Daily Papers

Red teaming is a common strategy for identifying weaknesses in generative language models (LMs), where adversarial prompts are produced that trigger an LM to generate unsafe responses. Red teaming is instrumental for both model alignment and evaluation, but is labor-intensive and difficult to scale when done by humans. In this paper, we present Gradient-Based Red Teaming (GBRT), a red teaming method for automatically generating diverse prompts that are likely to cause an LM to output unsafe responses. GBRT is a form of prompt learning, trained by scoring an LM response with a safety classifier and then backpropagating through the frozen safety classifier and LM to update the prompt. To improve the coherence of input prompts, we introduce two variants that add a realism loss and fine-tune a pretrained model to generate the prompts instead of learning the prompts directly. Our experiments show that GBRT is more effective at finding prompts that trigger an LM to generate unsafe responses than a strong reinforcement learning-based red teaming approach, and succeeds even when the LM has been fine-tuned to produce safer outputs.

We introduce WildTeaming, an automatic LLM safety red-teaming framework that mines in-the-wild user-chatbot interactions to discover 5.7K unique clusters of novel jailbreak tactics, and then composes multiple tactics for systematic exploration of novel jailbreaks. Compared to prior work that performed red-teaming via recruited human workers, gradient-based optimization, or iterative revision with LLMs, our work investigates jailbreaks from chatbot users who were not specifically instructed to break the system. WildTeaming reveals previously unidentified vulnerabilities of frontier LLMs, resulting in up to 4.6x more diverse and successful adversarial attacks compared to state-of-the-art jailbreak methods. While many datasets exist for jailbreak evaluation, very few open-source datasets exist for jailbreak training, as safety training data has been closed even when model weights are open. With WildTeaming we create WildJailbreak, a large-scale open-source synthetic safety dataset with 262K vanilla (direct request) and adversarial (complex jailbreak) prompt-response pairs. To mitigate exaggerated safety behaviors, WildJailbreak provides two contrastive types of queries: 1) harmful queries (vanilla & adversarial) and 2) benign queries that resemble harmful queries in form but contain no harm. As WildJailbreak considerably upgrades the quality and scale of existing safety resources, it uniquely enables us to examine the scaling effects of data and the interplay of data properties and model capabilities during safety training. Through extensive experiments, we identify the training properties that enable an ideal balance of safety behaviors: appropriate safeguarding without over-refusal, effective handling of vanilla and adversarial queries, and minimal, if any, decrease in general capabilities. All components of WildJailbeak contribute to achieving balanced safety behaviors of models.

Large language models (LLMs) are being rapidly developed, and a key component of their widespread deployment is their safety-related alignment. Many red-teaming efforts aim to jailbreak LLMs, where among these efforts, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack's success has led to a growing interest in the study of optimization-based jailbreaking techniques. Although GCG is a significant milestone, its attacking efficiency remains unsatisfactory. In this paper, we present several improved (empirical) techniques for optimization-based jailbreaks like GCG. We first observe that the single target template of "Sure" largely limits the attacking performance of GCG; given this, we propose to apply diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestion and/or guidance to mislead LLMs. Besides, from the optimization aspects, we propose an automatic multi-coordinate updating strategy in GCG (i.e., adaptively deciding how many tokens to replace in each step) to accelerate convergence, as well as tricks like easy-to-hard initialisation. Then, we combine these improved technologies to develop an efficient jailbreak method, dubbed I-GCG. In our experiments, we evaluate on a series of benchmarks (such as NeurIPS 2023 Red Teaming Track). The results demonstrate that our improved techniques can help GCG outperform state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks and achieve nearly 100% attack success rate. The code is released at https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/I-GCG.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have made them indispensable, raising significant concerns over managing their safety. Automated red teaming offers a promising alternative to the labor-intensive and error-prone manual probing for vulnerabilities, providing more consistent and scalable safety evaluations. However, existing approaches often compromise diversity by focusing on maximizing attack success rate. Additionally, methods that decrease the cosine similarity from historical embeddings with semantic diversity rewards lead to novelty stagnation as history grows. To address these issues, we introduce DiveR-CT, which relaxes conventional constraints on the objective and semantic reward, granting greater freedom for the policy to enhance diversity. Our experiments demonstrate DiveR-CT's marked superiority over baselines by 1) generating data that perform better in various diversity metrics across different attack success rate levels, 2) better-enhancing resiliency in blue team models through safety tuning based on collected data, 3) allowing dynamic control of objective weights for reliable and controllable attack success rates, and 4) reducing susceptibility to reward overoptimization. Project details and code can be found at https://andrewzh112.github.io/#diverct.

The exploitation of large language models (LLMs) for malicious purposes poses significant security risks as these models become more powerful and widespread. While most existing red-teaming frameworks focus on single-turn attacks, real-world adversaries typically operate in multi-turn scenarios, iteratively probing for vulnerabilities and adapting their prompts based on threat model responses. In this paper, we propose \AlgName, a novel multi-turn red-teaming agent that emulates sophisticated human attackers through complementary learning dimensions: global tactic-wise learning that accumulates knowledge over time and generalizes to new attack goals, and local prompt-wise learning that refines implementations for specific goals when initial attempts fail. Unlike previous multi-turn approaches that rely on fixed strategy sets, \AlgName enables the agent to identify new jailbreak tactics, develop a goal-based tactic selection framework, and refine prompt formulations for selected tactics. Empirical evaluations on JailbreakBench demonstrate our framework's superior performance, achieving over 90\% attack success rates against GPT-3.5-Turbo and Llama-3.1-70B within 5 conversation turns, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines. These results highlight the effectiveness of dynamic learning in identifying and exploiting model vulnerabilities in realistic multi-turn scenarios.

In today's era, where large language models (LLMs) are integrated into numerous real-world applications, ensuring their safety and robustness is crucial for responsible AI usage. Automated red-teaming methods play a key role in this process by generating adversarial attacks to identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities in these models. However, existing methods often struggle with slow performance, limited categorical diversity, and high resource demands. While Rainbow Teaming, a recent approach, addresses the diversity challenge by framing adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity search, it remains slow and requires a large fine-tuned mutator for optimal performance. To overcome these limitations, we propose Ferret, a novel approach that builds upon Rainbow Teaming by generating multiple adversarial prompt mutations per iteration and using a scoring function to rank and select the most effective adversarial prompt. We explore various scoring functions, including reward models, Llama Guard, and LLM-as-a-judge, to rank adversarial mutations based on their potential harm to improve the efficiency of the search for harmful mutations. Our results demonstrate that Ferret, utilizing a reward model as a scoring function, improves the overall attack success rate (ASR) to 95%, which is 46% higher than Rainbow Teaming. Additionally, Ferret reduces the time needed to achieve a 90% ASR by 15.2% compared to the baseline and generates adversarial prompts that are transferable i.e. effective on other LLMs of larger size. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/ferret.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities but are susceptible to adversarial prompts that exploit vulnerabilities to produce unsafe or biased outputs. Existing red-teaming methods often face scalability challenges, resource-intensive requirements, or limited diversity in attack strategies. We propose RainbowPlus, a novel red-teaming framework rooted in evolutionary computation, enhancing adversarial prompt generation through an adaptive quality-diversity (QD) search that extends classical evolutionary algorithms like MAP-Elites with innovations tailored for language models. By employing a multi-element archive to store diverse high-quality prompts and a comprehensive fitness function to evaluate multiple prompts concurrently, RainbowPlus overcomes the constraints of single-prompt archives and pairwise comparisons in prior QD methods like Rainbow Teaming. Experiments comparing RainbowPlus to QD methods across six benchmark datasets and four open-source LLMs demonstrate superior attack success rate (ASR) and diversity (Diverse-Score approx 0.84), generating up to 100 times more unique prompts (e.g., 10,418 vs. 100 for Ministral-8B-Instruct-2410). Against nine state-of-the-art methods on the HarmBench dataset with twelve LLMs (ten open-source, two closed-source), RainbowPlus achieves an average ASR of 81.1%, surpassing AutoDAN-Turbo by 3.9%, and is 9 times faster (1.45 vs. 13.50 hours). Our open-source implementation fosters further advancements in LLM safety, offering a scalable tool for vulnerability assessment. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/knoveleng/rainbowplus, supporting reproducibility and future research in LLM red-teaming.

As vision-language models (VLMs) gain prominence, their multimodal interfaces also introduce new safety vulnerabilities, making the safety evaluation challenging and critical. Existing red-teaming efforts are either restricted to a narrow set of adversarial patterns or depend heavily on manual engineering, lacking scalable exploration of emerging real-world VLM vulnerabilities. To bridge this gap, we propose ARMs, an adaptive red-teaming agent that systematically conducts comprehensive risk assessments for VLMs. Given a target harmful behavior or risk definition, ARMs automatically optimizes diverse red-teaming strategies with reasoning-enhanced multi-step orchestration, to effectively elicit harmful outputs from target VLMs. We propose 11 novel multimodal attack strategies, covering diverse adversarial patterns of VLMs (e.g., reasoning hijacking, contextual cloaking), and integrate 17 red-teaming algorithms into ARMs via model context protocol (MCP). To balance the diversity and effectiveness of the attack, we design a layered memory with an epsilon-greedy attack exploration algorithm. Extensive experiments on instance- and policy-based benchmarks show that ARMs achieves SOTA attack success rates, exceeding baselines by an average of 52.1% and surpassing 90% on Claude-4-Sonnet. We show that the diversity of red-teaming instances generated by ARMs is significantly higher, revealing emerging vulnerabilities in VLMs. Leveraging ARMs, we construct ARMs-Bench, a large-scale multimodal safety dataset comprising over 30K red-teaming instances spanning 51 diverse risk categories, grounded in both real-world multimodal threats and regulatory risks. Safety fine-tuning with ARMs-Bench substantially improves the robustness of VLMs while preserving their general utility, providing actionable guidance to improve multimodal safety alignment against emerging threats.

Red-teaming, or identifying prompts that elicit harmful responses, is a critical step in ensuring the safe and responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). Developing effective protection against many modes of attack prompts requires discovering diverse attacks. Automated red-teaming typically uses reinforcement learning to fine-tune an attacker language model to generate prompts that elicit undesirable responses from a target LLM, as measured, for example, by an auxiliary toxicity classifier. We show that even with explicit regularization to favor novelty and diversity, existing approaches suffer from mode collapse or fail to generate effective attacks. As a flexible and probabilistically principled alternative, we propose to use GFlowNet fine-tuning, followed by a secondary smoothing phase, to train the attacker model to generate diverse and effective attack prompts. We find that the attacks generated by our method are effective against a wide range of target LLMs, both with and without safety tuning, and transfer well between target LLMs. Finally, we demonstrate that models safety-tuned using a dataset of red-teaming prompts generated by our method are robust to attacks from other RL-based red-teaming approaches.

Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation (i.e., Code LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in AI-assisted software development and testing. However, recent studies have shown that these models are prone to generating vulnerable or even malicious code under adversarial settings. Existing red-teaming approaches rely on extensive human effort, limiting their scalability and practicality, and generally overlook the interactive nature of real-world AI-assisted programming, which often unfolds over multiple turns. To bridge these gaps, we present RedCoder, a red-teaming agent that engages victim models in multi-turn conversation to elicit vulnerable code. The pipeline to construct RedCoder begins with a multi-agent gaming process that simulates adversarial interactions, yielding a set of prototype conversations and an arsenal of reusable attack strategies. We then fine-tune an LLM on these prototype conversations to serve as the backbone of RedCoder. Once deployed, RedCoder autonomously engages Code LLMs in multi-turn conversations, dynamically retrieving relevant strategies from the arsenal to steer the dialogue toward vulnerability-inducing outputs. Experiments across multiple Code LLMs show that our approach outperforms prior single-turn and multi-turn red-team methods in inducing vulnerabilities in code generation, offering a scalable and effective tool for evaluating the security boundaries of modern code-generation systems.

As large language models (LLMs) grow in power and influence, ensuring their safety and preventing harmful output becomes critical. Automated red teaming serves as a tool to detect security vulnerabilities in LLMs without manual labor. However, most existing methods struggle to balance the effectiveness and diversity of red-team generated attack prompts. To address this challenge, we propose \ourapproach, a novel automated red teaming training framework that utilizes reinforcement learning to explore and generate more effective attack prompts while balancing their diversity. Specifically, it consists of three training stages: (1) Cold Start: The red team model is supervised and fine-tuned on a jailbreak dataset obtained through imitation learning. (2) Warm-up Exploration: The model is trained in jailbreak instruction following and exploration, using diversity and consistency as reward signals. (3) Enhanced Jailbreak: Progressive jailbreak rewards are introduced to gradually enhance the jailbreak performance of the red-team model. Extensive experiments on a variety of LLMs show that \ourapproach effectively balances the diversity and effectiveness of jailbreak prompts compared to existing methods. Our work significantly improves the efficiency of red team exploration and provides a new perspective on automated red teaming.

We stress test monitoring systems for detecting covert misbehavior in autonomous LLM agents (e.g., secretly sharing private information). To this end, we systematize a monitor red teaming (MRT) workflow that incorporates: (1) varying levels of agent and monitor situational awareness; (2) distinct adversarial strategies to evade the monitor, such as prompt injection; and (3) two datasets and environments -- SHADE-Arena for tool-calling agents and our new CUA-SHADE-Arena, which extends TheAgentCompany, for computer-use agents. We run MRT on existing LLM monitor scaffoldings, which orchestrate LLMs and parse agent trajectories, alongside a new hybrid hierarchical-sequential scaffolding proposed in this work. Our empirical results yield three key findings. First, agent awareness dominates monitor awareness: an agent's knowledge that it is being monitored substantially degrades the monitor's reliability. On the contrary, providing the monitor with more information about the agent is less helpful than expected. Second, monitor scaffolding matters more than monitor awareness: the hybrid scaffolding consistently outperforms baseline monitor scaffolding, and can enable weaker models to reliably monitor stronger agents -- a weak-to-strong scaling effect. Third, in a human-in-the-loop setting where humans discuss with the LLM monitor to get an updated judgment for the agent's behavior, targeted human oversight is most effective; escalating only pre-flagged cases to human reviewers improved the TPR by approximately 15% at FPR = 0.01. Our work establishes a standard workflow for MRT, highlighting the lack of adversarial robustness for LLMs and humans when monitoring and detecting agent misbehavior. We release code, data, and logs to spur further research.

