our approach explicitly models epistemic uncertainty, facilitating robust exploration of the reasoning space. As part of our framework, we introduce an on-policy reinforcement learning strategy incorporating epsilon-greedy exploration and entropy-based regularization to iteratively refine latent state transitions without requiring additional fine-tuning of the underlying LLM. Theoretical analyses provide evidence lower bounds (ELBO), theoretically grounding our transition-aware modeling of latent reasoning dynamics. Further experiments demonstrate improvements in reasoning accuracy, diversity, and exploration efficiency across benchmark reasoning tasks.

Affordance grounding focuses on predicting the specific regions of objects that are associated with the actions to be performed by robots. It plays a vital role in the fields of human-robot interaction, human-object interaction, embodied manipulation, and embodied perception. Existing models often neglect the affordance shared among different objects because they lack the Chain-of-Thought(CoT) reasoning abilities, limiting their out-of-domain (OOD) generalization and explicit reasoning capabilities. To address these challenges, we propose Affordance-R1, the first unified affordance grounding framework that integrates cognitive CoT guided Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) within a reinforcement learning paradigm. Specifically, we designed a sophisticated affordance function, which contains format, perception, and cognition rewards to effectively guide optimization directions. Furthermore, we constructed a high-quality affordance-centric reasoning dataset, ReasonAff, to support training. Trained exclusively via reinforcement learning with GRPO and without explicit reasoning data, Affordance-R1 achieves robust zero-shot generalization and exhibits emergent test-time reasoning capabilities. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that our model outperforms well-established methods and exhibits open-world generalization. To the best of our knowledge, Affordance-R1 is the first to integrate GRPO-based RL with reasoning into affordance reasoning. The code of our method and our dataset is released on https://github.com/hq-King/Affordance-R1.

Recent advancements in predictive models have demonstrated exceptional capabilities in predicting the future state of objects and scenes. However, the lack of categorization based on inherent characteristics continues to hinder the progress of predictive model development. Additionally, existing benchmarks are unable to effectively evaluate higher-capability, highly embodied predictive models from an embodied perspective. In this work, we classify the functionalities of predictive models into a hierarchy and take the first step in evaluating World Simulators by proposing a dual evaluation framework called WorldSimBench. WorldSimBench includes Explicit Perceptual Evaluation and Implicit Manipulative Evaluation, encompassing human preference assessments from the visual perspective and action-level evaluations in embodied tasks, covering three representative embodied scenarios: Open-Ended Embodied Environment, Autonomous, Driving, and Robot Manipulation. In the Explicit Perceptual Evaluation, we introduce the HF-Embodied Dataset, a video assessment dataset based on fine-grained human feedback, which we use to train a Human Preference Evaluator that aligns with human perception and explicitly assesses the visual fidelity of World Simulators. In the Implicit Manipulative Evaluation, we assess the video-action consistency of World Simulators by evaluating whether the generated situation-aware video can be accurately translated into the correct control signals in dynamic environments. Our comprehensive evaluation offers key insights that can drive further innovation in video generation models, positioning World Simulators as a pivotal advancement toward embodied artificial intelligence.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Approaches to fair and ethical AI have recently fell under the scrutiny of the emerging, chiefly qualitative, field of critical data studies, placing emphasis on the lack of sensitivity to context and complex social phenomena of such interventions. We employ some of these lessons to introduce a tripartite decision-making toolkit, informed by dilemmas encountered in the pursuit of responsible AI/ML. These are: (a) the opportunity dilemma between the availability of data shaping problem statements vs problem statements shaping data; (b) the trade-off between scalability and contextualizability (too much data versus too specific data); and (c) the epistemic positioning between the pragmatic technical objectivism and the reflexive relativism in acknowledging the social. This paper advocates for a situated reasoning and creative engagement with the dilemmas surrounding responsible algorithmic/data-driven systems, and going beyond the formulaic bias elimination and ethics operationalization narratives found in the fair-AI literature.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, while powerful, can produce unnecessarily verbose output for simpler problems. We present a framework for difficulty-aware reasoning that teaches models to dynamically adjust reasoning depth based on problem complexity. Remarkably, we show that models can be endowed with such dynamic inference pathways without any architectural modifications; we simply post-train on data that is carefully curated to include chain-of-thought traces that are proportional in length to problem difficulty. Our analysis reveals that post-training via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) primarily captures patterns like reasoning length and format, while direct preference optimization (DPO) preserves reasoning accuracy, with their combination reducing length and maintaining or improving performance. Both quantitative metrics and qualitative assessments confirm that models can learn to "think proportionally", reasoning minimally on simple problems while maintaining depth for complex ones.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have demonstrated impressive general capabilities across a wide range of multi-modal tasks. However, the reasoning processes of LVLMs often suffer from unreliable outputs and limited interpretability. To address this, grounded visual reasoning has emerged as a promising paradigm that enforces responses anchored on salient visual evidence regions. However, existing approaches typically rely on costly supervision such as bounding box annotations, chain-of-thought rationale or external tool calls, limiting their scalability. In this work, we propose Ground-R1, a reinforcement learning framework that enables grounded visual reasoning without requiring explicit evidence or rationale annotations. Ground-R1 consists of a grounding phase that generates evidence region rollouts based on format constraints, and an answering phase that produces responses guided by both answer correctness and format adherence rewards. Extensive experiments across multiple visual reasoning benchmarks manifest that Ground-R1 achieves superior performance and exhibits emergent cognitive behaviors such as uncertainty awareness, spatial perception, and iterative refinement, offering a scalable and interpretable alternative to existing approaches.

