new

Get trending papers in your email inbox!

Subscribe

Daily Papers

byAK and the research community

Oct 29

A Tale of Two Sides of Wafer: Physical Implementation and Block-Level PPA on Flip FET with Dual-sided Signals

As the conventional scaling of logic devices comes to an end, functional wafer backside and 3D transistor stacking are consensus for next-generation logic technology, offering considerable design space extension for powers, signals or even devices on the wafer backside. The Flip FET (FFET), a novel transistor architecture combining 3D transistor stacking and fully functional wafer backside, was recently proposed. With symmetric dual-sided standard cell design, the FFET can deliver around 12.5% cell area scaling and faster but more energy-efficient libraries beyond other stacked transistor technologies such as CFET. Besides, thanks to the novel cell design with dual-sided pins, the FFET supports dual-sided signal routing, delivering better routability and larger backside design space. In this work, we demonstrated a comprehensive FFET evaluation framework considering physical implementation and block-level power-performance-area (PPA) assessment for the first time, in which key functions are dual-sided routing and dual-sided RC extraction. A 32-bit RISC-V core was used for the evaluation here. Compared to the CFET with single-sided signals, the FFET with single-sided signals achieved 23.3% post-P&R core area reduction, 25.0% higher frequency and 11.9% lower power at the same utilization, and 16.0 % higher frequency at the same core area. Meanwhile, the FFET supports dual-sided signals, which can further benefit more from flexible allocation of cell input pins on both sides. By optimizing the input pin density and BEOL routing layer number on each side, 10.6% frequency gain was realized without power degradation compared to the one with single-sided signal routing. Moreover, the routability and power efficiency of FFET barely degrades even with the routing layer number reduced from 12 to 5 on each side, validating the great space for cost-friendly design enabled by FFET.

  • 10 authors
·
Jan 25

Individually Fair Learning with One-Sided Feedback

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 9, 2022

Solving Football by Exploiting Equilibrium Structure of 2p0s Differential Games with One-Sided Information

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 1