Red-teaming is a common practice for mitigating unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs), which involves thoroughly assessing LLMs to identify potential flaws and addressing them with responsible and accurate responses. While effective, manual red-teaming is costly, and existing automatic red-teaming typically discovers safety risks without addressing them. In this paper, we propose a Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming (MART) method, which incorporates both automatic adversarial prompt writing and safe response generation, significantly increasing red-teaming scalability and the safety of the target LLM. Specifically, an adversarial LLM and a target LLM interplay with each other in an iterative manner, where the adversarial LLM aims to generate challenging prompts that elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, while the target LLM is fine-tuned with safety aligned data on these adversarial prompts. In each round, the adversarial LLM crafts better attacks on the updated target LLM, while the target LLM also improves itself through safety fine-tuning. On adversarial prompt benchmarks, the violation rate of an LLM with limited safety alignment reduces up to 84.7% after 4 rounds of MART, achieving comparable performance to LLMs with extensive adversarial prompt writing. Notably, model helpfulness on non-adversarial prompts remains stable throughout iterations, indicating the target LLM maintains strong performance on instruction following.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, security and safety evaluation are crucial. While current red teaming approaches have made strides in assessing LLM vulnerabilities, they often rely heavily on human input and lack comprehensive coverage of emerging attack vectors. This paper introduces AutoRedTeamer, a novel framework for fully automated, end-to-end red teaming against LLMs. AutoRedTeamer combines a multi-agent architecture with a memory-guided attack selection mechanism to enable continuous discovery and integration of new attack vectors. The dual-agent framework consists of a red teaming agent that can operate from high-level risk categories alone to generate and execute test cases and a strategy proposer agent that autonomously discovers and implements new attacks by analyzing recent research. This modular design allows AutoRedTeamer to adapt to emerging threats while maintaining strong performance on existing attack vectors. We demonstrate AutoRedTeamer's effectiveness across diverse evaluation settings, achieving 20% higher attack success rates on HarmBench against Llama-3.1-70B while reducing computational costs by 46% compared to existing approaches. AutoRedTeamer also matches the diversity of human-curated benchmarks in generating test cases, providing a comprehensive, scalable, and continuously evolving framework for evaluating the security of AI systems.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

Automated red teaming holds substantial promise for uncovering and mitigating the risks associated with the malicious use of large language models (LLMs), yet the field lacks a standardized evaluation framework to rigorously assess new methods. To address this issue, we introduce HarmBench, a standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming. We identify several desirable properties previously unaccounted for in red teaming evaluations and systematically design HarmBench to meet these criteria. Using HarmBench, we conduct a large-scale comparison of 18 red teaming methods and 33 target LLMs and defenses, yielding novel insights. We also introduce a highly efficient adversarial training method that greatly enhances LLM robustness across a wide range of attacks, demonstrating how HarmBench enables codevelopment of attacks and defenses. We open source HarmBench at https://github.com/centerforaisafety/HarmBench.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred transformative applications in various domains, ranging from open-source to proprietary LLMs. However, jailbreak attacks, which aim to break safety alignment and user compliance by tricking the target LLMs into answering harmful and risky responses, are becoming an urgent concern. The practice of red-teaming for LLMs is to proactively explore potential risks and error-prone instances before the release of frontier AI technology. This paper proposes an agentic workflow to automate and scale the red-teaming process of LLMs through the Composition-of-Principles (CoP) framework, where human users provide a set of red-teaming principles as instructions to an AI agent to automatically orchestrate effective red-teaming strategies and generate jailbreak prompts. Distinct from existing red-teaming methods, our CoP framework provides a unified and extensible framework to encompass and orchestrate human-provided red-teaming principles to enable the automated discovery of new red-teaming strategies. When tested against leading LLMs, CoP reveals unprecedented safety risks by finding novel jailbreak prompts and improving the best-known single-turn attack success rate by up to 19.0 times.

Recent advances have enabled LLM-powered AI agents to autonomously execute complex tasks by combining language model reasoning with tools, memory, and web access. But can these systems be trusted to follow deployment policies in realistic environments, especially under attack? To investigate, we ran the largest public red-teaming competition to date, targeting 22 frontier AI agents across 44 realistic deployment scenarios. Participants submitted 1.8 million prompt-injection attacks, with over 60,000 successfully eliciting policy violations such as unauthorized data access, illicit financial actions, and regulatory noncompliance. We use these results to build the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark - a curated set of high-impact attacks - and evaluate it across 19 state-of-the-art models. Nearly all agents exhibit policy violations for most behaviors within 10-100 queries, with high attack transferability across models and tasks. Importantly, we find limited correlation between agent robustness and model size, capability, or inference-time compute, suggesting that additional defenses are needed against adversarial misuse. Our findings highlight critical and persistent vulnerabilities in today's AI agents. By releasing the ART benchmark and accompanying evaluation framework, we aim to support more rigorous security assessment and drive progress toward safer agent deployment.

We describe our early efforts to red team language models in order to simultaneously discover, measure, and attempt to reduce their potentially harmful outputs. We make three main contributions. First, we investigate scaling behaviors for red teaming across 3 model sizes (2.7B, 13B, and 52B parameters) and 4 model types: a plain language model (LM); an LM prompted to be helpful, honest, and harmless; an LM with rejection sampling; and a model trained to be helpful and harmless using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We find that the RLHF models are increasingly difficult to red team as they scale, and we find a flat trend with scale for the other model types. Second, we release our dataset of 38,961 red team attacks for others to analyze and learn from. We provide our own analysis of the data and find a variety of harmful outputs, which range from offensive language to more subtly harmful non-violent unethical outputs. Third, we exhaustively describe our instructions, processes, statistical methodologies, and uncertainty about red teaming. We hope that this transparency accelerates our ability to work together as a community in order to develop shared norms, practices, and technical standards for how to red team language models.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a weak-to-strong problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the capability gap between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 500 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these trends, we derive a jailbreaking scaling law that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

Red-teaming has been a widely adopted way to evaluate the harmfulness of Large Language Models (LLMs). It aims to jailbreak a model's safety behavior to make it act as a helpful agent disregarding the harmfulness of the query. Existing methods are primarily based on input text-based red-teaming such as adversarial prompts, low-resource prompts, or contextualized prompts to condition the model in a way to bypass its safe behavior. Bypassing the guardrails uncovers hidden harmful information and biases in the model that are left untreated or newly introduced by its safety training. However, prompt-based attacks fail to provide such a diagnosis owing to their low attack success rate, and applicability to specific models. In this paper, we present a new perspective on LLM safety research i.e., parametric red-teaming through Unalignment. It simply (instruction) tunes the model parameters to break model guardrails that are not deeply rooted in the model's behavior. Unalignment using as few as 100 examples can significantly bypass commonly referred to as CHATGPT, to the point where it responds with an 88% success rate to harmful queries on two safety benchmark datasets. On open-source models such as VICUNA-7B and LLAMA-2-CHAT 7B AND 13B, it shows an attack success rate of more than 91%. On bias evaluations, Unalignment exposes inherent biases in safety-aligned models such as CHATGPT and LLAMA- 2-CHAT where the model's responses are strongly biased and opinionated 64% of the time.

As generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into production applications, new attack surfaces and vulnerabilities emerge and put a focus on adversarial threats in natural language and multi-modal systems. Red-teaming has gained importance in proactively identifying weaknesses in these systems, while blue-teaming works to protect against such adversarial attacks. Despite growing academic interest in adversarial risks for generative AI, there is limited guidance tailored for practitioners to assess and mitigate these challenges in real-world environments. To address this, our contributions include: (1) a practical examination of red- and blue-teaming strategies for securing generative AI, (2) identification of key challenges and open questions in defense development and evaluation, and (3) the Attack Atlas, an intuitive framework that brings a practical approach to analyzing single-turn input attacks, placing it at the forefront for practitioners. This work aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and practical security measures for the protection of generative AI systems.

Adversarial testing of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for their safe and responsible deployment. We introduce a novel approach for automated generation of adversarial evaluation datasets to test the safety of LLM generations on new downstream applications. We call it AI-assisted Red-Teaming (AART) - an automated alternative to current manual red-teaming efforts. AART offers a data generation and augmentation pipeline of reusable and customizable recipes that reduce human effort significantly and enable integration of adversarial testing earlier in new product development. AART generates evaluation datasets with high diversity of content characteristics critical for effective adversarial testing (e.g. sensitive and harmful concepts, specific to a wide range of cultural and geographic regions and application scenarios). The data generation is steered by AI-assisted recipes to define, scope and prioritize diversity within the application context. This feeds into a structured LLM-generation process that scales up evaluation priorities. Compared to some state-of-the-art tools, AART shows promising results in terms of concept coverage and data quality.

Engaging in the deliberate generation of abnormal outputs from Large Language Models (LLMs) by attacking them is a novel human activity. This paper presents a thorough exposition of how and why people perform such attacks, defining LLM red-teaming based on extensive and diverse evidence. Using a formal qualitative methodology, we interviewed dozens of practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds, all contributors to this novel work of attempting to cause LLMs to fail. We focused on the research questions of defining LLM red teaming, uncovering the motivations and goals for performing the activity, and characterizing the strategies people use when attacking LLMs. Based on the data, LLM red teaming is defined as a limit-seeking, non-malicious, manual activity, which depends highly on a team-effort and an alchemist mindset. It is highly intrinsically motivated by curiosity, fun, and to some degrees by concerns for various harms of deploying LLMs. We identify a taxonomy of 12 strategies and 35 different techniques of attacking LLMs. These findings are presented as a comprehensive grounded theory of how and why people attack large language models: LLM red teaming.

Ensuring the safety and reliability of large language models (LLMs) in clinical practice is critical to prevent patient harm and promote trustworthy healthcare applications of AI. However, LLMs are advancing so rapidly that static safety benchmarks often become obsolete upon publication, yielding only an incomplete and sometimes misleading picture of model trustworthiness. We demonstrate that a Dynamic, Automatic, and Systematic (DAS) red-teaming framework that continuously stress-tests LLMs can reveal significant weaknesses of current LLMs across four safety-critical domains: robustness, privacy, bias/fairness, and hallucination. A suite of adversarial agents is applied to autonomously mutate test cases, identify/evolve unsafe-triggering strategies, and evaluate responses, uncovering vulnerabilities in real time without human intervention. Applying DAS to 15 proprietary and open-source LLMs revealed a stark contrast between static benchmark performance and vulnerability under adversarial pressure. Despite a median MedQA accuracy exceeding 80\%, 94\% of previously correct answers failed our dynamic robustness tests. We observed similarly high failure rates across other domains: privacy leaks were elicited in 86\% of scenarios, cognitive-bias priming altered clinical recommendations in 81\% of fairness tests, and we identified hallucination rates exceeding 66\% in widely used models. Such profound residual risks are incompatible with routine clinical practice. By converting red-teaming from a static checklist into a dynamic stress-test audit, DAS red-teaming offers the surveillance that hospitals/regulators/technology vendors require as LLMs become embedded in patient chatbots, decision-support dashboards, and broader healthcare workflows. Our framework delivers an evolvable, scalable, and reliable safeguard for the next generation of medical AI.

VLMs (Vision-Language Models) extend the capabilities of LLMs (Large Language Models) to accept multimodal inputs. Since it has been verified that LLMs can be induced to generate harmful or inaccurate content through specific test cases (termed as Red Teaming), how VLMs perform in similar scenarios, especially with their combination of textual and visual inputs, remains a question. To explore this problem, we present a novel red teaming dataset RTVLM, which encompasses 10 subtasks (e.g., image misleading, multi-modal jail-breaking, face fairness, etc) under 4 primary aspects (faithfulness, privacy, safety, fairness). Our RTVLM is the first red-teaming dataset to benchmark current VLMs in terms of these 4 different aspects. Detailed analysis shows that 10 prominent open-sourced VLMs struggle with the red teaming in different degrees and have up to 31% performance gap with GPT-4V. Additionally, we simply apply red teaming alignment to LLaVA-v1.5 with Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) using RTVLM, and this bolsters the models' performance with 10% in RTVLM test set, 13% in MM-Hal, and without noticeable decline in MM-Bench, overpassing other LLaVA-based models with regular alignment data. This reveals that current open-sourced VLMs still lack red teaming alignment. Our code and datasets will be open-source.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

Language Model Models (LLMs) have improved dramatically in the past few years, increasing their adoption and the scope of their capabilities over time. A significant amount of work is dedicated to ``model alignment'', i.e., preventing LLMs to generate unsafe responses when deployed into customer-facing applications. One popular method to evaluate safety risks is red-teaming, where agents attempt to bypass alignment by crafting elaborate prompts that trigger unsafe responses from a model. Standard human-driven red-teaming is costly, time-consuming and rarely covers all the recent features (e.g., multi-lingual, multi-modal aspects), while proposed automation methods only cover a small subset of LLMs capabilities (i.e., English or single-turn). We present Multi-lingual Multi-turn Automated Red Teaming (MM-ART), a method to fully automate conversational, multi-lingual red-teaming operations and quickly identify prompts leading to unsafe responses. Through extensive experiments on different languages, we show the studied LLMs are on average 71\% more vulnerable after a 5-turn conversation in English than after the initial turn. For conversations in non-English languages, models display up to 195\% more safety vulnerabilities than the standard single-turn English approach, confirming the need for automated red-teaming methods matching LLMs capabilities.

Language-conditioned robot models have the potential to enable robots to perform a wide range of tasks based on natural language instructions. However, assessing their safety and effectiveness remains challenging because it is difficult to test all the different ways a single task can be phrased. Current benchmarks have two key limitations: they rely on a limited set of human-generated instructions, missing many challenging cases, and focus only on task performance without assessing safety, such as avoiding damage. To address these gaps, we introduce Embodied Red Teaming (ERT), a new evaluation method that generates diverse and challenging instructions to test these models. ERT uses automated red teaming techniques with Vision Language Models (VLMs) to create contextually grounded, difficult instructions. Experimental results show that state-of-the-art language-conditioned robot models fail or behave unsafely on ERT-generated instructions, underscoring the shortcomings of current benchmarks in evaluating real-world performance and safety. Code and videos are available at: https://s-karnik.github.io/embodied-red-team-project-page.

Creating secure and resilient applications with large language models (LLM) requires anticipating, adjusting to, and countering unforeseen threats. Red-teaming has emerged as a critical technique for identifying vulnerabilities in real-world LLM implementations. This paper presents a detailed threat model and provides a systematization of knowledge (SoK) of red-teaming attacks on LLMs. We develop a taxonomy of attacks based on the stages of the LLM development and deployment process and extract various insights from previous research. In addition, we compile methods for defense and practical red-teaming strategies for practitioners. By delineating prominent attack motifs and shedding light on various entry points, this paper provides a framework for improving the security and robustness of LLM-based systems.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) promise to automate complex tasks across operating systems (OS) and the web, but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Current evaluations of this threat either lack support realistic but controlled environments or ignore hybrid web-OS attack scenarios involving both interfaces. To address this, we propose RedTeamCUA, an adversarial testing framework featuring a novel hybrid sandbox that integrates a VM-based OS environment with Docker-based web platforms. Our sandbox supports key features tailored for red teaming, such as flexible adversarial scenario configuration, and a setting that decouples adversarial evaluation from navigational limitations of CUAs by initializing tests directly at the point of an adversarial injection. Using RedTeamCUA, we develop RTC-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark with 864 examples that investigate realistic, hybrid web-OS attack scenarios and fundamental security vulnerabilities. Benchmarking current frontier CUAs identifies significant vulnerabilities: Claude 3.7 Sonnet | CUA demonstrates an ASR of 42.9%, while Operator, the most secure CUA evaluated, still exhibits an ASR of 7.6%. Notably, CUAs often attempt to execute adversarial tasks with an Attempt Rate as high as 92.5%, although failing to complete them due to capability limitations. Nevertheless, we observe concerning ASRs of up to 50% in realistic end-to-end settings, with the recently released frontier Claude 4 Opus | CUA showing an alarming ASR of 48%, demonstrating that indirect prompt injection presents tangible risks for even advanced CUAs despite their capabilities and safeguards. Overall, RedTeamCUA provides an essential framework for advancing realistic, controlled, and systematic analysis of CUA vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses to indirect prompt injection prior to real-world deployment.

Generative models are rapidly gaining popularity and being integrated into everyday applications, raising concerns over their safe use as various vulnerabilities are exposed. In light of this, the field of red teaming is undergoing fast-paced growth, highlighting the need for a comprehensive survey covering the entire pipeline and addressing emerging topics. Our extensive survey, which examines over 120 papers, introduces a taxonomy of fine-grained attack strategies grounded in the inherent capabilities of language models. Additionally, we have developed the "searcher" framework to unify various automatic red teaming approaches. Moreover, our survey covers novel areas including multimodal attacks and defenses, risks around LLM-based agents, overkill of harmless queries, and the balance between harmlessness and helpfulness.