Reasoning models have recently shown remarkable progress in domains such as math and coding. However, their expert-level abilities in math and coding contrast sharply with their performance in long-horizon, interactive tasks such as web navigation and computer/phone-use. Inspired by literature on human cognition, we argue that current AI agents need ''vicarious trial and error'' - the capacity to mentally simulate alternative futures before acting - in order to enhance their understanding and performance in complex interactive environments. We introduce Dyna-Mind, a two-stage training framework that explicitly teaches (V)LM agents to integrate such simulation into their reasoning. In stage 1, we introduce Reasoning with Simulations (ReSim), which trains the agent to generate structured reasoning traces from expanded search trees built from real experience gathered through environment interactions. ReSim thus grounds the agent's reasoning in faithful world dynamics and equips it with the ability to anticipate future states in its reasoning. In stage 2, we propose Dyna-GRPO, an online reinforcement learning method to further strengthen the agent's simulation and decision-making ability by using both outcome rewards and intermediate states as feedback from real rollouts. Experiments on two synthetic benchmarks (Sokoban and ALFWorld) and one realistic benchmark (AndroidWorld) demonstrate that (1) ReSim effectively infuses simulation ability into AI agents, and (2) Dyna-GRPO leverages outcome and interaction-level signals to learn better policies for long-horizon, planning-intensive tasks. Together, these results highlight the central role of simulation in enabling AI agents to reason, plan, and act more effectively in the ever more challenging environments.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

While large language models demonstrate impressive performance on static benchmarks, the true potential of large language models as self-learning and reasoning agents in dynamic environments remains unclear. This study systematically evaluates the efficacy of self-reflection, heuristic mutation, and planning as prompting techniques to test the adaptive capabilities of agents. We conduct experiments with various open-source language models in dynamic environments and find that larger models generally outperform smaller ones, but that strategic prompting can close this performance gap. Second, a too-long prompt can negatively impact smaller models on basic reactive tasks, while larger models show more robust behaviour. Third, advanced prompting techniques primarily benefit smaller models on complex games, but offer less improvement for already high-performing large language models. Yet, we find that advanced reasoning methods yield highly variable outcomes: while capable of significantly improving performance when reasoning and decision-making align, they also introduce instability and can lead to big performance drops. Compared to human performance, our findings reveal little evidence of true emergent reasoning. Instead, large language model performance exhibits persistent limitations in crucial areas such as planning, reasoning, and spatial coordination, suggesting that current-generation large language models still suffer fundamental shortcomings that may not be fully overcome through self-reflective prompting alone. Reasoning is a multi-faceted task, and while reasoning methods like Chain of thought improves multi-step reasoning on math word problems, our findings using dynamic benchmarks highlight important shortcomings in general reasoning capabilities, indicating a need to move beyond static benchmarks to capture the complexity of reasoning.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show promising results for embodied agents in operating meaningfully in complex, human-centered environments. Yet, evaluating their capacity for nuanced, human-like reasoning and decision-making remains challenging. In this work, we introduce VIVA+, a cognitively grounded benchmark for evaluating the reasoning and decision-making of MLLMs in human-centered situations. VIVA+ consists of 1,317 real-world situations paired with 6,373 multiple-choice questions, targeting three core abilities for decision-making: (1) Foundational Situation Comprehension, (2) Context-Driven Action Justification, and (3) Reflective Reasoning. Together, these dimensions provide a systematic framework for assessing a model's ability to perceive, reason, and act in socially meaningful ways. We evaluate the latest commercial and open-source models on VIVA+, where we reveal distinct performance patterns and highlight significant challenges. We further explore targeted training and multi-step reasoning strategies, which yield consistent performance improvements. Finally, our in-depth analysis highlights current model limitations and provides actionable insights for advancing MLLMs toward more robust, context-aware, and socially adept decision-making in real-world settings.

Effective decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) is essential for handling intricate tasks. However, existing approaches prioritize performance but often overlook the balance between effectiveness and computational cost. To address this, we first introduce the 3E Criteria to systematically assess the cost-effectiveness of search strategies, revealing that existing methods often trade significant efficiency for marginal performance gains. To improve LLM decision-making while maintaining efficiency, we propose the Speculative Reward Model (SRM), a plug-and-play framework that seamlessly integrates with existing search strategies. Specifically, SRM employs an external reward assigner to predict optimal actions, reducing reliance on LLMs' internal self-evaluation. And a speculative verification mechanism is used to prune suboptimal choices and guide the search toward more promising steps. We evaluate SRM on several complex decision-making tasks including mathematical reasoning, planning and numerical reasoning in specialized domains. Experimental results show that SRM reduces costs to 1/10 of the original search framework on average while maintaining effectiveness.

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

Large language models have enabled agents of all kinds to interact with users through natural conversation. Consequently, agents now have two jobs: conversing and planning/reasoning. Their conversational responses must be informed by all available information, and their actions must help to achieve goals. This dichotomy between conversing with the user and doing multi-step reasoning and planning can be seen as analogous to the human systems of "thinking fast and slow" as introduced by Kahneman. Our approach is comprised of a "Talker" agent (System 1) that is fast and intuitive, and tasked with synthesizing the conversational response; and a "Reasoner" agent (System 2) that is slower, more deliberative, and more logical, and is tasked with multi-step reasoning and planning, calling tools, performing actions in the world, and thereby producing the new agent state. We describe the new Talker-Reasoner architecture and discuss its advantages, including modularity and decreased latency. We ground the discussion in the context of a sleep coaching agent, in order to demonstrate real-world relevance.

Algorithmic fairness has conventionally adopted the mathematically convenient perspective of racial color-blindness (i.e., difference unaware treatment). However, we contend that in a range of important settings, group difference awareness matters. For example, differentiating between groups may be necessary in legal contexts (e.g., the U.S. compulsory draft applies to men but not women) and harm assessments (e.g., referring to girls as ``terrorists'' may be less harmful than referring to Muslim people as such). Thus, in contrast to most fairness work, we study fairness through the perspective of treating people differently -- when it is contextually appropriate to. We first introduce an important distinction between descriptive (fact-based), normative (value-based), and correlation (association-based) benchmarks. This distinction is significant because each category requires separate interpretation and mitigation tailored to its specific characteristics. Then, we present a benchmark suite composed of eight different scenarios for a total of 16k questions that enables us to assess difference awareness. Finally, we show results across ten models that demonstrate difference awareness is a distinct dimension to fairness where existing bias mitigation strategies may backfire.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

We consider the regret minimization task in a dueling bandits problem with context information. In every round of the sequential decision problem, the learner makes a context-dependent selection of two choice alternatives (arms) to be compared with each other and receives feedback in the form of noisy preference information. We assume that the feedback process is determined by a linear stochastic transitivity model with contextualized utilities (CoLST), and the learner's task is to include the best arm (with highest latent context-dependent utility) in the duel. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, CoLSTIM, which makes its choice based on imitating the feedback process using perturbed context-dependent utility estimates of the underlying CoLST model. If each arm is associated with a d-dimensional feature vector, we show that CoLSTIM achieves a regret of order tilde O( dT) after T learning rounds. Additionally, we also establish the optimality of CoLSTIM by showing a lower bound for the weak regret that refines the existing average regret analysis. Our experiments demonstrate its superiority over state-of-art algorithms for special cases of CoLST models.