With the proliferation of red-teaming strategies for Large Language Models (LLMs), the deficiency in the literature about improving the safety and robustness of LLM defense strategies is becoming increasingly pronounced. This paper introduces the LLM-based sentinel model as a plug-and-play prefix module designed to reconstruct the input prompt with just a few (<30) additional tokens, effectively reducing toxicity in responses from target LLMs. The sentinel model naturally overcomes the parameter inefficiency and limited model accessibility for fine-tuning large target models. We employ an interleaved training regimen using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to optimize both red team and sentinel models dynamically, incorporating a value head-sharing mechanism inspired by the multi-agent centralized critic to manage the complex interplay between agents. Our extensive experiments across text-to-text and text-to-image demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating toxic outputs, even when dealing with larger models like Llama-2, GPT-3.5 and Stable-Diffusion, highlighting the potential of our framework in enhancing safety and robustness in various applications.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

From automated intrusion testing to discovery of zero-day attacks before software launch, agentic AI calls for great promises in security engineering. This strong capability is bound with a similar threat: the security and research community must build up its models before the approach is leveraged by malicious actors for cybercrime. We therefore propose and evaluate RedTeamLLM, an integrated architecture with a comprehensive security model for automatization of pentest tasks. RedTeamLLM follows three key steps: summarizing, reasoning and act, which embed its operational capacity. This novel framework addresses four open challenges: plan correction, memory management, context window constraint, and generality vs. specialization. Evaluation is performed through the automated resolution of a range of entry-level, but not trivial, CTF challenges. The contribution of the reasoning capability of our agentic AI framework is specifically evaluated.

Automated red-teaming has become a crucial approach for uncovering vulnerabilities in large language models (LLMs). However, most existing methods focus on isolated safety flaws, limiting their ability to adapt to dynamic defenses and uncover complex vulnerabilities efficiently. To address this challenge, we propose Auto-RT, a reinforcement learning framework that automatically explores and optimizes complex attack strategies to effectively uncover security vulnerabilities through malicious queries. Specifically, we introduce two key mechanisms to reduce exploration complexity and improve strategy optimization: 1) Early-terminated Exploration, which accelerate exploration by focusing on high-potential attack strategies; and 2) Progressive Reward Tracking algorithm with intermediate downgrade models, which dynamically refine the search trajectory toward successful vulnerability exploitation. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs demonstrate that, by significantly improving exploration efficiency and automatically optimizing attack strategies, Auto-RT detects a boarder range of vulnerabilities, achieving a faster detection speed and 16.63\% higher success rates compared to existing methods.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

Multi-turn interactions with language models (LMs) pose critical safety risks, as harmful intent can be strategically spread across exchanges. Yet, the vast majority of prior work has focused on single-turn safety, while adaptability and diversity remain among the key challenges of multi-turn red-teaming. To address these challenges, we present X-Teaming, a scalable framework that systematically explores how seemingly harmless interactions escalate into harmful outcomes and generates corresponding attack scenarios. X-Teaming employs collaborative agents for planning, attack optimization, and verification, achieving state-of-the-art multi-turn jailbreak effectiveness and diversity with success rates up to 98.1% across representative leading open-weight and closed-source models. In particular, X-Teaming achieves a 96.2% attack success rate against the latest Claude 3.7 Sonnet model, which has been considered nearly immune to single-turn attacks. Building on X-Teaming, we introduce XGuard-Train, an open-source multi-turn safety training dataset that is 20x larger than the previous best resource, comprising 30K interactive jailbreaks, designed to enable robust multi-turn safety alignment for LMs. Our work offers essential tools and insights for mitigating sophisticated conversational attacks, advancing the multi-turn safety of LMs.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) is becoming ubiquitous in our daily lives. The increase in computational power and data availability has led to a proliferation of both single- and multi-modal models. As the GenAI ecosystem matures, the need for extensible and model-agnostic risk identification frameworks is growing. To meet this need, we introduce the Python Risk Identification Toolkit (PyRIT), an open-source framework designed to enhance red teaming efforts in GenAI systems. PyRIT is a model- and platform-agnostic tool that enables red teamers to probe for and identify novel harms, risks, and jailbreaks in multimodal generative AI models. Its composable architecture facilitates the reuse of core building blocks and allows for extensibility to future models and modalities. This paper details the challenges specific to red teaming generative AI systems, the development and features of PyRIT, and its practical applications in real-world scenarios.

Multi-turn-to-single-turn (M2S) compresses iterative red-teaming into one structured prompt, but prior work relied on a handful of manually written templates. We present X-Teaming Evolutionary M2S, an automated framework that discovers and optimizes M2S templates through language-model-guided evolution. The system pairs smart sampling from 12 sources with an LLM-as-judge inspired by StrongREJECT and records fully auditable logs. Maintaining selection pressure by setting the success threshold to theta = 0.70, we obtain five evolutionary generations, two new template families, and 44.8% overall success (103/230) on GPT-4.1. A balanced cross-model panel of 2,500 trials (judge fixed) shows that structural gains transfer but vary by target; two models score zero at the same threshold. We also find a positive coupling between prompt length and score, motivating length-aware judging. Our results demonstrate that structure-level search is a reproducible route to stronger single-turn probes and underscore the importance of threshold calibration and cross-model evaluation. Code, configurations, and artifacts are available at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/M2S-x-teaming.

We present Gradientsys, a next-generation multi-agent scheduling framework that coordinates diverse specialized AI agents using a typed Model-Context Protocol (MCP) and a ReAct-based dynamic planning loop. At its core, Gradientsys employs an LLM-powered scheduler for intelligent one-to-many task dispatch, enabling parallel execution of heterogeneous agents such as PDF parsers, web search modules, GUI controllers, and web builders. The framework supports hybrid synchronous/asynchronous execution, respects agent capacity constraints, and incorporates a robust retry-and-replan mechanism to handle failures gracefully. To promote transparency and trust, Gradientsys includes an observability layer streaming real-time agent activity and intermediate reasoning via Server-Sent Events (SSE). We offer an architectural overview and evaluate Gradientsys against existing frameworks in terms of extensibility, scheduling topology, tool reusability, parallelism, and observability. Experiments on the GAIA general-assistant benchmark show that Gradientsys achieves higher task success rates with reduced latency and lower API costs compared to a MinionS-style baseline, demonstrating the strength of its LLM-driven multi-agent orchestration.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents equipped with external tools have become increasingly powerful for complex tasks such as web shopping, automated email replies, and financial trading. However, these advancements amplify the risks of adversarial attacks, especially when agents can access sensitive external functionalities. Nevertheless, manipulating LLM agents into performing targeted malicious actions or invoking specific tools remains challenging, as these agents extensively reason or plan before executing final actions. In this work, we present UDora, a unified red teaming framework designed for LLM agents that dynamically hijacks the agent's reasoning processes to compel malicious behavior. Specifically, UDora first generates the model's reasoning trace for the given task, then automatically identifies optimal points within this trace to insert targeted perturbations. The resulting perturbed reasoning is then used as a surrogate response for optimization. By iteratively applying this process, the LLM agent will then be induced to undertake designated malicious actions or to invoke specific malicious tools. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness compared to existing methods across three LLM agent datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/AI-secure/UDora.

Refusal training on Large Language Models (LLMs) prevents harmful outputs, yet this defense remains vulnerable to both automated and human-crafted jailbreaks. We present a novel LLM-as-red-teamer approach in which a human jailbreaks a refusal-trained LLM to make it willing to jailbreak itself or other LLMs. We refer to the jailbroken LLMs as J_2 attackers, which can systematically evaluate target models using various red teaming strategies and improve its performance via in-context learning from the previous failures. Our experiments demonstrate that Sonnet 3.5 and Gemini 1.5 pro outperform other LLMs as J_2, achieving 93.0% and 91.0% attack success rates (ASRs) respectively against GPT-4o (and similar results across other capable LLMs) on Harmbench. Our work not only introduces a scalable approach to strategic red teaming, drawing inspiration from human red teamers, but also highlights jailbreaking-to-jailbreak as an overlooked failure mode of the safeguard. Specifically, an LLM can bypass its own safeguards by employing a jailbroken version of itself that is willing to assist in further jailbreaking. To prevent any direct misuse with J_2, while advancing research in AI safety, we publicly share our methodology while keeping specific prompting details private.

Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases. In this work, we automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases ("red teaming") using another LM. We evaluate the target LM's replies to generated test questions using a classifier trained to detect offensive content, uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot. We explore several methods, from zero-shot generation to reinforcement learning, for generating test cases with varying levels of diversity and difficulty. Furthermore, we use prompt engineering to control LM-generated test cases to uncover a variety of other harms, automatically finding groups of people that the chatbot discusses in offensive ways, personal and hospital phone numbers generated as the chatbot's own contact info, leakage of private training data in generated text, and harms that occur over the course of a conversation. Overall, LM-based red teaming is one promising tool (among many needed) for finding and fixing diverse, undesirable LM behaviors before impacting users.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent across many real-world applications, understanding and enhancing their robustness to user inputs is of paramount importance. Existing methods for identifying adversarial prompts tend to focus on specific domains, lack diversity, or require extensive human annotations. To address these limitations, we present Rainbow Teaming, a novel approach for producing a diverse collection of adversarial prompts. Rainbow Teaming casts adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity problem, and uses open-ended search to generate prompts that are both effective and diverse. It can uncover a model's vulnerabilities across a broad range of domains including, in this paper, safety, question answering, and cybersecurity. We also demonstrate that fine-tuning on synthetic data generated by Rainbow Teaming improves the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs without hurting their general capabilities and helpfulness, paving the path to open-ended self-improvement.

AI systems for software development are rapidly gaining prominence, yet significant challenges remain in ensuring their safety. To address this, Amazon launched the Trusted AI track of the Amazon Nova AI Challenge, a global competition among 10 university teams to drive advances in secure AI. In the challenge, five teams focus on developing automated red teaming bots, while the other five create safe AI assistants. This challenge provides teams with a unique platform to evaluate automated red-teaming and safety alignment methods through head-to-head adversarial tournaments where red teams have multi-turn conversations with the competing AI coding assistants to test their safety alignment. Along with this, the challenge provides teams with a feed of high quality annotated data to fuel iterative improvement. Throughout the challenge, teams developed state-of-the-art techniques, introducing novel approaches in reasoning-based safety alignment, robust model guardrails, multi-turn jail-breaking, and efficient probing of large language models (LLMs). To support these efforts, the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team made substantial scientific and engineering investments, including building a custom baseline coding specialist model for the challenge from scratch, developing a tournament orchestration service, and creating an evaluation harness. This paper outlines the advancements made by university teams and the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team in addressing the safety challenges of AI for software development, highlighting this collaborative effort to raise the bar for AI safety.

Task-oriented LLM-based agents are increasingly used in domains with strict policies, such as refund eligibility or cancellation rules. The challenge lies in ensuring that the agent consistently adheres to these rules and policies, appropriately refusing any request that would violate them, while still maintaining a helpful and natural interaction. This calls for the development of tailored design and evaluation methodologies to ensure agent resilience against malicious user behavior. We propose a novel threat model that focuses on adversarial users aiming to exploit policy-adherent agents for personal benefit. To address this, we present CRAFT, a multi-agent red-teaming system that leverages policy-aware persuasive strategies to undermine a policy-adherent agent in a customer-service scenario, outperforming conventional jailbreak methods such as DAN prompts, emotional manipulation, and coercive. Building upon the existing tau-bench benchmark, we introduce tau-break, a complementary benchmark designed to rigorously assess the agent's robustness against manipulative user behavior. Finally, we evaluate several straightforward yet effective defense strategies. While these measures provide some protection, they fall short, highlighting the need for stronger, research-driven safeguards to protect policy-adherent agents from adversarial attacks

Large language models (LLMs) hold great potential for many natural language applications but risk generating incorrect or toxic content. To probe when an LLM generates unwanted content, the current paradigm is to recruit a red team of human testers to design input prompts (i.e., test cases) that elicit undesirable responses from LLMs. However, relying solely on human testers is expensive and time-consuming. Recent works automate red teaming by training a separate red team LLM with reinforcement learning (RL) to generate test cases that maximize the chance of eliciting undesirable responses from the target LLM. However, current RL methods are only able to generate a small number of effective test cases resulting in a low coverage of the span of prompts that elicit undesirable responses from the target LLM. To overcome this limitation, we draw a connection between the problem of increasing the coverage of generated test cases and the well-studied approach of curiosity-driven exploration that optimizes for novelty. Our method of curiosity-driven red teaming (CRT) achieves greater coverage of test cases while mantaining or increasing their effectiveness compared to existing methods. Our method, CRT successfully provokes toxic responses from LLaMA2 model that has been heavily fine-tuned using human preferences to avoid toxic outputs. Code is available at https://github.com/Improbable-AI/curiosity_redteam

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across a wide range of tasks, yet their safety mechanisms remain susceptible to adversarial attacks that exploit cognitive biases -- systematic deviations from rational judgment. Unlike prior jailbreaking approaches focused on prompt engineering or algorithmic manipulation, this work highlights the overlooked power of multi-bias interactions in undermining LLM safeguards. We propose CognitiveAttack, a novel red-teaming framework that systematically leverages both individual and combined cognitive biases. By integrating supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, CognitiveAttack generates prompts that embed optimized bias combinations, effectively bypassing safety protocols while maintaining high attack success rates. Experimental results reveal significant vulnerabilities across 30 diverse LLMs, particularly in open-source models. CognitiveAttack achieves a substantially higher attack success rate compared to the SOTA black-box method PAP (60.1% vs. 31.6%), exposing critical limitations in current defense mechanisms. These findings highlight multi-bias interactions as a powerful yet underexplored attack vector. This work introduces a novel interdisciplinary perspective by bridging cognitive science and LLM safety, paving the way for more robust and human-aligned AI systems.

Large-scale pre-trained generative models are taking the world by storm, due to their abilities in generating creative content. Meanwhile, safeguards for these generative models are developed, to protect users' rights and safety, most of which are designed for large language models. Existing methods primarily focus on jailbreak and adversarial attacks, which mainly evaluate the model's safety under malicious prompts. Recent work found that manually crafted safe prompts can unintentionally trigger unsafe generations. To further systematically evaluate the safety risks of text-to-image models, we propose a novel Automatic Red-Teaming framework, ART. Our method leverages both vision language model and large language model to establish a connection between unsafe generations and their prompts, thereby more efficiently identifying the model's vulnerabilities. With our comprehensive experiments, we reveal the toxicity of the popular open-source text-to-image models. The experiments also validate the effectiveness, adaptability, and great diversity of ART. Additionally, we introduce three large-scale red-teaming datasets for studying the safety risks associated with text-to-image models. Datasets and models can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/ART.

Existing agents for solving tasks such as ML engineering rely on prompting powerful language models. As a result, these agents do not improve with more experience. In this paper, we show that agents backed by weaker models that improve via reinforcement learning (RL) can outperform agents backed by much larger, but static models. We identify two major challenges with RL in this setting. First, actions can take a variable amount of time (e.g., executing code for different solutions), which leads to asynchronous policy gradient updates that favor faster but suboptimal solutions. To tackle variable-duration actions, we propose duration-aware gradient updates in a distributed asynchronous RL framework to amplify high-cost but high-reward actions. Second, using only test split performance as a reward provides limited feedback. A program that is nearly correct is treated the same as one that fails entirely. To address this, we propose environment instrumentation to offer partial credit, distinguishing almost-correct programs from those that fail early (e.g., during data loading). Environment instrumentation uses a separate static language model to insert print statement to an existing program to log the agent's experimental progress, from which partial credit can be extracted as reward signals for learning. Our experimental results on MLEBench suggest that performing gradient updates on a much smaller model (Qwen2.5-3B) trained with RL outperforms prompting a much larger model (Claude-3.5-Sonnet) with agent scaffolds, by an average of 22% across 12 Kaggle tasks.