In this article, we introduce a neuro-symbolic approach that combines a low-level perception task performed by a neural network with a high-level reasoning task performed by a possibilistic rule-based system. The goal is to be able to derive for each input instance the degree of possibility that it belongs to a target (meta-)concept. This (meta-)concept is connected to intermediate concepts by a possibilistic rule-based system. The probability of each intermediate concept for the input instance is inferred using a neural network. The connection between the low-level perception task and the high-level reasoning task lies in the transformation of neural network outputs modeled by probability distributions (through softmax activation) into possibility distributions. The use of intermediate concepts is valuable for the explanation purpose: using the rule-based system, the classification of an input instance as an element of the (meta-)concept can be justified by the fact that intermediate concepts have been recognized. From the technical side, our contribution consists of the design of efficient methods for defining the matrix relation and the equation system associated with a possibilistic rule-based system. The corresponding matrix and equation are key data structures used to perform inferences from a possibilistic rule-based system and to learn the values of the rule parameters in such a system according to a training data sample. Furthermore, leveraging recent results on the handling of inconsistent systems of fuzzy relational equations, an approach for learning rule parameters according to multiple training data samples is presented. Experiments carried out on the MNIST addition problems and the MNIST Sudoku puzzles problems highlight the effectiveness of our approach compared with state-of-the-art neuro-symbolic ones.

The recent rise of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) has significantly improved multi-step reasoning performance, but often at the cost of generating excessively long reasoning chains. This paper revisits the efficiency of such reasoning processes through an information-theoretic lens, revealing a fundamental trade-off between reasoning length and semantic efficiency. We propose two metrics, InfoBias and InfoGain, to quantify divergence from ideal reasoning paths and stepwise information contribution, respectively. Empirical analyses show that longer reasoning chains tend to exhibit higher information bias and diminishing information gain, especially for incorrect answers. Motivated by these findings, we introduce an entropy-based Adaptive Think strategy that dynamically halts reasoning once confidence is sufficiently high, improving efficiency while maintaining competitive accuracy. Compared to the Vanilla Think approach (default mode), our strategy yields a 1.10% improvement in average accuracy and a 50.80% reduction in token usage on QwQ-32B across six benchmark tasks spanning diverse reasoning types and difficulty levels, demonstrating superior efficiency and reasoning performance. These results underscore the promise of entropy-based methods for enhancing both accuracy and cost-effiiciency in large language model deployment.

Recent thinking models solve complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute, but this scaling must be allocated in line with task difficulty. On one hand, short reasoning (underthinking) leads to errors on harder problems that require extended reasoning steps; but, excessively long reasoning (overthinking) can be token-inefficient, generating unnecessary steps even after reaching a correct intermediate solution. We refer to this as under-adaptivity, where the model fails to modulate its response length appropriately given problems of varying difficulty. To address under-adaptivity and strike a balance between under- and overthinking, we propose TRAAC (Think Right with Adaptive, Attentive Compression), an online post-training RL method that leverages the model's self-attention over a long reasoning trajectory to identify important steps and prune redundant ones. TRAAC also estimates difficulty and incorporates it into training rewards, thereby learning to allocate reasoning budget commensurate with example difficulty. Our approach improves accuracy, reduces reasoning steps, and enables adaptive thinking compared to base models and other RL baselines. Across a variety of tasks (AIME, AMC, GPQA-D, BBEH), TRAAC (Qwen3-4B) achieves an average absolute accuracy gain of 8.4% with a relative reduction in reasoning length of 36.8% compared to the base model, and a 7.9% accuracy gain paired with a 29.4% length drop compared to the best RL baseline. TRAAC also shows strong generalization: although our models are trained on math datasets, they show accuracy and efficiency gains on out-of-distribution non-math datasets like GPQA-D, BBEH, and OptimalThinkingBench. Our analysis further verifies that TRAAC provides fine-grained adjustments to thinking budget based on difficulty and that a combination of task-difficulty calibration and attention-based compression yields gains across diverse tasks.

Large reasoning models achieve remarkable performance through extensive chain-of-thought generation, yet exhibit significant computational inefficiency by applying uniform reasoning strategies regardless of problem complexity. We present Hierarchical Budget Policy Optimization (HBPO), a reinforcement learning framework that enables models to learn problem-specific reasoning depths without sacrificing capability. HBPO addresses the fundamental challenge of exploration space collapse in efficiency-oriented training, where penalties on long output length systematically bias models away from necessary long reasoning paths. Through hierarchical budget exploration, our approach partitions rollout samples into multiple subgroups with distinct token budgets, aiming to enable efficient resource allocation while preventing degradation of capability. We introduce differentiated reward mechanisms that create budget-aware incentives aligned with the complexity of the problem, allowing models to discover natural correspondences between task requirements and computational effort. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HBPO reduces average token usage by up to 60.6% while improving accuracy by 3.14% across four reasoning benchmarks. Unlike existing methods that impose external constraints or rely on discrete mode selection, HBPO exhibits emergent adaptive behavior where models automatically adjust reasoning depth based on problem complexity. Our results suggest that reasoning efficiency and capability are not inherently conflicting, and can be simultaneously optimized through appropriately structured hierarchical training that preserves exploration diversity.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

A visually-grounded navigation instruction can be interpreted as a sequence of expected observations and actions an agent following the correct trajectory would encounter and perform. Based on this intuition, we formulate the problem of finding the goal location in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) within the framework of Bayesian state tracking - learning observation and motion models conditioned on these expectable events. Together with a mapper that constructs a semantic spatial map on-the-fly during navigation, we formulate an end-to-end differentiable Bayes filter and train it to identify the goal by predicting the most likely trajectory through the map according to the instructions. The resulting navigation policy constitutes a new approach to instruction following that explicitly models a probability distribution over states, encoding strong geometric and algorithmic priors while enabling greater explainability. Our experiments show that our approach outperforms a strong LingUNet baseline when predicting the goal location on the map. On the full VLN task, i.e. navigating to the goal location, our approach achieves promising results with less reliance on navigation constraints.

Recent studies show that the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be improved by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) to question-answering (QA) tasks in areas such as math and coding. With a long context length, LLMs may learn to perform search, as indicated by the self-correction behavior observed in DeepSeek R1. However, this search behavior is often imprecise and lacks confidence, resulting in long, redundant responses and highlighting deficiencies in intuition and verification. Inspired by the Dual Process Theory in psychology, we introduce a simple modification to the QA task that includes four stages: Fast Thinking, where the LLM must answer within a strict token budget; Verification, where the model evaluates its initial response; Slow Thinking, where it refines the initial response with more deliberation; and Summarization, where it distills the refinement from the previous stage into precise steps. Our proposed task improves average accuracy from 24.9% to 27.9% for Qwen2.5-1.5B, and from 45.9% to 49.8% for DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-1.5B. Notably, for Qwen2.5-1.5B, the Fast Thinking mode alone achieves 26.8% accuracy using fewer than 1000 tokens, demonstrating substantial inference efficiency gains. These findings suggest that intuition and deliberative reasoning are distinct, complementary systems benefiting from targeted training.

Scaling up language models to billions of parameters has opened up possibilities for in-context learning, allowing instruction tuning and few-shot learning on tasks that the model was not specifically trained for. This has achieved breakthrough performance on language tasks such as translation, summarization, and question-answering. Furthermore, in addition to these associative "System 1" tasks, recent advances in Chain-of-thought prompt learning have demonstrated strong "System 2" reasoning abilities, answering a question in the field of artificial general intelligence whether LLMs can reason. The field started with the question whether LLMs can solve grade school math word problems. This paper reviews the rapidly expanding field of prompt-based reasoning with LLMs. Our taxonomy identifies different ways to generate, evaluate, and control multi-step reasoning. We provide an in-depth coverage of core approaches and open problems, and we propose a research agenda for the near future. Finally, we highlight the relation between reasoning and prompt-based learning, and we discuss the relation between reasoning, sequential decision processes, and reinforcement learning. We find that self-improvement, self-reflection, and some metacognitive abilities of the reasoning processes are possible through the judicious use of prompts. True self-improvement and self-reasoning, to go from reasoning with LLMs to reasoning by LLMs, remains future work.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Recent advancements in the field of large language models, particularly through the Chain of Thought (CoT) approach, have demonstrated significant improvements in solving complex problems. However, existing models either tend to sacrifice detailed reasoning for brevity due to user preferences, or require extensive and expensive training data to learn complicated reasoning ability, limiting their potential in solving complex tasks. To bridge this gap, following the concept of scaling test-time, we propose a simple method by encouraging models to adopt a more patient reasoning style without the need of introducing new knowledge or skills. To employ a preference optimization approach, we generate detailed reasoning processes as positive examples and simple answers as negative examples, thereby training the model to favor thoroughness in its responses. Our results demonstrate a performance increase of up to 6.7% on GSM8k with training just on a lightweight dataset.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