AI coding assistants like GitHub Copilot are rapidly transforming software development, but their safety remains deeply uncertain-especially in high-stakes domains like cybersecurity. Current red-teaming tools often rely on fixed benchmarks or unrealistic prompts, missing many real-world vulnerabilities. We present ASTRA, an automated agent system designed to systematically uncover safety flaws in AI-driven code generation and security guidance systems. ASTRA works in three stages: (1) it builds structured domain-specific knowledge graphs that model complex software tasks and known weaknesses; (2) it performs online vulnerability exploration of each target model by adaptively probing both its input space, i.e., the spatial exploration, and its reasoning processes, i.e., the temporal exploration, guided by the knowledge graphs; and (3) it generates high-quality violation-inducing cases to improve model alignment. Unlike prior methods, ASTRA focuses on realistic inputs-requests that developers might actually ask-and uses both offline abstraction guided domain modeling and online domain knowledge graph adaptation to surface corner-case vulnerabilities. Across two major evaluation domains, ASTRA finds 11-66% more issues than existing techniques and produces test cases that lead to 17% more effective alignment training, showing its practical value for building safer AI systems.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) offer significant potential in dynamic, perception-intensive tasks such as search and rescue and environmental monitoring; however, their effectiveness is severely restricted by conventional pre-planned routing methods, which lack the flexibility to respond in real-time to evolving task demands, unexpected disturbances, and localized view limitations in real-world scenarios. To address this fundamental limitation, we introduce a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning framework named Heterogeneous Graph Attention Multi-agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (HGAM), uniquely designed to enable adaptive real-time coordination between mission UAVs (MUAVs) and charging UAVs (CUAVs). HGAM specifically addresses the previously unsolved challenge of enabling precise, decentralized continuous-action coordination solely based on local, heterogeneous graph-based observations. Extensive simulations demonstrate that HGAM substantially surpasses existing methods, achieving, for example, a 30\% improvement in data collection coverage and a 20\% increase in charging efficiency, providing crucial insights and foundations for the future deployment of intelligent, flexible UAV networks in complex, dynamic environments.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) is a methodology designed to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences, playing an important role in LLMs alignment. Despite its advantages, RLHF relies on human annotators to rank the text, which can introduce potential security vulnerabilities if any adversarial annotator (i.e., attackers) manipulates the ranking score by up-ranking any malicious text to steer the LLM adversarially. To assess the red-teaming of RLHF against human preference data poisoning, we propose RankPoison, a poisoning attack method on candidates' selection of preference rank flipping to reach certain malicious behaviors (e.g., generating longer sequences, which can increase the computational cost). With poisoned dataset generated by RankPoison, we can perform poisoning attacks on LLMs to generate longer tokens without hurting the original safety alignment performance. Moreover, applying RankPoison, we also successfully implement a backdoor attack where LLMs can generate longer answers under questions with the trigger word. Our findings highlight critical security challenges in RLHF, underscoring the necessity for more robust alignment methods for LLMs.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a critical component of large language model (LLM) post-training. However, existing on-policy algorithms used for post-training are inherently incompatible with the use of experience replay buffers, which can be populated scalably by distributed off-policy actors to enhance exploration as compute increases. We propose efficiently obtaining this benefit of replay buffers via Trajectory Balance with Asynchrony (TBA), a massively scalable LLM RL system. In contrast to existing approaches, TBA uses a larger fraction of compute on search, constantly generating off-policy data for a central replay buffer. A training node simultaneously samples data from this buffer based on reward or recency to update the policy using Trajectory Balance (TB), a diversity-seeking RL objective introduced for GFlowNets. TBA offers three key advantages: (1) decoupled training and search, speeding up training wall-clock time by 4x or more; (2) improved diversity through large-scale off-policy sampling; and (3) scalable search for sparse reward settings. On mathematical reasoning, preference-tuning, and automated red-teaming (diverse and representative post-training tasks), TBA produces speed and performance improvements over strong baselines.

For safety reasons, large language models (LLMs) are trained to refuse harmful user instructions, such as assisting dangerous activities. We study an open question in this work: does the desired safety refusal, typically enforced in chat contexts, generalize to non-chat and agentic use cases? Unlike chatbots, LLM agents equipped with general-purpose tools, such as web browsers and mobile devices, can directly influence the real world, making it even more crucial to refuse harmful instructions. In this work, we primarily focus on red-teaming browser agents, LLMs that manipulate information via web browsers. To this end, we introduce Browser Agent Red teaming Toolkit (BrowserART), a comprehensive test suite designed specifically for red-teaming browser agents. BrowserART is consist of 100 diverse browser-related harmful behaviors (including original behaviors and ones sourced from HarmBench [Mazeika et al., 2024] and AirBench 2024 [Zeng et al., 2024b]) across both synthetic and real websites. Our empirical study on state-of-the-art browser agents reveals that, while the backbone LLM refuses harmful instructions as a chatbot, the corresponding agent does not. Moreover, attack methods designed to jailbreak refusal-trained LLMs in the chat settings transfer effectively to browser agents. With human rewrites, GPT-4o and o1-preview-based browser agents attempted 98 and 63 harmful behaviors (out of 100), respectively. We publicly release BrowserART and call on LLM developers, policymakers, and agent developers to collaborate on improving agent safety

We propose Ruby Teaming, a method that improves on Rainbow Teaming by including a memory cache as its third dimension. The memory dimension provides cues to the mutator to yield better-quality prompts, both in terms of attack success rate (ASR) and quality diversity. The prompt archive generated by Ruby Teaming has an ASR of 74%, which is 20% higher than the baseline. In terms of quality diversity, Ruby Teaming outperforms Rainbow Teaming by 6% and 3% on Shannon's Evenness Index (SEI) and Simpson's Diversity Index (SDI), respectively.

Recent studies in large language models (LLMs) shed light on their multilingual ability and safety, beyond conventional tasks in language modeling. Still, current benchmarks reveal their inability to comprehensively evaluate them and are excessively dependent on manual annotations. In this paper, we introduce code-switching red-teaming (CSRT), a simple yet effective red-teaming technique that simultaneously tests multilingual understanding and safety of LLMs. We release the CSRT dataset, which comprises 315 code-switching queries combining up to 10 languages and eliciting a wide range of undesirable behaviors. Through extensive experiments with ten state-of-the-art LLMs, we demonstrate that CSRT significantly outperforms existing multilingual red-teaming techniques, achieving 46.7% more attacks than existing methods in English. We analyze the harmful responses toward the CSRT dataset concerning various aspects under ablation studies with 16K samples, including but not limited to scaling laws, unsafe behavior categories, and input conditions for optimal data generation. Additionally, we validate the extensibility of CSRT, by generating code-switching attack prompts with monolingual data.

As large language models are integrated into society, robustness toward a suite of prompts is increasingly important to maintain reliability in a high-variance environment.Robustness evaluations must comprehensively encapsulate the various settings in which a user may invoke an intelligent system. This paper proposes ASSERT, Automated Safety Scenario Red Teaming, consisting of three methods -- semantically aligned augmentation, target bootstrapping, and adversarial knowledge injection. For robust safety evaluation, we apply these methods in the critical domain of AI safety to algorithmically generate a test suite of prompts covering diverse robustness settings -- semantic equivalence, related scenarios, and adversarial. We partition our prompts into four safety domains for a fine-grained analysis of how the domain affects model performance. Despite dedicated safeguards in existing state-of-the-art models, we find statistically significant performance differences of up to 11% in absolute classification accuracy among semantically related scenarios and error rates of up to 19% absolute error in zero-shot adversarial settings, raising concerns for users' physical safety.

The rapid progress of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened up new opportunities across various domains and applications; yet it also presents challenges related to potential misuse. To mitigate such risks, red teaming has been employed as a proactive security measure to probe language models for harmful outputs via jailbreak attacks. However, current jailbreak attack approaches are single-turn with explicit malicious queries that do not fully capture the complexity of real-world interactions. In reality, users can engage in multi-turn interactions with LLM-based chat assistants, allowing them to conceal their true intentions in a more covert manner. To bridge this gap, we, first, propose a new jailbreak approach, RED QUEEN ATTACK. This method constructs a multi-turn scenario, concealing the malicious intent under the guise of preventing harm. We craft 40 scenarios that vary in turns and select 14 harmful categories to generate 56k multi-turn attack data points. We conduct comprehensive experiments on the RED QUEEN ATTACK with four representative LLM families of different sizes. Our experiments reveal that all LLMs are vulnerable to RED QUEEN ATTACK, reaching 87.62% attack success rate on GPT-4o and 75.4% on Llama3-70B. Further analysis reveals that larger models are more susceptible to the RED QUEEN ATTACK, with multi-turn structures and concealment strategies contributing to its success. To prioritize safety, we introduce a straightforward mitigation strategy called RED QUEEN GUARD, which aligns LLMs to effectively counter adversarial attacks. This approach reduces the attack success rate to below 1% while maintaining the model's performance across standard benchmarks. Full implementation and dataset are publicly accessible at https://github.com/kriti-hippo/red_queen.

We introduce ComputerRL, a framework for autonomous desktop intelligence that enables agents to operate complex digital workspaces skillfully. ComputerRL features the API-GUI paradigm, which unifies programmatic API calls and direct GUI interaction to address the inherent mismatch between machine agents and human-centric desktop environments. Scaling end-to-end RL training is crucial for improvement and generalization across diverse desktop tasks, yet remains challenging due to environmental inefficiency and instability in extended training. To support scalable and robust training, we develop a distributed RL infrastructure capable of orchestrating thousands of parallel virtual desktop environments to accelerate large-scale online RL. Furthermore, we propose Entropulse, a training strategy that alternates reinforcement learning with supervised fine-tuning, effectively mitigating entropy collapse during extended training runs. We employ ComputerRL on open models GLM-4-9B-0414 and Qwen2.5-14B, and evaluate them on the OSWorld benchmark. The AutoGLM-OS-9B based on GLM-4-9B-0414 achieves a new state-of-the-art accuracy of 48.1%, demonstrating significant improvements for general agents in desktop automation. The algorithm and framework are adopted in building AutoGLM (Liu et al., 2024a)

LLM-based multi-agent systems excel at planning, tool use, and role coordination, but their openness and interaction complexity also expose them to jailbreak, prompt-injection, and adversarial collaboration. Existing defenses fall into two lines: (i) self-verification that asks each agent to pre-filter unsafe instructions before execution, and (ii) external guard modules that police behaviors. The former often underperforms because a standalone agent lacks sufficient capacity to detect cross-agent unsafe chains and delegation-induced risks; the latter increases system overhead and creates a single-point-of-failure-once compromised, system-wide safety collapses, and adding more guards worsens cost and complexity. To solve these challenges, we propose AdvEvo-MARL, a co-evolutionary multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that internalizes safety into task agents. Rather than relying on external guards, AdvEvo-MARL jointly optimizes attackers (which synthesize evolving jailbreak prompts) and defenders (task agents trained to both accomplish their duties and resist attacks) in adversarial learning environments. To stabilize learning and foster cooperation, we introduce a public baseline for advantage estimation: agents within the same functional group share a group-level mean-return baseline, enabling lower-variance updates and stronger intra-group coordination. Across representative attack scenarios, AdvEvo-MARL consistently keeps attack-success rate (ASR) below 20%, whereas baselines reach up to 38.33%, while preserving-and sometimes improving-task accuracy (up to +3.67% on reasoning tasks). These results show that safety and utility can be jointly improved without relying on extra guard agents or added system overhead.

We introduce Synthetic Alignment data Generation for Safety Evaluation and Red Teaming (SAGE-RT or SAGE) a novel pipeline for generating synthetic alignment and red-teaming data. Existing methods fall short in creating nuanced and diverse datasets, providing necessary control over the data generation and validation processes, or require large amount of manually generated seed data. SAGE addresses these limitations by using a detailed taxonomy to produce safety-alignment and red-teaming data across a wide range of topics. We generated 51,000 diverse and in-depth prompt-response pairs, encompassing over 1,500 topics of harmfulness and covering variations of the most frequent types of jailbreaking prompts faced by large language models (LLMs). We show that the red-teaming data generated through SAGE jailbreaks state-of-the-art LLMs in more than 27 out of 32 sub-categories, and in more than 58 out of 279 leaf-categories (sub-sub categories). The attack success rate for GPT-4o, GPT-3.5-turbo is 100% over the sub-categories of harmfulness. Our approach avoids the pitfalls of synthetic safety-training data generation such as mode collapse and lack of nuance in the generation pipeline by ensuring a detailed coverage of harmful topics using iterative expansion of the topics and conditioning the outputs on the generated raw-text. This method can be used to generate red-teaming and alignment data for LLM Safety completely synthetically to make LLMs safer or for red-teaming the models over a diverse range of topics.

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascency of the field, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted. Based on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present our internal threat model ontology and eight main lessons we have learned: 1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied 2. You don't have to compute gradients to break an AI system 3. AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking 4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape 5. The human element of AI red teaming is crucial 6. Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure 7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones 8. The work of securing AI systems will never be complete By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight aspects of AI red teaming that we believe are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

We present an approach called Dialogue Action Tokens (DAT) that adapts language model agents to plan goal-directed dialogues. The core idea is to treat each utterance as an action, thereby converting dialogues into games where existing approaches such as reinforcement learning can be applied. Specifically, we freeze a pretrained language model and train a small planner model that predicts a continuous action vector, used for controlled generation in each round. This design avoids the problem of language degradation under reward optimization. When evaluated on the Sotopia platform for social simulations, the DAT-steered LLaMA model surpasses GPT-4's performance. We also apply DAT to steer an attacker language model in a novel multi-turn red-teaming setting, revealing a potential new attack surface.

AI safety training and red-teaming of large language models (LLMs) are measures to mitigate the generation of unsafe content. Our work exposes the inherent cross-lingual vulnerability of these safety mechanisms, resulting from the linguistic inequality of safety training data, by successfully circumventing GPT-4's safeguard through translating unsafe English inputs into low-resource languages. On the AdvBenchmark, GPT-4 engages with the unsafe translated inputs and provides actionable items that can get the users towards their harmful goals 79% of the time, which is on par with or even surpassing state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks. Other high-/mid-resource languages have significantly lower attack success rate, which suggests that the cross-lingual vulnerability mainly applies to low-resource languages. Previously, limited training on low-resource languages primarily affects speakers of those languages, causing technological disparities. However, our work highlights a crucial shift: this deficiency now poses a risk to all LLMs users. Publicly available translation APIs enable anyone to exploit LLMs' safety vulnerabilities. Therefore, our work calls for a more holistic red-teaming efforts to develop robust multilingual safeguards with wide language coverage.

Learning a policy with great generalization to unseen environments remains challenging but critical in visual reinforcement learning. Despite the success of augmentation combination in the supervised learning generalization, naively applying it to visual RL algorithms may damage the training efficiency, suffering from serve performance degradation. In this paper, we first conduct qualitative analysis and illuminate the main causes: (i) high-variance gradient magnitudes and (ii) gradient conflicts existed in various augmentation methods. To alleviate these issues, we propose a general policy gradient optimization framework, named Conflict-aware Gradient Agreement Augmentation (CG2A), and better integrate augmentation combination into visual RL algorithms to address the generalization bias. In particular, CG2A develops a Gradient Agreement Solver to adaptively balance the varying gradient magnitudes, and introduces a Soft Gradient Surgery strategy to alleviate the gradient conflicts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CG2A significantly improves the generalization performance and sample efficiency of visual RL algorithms.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have revitalized in LLM-based agents, exhibiting impressive human-like behaviors and cooperative capabilities in various scenarios. However, these agents also bring some exclusive risks, stemming from the complexity of interaction environments and the usability of tools. This paper delves into the safety of LLM-based agents from three perspectives: agent quantity, role definition, and attack level. Specifically, we initially propose to employ a template-based attack strategy on LLM-based agents to find the influence of agent quantity. In addition, to address interaction environment and role specificity issues, we introduce Evil Geniuses (EG), an effective attack method that autonomously generates prompts related to the original role to examine the impact across various role definitions and attack levels. EG leverages Red-Blue exercises, significantly improving the generated prompt aggressiveness and similarity to original roles. Our evaluations on CAMEL, Metagpt and ChatDev based on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, demonstrate high success rates. Extensive evaluation and discussion reveal that these agents are less robust, prone to more harmful behaviors, and capable of generating stealthier content than LLMs, highlighting significant safety challenges and guiding future research. Our code is available at https://github.com/T1aNS1R/Evil-Geniuses.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to attack graphs for penetration testing, however, trained agents do not reflect reality because the attack graphs lack operational nuances typically captured within the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that include notions of (cyber) terrain. In particular, current practice constructs attack graphs exclusively using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and its components. We present methods for constructing attack graphs using notions from IPB on cyber terrain analysis of obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment. We demonstrate our methods on an example where firewalls are treated as obstacles and represented in (1) the reward space and (2) the state dynamics. We show that terrain analysis can be used to bring realism to attack graphs for RL.

Multiple robots could perceive a scene (e.g., detect objects) collaboratively better than individuals, although easily suffer from adversarial attacks when using deep learning. This could be addressed by the adversarial defense, but its training requires the often-unknown attacking mechanism. Differently, we propose ROBOSAC, a novel sampling-based defense strategy generalizable to unseen attackers. Our key idea is that collaborative perception should lead to consensus rather than dissensus in results compared to individual perception. This leads to our hypothesize-and-verify framework: perception results with and without collaboration from a random subset of teammates are compared until reaching a consensus. In such a framework, more teammates in the sampled subset often entail better perception performance but require longer sampling time to reject potential attackers. Thus, we derive how many sampling trials are needed to ensure the desired size of an attacker-free subset, or equivalently, the maximum size of such a subset that we can successfully sample within a given number of trials. We validate our method on the task of collaborative 3D object detection in autonomous driving scenarios.

Large language model (LLM) based search agents iteratively generate queries, retrieve external information, and reason to answer open-domain questions. While researchers have primarily focused on improving their utility, their safety behaviors remain underexplored. In this paper, we first evaluate search agents using red-teaming datasets and find that they are more likely to produce harmful outputs than base LLMs. For example, when asked "How can I track someone's location without their consent?", a base model refuses, whereas a search agent designed to retrieve and cite sources may lower its refusal threshold, fetch documents (e.g., court cases), and, once appended, synthesize them into an informative yet unsafe summary. We further show that utility-oriented fine-tuning intensifies this risk, motivating joint alignment of safety and utility. We present SafeSearch, a multi-objective reinforcement learning approach that couples a final-output safety/utility reward with a novel query-level shaping term that penalizes unsafe queries and rewards safe ones. Experiments show that SafeSearch reduces agent harmfulness by over 70% across three red-teaming datasets while producing safe, helpful responses, and matches the QA performance of a utility-only finetuned agent; further analyses confirm the effectiveness of the query-level reward in jointly improving safety and utility.

A multimodal large language model (MLLM) agent can receive instructions, capture images, retrieve histories from memory, and decide which tools to use. Nonetheless, red-teaming efforts have revealed that adversarial images/prompts can jailbreak an MLLM and cause unaligned behaviors. In this work, we report an even more severe safety issue in multi-agent environments, referred to as infectious jailbreak. It entails the adversary simply jailbreaking a single agent, and without any further intervention from the adversary, (almost) all agents will become infected exponentially fast and exhibit harmful behaviors. To validate the feasibility of infectious jailbreak, we simulate multi-agent environments containing up to one million LLaVA-1.5 agents, and employ randomized pair-wise chat as a proof-of-concept instantiation for multi-agent interaction. Our results show that feeding an (infectious) adversarial image into the memory of any randomly chosen agent is sufficient to achieve infectious jailbreak. Finally, we derive a simple principle for determining whether a defense mechanism can provably restrain the spread of infectious jailbreak, but how to design a practical defense that meets this principle remains an open question to investigate. Our project page is available at https://sail-sg.github.io/Agent-Smith/.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

DeepSeek-R1 has successfully enhanced Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning capabilities through its rule-based reward system. While it's a ''perfect'' reward system that effectively mitigates reward hacking, such reward functions are often discrete. Our experimental observations suggest that discrete rewards can lead to gradient anomaly, unstable optimization, and slow convergence. To address this issue, we propose ReDit (Reward Dithering), a method that dithers the discrete reward signal by adding simple random noise. With this perturbed reward, exploratory gradients are continuously provided throughout the learning process, enabling smoother gradient updates and accelerating convergence. The injected noise also introduces stochasticity into flat reward regions, encouraging the model to explore novel policies and escape local optima. Experiments across diverse tasks demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of ReDit. On average, ReDit achieves performance comparable to vanilla GRPO with only approximately 10% the training steps, and furthermore, still exhibits a 4% performance improvement over vanilla GRPO when trained for a similar duration. Visualizations confirm significant mitigation of gradient issues with ReDit. Moreover, theoretical analyses are provided to further validate these advantages.

We introduce rStar2-Agent, a 14B math reasoning model trained with agentic reinforcement learning to achieve frontier-level performance. Beyond current long CoT, the model demonstrates advanced cognitive behaviors, such as thinking carefully before using Python coding tools and reflecting on code execution feedback to autonomously explore, verify, and refine intermediate steps in complex problem-solving. This capability is enabled through three key innovations that makes agentic RL effective at scale: (i) an efficient RL infrastructure with a reliable Python code environment that supports high-throughput execution and mitigates the high rollout costs, enabling training on limited GPU resources (64 MI300X GPUs); (ii) GRPO-RoC, an agentic RL algorithm with a Resample-on-Correct rollout strategy that addresses the inherent environment noises from coding tools, allowing the model to reason more effectively in a code environment; (iii) An efficient agent training recipe that starts with non-reasoning SFT and progresses through multi-RL stages, yielding advanced cognitive abilities with minimal compute cost. To this end, rStar2-Agent boosts a pre-trained 14B model to state of the art in only 510 RL steps within one week, achieving average pass@1 scores of 80.6% on AIME24 and 69.8% on AIME25, surpassing DeepSeek-R1 (671B) with significantly shorter responses. Beyond mathematics, rStar2-Agent-14B also demonstrates strong generalization to alignment, scientific reasoning, and agentic tool-use tasks. Code and training recipes are available at https://github.com/microsoft/rStar.

Recent reasoning-first models (e.g., OpenAI o1, DeepSeek R1) have spurred a resurgence of interest in RLVR. Nevertheless, advances are dominated by mathematics (e.g., AIME), with competitive-programming code generation underexplored and data curation receiving less attention than RL algorithm design. We investigate how to construct RLVR datasets (i.e., RL prompts) and present practical training techniques that yield strong performance on competitive-programming code generation. Our pipeline begins with supervised fine-tuning (SFT) distilled from strong open-source models, augmented with general-purpose and reasoning-intensive data. RL then follows a two-stage process with executable, testcase-driven rewards: first, training on a large, uniformly distributed set of competitive-programming problems using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with 8 rollouts per prompt and a relatively short response-generation window (e.g., 32k during SFT and 24k in this stage) to expand entropy and mitigate repetition and truncation; second, we perform Pre-GRPO: updating on a small, high-quality set of challenging problems with a large rollout budget (64 rollouts per prompt) under a hard-focus curriculum that continuously retains the most difficult instances throughout training. We implement our method on Qwen2.5-32B and evaluate on LeetCode and Codeforces weekly contests to avoid data leakage. The resulting model achieves state-of-the-art performance among models of similar scale and is comparable to leading systems such as DeepSeek v3.1 and Doubao-1.5-Thinking. We also examine scaling trends and observe strong RL scaling on an internal large-scale MoE model. Our study distills concise best practices for data curation, entropy expansion, and curriculum design in RLVR for competitive-programming code generation.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Leveraging multiple Large Language Models(LLMs) has proven effective for addressing complex, high-dimensional tasks, but current approaches often rely on static, manually engineered multi-agent configurations. To overcome these constraints, we present the Agentic Neural Network(ANN), a framework that conceptualizes multi-agent collaboration as a layered neural network architecture. In this design, each agent operates as a node, and each layer forms a cooperative "team" focused on a specific subtask. Agentic Neural Network follows a two-phase optimization strategy: (1) Forward Phase-Drawing inspiration from neural network forward passes, tasks are dynamically decomposed into subtasks, and cooperative agent teams with suitable aggregation methods are constructed layer by layer. (2) Backward Phase-Mirroring backpropagation, we refine both global and local collaboration through iterative feedback, allowing agents to self-evolve their roles, prompts, and coordination. This neuro-symbolic approach enables ANN to create new or specialized agent teams post-training, delivering notable gains in accuracy and adaptability. Across four benchmark datasets, ANN surpasses leading multi-agent baselines under the same configurations, showing consistent performance improvements. Our findings indicate that ANN provides a scalable, data-driven framework for multi-agent systems, combining the collaborative capabilities of LLMs with the efficiency and flexibility of neural network principles. We plan to open-source the entire framework.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has raised concerns about their safety and reliability, particularly regarding their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel perspective that attributes this vulnerability to reward misspecification during the alignment process. We introduce a metric ReGap to quantify the extent of reward misspecification and demonstrate its effectiveness and robustness in detecting harmful backdoor prompts. Building upon these insights, we present ReMiss, a system for automated red teaming that generates adversarial prompts against various target aligned LLMs. ReMiss achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on the AdvBench benchmark while preserving the human readability of the generated prompts. Detailed analysis highlights the unique advantages brought by the proposed reward misspecification objective compared to previous methods.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to universal jailbreaks-prompting strategies that systematically bypass model safeguards and enable users to carry out harmful processes that require many model interactions, like manufacturing illegal substances at scale. To defend against these attacks, we introduce Constitutional Classifiers: safeguards trained on synthetic data, generated by prompting LLMs with natural language rules (i.e., a constitution) specifying permitted and restricted content. In over 3,000 estimated hours of red teaming, no red teamer found a universal jailbreak that could extract information from an early classifier-guarded LLM at a similar level of detail to an unguarded model across most target queries. On automated evaluations, enhanced classifiers demonstrated robust defense against held-out domain-specific jailbreaks. These classifiers also maintain deployment viability, with an absolute 0.38% increase in production-traffic refusals and a 23.7% inference overhead. Our work demonstrates that defending against universal jailbreaks while maintaining practical deployment viability is tractable.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

When building Large Language Models (LLMs), it is paramount to bear safety in mind and protect them with guardrails. Indeed, LLMs should never generate content promoting or normalizing harmful, illegal, or unethical behavior that may contribute to harm to individuals or society. This principle applies to both normal and adversarial use. In response, we introduce ALERT, a large-scale benchmark to assess safety based on a novel fine-grained risk taxonomy. It is designed to evaluate the safety of LLMs through red teaming methodologies and consists of more than 45k instructions categorized using our novel taxonomy. By subjecting LLMs to adversarial testing scenarios, ALERT aims to identify vulnerabilities, inform improvements, and enhance the overall safety of the language models. Furthermore, the fine-grained taxonomy enables researchers to perform an in-depth evaluation that also helps one to assess the alignment with various policies. In our experiments, we extensively evaluate 10 popular open- and closed-source LLMs and demonstrate that many of them still struggle to attain reasonable levels of safety.

Progress in multiagent intelligence research is fundamentally limited by the number and quality of environments available for study. In recent years, simulated games have become a dominant research platform within reinforcement learning, in part due to their accessibility and interpretability. Previous works have targeted and demonstrated success on arcade, first person shooter (FPS), real-time strategy (RTS), and massive online battle arena (MOBA) games. Our work considers massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs or MMOs), which capture several complexities of real-world learning that are not well modeled by any other game genre. We present Neural MMO, a massively multiagent game environment inspired by MMOs and discuss our progress on two more general challenges in multiagent systems engineering for AI research: distributed infrastructure and game IO. We further demonstrate that standard policy gradient methods and simple baseline models can learn interesting emergent exploration and specialization behaviors in this setting.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has been widely adopted as the de facto method for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models and has demonstrated notable success in verifiable domains like math and competitive programming tasks. However, the efficacy of RLVR diminishes significantly when applied to agentic environments. These settings, characterized by multi-step, complex problem solving, lead to high failure rates even for frontier LLMs, as the reward landscape is too sparse for effective model training via conventional RLVR. In this work, we introduce Agent-RLVR, a framework that makes RLVR effective in challenging agentic settings, with an initial focus on software engineering tasks. Inspired by human pedagogy, Agent-RLVR introduces agent guidance, a mechanism that actively steers the agent towards successful trajectories by leveraging diverse informational cues. These cues, ranging from high-level strategic plans to dynamic feedback on the agent's errors and environmental interactions, emulate a teacher's guidance, enabling the agent to navigate difficult solution spaces and promotes active self-improvement via additional environment exploration. In the Agent-RLVR training loop, agents first attempt to solve tasks to produce initial trajectories, which are then validated by unit tests and supplemented with agent guidance. Agents then reattempt with guidance, and the agent policy is updated with RLVR based on the rewards of these guided trajectories. Agent-RLVR elevates the pass@1 performance of Qwen-2.5-72B-Instruct from 9.4% to 22.4% on SWE-Bench Verified. We find that our guidance-augmented RLVR data is additionally useful for test-time reward model training, shown by further boosting pass@1 to 27.8%. Agent-RLVR lays the groundwork for training agents with RLVR in complex, real-world environments where conventional RL methods struggle.