Recent progress in multimodal reasoning has been significantly advanced by textual Chain-of-Thought (CoT), a paradigm where models conduct reasoning within language. This text-centric approach, however, treats vision as a static, initial context, creating a fundamental "semantic gap" between rich perceptual data and discrete symbolic thought. Human cognition often transcends language, utilizing vision as a dynamic mental sketchpad. A similar evolution is now unfolding in AI, marking a fundamental paradigm shift from models that merely think about images to those that can truly think with images. This emerging paradigm is characterized by models leveraging visual information as intermediate steps in their thought process, transforming vision from a passive input into a dynamic, manipulable cognitive workspace. In this survey, we chart this evolution of intelligence along a trajectory of increasing cognitive autonomy, which unfolds across three key stages: from external tool exploration, through programmatic manipulation, to intrinsic imagination. To structure this rapidly evolving field, our survey makes four key contributions. (1) We establish the foundational principles of the think with image paradigm and its three-stage framework. (2) We provide a comprehensive review of the core methods that characterize each stage of this roadmap. (3) We analyze the critical landscape of evaluation benchmarks and transformative applications. (4) We identify significant challenges and outline promising future directions. By providing this structured overview, we aim to offer a clear roadmap for future research towards more powerful and human-aligned multimodal AI.

Reasoning large language models (RLLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities through structured and multi-step reasoning. While prior research has primarily focused on improving their training and inference strategies, their potential for in-context learning (ICL) remains largely underexplored. To fill this gap, we propose Thinking with Nothinking Calibration (JointThinking), a new ICL paradigm that leverages the structured difference between two reasoning modes, i.e., Thinking and Nothinking, to improve reasoning accuracy. Specifically, our method prompts the model to generate two answers in parallel: one in Thinking mode and the other in Nothinking mode. A second round of Thinking is triggered only when the two initial responses are inconsistent, using a single prompt that incorporates the original question and both candidate answers. Since such disagreement occurs infrequently (e.g., only 6\% in GSM8K), our method performs just one round of reasoning in most cases, resulting in minimal latency overhead. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that JointThinking significantly outperforms few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) and majority voting with improved answer robustness. Moreover, It achieves comparable in-distribution performance to training-based SOTA method, while substantially outperforming on out-of-distribution tasks. We further conduct a systematic analysis of the calibration mechanism, showing that leveraging different reasoning modes consistently lowers the error rate and highlights the value of structural thinking diversity. Additionally, we observe that the performance gap between actual and ideal reasoning narrows as model size increases in the second round of thinking, indicating the strong scalability of our approach. Finally, we discuss current limitations and outline promising directions for future ICL research in RLLMs.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/ysymyth/tree-of-thought-llm.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in text-based tasks but often struggle to provide actionable guidance in real-world physical environments. This is because of their inability to recognize their limited understanding of the user's physical context. We present SituationalLLM, a novel approach that integrates structured scene information into an LLM to deliver proactive, context-aware assistance. By encoding objects, attributes, and relationships in a custom Scene Graph Language, SituationalLLM actively identifies gaps in environmental context and seeks clarifications during user interactions. This behavior emerges from training on the Situational Awareness Database for Instruct-Tuning (SAD-Instruct), which combines diverse, scenario-specific scene graphs with iterative, dialogue-based refinements. Experimental results indicate that SituationalLLM outperforms generic LLM baselines in task specificity, reliability, and adaptability, paving the way for environment-aware AI assistants capable of delivering robust, user-centric guidance under real-world constraints.

In recent years, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have been extensively utilized for multimodal reasoning tasks, including Graphical User Interface (GUI) automation. Unlike general offline multimodal tasks, GUI automation is executed in online interactive environments, necessitating step-by-step decision-making based on real-time status of the environment. This task has a lower tolerance for decision-making errors at each step, as any mistakes may cumulatively disrupt the process and potentially lead to irreversible outcomes like deletions or payments. To address these issues, we introduce a pre-operative critic mechanism that provides effective feedback prior to the actual execution, by reasoning about the potential outcome and correctness of actions. Specifically, we propose a Suggestion-aware Gradient Relative Policy Optimization (S-GRPO) strategy to construct our pre-operative critic model GUI-Critic-R1, incorporating a novel suggestion reward to enhance the reliability of the model's feedback. Furthermore, we develop a reasoning-bootstrapping based data collection pipeline to create a GUI-Critic-Train and a GUI-Critic-Test, filling existing gaps in GUI critic data. Static experiments on the GUI-Critic-Test across both mobile and web domains reveal that our GUI-Critic-R1 offers significant advantages in critic accuracy compared to current MLLMs. Dynamic evaluation on GUI automation benchmark further highlights the effectiveness and superiority of our model, as evidenced by improved success rates and operational efficiency.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.