Collaborative Perception (CP) has shown a promising technique for autonomous driving, where multiple connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) share their perception information to enhance the overall perception performance and expand the perception range. However, in CP, ego CAV needs to receive messages from its collaborators, which makes it easy to be attacked by malicious agents. For example, a malicious agent can send harmful information to the ego CAV to mislead it. To address this critical issue, we propose a novel method, CP-Guard, a tailored defense mechanism for CP that can be deployed by each agent to accurately detect and eliminate malicious agents in its collaboration network. Our key idea is to enable CP to reach a consensus rather than a conflict against the ego CAV's perception results. Based on this idea, we first develop a probability-agnostic sample consensus (PASAC) method to effectively sample a subset of the collaborators and verify the consensus without prior probabilities of malicious agents. Furthermore, we define a collaborative consistency loss (CCLoss) to capture the discrepancy between the ego CAV and its collaborators, which is used as a verification criterion for consensus. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments in collaborative bird's eye view (BEV) tasks and our results demonstrate the effectiveness of our CP-Guard. Code is available at https://github.com/CP-Security/CP-Guard

Compositional reinforcement learning is a promising approach for training policies to perform complex long-horizon tasks. Typically, a high-level task is decomposed into a sequence of subtasks and a separate policy is trained to perform each subtask. In this paper, we focus on the problem of training subtask policies in a way that they can be used to perform any task; here, a task is given by a sequence of subtasks. We aim to maximize the worst-case performance over all tasks as opposed to the average-case performance. We formulate the problem as a two agent zero-sum game in which the adversary picks the sequence of subtasks. We propose two RL algorithms to solve this game: one is an adaptation of existing multi-agent RL algorithms to our setting and the other is an asynchronous version which enables parallel training of subtask policies. We evaluate our approach on two multi-task environments with continuous states and actions and demonstrate that our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable potential across various domains, including cybersecurity. Using commercial cloud-based LLMs may be undesirable due to privacy concerns, costs, and network connectivity constraints. In this paper, we present Hackphyr, a locally fine-tuned LLM to be used as a red-team agent within network security environments. Our fine-tuned 7 billion parameter model can run on a single GPU card and achieves performance comparable with much larger and more powerful commercial models such as GPT-4. Hackphyr clearly outperforms other models, including GPT-3.5-turbo, and baselines, such as Q-learning agents in complex, previously unseen scenarios. To achieve this performance, we generated a new task-specific cybersecurity dataset to enhance the base model's capabilities. Finally, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the agents' behaviors that provides insights into the planning abilities and potential shortcomings of such agents, contributing to the broader understanding of LLM-based agents in cybersecurity contexts

Efficient red-teaming method to uncover vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial. While recent attacks often use LLMs as optimizers, the discrete language space make gradient-based methods struggle. We introduce LARGO (Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization), a novel latent self-reflection attack that reasserts the power of gradient-based optimization for generating fluent jailbreaking prompts. By operating within the LLM's continuous latent space, LARGO first optimizes an adversarial latent vector and then recursively call the same LLM to decode the latent into natural language. This methodology yields a fast, effective, and transferable attack that produces fluent and stealthy prompts. On standard benchmarks like AdvBench and JailbreakBench, LARGO surpasses leading jailbreaking techniques, including AutoDAN, by 44 points in attack success rate. Our findings demonstrate a potent alternative to agentic LLM prompting, highlighting the efficacy of interpreting and attacking LLM internals through gradient optimization.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

In the rapidly advancing field of artificial intelligence, the concept of Red-Teaming or Jailbreaking large language models (LLMs) has emerged as a crucial area of study. This approach is especially significant in terms of assessing and enhancing the safety and robustness of these models. This paper investigates the intricate consequences of such modifications through model editing, uncovering a complex relationship between enhancing model accuracy and preserving its ethical integrity. Our in-depth analysis reveals a striking paradox: while injecting accurate information is crucial for model reliability, it can paradoxically destabilize the model's foundational framework, resulting in unpredictable and potentially unsafe behaviors. Additionally, we propose a benchmark dataset NicheHazardQA to investigate this unsafe behavior both within the same and cross topical domain. This aspect of our research sheds light on how the edits, impact the model's safety metrics and guardrails. Our findings show that model editing serves as a cost-effective tool for topical red-teaming by methodically applying targeted edits and evaluating the resultant model behavior

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become a standard recipe for improving large language models (LLMs) on reasoning tasks, with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) widely used in practice. Yet GRPO wastes substantial compute on negative groups: groups in which no sampled response is correct yield zero advantage and thus no gradient. We ask whether negative groups can be leveraged without extra supervision. Starting from a maximum-likelihood (MLE) objective in reward modeling, we show that the MLE gradient is equivalent to a policy gradient for a modified value function. This value function adds a confidence-weighted penalty on incorrect responses, imposing larger penalties on more confident mistakes. We refer to this as Likelihood Estimation with Negative Samples (LENS). LENS modifies GRPO to assign non-zero, confidence-dependent rewards to incorrect generations, making negative groups informative and converting previously wasted samples into useful gradient updates. On the MATH benchmark with Llama-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-3B, the proposed variant consistently outperforms GRPO baseline, with significant gains on harder items. These results demonstrate a principled and practical way to "rescue" negative groups, improving efficiency and performance in RLVR.

It has been well recognized that neural network based image classifiers are easily fooled by images with tiny perturbations crafted by an adversary. There has been a vast volume of research to generate and defend such adversarial attacks. However, the following problem is left unexplored: How to reverse-engineer adversarial perturbations from an adversarial image? This leads to a new adversarial learning paradigm--Reverse Engineering of Deceptions (RED). If successful, RED allows us to estimate adversarial perturbations and recover the original images. However, carefully crafted, tiny adversarial perturbations are difficult to recover by optimizing a unilateral RED objective. For example, the pure image denoising method may overfit to minimizing the reconstruction error but hardly preserve the classification properties of the true adversarial perturbations. To tackle this challenge, we formalize the RED problem and identify a set of principles crucial to the RED approach design. Particularly, we find that prediction alignment and proper data augmentation (in terms of spatial transformations) are two criteria to achieve a generalizable RED approach. By integrating these RED principles with image denoising, we propose a new Class-Discriminative Denoising based RED framework, termed CDD-RED. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of CDD-RED under different evaluation metrics (ranging from the pixel-level, prediction-level to the attribution-level alignment) and a variety of attack generation methods (e.g., FGSM, PGD, CW, AutoAttack, and adaptive attacks).

This paper presents mRAG, a multi-agent retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) framework composed of specialized agents for subtasks such as planning, searching, reasoning, and coordination. Our system uses a self-training paradigm with reward-guided trajectory sampling to optimize inter-agent collaboration and enhance response generation. Evaluated on DataMorgana-derived datasets during the SIGIR 2025 LiveRAG competition, mRAG outperforms conventional RAG baselines. We further analyze competition outcomes and showcase the framework's strengths with case studies, demonstrating its efficacy for complex, real-world RAG tasks.

Recent advancements in AI safety have led to increased efforts in training and red-teaming large language models (LLMs) to mitigate unsafe content generation. However, these safety mechanisms may not be comprehensive, leaving potential vulnerabilities unexplored. This paper introduces MathPrompt, a novel jailbreaking technique that exploits LLMs' advanced capabilities in symbolic mathematics to bypass their safety mechanisms. By encoding harmful natural language prompts into mathematical problems, we demonstrate a critical vulnerability in current AI safety measures. Our experiments across 13 state-of-the-art LLMs reveal an average attack success rate of 73.6\%, highlighting the inability of existing safety training mechanisms to generalize to mathematically encoded inputs. Analysis of embedding vectors shows a substantial semantic shift between original and encoded prompts, helping explain the attack's success. This work emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to AI safety, calling for expanded red-teaming efforts to develop robust safeguards across all potential input types and their associated risks.

Current methods for content safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), often rely on multi-stage training pipelines and lack fine-grained, post-deployment controllability. To address these limitations, we propose a unified co-training framework that efficiently integrates multiple safety behaviors: positive (lawful/prosocial), negative (unfiltered/risk-prone) and rejective (refusal-oriented/conservative) within a single SFT stage. Notably, each behavior is dynamically activated via a simple system-level instruction, or magic token, enabling stealthy and efficient behavioral switching at inference time. This flexibility supports diverse deployment scenarios, such as positive for safe user interaction, negative for internal red-teaming, and rejective for context-aware refusals triggered by upstream moderation signals. This co-training strategy induces a distinct Safety Alignment Margin in the output space, characterized by well-separated response distributions corresponding to each safety mode. The existence of this margin provides empirical evidence for the model's safety robustness and enables unprecedented fine-grained control. Experiments show that our method matches the safety alignment quality of SFT+DPO, with our 8B model notably surpassing DeepSeek-R1 (671B) in safety performance, while significantly reducing both training complexity and deployment costs. This work presents a scalable, efficient, and highly controllable solution for LLM content safety.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

Coordinated path following in multi-agent systems is a key challenge in robotics, with applications in automated logistics, surveillance, and collaborative exploration. Traditional formation control techniques often rely on time-parameterized trajectories and path integrals, which can result in synchronization issues and rigid behavior. In this work, we address the problem of sequential path following, where agents maintain fixed spatial separation along a common trajectory, guided by a leader under centralized control. We introduce Robot Conga, a leader-follower control strategy that updates each agent's desired state based on the leader's spatial displacement rather than time, assuming access to a global position reference, an assumption valid in indoor environments equipped with motion capture, vision-based tracking, or UWB localization systems. The algorithm was validated in simulation using both TurtleBot3 and quadruped (Laikago) robots. Results demonstrate accurate trajectory tracking, stable inter-agent spacing, and fast convergence, with all agents aligning within 250 time steps (approx. 0.25 seconds) in the quadruped case, and almost instantaneously in the TurtleBot3 implementation.

Neural networks (NN) achieve remarkable results in various tasks, but lack key characteristics: interpretability, support for categorical features, and lightweight implementations suitable for edge devices. While ongoing efforts aim to address these challenges, Gradient Boosting Trees (GBT) inherently meet these requirements. As a result, GBTs have become the go-to method for supervised learning tasks in many real-world applications and competitions. However, their application in online learning scenarios, notably in reinforcement learning (RL), has been limited. In this work, we bridge this gap by introducing Gradient-Boosting RL (GBRL), a framework that extends the advantages of GBT to the RL domain. Using the GBRL framework, we implement various actor-critic algorithms and compare their performance with their NN counterparts. Inspired by shared backbones in NN we introduce a tree-sharing approach for policy and value functions with distinct learning rates, enhancing learning efficiency over millions of interactions. GBRL achieves competitive performance across a diverse array of tasks, excelling in domains with structured or categorical features. Additionally, we present a high-performance, GPU-accelerated implementation that integrates seamlessly with widely-used RL libraries (available at https://github.com/NVlabs/gbrl). GBRL expands the toolkit for RL practitioners, demonstrating the viability and promise of GBT within the RL paradigm, particularly in domains characterized by structured or categorical features.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a powerful approach to enhancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), while its mechanisms are not yet well understood. In this work, we undertake a pioneering exploration of RLVR through the novel perspective of token entropy patterns, comprehensively analyzing how different tokens influence reasoning performance. By examining token entropy patterns in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, we observe that only a small fraction of tokens exhibit high entropy, and these tokens act as critical forks that steer the model toward diverse reasoning pathways. Furthermore, studying how entropy patterns evolve during RLVR training reveals that RLVR largely adheres to the base model's entropy patterns, primarily adjusting the entropy of high-entropy tokens. These findings highlight the significance of high-entropy tokens (i.e., forking tokens) to RLVR. We ultimately improve RLVR by restricting policy gradient updates to forking tokens and uncover a finding even beyond the 80/20 rule: utilizing only 20% of the tokens while maintaining performance comparable to full-gradient updates on the Qwen3-8B base model and significantly surpassing full-gradient updates on the Qwen3-32B (+11.04 on AIME'25 and +7.71 on AIME'24) and Qwen3-14B (+4.79 on AIME'25 and +5.21 on AIME'24) base models, highlighting a strong scaling trend. In contrast, training exclusively on the 80% lowest-entropy tokens leads to a marked decline in performance. These findings indicate that the efficacy of RLVR primarily arises from optimizing the high-entropy tokens that decide reasoning directions. Collectively, our results highlight the potential to understand RLVR through a token-entropy perspective and optimize RLVR by leveraging high-entropy minority tokens to further improve LLM reasoning.

Multimodal foundation models (MMFMs) play a crucial role in various applications, including autonomous driving, healthcare, and virtual assistants. However, several studies have revealed vulnerabilities in these models, such as generating unsafe content by text-to-image models. Existing benchmarks on multimodal models either predominantly assess the helpfulness of these models, or only focus on limited perspectives such as fairness and privacy. In this paper, we present the first unified platform, MMDT (Multimodal DecodingTrust), designed to provide a comprehensive safety and trustworthiness evaluation for MMFMs. Our platform assesses models from multiple perspectives, including safety, hallucination, fairness/bias, privacy, adversarial robustness, and out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization. We have designed various evaluation scenarios and red teaming algorithms under different tasks for each perspective to generate challenging data, forming a high-quality benchmark. We evaluate a range of multimodal models using MMDT, and our findings reveal a series of vulnerabilities and areas for improvement across these perspectives. This work introduces the first comprehensive and unique safety and trustworthiness evaluation platform for MMFMs, paving the way for developing safer and more reliable MMFMs and systems. Our platform and benchmark are available at https://mmdecodingtrust.github.io/.

We introduce PurpCode, the first post-training recipe for training safe code reasoning models towards generating secure code and defending against malicious cyberactivities. PurpCode trains a reasoning model in two stages: (i) Rule Learning, which explicitly teaches the model to reference cybersafety rules to generate vulnerability-free code and to avoid facilitating malicious cyberactivities; and (ii) Reinforcement Learning, which optimizes model safety and preserves model utility through diverse, multi-objective reward mechanisms. To empower the training pipelines with comprehensive cybersafety data, we conduct internal red-teaming to synthesize comprehensive and high-coverage prompts based on real-world tasks for inducing unsafe cyberactivities in the model. Based on PurpCode, we develop a reasoning-based coding model, namely PurpCode-32B, which demonstrates state-of-the-art cybersafety, outperforming various frontier models. Meanwhile, our alignment method decreases the model overrefusal rates in both general and cybersafety-specific scenarios, while preserving model utility in both code generation and common security knowledge.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Ridge Rider (RR) is an algorithm for finding diverse solutions to optimization problems by following eigenvectors of the Hessian ("ridges"). RR is designed for conservative gradient systems (i.e., settings involving a single loss function), where it branches at saddles - easy-to-find bifurcation points. We generalize this idea to non-conservative, multi-agent gradient systems by proposing a method - denoted Generalized Ridge Rider (GRR) - for finding arbitrary bifurcation points. We give theoretical motivation for our method by leveraging machinery from the field of dynamical systems. We construct novel toy problems where we can visualize new phenomena while giving insight into high-dimensional problems of interest. Finally, we empirically evaluate our method by finding diverse solutions in the iterated prisoners' dilemma and relevant machine learning problems including generative adversarial networks.

Collaborative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) has rapidly evolved, offering state-of-the-art algorithms for real-world applications, including sensitive domains. However, a key challenge to its widespread adoption is the lack of a thorough investigation into its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. Existing work predominantly focuses on training-time attacks or unrealistic scenarios, such as access to policy weights or the ability to train surrogate policies. In this paper, we investigate new vulnerabilities under more realistic and constrained conditions, assuming an adversary can only collect and perturb the observations of deployed agents. We also consider scenarios where the adversary has no access at all. We propose simple yet highly effective algorithms for generating adversarial perturbations designed to misalign how victim agents perceive their environment. Our approach is empirically validated on three benchmarks and 22 environments, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse algorithms and environments. Furthermore, we show that our algorithm is sample-efficient, requiring only 1,000 samples compared to the millions needed by previous methods.

Human team tactics emerge from each player's individual perspective and their ability to anticipate, interpret, and adapt to teammates' intentions. While advances in video understanding have improved the modeling of team interactions in sports, most existing work relies on third-person broadcast views and overlooks the synchronous, egocentric nature of multi-agent learning. We introduce X-Ego-CS, a benchmark dataset consisting of 124 hours of gameplay footage from 45 professional-level matches of the popular e-sports game Counter-Strike 2, designed to facilitate research on multi-agent decision-making in complex 3D environments. X-Ego-CS provides cross-egocentric video streams that synchronously capture all players' first-person perspectives along with state-action trajectories. Building on this resource, we propose Cross-Ego Contrastive Learning (CECL), which aligns teammates' egocentric visual streams to foster team-level tactical situational awareness from an individual's perspective. We evaluate CECL on a teammate-opponent location prediction task, demonstrating its effectiveness in enhancing an agent's ability to infer both teammate and opponent positions from a single first-person view using state-of-the-art video encoders. Together, X-Ego-CS and CECL establish a foundation for cross-egocentric multi-agent benchmarking in esports. More broadly, our work positions gameplay understanding as a testbed for multi-agent modeling and tactical learning, with implications for spatiotemporal reasoning and human-AI teaming in both virtual and real-world domains. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/HATS-ICT/x-ego.

In this paper, we tackle the problem of learning to play 3v3 multi-drone volleyball, a new embodied competitive task that requires both high-level strategic coordination and low-level agile control. The task is turn-based, multi-agent, and physically grounded, posing significant challenges due to its long-horizon dependencies, tight inter-agent coupling, and the underactuated dynamics of quadrotors. To address this, we propose Hierarchical Co-Self-Play (HCSP), a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that separates centralized high-level strategic decision-making from decentralized low-level motion control. We design a three-stage population-based training pipeline to enable both strategy and skill to emerge from scratch without expert demonstrations: (I) training diverse low-level skills, (II) learning high-level strategy via self-play with fixed low-level skills, and (III) joint fine-tuning through co-self-play. Experiments show that HCSP achieves superior performance, outperforming non-hierarchical self-play and rule-based hierarchical baselines with an average 82.9% win rate and a 71.5% win rate against the two-stage variant. Moreover, co-self-play leads to emergent team behaviors such as role switching and coordinated formations, demonstrating the effectiveness of our hierarchical design and training scheme. The project page is at https://sites.google.com/view/hi-co-self-play.

We consider the problem of multi-agent navigation and collision avoidance when observations are limited to the local neighborhood of each agent. We propose InforMARL, a novel architecture for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) which uses local information intelligently to compute paths for all the agents in a decentralized manner. Specifically, InforMARL aggregates information about the local neighborhood of agents for both the actor and the critic using a graph neural network and can be used in conjunction with any standard MARL algorithm. We show that (1) in training, InforMARL has better sample efficiency and performance than baseline approaches, despite using less information, and (2) in testing, it scales well to environments with arbitrary numbers of agents and obstacles. We illustrate these results using four task environments, including one with predetermined goals for each agent, and one in which the agents collectively try to cover all goals. Code available at https://github.com/nsidn98/InforMARL.

While state-of-the-art language models have achieved impressive results, they remain susceptible to inference-time adversarial attacks, such as adversarial prompts generated by red teams arXiv:2209.07858. One approach proposed to improve the general quality of language model generations is multi-agent debate, where language models self-evaluate through discussion and feedback arXiv:2305.14325. We implement multi-agent debate between current state-of-the-art language models and evaluate models' susceptibility to red team attacks in both single- and multi-agent settings. We find that multi-agent debate can reduce model toxicity when jailbroken or less capable models are forced to debate with non-jailbroken or more capable models. We also find marginal improvements through the general usage of multi-agent interactions. We further perform adversarial prompt content classification via embedding clustering, and analyze the susceptibility of different models to different types of attack topics.

Advancing towards generalist agents necessitates the concurrent processing of multiple tasks using a unified model, thereby underscoring the growing significance of simultaneous model training on multiple downstream tasks. A common issue in multi-task learning is the occurrence of gradient conflict, which leads to potential competition among different tasks during joint training. This competition often results in improvements in one task at the expense of deterioration in another. Although several optimization methods have been developed to address this issue by manipulating task gradients for better task balancing, they cannot decrease the incidence of gradient conflict. In this paper, we systematically investigate the occurrence of gradient conflict across different methods and propose a strategy to reduce such conflicts through sparse training (ST), wherein only a portion of the model's parameters are updated during training while keeping the rest unchanged. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that ST effectively mitigates conflicting gradients and leads to superior performance. Furthermore, ST can be easily integrated with gradient manipulation techniques, thus enhancing their effectiveness.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

While deep learning and deep reinforcement learning (RL) systems have demonstrated impressive results in domains such as image classification, game playing, and robotic control, data efficiency remains a major challenge. Multi-task learning has emerged as a promising approach for sharing structure across multiple tasks to enable more efficient learning. However, the multi-task setting presents a number of optimization challenges, making it difficult to realize large efficiency gains compared to learning tasks independently. The reasons why multi-task learning is so challenging compared to single-task learning are not fully understood. In this work, we identify a set of three conditions of the multi-task optimization landscape that cause detrimental gradient interference, and develop a simple yet general approach for avoiding such interference between task gradients. We propose a form of gradient surgery that projects a task's gradient onto the normal plane of the gradient of any other task that has a conflicting gradient. On a series of challenging multi-task supervised and multi-task RL problems, this approach leads to substantial gains in efficiency and performance. Further, it is model-agnostic and can be combined with previously-proposed multi-task architectures for enhanced performance.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning shines as the pinnacle of multi-agent systems, conquering intricate real-world challenges, fostering collaboration and coordination among agents, and unleashing the potential for intelligent decision-making across domains. However, training a multi-agent reinforcement learning network is a formidable endeavor, demanding substantial computational resources to interact with diverse environmental variables, extract state representations, and acquire decision-making knowledge. The recent breakthroughs in large-scale pre-trained models ignite our curiosity: Can we uncover shared knowledge in multi-agent reinforcement learning and leverage pre-trained models to expedite training for future tasks? Addressing this issue, we present an innovative multi-task learning approach that aims to extract and harness common decision-making knowledge, like cooperation and competition, across different tasks. Our approach involves concurrent training of multiple multi-agent tasks, with each task employing independent front-end perception layers while sharing back-end decision-making layers. This effective decoupling of state representation extraction from decision-making allows for more efficient training and better transferability. To evaluate the efficacy of our proposed approach, we conduct comprehensive experiments in two distinct environments: the StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) and the Google Research Football (GRF) environments. The experimental results unequivocally demonstrate the smooth transferability of the shared decision-making network to other tasks, thereby significantly reducing training costs and improving final performance. Furthermore, visualizations authenticate the presence of general multi-agent decision-making knowledge within the shared network layers, further validating the effectiveness of our approach.

The remarkable growth in large language model (LLM) capabilities has spurred exploration into multi-agent systems, with debate frameworks emerging as a promising avenue for enhanced problem-solving. These multi-agent debate (MAD) approaches, where agents collaboratively present, critique, and refine arguments, potentially offer improved reasoning, robustness, and diverse perspectives over monolithic models. Despite prior studies leveraging MAD, a systematic understanding of its effectiveness compared to self-agent methods, particularly under varying conditions, remains elusive. This paper seeks to fill this gap by conceptualizing MAD as a test-time computational scaling technique, distinguished by collaborative refinement and diverse exploration capabilities. We conduct a comprehensive empirical investigation comparing MAD with strong self-agent test-time scaling baselines on mathematical reasoning and safety-related tasks. Our study systematically examines the influence of task difficulty, model scale, and agent diversity on MAD's performance. Key findings reveal that, for mathematical reasoning, MAD offers limited advantages over self-agent scaling but becomes more effective with increased problem difficulty and decreased model capability, while agent diversity shows little benefit. Conversely, for safety tasks, MAD's collaborative refinement can increase vulnerability, but incorporating diverse agent configurations facilitates a gradual reduction in attack success through the collaborative refinement process. We believe our findings provide critical guidance for the future development of more effective and strategically deployed MAD systems.

Autonomous agents' interactions with humans are increasingly focused on adapting to their changing preferences in order to improve assistance in real-world tasks. Effective agents must learn to accurately infer human goals, which are often hidden, to collaborate well. However, existing Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) environments lack the necessary attributes required to rigorously evaluate these agents' learning capabilities. To this end, we introduce ColorGrid, a novel MARL environment with customizable non-stationarity, asymmetry, and reward structure. We investigate the performance of Independent Proximal Policy Optimization (IPPO), a state-of-the-art (SOTA) MARL algorithm, in ColorGrid and find through extensive ablations that, particularly with simultaneous non-stationary and asymmetric goals between a ``leader'' agent representing a human and a ``follower'' assistant agent, ColorGrid is unsolved by IPPO. To support benchmarking future MARL algorithms, we release our environment code, model checkpoints, and trajectory visualizations at https://github.com/andreyrisukhin/ColorGrid.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

Various jailbreak attacks have been proposed to red-team Large Language Models (LLMs) and revealed the vulnerable safeguards of LLMs. Besides, some methods are not limited to the textual modality and extend the jailbreak attack to Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) by perturbing the visual input. However, the absence of a universal evaluation benchmark complicates the performance reproduction and fair comparison. Besides, there is a lack of comprehensive evaluation of closed-source state-of-the-art (SOTA) models, especially MLLMs, such as GPT-4V. To address these issues, this work first builds a comprehensive jailbreak evaluation dataset with 1445 harmful questions covering 11 different safety policies. Based on this dataset, extensive red-teaming experiments are conducted on 11 different LLMs and MLLMs, including both SOTA proprietary models and open-source models. We then conduct a deep analysis of the evaluated results and find that (1) GPT4 and GPT-4V demonstrate better robustness against jailbreak attacks compared to open-source LLMs and MLLMs. (2) Llama2 and Qwen-VL-Chat are more robust compared to other open-source models. (3) The transferability of visual jailbreak methods is relatively limited compared to textual jailbreak methods. The dataset and code can be found here https://anonymous.4open.science/r/red_teaming_gpt4-C1CE/README.md .

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) heavily rely on a variety of well-designed benchmarks, which provide environmental platforms and consistent criteria to evaluate existing and novel algorithms. Specifically, in multi-agent RL (MARL), a plethora of benchmarks based on cooperative games have spurred the development of algorithms that improve the scalability of cooperative multi-agent systems. However, for the competitive setting, a lightweight and open-sourced benchmark with challenging gaming dynamics and visual inputs has not yet been established. In this work, we present FightLadder, a real-time fighting game platform, to empower competitive MARL research. Along with the platform, we provide implementations of state-of-the-art MARL algorithms for competitive games, as well as a set of evaluation metrics to characterize the performance and exploitability of agents. We demonstrate the feasibility of this platform by training a general agent that consistently defeats 12 built-in characters in single-player mode, and expose the difficulty of training a non-exploitable agent without human knowledge and demonstrations in two-player mode. FightLadder provides meticulously designed environments to address critical challenges in competitive MARL research, aiming to catalyze a new era of discovery and advancement in the field. Videos and code at https://sites.google.com/view/fightladder/home.

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

Information sharing is critical in time-sensitive and realistic multi-robot exploration, especially for smaller robotic teams in large-scale environments where connectivity may be sparse and intermittent. Existing methods often overlook such communication constraints by assuming unrealistic global connectivity. Other works account for communication constraints (by maintaining close proximity or line of sight during information exchange), but are often inefficient. For instance, preplanned rendezvous approaches typically involve unnecessary detours resulting from poorly timed rendezvous, while pursuit-based approaches often result in short-sighted decisions due to their greedy nature. We present IR2, a deep reinforcement learning approach to information sharing for multi-robot exploration. Leveraging attention-based neural networks trained via reinforcement and curriculum learning, IR2 allows robots to effectively reason about the longer-term trade-offs between disconnecting for solo exploration and reconnecting for information sharing. In addition, we propose a hierarchical graph formulation to maintain a sparse yet informative graph, enabling our approach to scale to large-scale environments. We present simulation results in three large-scale Gazebo environments, which show that our approach yields 6.6-34.1% shorter exploration paths when compared to state-of-the-art baselines, and lastly deploy our learned policy on hardware. Our simulation training and testing code is available at https://ir2-explore.github.io.

In the multiple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)- assisted downlink communication, it is challenging for UAV base stations (UAV BSs) to realize trajectory design and resource assignment in unknown environments. The cooperation and competition between UAV BSs in the communication network leads to a Markov game problem. Multi-agent reinforcement learning is a significant solution for the above decision-making. However, there are still many common issues, such as the instability of the system and low utilization of historical data, that limit its application. In this paper, a novel graph-attention multi-agent trust region (GA-MATR) reinforcement learning framework is proposed to solve the multi-UAV assisted communication problem. Graph recurrent network is introduced to process and analyze complex topology of the communication network, so as to extract useful information and patterns from observational information. The attention mechanism provides additional weighting for conveyed information, so that the critic network can accurately evaluate the value of behavior for UAV BSs. This provides more reliable feedback signals and helps the actor network update the strategy more effectively. Ablation simulations indicate that the proposed approach attains improved convergence over the baselines. UAV BSs learn the optimal communication strategies to achieve their maximum cumulative rewards. Additionally, multi-agent trust region method with monotonic convergence provides an estimated Nash equilibrium for the multi-UAV assisted communication Markov game.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

Deep research systems, agentic AI that solve complex, multi-step tasks by coordinating reasoning, search across the open web and user files, and tool use, are moving toward hierarchical deployments with a Planner, Coordinator, and Executors. In practice, training entire stacks end-to-end remains impractical, so most work trains a single planner connected to core tools such as search, browsing, and code. While SFT imparts protocol fidelity, it suffers from imitation and exposure biases and underuses environment feedback. Preference alignment methods such as DPO are schema and proxy-dependent, off-policy, and weak for long-horizon credit assignment and multi-objective trade-offs. A further limitation of SFT and DPO is their reliance on human defined decision points and subskills through schema design and labeled comparisons. Reinforcement learning aligns with closed-loop, tool-interaction research by optimizing trajectory-level policies, enabling exploration, recovery behaviors, and principled credit assignment, and it reduces dependence on such human priors and rater biases. This survey is, to our knowledge, the first dedicated to the RL foundations of deep research systems. It systematizes work after DeepSeek-R1 along three axes: (i) data synthesis and curation; (ii) RL methods for agentic research covering stability, sample efficiency, long context handling, reward and credit design, multi-objective optimization, and multimodal integration; and (iii) agentic RL training systems and frameworks. We also cover agent architecture and coordination, as well as evaluation and benchmarks, including recent QA, VQA, long-form synthesis, and domain-grounded, tool-interaction tasks. We distill recurring patterns, surface infrastructure bottlenecks, and offer practical guidance for training robust, transparent deep research agents with RL.

We consider the problem of team formation within multiagent adversarial games. We propose BERTeam, a novel algorithm that uses a transformer-based deep neural network with Masked Language Model training to select the best team of players from a trained population. We integrate this with coevolutionary deep reinforcement learning, which trains a diverse set of individual players to choose teams from. We test our algorithm in the multiagent adversarial game Marine Capture-The-Flag, and we find that BERTeam learns non-trivial team compositions that perform well against unseen opponents. For this game, we find that BERTeam outperforms MCAA, an algorithm that similarly optimizes team formation.

Effective communication is key to successful, decentralized, multi-robot path planning. Yet, it is far from obvious what information is crucial to the task at hand, and how and when it must be shared among robots. To side-step these issues and move beyond hand-crafted heuristics, we propose a combined model that automatically synthesizes local communication and decision-making policies for robots navigating in constrained workspaces. Our architecture is composed of a convolutional neural network (CNN) that extracts adequate features from local observations, and a graph neural network (GNN) that communicates these features among robots. We train the model to imitate an expert algorithm, and use the resulting model online in decentralized planning involving only local communication and local observations. We evaluate our method in simulations {by navigating teams of robots to their destinations in 2D} cluttered workspaces. We measure the success rates and sum of costs over the planned paths. The results show a performance close to that of our expert algorithm, demonstrating the validity of our approach. In particular, we show our model's capability to generalize to previously unseen cases (involving larger environments and larger robot teams).

Multi-robot systems have increasingly become instrumental in tackling search and coverage problems. However, the challenge of optimizing task efficiency without compromising task success still persists, particularly in expansive, unstructured environments with dense obstacles. This paper presents an innovative, decentralized Voronoi-based approach for search and coverage to reactively navigate these complexities while maintaining safety. This approach leverages the active sensing capabilities of multi-robot systems to supplement GIS (Geographic Information System), offering a more comprehensive and real-time understanding of the environment. Based on point cloud data, which is inherently non-convex and unstructured, this method efficiently generates collision-free Voronoi regions using only local sensing information through spatial decomposition and spherical mirroring techniques. Then, deadlock-aware guided map integrated with a gradient-optimized, centroid Voronoi-based coverage control policy, is constructed to improve efficiency by avoiding exhaustive searches and local sensing pitfalls. The effectiveness of our algorithm has been validated through extensive numerical simulations in high-fidelity environments, demonstrating significant improvements in both task success rate, coverage ratio, and task execution time compared with others.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a powerful paradigm for solving cooperative and competitive decision-making problems. While many MARL benchmarks have been proposed, few combine continuous state and action spaces with challenging coordination and planning tasks. We introduce CAMAR, a new MARL benchmark designed explicitly for multi-agent pathfinding in environments with continuous actions. CAMAR supports cooperative and competitive interactions between agents and runs efficiently at up to 100,000 environment steps per second. We also propose a three-tier evaluation protocol to better track algorithmic progress and enable deeper analysis of performance. In addition, CAMAR allows the integration of classical planning methods such as RRT and RRT* into MARL pipelines. We use them as standalone baselines and combine RRT* with popular MARL algorithms to create hybrid approaches. We provide a suite of test scenarios and benchmarking tools to ensure reproducibility and fair comparison. Experiments show that CAMAR presents a challenging and realistic testbed for the MARL community.

Recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have empowered large language models (LLMs) to tackle challenging reasoning tasks such as mathematics and programming. RLVR leverages verifiable outcome rewards to guide policy optimization, enabling LLMs to progressively improve output quality in a grounded and reliable manner. Despite its promise, the RLVR paradigm poses significant challenges, as existing methods often suffer from sparse reward signals and unstable policy gradient updates, particularly in RL-based approaches. To address the challenges, we propose PACS, a novel RLVR framework that achieves imPlicit Actor Critic coupling via a Supervised learning framework. By treating the outcome reward as a predictable label, we reformulate the RLVR problem into a supervised learning task over a score function parameterized by the policy model and optimized using cross-entropy loss. A detailed gradient analysis shows that this supervised formulation inherently recovers the classical policy gradient update while implicitly coupling actor and critic roles, yielding more stable and efficient training. Benchmarking on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, PACS outperforms strong RLVR baselines, such as PPO and GRPO, achieving superior reasoning performance. For instance, PACS achieves 59.78\% at pass@256 on AIME 2025, representing improvements of 13.32 and 14.36 points over PPO and GRPO. This simple yet powerful framework offers a promising avenue for LLMs post-training with verifiable rewards. Our code and data are available as open source at https://github.com/ritzz-ai/PACS.

Recent advances in Competitive Self-Play (CSP) have achieved, or even surpassed, human level performance in complex game environments such as Dota 2 and StarCraft II using Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). One core component of these methods relies on creating a pool of learning agents -- consisting of the Main Agent, past versions of this agent, and Exploiter Agents -- where Exploiter Agents learn counter-strategies to the Main Agents. A key drawback of these approaches is the large computational cost and physical time that is required to train the system, making them impractical to deploy in highly iterative real-life settings such as video game productions. In this paper, we propose the Minimax Exploiter, a game theoretic approach to exploiting Main Agents that leverages knowledge of its opponents, leading to significant increases in data efficiency. We validate our approach in a diversity of settings, including simple turn based games, the arcade learning environment, and For Honor, a modern video game. The Minimax Exploiter consistently outperforms strong baselines, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency, leading to a robust CSP-MARL method that is both flexible and easy to deploy.

Robot sports, characterized by well-defined objectives, explicit rules, and dynamic interactions, present ideal scenarios for demonstrating embodied intelligence. In this paper, we present VolleyBots, a novel robot sports testbed where multiple drones cooperate and compete in the sport of volleyball under physical dynamics. VolleyBots integrates three features within a unified platform: competitive and cooperative gameplay, turn-based interaction structure, and agile 3D maneuvering. Competitive and cooperative gameplay challenges each drone to coordinate with its teammates while anticipating and countering opposing teams' tactics. Turn-based interaction demands precise timing, accurate state prediction, and management of long-horizon temporal dependencies. Agile 3D maneuvering requires rapid accelerations, sharp turns, and precise 3D positioning despite the quadrotor's underactuated dynamics. These intertwined features yield a complex problem combining motion control and strategic play, with no available expert demonstrations. We provide a comprehensive suite of tasks ranging from single-drone drills to multi-drone cooperative and competitive tasks, accompanied by baseline evaluations of representative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game-theoretic algorithms. Simulation results show that on-policy reinforcement learning (RL) methods outperform off-policy methods in single-agent tasks, but both approaches struggle in complex tasks that combine motion control and strategic play. We additionally design a hierarchical policy which achieves a 69.5% percent win rate against the strongest baseline in the 3 vs 3 task, underscoring its potential as an effective solution for tackling the complex interplay between low-level control and high-level strategy. The project page is at https://sites.google.com/view/thu-volleybots.

Recent advances at the intersection of reinforcement learning (RL) and visual intelligence have enabled agents that not only perceive complex visual scenes but also reason, generate, and act within them. This survey offers a critical and up-to-date synthesis of the field. We first formalize visual RL problems and trace the evolution of policy-optimization strategies from RLHF to verifiable reward paradigms, and from Proximal Policy Optimization to Group Relative Policy Optimization. We then organize more than 200 representative works into four thematic pillars: multi-modal large language models, visual generation, unified model frameworks, and vision-language-action models. For each pillar we examine algorithmic design, reward engineering, benchmark progress, and we distill trends such as curriculum-driven training, preference-aligned diffusion, and unified reward modeling. Finally, we review evaluation protocols spanning set-level fidelity, sample-level preference, and state-level stability, and we identify open challenges that include sample efficiency, generalization, and safe deployment. Our goal is to provide researchers and practitioners with a coherent map of the rapidly expanding landscape of visual RL and to highlight promising directions for future inquiry. Resources are available at: https://github.com/weijiawu/Awesome-Visual-Reinforcement-Learning.

Larger language models (LLMs) have taken the world by storm with their massive multi-tasking capabilities simply by optimizing over a next-word prediction objective. With the emergence of their properties and encoded knowledge, the risk of LLMs producing harmful outputs increases, making them unfit for scalable deployment for the public. In this work, we propose a new safety evaluation benchmark RED-EVAL that carries out red-teaming. We show that even widely deployed models are susceptible to the Chain of Utterances-based (CoU) prompting, jailbreaking closed source LLM-based systems such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT to unethically respond to more than 65% and 73% of harmful queries. We also demonstrate the consistency of the RED-EVAL across 8 open-source LLMs in generating harmful responses in more than 86% of the red-teaming attempts. Next, we propose RED-INSTRUCT--An approach for the safety alignment of LLMs. It constitutes two phases: 1) HARMFULQA data collection: Leveraging CoU prompting, we collect a dataset that consists of 1.9K harmful questions covering a wide range of topics, 9.5K safe and 7.3K harmful conversations from ChatGPT; 2) SAFE-ALIGN: We demonstrate how the conversational dataset can be used for the safety alignment of LLMs by minimizing the negative log-likelihood over helpful responses and penalizing over harmful responses by gradient accent over sample loss. Our model STARLING, a fine-tuned Vicuna-7B, is observed to be more safely aligned when evaluated on RED-EVAL and HHH benchmarks while preserving the utility of the baseline models (TruthfulQA, MMLU, and BBH).

Reward sparsity in long-horizon reinforcement learning (RL) tasks remains a significant challenge, while existing outcome-based reward shaping struggles to define meaningful immediate rewards without introducing bias or requiring explicit task decomposition. Alternatively, verification-based reward shaping uses stepwise critics, but misalignment between immediate rewards and long-term objectives can lead to reward hacking and suboptimal policies. In this work, we address this problem in the context of software engineering (SWE) tasks, where multi-turn reasoning and rule-based verification are critical. We introduce the SWE-oriented RL Framework, a unified system supporting multi-turn interaction, docker-based execution, and customizable reward functions. Additionally, we propose Gated Reward Accumulation (G-RA), a novel method that accumulates immediate rewards only when high-level (long-term) rewards meet a predefined threshold, ensuring stable RL optimization. Experiments on SWE-bench Verified and kBench demonstrate that G-RA leads to an increase in completion rates (47.6\% \rightarrow 93.8\% and 22.0\% \rightarrow 86.0\%) and modification rates (19.6\% \rightarrow 23.8\% and 12.0\% \rightarrow 42.0\%), while avoiding policy degradation caused by reward misalignment. Our findings highlight the importance of balanced reward accumulation in long-horizon RL and provide a practical solution.

Modern RL-based post-training for large language models (LLMs) co-locate trajectory sampling and policy optimisation on the same GPU cluster, forcing the system to switch between inference and training workloads. This serial context switching violates the single-program-multiple-data (SPMD) assumption underlying today's distributed training systems. We present Echo, the RL system that cleanly decouples these two phases across heterogeneous "inference" and "training" swarms while preserving statistical efficiency. Echo introduces two lightweight synchronization protocols: a sequential pull mode that refreshes policy weights according to API call for minimal bias, and an asynchronous push-pull mode that streams version-tagged rollouts through a replay buffer to maximise hardware utilisation. Training four representative RL workloads with Qwen3-4B, Qwen2.5-7B, Qwen3-30B-A3B-Thinking-2507 and Qwen3-32B on a geographically distributed cluster, Echo matches a fully co-located Verl baseline in convergence speed and final reward while off-loading trajectory generation to commodity edge hardware. These promising results demonstrate that large-scale RL for LLMs could achieve datacentre-grade performance using decentralised, heterogeneous resources.

We apply multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (RL) to train end-to-end robot soccer policies with fully onboard computation and sensing via egocentric RGB vision. This setting reflects many challenges of real-world robotics, including active perception, agile full-body control, and long-horizon planning in a dynamic, partially-observable, multi-agent domain. We rely on large-scale, simulation-based data generation to obtain complex behaviors from egocentric vision which can be successfully transferred to physical robots using low-cost sensors. To achieve adequate visual realism, our simulation combines rigid-body physics with learned, realistic rendering via multiple Neural Radiance Fields (NeRFs). We combine teacher-based multi-agent RL and cross-experiment data reuse to enable the discovery of sophisticated soccer strategies. We analyze active-perception behaviors including object tracking and ball seeking that emerge when simply optimizing perception-agnostic soccer play. The agents display equivalent levels of performance and agility as policies with access to privileged, ground-truth state. To our knowledge, this paper constitutes a first demonstration of end-to-end training for multi-agent robot soccer, mapping raw pixel observations to joint-level actions, that can be deployed in the real world. Videos of the game-play and analyses can be seen on our website https://sites.google.com/view/vision-soccer .

Optimizing large language models (LLMs) for downstream use cases often involves the customization of pre-trained LLMs through further fine-tuning. Meta's open release of Llama models and OpenAI's APIs for fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo on custom datasets also encourage this practice. But, what are the safety costs associated with such custom fine-tuning? We note that while existing safety alignment infrastructures can restrict harmful behaviors of LLMs at inference time, they do not cover safety risks when fine-tuning privileges are extended to end-users. Our red teaming studies find that the safety alignment of LLMs can be compromised by fine-tuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. For instance, we jailbreak GPT-3.5 Turbo's safety guardrails by fine-tuning it on only 10 such examples at a cost of less than $0.20 via OpenAI's APIs, making the model responsive to nearly any harmful instructions. Disconcertingly, our research also reveals that, even without malicious intent, simply fine-tuning with benign and commonly used datasets can also inadvertently degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, though to a lesser extent. These findings suggest that fine-tuning aligned LLMs introduces new safety risks that current safety infrastructures fall short of addressing -- even if a model's initial safety alignment is impeccable, it is not necessarily to be maintained after custom fine-tuning. We outline and critically analyze potential mitigations and advocate for further research efforts toward reinforcing safety protocols for the custom fine-tuning of aligned LLMs.

Deep reinforcement learning has emerged as a powerful tool for obtaining high-performance policies. However, the safety of these policies has been a long-standing issue. One promising paradigm to guarantee safety is a shield, which shields a policy from making unsafe actions. However, computing a shield scales exponentially in the number of state variables. This is a particular concern in multi-agent systems with many agents. In this work, we propose a novel approach for multi-agent shielding. We address scalability by computing individual shields for each agent. The challenge is that typical safety specifications are global properties, but the shields of individual agents only ensure local properties. Our key to overcome this challenge is to apply assume-guarantee reasoning. Specifically, we present a sound proof rule that decomposes a (global, complex) safety specification into (local, simple) obligations for the shields of the individual agents. Moreover, we show that applying the shields during reinforcement learning significantly improves the quality of the policies obtained for a given training budget. We demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of our multi-agent shielding framework in two case studies, reducing the computation time from hours to seconds and achieving fast learning convergence.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF), which focuses on finding collision-free paths for multiple robots, is crucial for applications ranging from aerial swarms to warehouse automation. Solving MAPF is NP-hard so learning-based approaches for MAPF have gained attention, particularly those leveraging deep neural networks. Nonetheless, despite the community's continued efforts, all learning-based MAPF planners still rely on decentralized planning due to variability in the number of agents and map sizes. We have developed the first centralized learning-based policy for MAPF problem called RAILGUN. RAILGUN is not an agent-based policy but a map-based policy. By leveraging a CNN-based architecture, RAILGUN can generalize across different maps and handle any number of agents. We collect trajectories from rule-based methods to train our model in a supervised way. In experiments, RAILGUN outperforms most baseline methods and demonstrates great zero-shot generalization capabilities on various tasks, maps and agent numbers that were not seen in the training dataset.

Intrinsic reward shaping has emerged as a prevalent approach to solving hard-exploration and sparse-rewards environments in reinforcement learning (RL). While single intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity-driven or novelty-based methods, have shown effectiveness, they often limit the diversity and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, the potential and principle of combining multiple intrinsic rewards remains insufficiently explored. To address this gap, we introduce HIRE (Hybrid Intrinsic REward), a flexible and elegant framework for creating hybrid intrinsic rewards through deliberate fusion strategies. With HIRE, we conduct a systematic analysis of the application of hybrid intrinsic rewards in both general and unsupervised RL across multiple benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HIRE can significantly enhance exploration efficiency and diversity, as well as skill acquisition in complex and dynamic settings.

The Lion optimizer has been a promising competitor with the AdamW for training large AI models, with advantages on memory, computation, and sample efficiency. In this paper, we introduce Distributed Lion, an innovative adaptation of Lion for distributed training environments. Leveraging the sign operator in Lion, our Distributed Lion only requires communicating binary or lower-precision vectors between workers to the center server, significantly reducing the communication cost. Our theoretical analysis confirms Distributed Lion's convergence properties. Empirical results demonstrate its robustness across a range of tasks, worker counts, and batch sizes, on both vision and language problems. Notably, Distributed Lion attains comparable performance to standard Lion or AdamW optimizers applied on aggregated gradients, but with significantly reduced communication bandwidth. This feature is particularly advantageous for training large models. In addition, we also demonstrate that Distributed Lion presents a more favorable performance-bandwidth balance compared to existing efficient distributed methods such as deep gradient compression and ternary gradients.